Dumb question but

The noumenal universe is not separate from the phenomenal universe—the one in which is derived experience or empiricism--but are one in the same if, and only if, matter is determined to be made up of spacetime itself. If on the subatomic level, quarks turn out to be made up of strings which are just aberrations of spacetime caused by the presence of minuscule dimensions, then all human cognition, all things we experience are not dissimilar from all other inanimate objects because we both are fundamentally the same thing: aberrations of spacetime. All a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge could no longer be distinguished from each other. If this is the case, wouldn't metaphysics forever be destroyed?

Other urls found in this thread:

epochemagazine.org/the-thing-in-itself-a-problem-child-28bbcc505430
en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon#Schopenhauer's_critique
twitter.com/NSFWRedditVideo

You're mistaken in what noumena is. Sub-atomic particles right down to strings are still phenomenon. Noumena if it is anything at all is defined simply negatively by Kant as that which MAY be the case and which is not phenomenon
Spacetime in this regard is irrelevant in the terms in which you bring it up

Did you know that the Kants stem from Jews?
That's right. The Jews.

Are you, by any chance, a virgin?? ? ?

Explain further, my espresso high is coming down

Sure but you need to be specific

If all things are the same, consciousness, thought, and emotion aren't anything but phenomenal but are equally noumenal as well? I think that's what OP is trying to say but that doesn't make sense either

First, stop posting. Then read physics. Then read Kant.

Stick to nihilist memes on Facebook m8. You're too retarded for this.

No, the noumenal is not (an) other (universe), it's what lies beyond the current year limit to our understanding of the universe, it is the unknown from which new knowns are brought to our understanding (i.e. yay, more phenomena that explain more!) after each new discovery and paradigm shift. Sapere aude.

Consciousness is still a mystery and possibly noumenal, as is the origin of matter. In either case in a completely materialist world its not that these things are noumenal, rather there simply is no noumena

You're totally incorrect, noumena is something which is transcendentally inaccessible to sensory experience

>Consciousness is still a mystery and possibly noumenal, as is the origin of matter.
Nope

...

If that were the case the thing in itself couldn't affect you. Kant is no metaphysical idealist, he is merely an epistemological idealist.

consciousness is still a mystery i don’t agree with the rest, if you disagree I am truly sorry

>If that were the case the thing in itself couldn't affect you

Of course it could. For instance if we take consciousness as an example, obviously that affects us even though we can not empirically determine it. Another example would be the first cause.
These things COULD be transcendentally indeterminable and yet define our very existence.
Note. Before some aspie fedora squeels at me I emphasize I'm speaking in mere hypothetical

epochemagazine.org/the-thing-in-itself-a-problem-child-28bbcc505430

Read this to get up to date with what the noumenon/thing-in-itself problem is about op.

Consciousness is not a mystery, it's the product of living in hyperreality. Man invented media which in turn created man, as it evolves it evolves the mind. Read some fucking McLuhan

This is a big boy thread, fuck off you silly pseud

Pomosexual

>obviously that affects us even though we can not empirically determine it
Then it's not obvious.

>if we take consciousness as an example
...we have no mathematical model that ends the debate over muh free will and other issues in the philosophy of mind, for so much remains outside our knowledge.

>Another example would be the first cause.
With Kant's conclusion being for you to STFU about prima causa as if it was a thing.

>Before some aspie fedora squeels at me I emphasize I'm speaking in mere hypothetical
With Kant being the aspie feodra who wants you to shut up and stay on your little island of knowledge.

i haven't read Kant in a while but it seems to me that his epistemological arguments are going to stay mostly the same regardless of what empirical account you give for the existence of physical things.

>If that were the case the thing in itself couldn't affect you.

I think the point is that we can't know the effect as the effect of the thing in itself. whether or not the thing in itself affects you is - it seems to me - precisely the kind of thing that is transcendentally inaccessible to sensory experience.

We can know it's an appearance (or whatever other effect) of the thing in itself because the intellect puts the sensory information together.

The work and experience of the mind doesn't stop at the retina, the transcendental unity of apperception provides the ability to synthetize knowledge from different sources.

In other words, we see 2D surfaces but experience 3D things.

>With Kant being the aspie feodra who wants you to shut up and stay on your little island of knowledge

For good reason

But that's still a distinct mode of knowing from sensory experience, right?

>With Kant being the aspie feodra who wants you to shut up and stay on your little island of knowledge.

For good reason

Nobody on Veeky Forums has a problem with the Jews.

t. Hegel

There is no sensory EXPERIENCE that can be magically detached from the workings of the intellect. No mind, no experience.

In case you didn't notice, the job of Kant is not the divorce lawyer of empiricism and rationalism.

the noumenal universe is wholly irrelevant because if it does exist, we can never know it

We can actually, we just can't prove it

This.

Bennet's Kant's Analytic really helped in the way of elucidating "boundary concept" and nthe negative sense. We can't speak of noumena properly, per se. By making the sound noumena, we're refering to some broader cognition (understanding in the genereal sense iirc) that just so happens to account for our capcity for things like logic and inference. So really noumena is just more of a particle or something that just so happens to have major metaphysical implications, none of whixh we can properly speak about aside from just saying, "hey look here's what we know about phenomena, and there's all this stuff not known about it that entails such and such." Even "entails" here is a bit strong.

Idk the specific but i think the contemporary equivalent would be some specialized branch of a priori epistemology, which itself is already whack.

One really sees how Schopenhaur had the reaction to this that he did.

