Why did it take like 250 years for someone to come along and say "dude you can have both kinds of knowledge at the same...

Ecclesiastes

it's another "some dumb anglo reads a translation of Kant" episode

No. Kant firmly believes in the objective existence of things in themselves. He just says that we don't perceive them directly but THROUGH the senses. It doesn't make them less real.
Since we can only think of objects in the form of thoughts if objects were given to us directly they would have to be given to us in the form of thoughts i.e. not through the senses. Kant rejects that sort of absolute idealism.
This is the opposite of distrusting the senses.

>This is the opposite of distrusting the senses.

Hardly.

In what way?

He clearly distrusts his senses but deem total idealism as absurd. I mean it means that the only thing real is ourselves.

Although synchronicity is scary.

>He clearly distrusts his senses
It's not clear for me. Explain in detail how itr is clear for you.
>it means that the only thing real is ourselves
What in the world are you blabbering on about?

(Somebody else posted this: )

>In what way?

For the first time in philosophical history, Kant proposed a distinction between the object of sense perception (the noumenon, the "thing in itself"),* and the thing as it appears to the senses (the phenomenon).

This distinction necessarily rests on a radical distrust of human sense perception; absent this distrust, there would be no need to draw such a distinction.

*The parenthetical remark turns on whether one regards the "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous; some do, some don't. See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon#Noumenon_and_the_thing-in-itself

But either way you slice it, aa radical distrust of human sense perception remains central to Kant's thinking. It follows from this that Kant's philosophy "traps each of us within the contents of our own mind and cuts us off from reality."

>it's another "Kant restates dualism" treatise

sigh

>absent this distrust, there would be no need to draw such a distinction.
The distinction is necessary because the object and the way we think of it are qualitatively different or do you believe them to be qualitatively the same?
Is out thought of the object the object?
Do you believe thought is something material that can exists independently outside of yourself or do you believe that the object is purely transcendental? If not, how do you reconcile that without the help of appearances and what does distrust have to do with it? Again, I see nothing that inherently implies distrust.
Explain in detail why the distinction implies distrust.

I think fair answers to your questions are implicit in the remarks I've already made. If not, so be it; I don't wish to engage in a Socratic dialogue. I'm going to finish watching a movie now, and then get something to eat. By the experience of seeing my food, eating it, tasting it, and digesting it, I thus refute Kant's skepticism. I thus heal the divide between the noumenon and the phenomenon. I bring the two together and make them one, although they were never really divided in the first place other than in Kant's autistic imaginings.

Go to bed Ayn Rand

That's the meanest thing anybody has ever said to me.

>I think fair answers to your questions are implicit in the remarks I've already made.
They are not.
If you didn't understand my post you could have just said so. Have a nice time.
Bye.

>If you didn't understand my post you could have just said so.

It wasn't a question of not understanding your posts; you posited fair questions - good, well-thought-out questions - and I responded, to the initial ones, to the limit of my interest in the subject, that's all.

The only answer you have given me is that you believe that the distinction between phenomena and noumena is made necessary by distrust of the senses but no explanation of why you would believe that.
I explained to why the distinction between phenomena and noumena is necessary and that I don't see how it implies distrust of the senses.

If you are not interested in philosophy that's fine. It's not everyone's calling.

Also I advice you to not rely on secondary sources or at least, when you do, to try not to speak as if you have any authority.

>I explained to why the distinction between phenomena and noumena is necessary

You took a stab at it.

>and that I don't see how it implies distrust of the senses.

That's what you said, and I explained why, and still contend, that your position is flatly contrary to Kant's obvious skepticism about sense perception.

But this is perhaps not surprising. Given that Kant's position is contrary and seemingly oblivious to common sense, it follows that someone who accepts Kant's wrongheaded distinctions would be similarly oblivious.

>I explained why
You did not.
>Kant's obvious skepticism
It is not obvious to me.

>You did not.

Sed contra. See :

>This distinction necessarily rests on a radical distrust of human sense perception; absent this distrust, there would be no need to draw such a distinction.

Put the bit after the semicolon in italics.

See:
>The only answer you have given me is that you believe that the distinction between phenomena and noumena is made necessary by distrust of the senses but no explanation of why you would believe that.
Put the bit after "but" in italics.

Aye, there's the rub.

I don't think you've answered my objections, and you don't think I've answered yours.

Also, I don't think this:
>is made necessary by distrust of the senses
is a fair paraphrase of my remarks.

It does not follow from the fact that the distinction he draws between the thing itself and the appearance of the thing necessarily implies that he distrusts the evidence of the senses that Kant's distinction is *made necessary* by distrust of the senses. The former doesn't necessarily follow from the latter; it only follows in Kant's case because of his misguided philosophical autism.

He is saying you can't trust your senses to determine what things are in themselves but that all you have are your senses. Basically, having an opinion.

>I don't think you've answered my objections
You haven't made any objections, just ungrounded allegations.

>The former doesn't necessarily follow from the latter
So much the worse. Then you've answered my question even less than you claim you have.

>it only follows in Kant's case because of his misguided philosophical autism.
What case? What autism? By what logic did you deduce that Kant distrusts the senses?

Also learn the meaning of the word "necessarily" and how to use it correctly.

>He is saying you can't trust your senses

Cf. your earlier remark :

>I don't see how it implies distrust of the senses.

In you admit what you denied in , which in any case is so obvious I don't know why you denied it in the first place, although you did.

You're rather snotty and something of a dissembler. It is not an attractive combination. That's the final truth I'll leave you with.

You can't always get what you want, etc.

Piffle and nonsense.

I'm not that guy you weirdo. Anyway, yes I'm saying Kant said that you can't trust your senses to determine the objectivity of things around us. This is also a big difference from saying he said that you should distrust your senses which implies that you completely ignore all your perceptions.

What is going on in this thread?

is not
>I don't see how it implies distrust of the senses(me)

Also learn how to quote.
Fucking retard.

>you can't trust your senses to determine the objectivity of things around us
>you can't trust your senses to determine what things are in themselves
Aren't those different things?
Things in themselves are by definition something we cannot perceive by the senses so it's not a matter of trusting or not trusting your senses on them. Senses give you no data about them at all in the first place so there is nothing to trust or distrust.
Noumena are concepts that the understanding creates according to the principle of causality to contain the object that has acted upon the senses to generate a representation.
On the other hand objectivity is whether the object (or rather our concept of it?) meets the formal criteria of truth or something along those lines.

In any case sensory data is generated according to very strict a priori rules and is physiologically impossible to distrust.