Is Hegelianism necessarily deterministic...

Is Hegelianism necessarily deterministic? Does there always have to be an endgoal of history and only one path leading up to it? Are there any thinkers who built on Hegel's conception of historical progress and did not end up with a teleological view of human history?

>removing teleology from Hegel
You've gone beyond madness my dude. Also nobody said anything about one path.

>Is Hegelianism necessarily deterministic?
Yeah
>Are there any thinkers who built on Hegel's conception of historical progress and did not end up with a teleological view of human history?
Yeah, but that's not Hegelianism

>Also nobody said anything about one path.
Isn't that implied though?

>Yeah, but that's not Hegelianism
Could you point me to some of them regardless?

I literally had the same insight as Hegel when I was like ten years old. Guy is a worthless shit

Yeah lots. Hegel is ambiguous about the "end of history," despite conventional interpretations and some gnomic pronouncements during lectures. Many people read Hegel as an open-ended history of the life of Spirit, particularly modern metaphysical pragmatists.

Hegel's philosophy of history is a lot more subtle and nuanced than a simple deterministic schema. It allows for slides and lapses, ahistorical or incompletely historical monadic cultures, and all kinds of self-talk within the self-understanding of a given spiritual formation. All that is really "determined" is the progressive aspect - the notion that movement is movement forward (or backward, in the case of lapses or catastrophes).

This doesn't even necessarily imply linear stadial progression. Plug it into a Heideggerian ontology and you have the following: a historically "thrown" (Geworfen) Spirit which understands itself by reflecting on itself. Reflection necessarily leads to rationalisation and consolidation, so the Spirit "ascends" (Aufheben, "sublates") its pre-reflective moments in ever higher and more critical moments, if it is progressing at all. Not to progress is not to move; it is only to move in brownian motion, and therefore either to be static or to lapse. Even "lapsing" need not be stadial and unidirectional - it only needs to suppose a decrease in critical reflexivity.

Nowhere in this schematic is the possibility of "other Spirits" forbidden. In that, it is more Heideggerian and Herderian than Hegelian, but it is certainly Hegelian - and the extent to which the *Rationality* (Vernunft) of self-reflexivity, as opposed to merely existential or Nietzschean self-reflexivity, is emphasised, would make it more or less Hegelian. But all of these are Hegelian (and Herderian) in any case; both Nietzsche's existential authenticity toward metaphysics and the possibility of knowledge and Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein are forms of Hegelian (thereby also Kantian) Reason, even if they are attempts at rebellions against it. Foucault once said that no matter how we attempt to escape Hegel, there he is waiting for us again.

The extent to which an appropriation of Hegel is properly Hegelian is maybe easier to understand by an analogy to Kant: If one is thoroughly Kantian in all the relevant epistemological, and hell, even moral-practical senses, but rejects the Critique of Judgment as an attempt to avoid the historicity of sensus communis, does that make one "not a Kantian?" Because pretty much everyone does that.

Again, the extent to which you want to emphasise transparent Rationality would make it more or less obviously Hegelian. And doing this in any extreme way is pretty unpopular these days. Martin Jay wrote a book very recently called "Reason After its Eclipse," which I think is a prospectus for rehabilitating a vital vision of Vernunft after a century or more of its being out of vogue.

Foucault owes a massive debt to Hegel's dialectic, and is exactly what you're looking for

>Guy writes a book about how human history is a process of the use of free will resulting in a more perfect world created by the voluntary use of the rational faculties
>"Gaiz is he a determinist?"

Hegel's understanding of free will is really fucking wiggly though. It's like, free in its absolute subjectivity, but to properly self-actualise it has to insert itself into unfree, contingent particularity, imposing itself to maximise the "freedom" collectively for Spirit, which becomes oddly synonymous with "Reason."

So you get a freedom that is completely absolute, but meaningless unless it interacts with contingency (okay so far..), but it is only interesting insofar as it COLLECTIVELY realises RATIONALITY. Same problem as with Schelling - where is the individual life dignified, where is expressive particularity celebrated in that?

You can find ways to do it, but there are arguments that Schelling/Hegel are indifferent to freedom, and especially that Hegel resurrects the Greek idea of agency, where for a perfectly "good" and "knowledgeable" mind, there is only one proper course of action in any situation. If that's true of Hegel (not even saying it is necessarily, but it's one reading), then he allows for individual particularity on a political plane, in that every individual dude gets his own little zone of particularity to carve out and make his own, but Hegel doesn't really metaphysically dignify expressive freedom in the deepest romantic sense.

I don't see what's hard to understand about that. I really don't. It's only confusing because you phrased it like an idiot.

>Could you point me to some of them regardless?

