Soc.And that which has to be named has to be named withsomething?
Her.True.
Soc.What is that with which we pierce?
Her.An awl.
Soc.And with which we weave?
Her.A shuttle.
Soc.And with which we name?
Her.A name.
Soc.Very good: then a name is an instrument?
Her.Certainly.
Soc.Suppose that I ask, "What sort of instrument is a shuttle?"And you answer, "A weaving instrument."
Her.Well.
Soc.And I ask again, "What do we do when we weave?"- Theanswer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from thewoof.
Her.Very true.
Soc.And may not a similar description be given of an awl,and of instruments in general?
Her.To be sure.
Soc.And now suppose that I ask a similar question aboutnames: will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what dowe do when we name?
Her.I cannot say.
Soc.Do we not give information to one another, and distinguishthings according to their natures?
Her.Certainly we do.
Soc.Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishingnatures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of theweb.
Her.Yes.
Soc.And the shuttle is the instrument of theweaver?
Her.Assuredly.
Soc.Then the weaver will use the shuttle well- and wellmeans like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well- and well meanslike a teacher?
Her.Yes.
Soc.And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work willhe be using well?
Her.That of the carpenter.
Soc.And is every man a carpenter, or the skilledonly?
Her.Only the skilled.
Soc.And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work willhe be using well?
Her.That of the smith.
Soc.And is every man a smith, or only theskilled?
Her.The skilled only.
Soc.And when the teacher uses the name, whose work willhe be using?
Her.There again I am puzzled.
Soc.Cannot you at least say who gives us the names whichwe use?
Her.Indeed I cannot.
Soc.Does not the law seem to you to give usthem?
Her.Yes, I suppose so.
(continued below)
What would Wittgenstein say about this passage from Plato's Cratylus?
Soc.Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses thework of the legislator?
Her.I agree.
Soc.And is every man a legislator, or the skilledonly?
Her.The skilled only.
Soc.Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name,but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilledartisans in the world is the rarest.
Her.True.
Soc.And how does the legislator make names? and to whatdoes he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: towhat does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look tothat which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
Her.Certainly.
Soc.And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, willhe make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the formaccording to which he made the other?
Her.To the latter, I should imagine.
Soc.Might not that be justly called the true or idealshuttle?
Her.I think so.
What is he getting at, this passage is very uncontextual... is he trying to hint that there are ideal names and words? Was he not aware that other cultures existed with different languages that sound completely different?
Wittgenstein was wrong about language. So it doesn't matter what he thought.
the passage is just describing the concept of a platonic ideal I believe
Can you elaborate?
It seemed like it was saying:
Some things are tools. Awl. Shuttle.
And for the tools to work, any layman cannot just make them, and expect them to work well.
Words are a tool, (for what, a tool for what, is the interesting aspect and idea... labeling, organizing things, being able to direct things.... meaning??)
Not anyone can just make words, like not anyone can just make an awl or shuttle.
He seems to be suggesting that 'special' crafty artisan folks are in charge of designing language: so that it can successfully be used as a tool, to weave understanding.
I didnt know legislators were in charge of constructing the language back then:
But I guess even now they make up new word with lawyer speak and what not.
The thing with wittgenstein is:
Creating words, to then describe things that cannot be seen. Ideas. And then using words and ideas of things that cannot be seen, to describe those words and ideas.. and getting far away from actual tangible referable referenceable provable showable things and get lost in a foggy maze of semantics and arbitrary man made tautologies and definitions, and then thinking that one knows something about Truth and Reality by dancing around in their maze of letters.
language is a tool that we can use to work on other people. this is obviously not its only function, but it is a major one. a person particularly skilled in handling language, as a tool, will be particularly capable of crafting other humans.
Wittgenstein would have said we gain nothing by calling a name an "instrument". In the same way, we gain nothing by changing all of our definitions to the form of "x signifies y."
He would have suggested that a name is like a tool, but only in that it has various uses. (Think of all the uses of a hammer.)
> Does he not look tothat which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
Her.Certainly.
Soc.And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, willhe make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the formaccording to which he made the other?
Her.To the latter, I should imagine.
Soc.Might not that be justly called the true or idealshuttle?
Is he trying to suggest: The Wordcreator looks to some ideal source to create words? Ideal words?
Obvious they are limited by the sounds the mouth can make. And obviously, asians, germans, balticians, jews, arabs dutch, excluded would choose easier mouth noises as compared to the extreme ends of possible mouth noises for extents of time:
So the limits of the 'ideal' of words is established by the limits of the sounds of mouth.
bumps
bump bunny
braamp
Don't do that thing where you imitate the style.
bump
This argument is typical of Plato, it works from the implied premise of a necessary skilled creator of all things. Wittgenstein asks the rhetorical question, what information does a name itself convey? None. It is only informative in the context of a proposition. A name outside of a proposition is an empty sign. The act of naming, then, is only difficult in that one must conceive a name that doesn't overlap with others such that vague propositions are not generated. Take the confusion and multiplicity of meaning in the word "ego" as an example of what we do not want to happen in language. This definitely requires practice, but the analogy to carpenters is disingenuous because each person constructs systems of signifiers whenever they think in language. It's a skill we all use, misuse, and abuse, whether we like to admit this, or are very practiced in it
No he cant
Heres why:
Define cat using words/symbols.
Now define all the the words/symbols you used to define cat.
Rinse and repeat this recursive trick forever; you will find that no matter how hard you try, you cannot figure out the precise-concrete-crystal clear definition of what a cat is
This is Wittgensteins' main point. Our language, our symbols are never the things themselves, and so must be defined by using other symbols. (which must be defined using other symbols... etc)
The reason why Wittgenstein made an autistic fuss over his insight is because he claimed that philosophy up to this point has been talking in semantical circles for the most part
To say Wittgenstein is wrong about language is to have never read Wittgenstein
Nietzsche said the same thing way before W. What a hack
>Rinse and repeat this recursive trick forever; you will find that no matter how hard you try, you cannot figure out the precise-concrete-crystal clear definition of what a cat is
>This is Wittgensteins' main point.
But this is only what Wittgenstein thought, he did not know this, and as far as I know he did not attempt to absolutely go through the process of 'proverbially perfectly defining a cat'.
He just said, seemingly according to your post: It cant be done..because... I think it cant be done... because it seems like it wouldnt be able to be done...
but he is saying that from a limited and admittedly ignorant position.
But yes, in a sense, it may get to, eventually: some incompleteness therom like thing where, we couldnt know if we actually had all the 100% information that defines a cat, we wouldn't know when we are complete...maybe:
So I guess that is his point, at least partly, is we 1) cant know when we have all the required understanding and qualities and info related to Cat.
2) What do we entirely use for reference to Know that the qualities and info and terms and styles we use to compose our total understand of Cat, are absolute accurate and 'objectively', meaningful and accurate to some: what(?) true universal concept Truth of Cat?
If God existed and made Cat, would God even know everything there is about Cat? Could God know? What would let God know he knew everything there was to know about it?
What signifies complete knowledge and understanding?
What defines the meaning of Complete, complete knowledge and understanding?
yer both pretty off base
to the point where it would be too difficult to correct your position from where you currently stand
probably best to end it
Read J.L. Austin you brainlet.
this is what an xbox playing monster drinking pimple wearing highschooler troll would say to try to elicit a response while having no actual knowledge on the subject themselves.