Is this guy for real?

>[Even a] fool, when he hears of … a being than which nothing greater can be conceived … understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding.… And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.… Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

>God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.… And [God] assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

You literally don't get it my man.
He's saying that if you think God doesn't exist then you aren't thinking of God at all, because if you were, it would be clear that he cannot possibly not exist.
I know it's hard lol, only the elect can get this shit.

This post is both the truth and the highest form of comedy.

Congrats user on being so based.

>I can think of him, therefore he's real. If you think he's not real, you aren't thinking of him. Woah

name one error in this argument

The guy's not a fucking logician he's just telling you how it is lol.

He's correct, though. If you conceive of God such that it is possible that God doesn't exist, then you are not conceiving of God.

>Because I said so
>If in an identical judgement I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arises a contradiction, and hence I say that the former belongs to the latter necessarily. But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction, because there is nothing left that could be contradicted. To posit a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is contradictory; but there is no contradiction at all in rejecting the triangle along with its three angles. The same applies to the concept of an absolutely necessary being. Remove its existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible.
And
>Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, and of certain determinations in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and omnipotence. The small word is is not an additional predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates … and say, God is, or, There is a God, I do not add a new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates.
From the critique of pure reason

It seems like Anselm's argument would apply against some type of agnostic position. If you choose to conceive of God, then it is necessary that he exist, there is no "maybe" or possibility. He either is or he isn't.

>If you choose to conceive of God, then it is necessary that he exist
I don't understand the jump from something being conceivable (and conceived) to its existence.

I'm talking about mental conception. Per Anselm, God cannot be conceived as a thing which exists only in the mind or which may possibly not exist; he can only be conceived as a thing which exists in a reality and cannot possibly not exist. Of course you can simply reject the entire thing, but if you are conceiving of God as something which "may not exist" then you aren't conceiving of God.

Ah, I see. Thanks. Still, it doesn't make too much sense.

While the ontological argument Anselm gave is incorrect, Kant doesn't tackle his version at all (he deals with Descartes, who did a different thing) because never did engage with the primary versions of any argument that predated Descartes outside the stoics, whom he loved.
Never take Kant seriously on his criticism of scholasticim- he literally never read any.

Can you point out to what Kant gets wrong?

Well, consider the first part of what Anselm is saying. God is a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived". That part is the key. If we conceive of such a being in our minds, something we should ask would be whether that being simply exists as a concept in our mind or whether it is something that truly exists in reality. But this question has bearing on our conception of the being. For which one of those states is greater? Is it greater for the being to only exist in our mind or is it greater if it actually exists in reality? It is of course greater if it exists in reality. So, if we conceive of a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived" but conceive that it only exists in our mind, then it is not a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived" because we can conceive of a greater being, i.e. one that exists in reality. So in order for us to actually conceive of a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived" we must conceive of a being that exists in reality and not just our mind. The same applies to whether it is possible that the being does not exist, or whether it is impossible that the being does not exist.

Based calvinist, for once.

>It is of course greater if it exists in reality.
I don't see any reason at all to believe this

Hmm, a being that existed only in the mind would be the subject of the thinker. If forgotten, if the thinker expired, the being would cease to exist. It would have a dependent existence. Really, it seems that the thinker would be the greater being in such a case.

When I took Phil 101 we analyzed this argument, basically the idiot making it is defining god into existence without actually showing that god can be defined as existing
so it can't be a correct argument because you have to know god exists before you can make it, and the point of the argument is to show that god exists, so...

k prove god doesn't exist

We need to define greater. Does it mean eternality? Does it mean omnipotence? To me, it seems a temporary existence doesn't mean being less great. I can conceive of an entity that does a number of deeds surpassing any God you can think of, both faster and better deeds, and despite its temporary nature, such an entity would seem greater than an external entity

> Really, it seems that the thinker would be the greater being in such a case.
Completely unfounded. If I had a world encompassing tree growing from my mind, would that indicate I was the greater being ?

Anselm was the og presuppositionalist

greatness in and of itself is not an objective quality of things

>We need to define greater.
How about, "lack of subjection to things external to oneself?" God is subject to nothing; e.g. human thought, time, contingency, etc.

>God is subject to nothing; e.g. human thought, time, contingency, etc.
logic?

Is logic external to God?

The argument is based in the idea that once you know the essence of a thing it must necessarily exist because only things that exists have essences. The argument is wrong because nobody knows the essence of God, but if it were to be known, it would be certain that he exists. This is prior to that based in the philosophy of being, aka things that have existence, but exist as something, meaning they have an essence. Kant is operating within a different ontological system.

Didn't Aquinas debunk this argument so thoroughly that people were surprised when Descartes took it back up?

Remind me of this:

>Total presence breaks on the univocal predication of the exterior absolute the absolute existent (of that of which it is not possible to univocally predicate an outside, while the equivocal predication of the outside of the absolute exterior is possible of that of which the reality so predicated is not the reality, viz., of the dark/of the self, the identity of which is not outside the absolute identity of the outside, which is to say that the equivocal predication of identity is possible of the self-identity which is not identity, while identity is univocally predicated of the limit to the darkness, of the limit of the reality of the self). This is the real exteriority of the absolute outside: the reality of the absolutely unconditioned absolute outside univocally predicated of the dark: the light univocally predicated of the darkness: the shining of the light univocally predicated of the limit of the darkness: actuality univocally predicated of the other of self-identity: existence univocally predicated of the absolutely unconditioned other of the self. The precision of the shining of the light breaking the dark is the other-identity of the light. The precision of the absolutely minimum transcendence of the dark is the light itself/the absolutely unconditioned exteriority of existence for the first time/the absolutely facial identity of existence/the proportion of the new creation sans depth/the light itself ex nihilo: the dark itself univocally identified, i.e., not self-identity identity itself equivocally, not the dark itself equivocally, in “self-alienation,” not “self-identity, itself in self-alienation” “released” in and by “otherness,” and “actual other,” “itself,” not the abysmal inversion of the light, the reality of the darkness equivocally, absolute identity equivocally predicated of the self/selfhood equivocally predicated of the dark (the reality of this darkness the other-self-covering of identity which is the identification person-self).

*needs a slap on the penis

>Great God in Boots!—the ontological argument is sound!

>just choose this weird definition which makes my argument correct even though it leads to an entity that is not omnipotent and not omniscient yet actually existing being classified as greater than an omniscient, omnipotent entity existing only in someone's mind
And Christians are very wont to say God has an unchanging nature, without God himself saying so, so in their theology God is subject to the thoughts of man

Probably, logic is part of the world. Otherwise, your bordering on pantheistic heresy