Brandom, Pippin, Pinkard are good starting places for the "recent" Hegel revival. So is Marcuse. Also look into Charles Taylor's book on Hegel as a starting point, as it is ultimately critical of Hegel.

Also check out a book called French Hegel, on Hegel's reception in France (surprisingly). Much more ambiguous and eclectic readings there, but still extremely influential and well-wrought - shows how Hegelian you can be without being a systematic Hegelian at all.

It's not "hard," it's wiggly. As in, difficult to pin down to a single plausible interpretation that satisfies anybody. Understandably, a pre-Pauline "free will" that isn't really "free" at all, if Hegel is advocating such, is unsatisfying to many.

So, this is the power of starting with the greeks

>metaphysical pragmatism

>wiggly
That's a stupid term and you ought to be ashamed.

In the sense that some kind of radical/transcendental empiricism is a rejection of conventional subject-object dualism.

You're just grasping at worms here at this point.

No, I'm not--You type like you're trying to entertain people and it's embarrassing.

Mah dood

Muthafuck your favorite style of writing

I don't have a favorite style of writing, but whatever you call your style is certainly embarrassing. Almost tumblr, even.

It's not hard to imagine a tree of branching paths instead of a straight line and the specific branches are chosen depending on the conditions of the time.

>Are there any thinkers who built on Hegel's conception of historical progress and did not end up with a teleological view of human history?

literally Adorno's negative dialectics.

>someone makes an actually informative post
>pseuds immediately feel bad that they can't do the same and start shitting on the style

You're the reason why Veeky Forums is shit.

>Someone has a faggy style of writing
>gets called out for it
>OMG WHY CANT WR ALL BE FRIENDS
This isn't your hugbox

I was gonna disagree with you, then I read OP's cringy vocab choices. Christ.

How does any one make the leap from the dialectic being *descriptive* to the dialectic being *predictive*?

LOL You can't understand Hegel in english translation.

ahh but french translations! those are proper

>muh translation

Does Hegel's philosophy imply that society should be ruled by a totalitarian state?

No

Absolutely yes

then prove it faggot

>totalitarian
That retarded buzzword needs to die.

I don't know what that means.

The one good thing about Veeky Forums is that you can be idiosyncratic and still post whatever you want. You don't have to fit what you want to say into someone else's strictures, or bite your tongue until you feel like you're an expert on a topic, etc.

I'm doing a PhD in Philosophy at an Ivy so I'm OK. I figured the other guy was trolling so I stopped replying.

No, that's generally considered a misconception.

Say that to my face, faggot

The only thing worse than a phil grad student is an Ivy Leaguer who doesn't know that he's retarded

Freedom is to actualize my necessity. To confused indeterminism with freedom is to think that chance—any and all chance as such—is >my< freedom. But my freedom is not chance at such, or any chance at all, but rather my becoming what I essentially am. The freedom of a plant is to actualize itself as plant. The freedom of a cat is to be and live as a cat. The freedom of a human being is near absolute, since the essence of the human being is freedom as such. Humans, as spirits, can actualize virtually anything, can choose to be virtually anything, can choose to do virtually anything—and when we can't it's just a matter of time before we do. We engage the material and life processes of other things at our will with the knowledge of their essence. Our imagination is limitless given the right mediums and degrees of freedom. We can live our life as anything (traps), and work as anything we can think of more or less. With the onset of virtual reality, pinpoint genetic human crafting, and even post-biological existence we will be just slightly short of the ideal of gods both internally and externally. History is the necessary movements we had to make to advance our knowledge and living of freedom, our learning and growing up to comprehend what freedom really is.

The end of history is the end of new meta-systems with the arising of THE true logical meta-system. This does not mean new ideas shall not arise, rather, it means that nothing metaphysically new shall arise in these conceptions, they will only be repetitions of the older fundamental structures. We are always living at the end of history in that our present is the constant end at which history has reached, but the end of logical history is simply one of grand systems. Hegel sees his philosophy as the last one in that its method is the one to which all philosophy and true inquiry must lead. Regarding any present as a 'final form' of history itself, however, is not what Hegel thinks. He's actually a bit humble and thinks there is a possibility of different absolute end points, but we can't know these other end points in that they don't yet exist for us to know them.

He sees obvious and severe problems with his world, just as we see them now, and thinks there is still progress to be made. This progress, however, is for him already locked with modernity. There shall be no more grand world system shifts like that of feudalism to capitalism, where a whole way of life and worldview was abandoned. For Hegel our future will be one that includes the present structures in some form since he sees them as positive forms of freedom which we won't give up once they become the norm, no one shall want to retreat to less freedom. Capitalism, for hegel, is a rational system of freedom which simply is incomplete and lacks the other logical components that will restrain it, thus his system of Right includes orders of society above which logically constrain capitalism away from an absolute position.