It’s hysterically funny to so easily be able to spot the difference between people who genuinely read Kant and people who read about Kant on Veeky Forums.

If only it was as easy with all authors

>If on the subatomic level, quarks turn out to be made up of strings which are just aberrations of spacetime caused by the presence of minuscule dimensions

Stopped reading right here. Get off the pop-sci and you won't end up confused. You talk about "quarks" and "strings" as if they're established entities that exist in reality, when nobody has ever observed any such thing. They are mathematical values used to predict the results of measurements. Yeah, we do experiments and we *something*, but that something can be used to fit any model we construct, not just the Standard Model, and will almost certainly be replaced in the future. Don't mistake physics for ontology

>observe *something*

Your assumptions make you just as stupid as him. You have zero reason to assume the current model is subject to change

There are actually many reasons to assume the model is subject to change. That's how the scientific method works. Nothing is ever proven in science and certainly not the Standard Model. The only way what you're saying might be right is if physics was complete and nobody thinks that. Conceptual issues in quantum mechanics and actual mathematical problems in relativity make it not just likely but certain that the model will change. You're like a Newtonian resisting the notion that classical mechanic's inconsistency in predicting Mercury's orbit doesn't portend serious changes in the scientific consensus.

Well that was some fun research. The person pictured is not Mr. Rosenthal, it was his boss a US Senator (Rosenthal was a 29 year old kid with a jew fro). That poster was made two years after Rosenthal's death and after the person who made it supposedly interviewed him. Also, if the white race needs such pedantic use of highlighting and underlining to understand the contents of that poster, it deserves to die out.

Read the preface and the transcendental aesthetic in CPR and you'll understand why your question does not make any sense. It's way more understandable than the rest of the book and outlines the goals and ideas of te critique pretty good

Honestly I recommend the Phenomena and Noumena section to the inquiring mind. I think one could blaze through the TA by just reading the intro and his space/time proofs, and then rolling to P+N and figure out the rest of the network.

But then again nothing quitw beata slogging through 300 pages just to find out that world is appearances ft. some really cool preconditions/epistemic rules

Christ no, why the fuck would you do that. You're an imbecile

What the fuck is this all about?

Kant's metaphysics and epistemology, duh.

Fuck you retard.
If you can't figure out P+N by yourself you're a brainlet.

Noumena was already conceptualized by Locke you illiterate idiot. The worth of Kant's work is elucidating the limits of phenomena and in doing so negatively establishing the possibility of noumena. If you're not going to read through the Transcendental of Principles then there's no point in you reading Kant at all

Do not respond to positivist posters user

Rationalising morality without causality

Shits recapped in P and N you swine, hence why i'd recommend it to someone looking to briefly delve into Kant. Also, if you read Kant in light of Locke rather than Berkley you're a patented retard, hence why you're still a retard.

You're out of depth kid. Know your place

If anything, my instrumentalism about science is closer to positivism than his naive realism. I hate how "positivism" has become the buzz word for any philosophical bogeyman you kids have conjured up in your heads

you’re not a philosopher, the modern form of it is called verificationism or hard empiricism and it just reroutes away from all the issues that came up before

you sound like you're talking about yu-gi-oh desu

>reads kant once
>probs uni
>"kid"
Well geez yes sir oh i guess i really better watch out

But the funny thing is your still retarded. Better start re-reading kant boyo

Yeah I'll be sure to check the appendix to reference all your non-arguments. Fuck off dumb dumb

>noumenal realm

fucking lol

The thing in itself is simply the thing considered in abstraction from the forms of sensibility -- abstracted from our mode of access to it. Since, for Kant, sensible intuition is the source of intelligible content, the thing in itself is a mere 'thought' without any positive content and not a possible object of cognition. The upshot being that things in themselves are not somehow separate from things as appearance. The language of 'noumena' and 'phenomena' is misleading here, since it is derived from classical idealisms where there are two distinct realms.

t. someone who has actually read the first Critique

Ooh must've struck a nerve:

As for "non-arguments," let's be clear. I made a remark suggesting a way into KantLite, you said that was dumb bc "muh Locke," which I refuted by saying "muh Berkley." The fact that you're this big of a faggot to appeal to argumentation after we've resorted to the level of name calling tells me a few things:

1. You're deeply insecure about your own understanding of Kant
2. You'd really like to think you're a special snowflake for being one of the only people on this board to crack open the critique. But sucks for you because you're not and
3. You're too retarded to realize the only "depth" there is to Kant is a hyper-specialized jargon, some really bad argumentation, and a couple of trite, fence-sitting observations about the limits of human knowledge. That's not to Kant's discredit, though, he's a titan, but I'm not gonna stand for faggots like you who think they've somehow gazed into the Heaven of the Forms by becoming acquainted with the language of "pure forms of sensible intuition," and "Transcendental Logic." It's not that hard, buddy. You aren't "in" on any eldeitch knowledge. You're still an asshole like the rest of us. Rather, you're a retarded asshole at that because you unironically disregard the importance of Berkley on a reading of Kant as well as the sheer brilliance of the recap presented in P and N.

Dumb dumb. Shut up

Definitely agree this is the major interpretation, at least by Kemp-Smith, Allison, et. al. But I am not too convinced that things in themselves are all different from noumena. Maybe there's an epistemological difference, but he uses them interchangeably at times. Know any good secondary literature on this?

:,) fuck you retard

Shhhh

No. Verificationism was the strictly positivist program that died with the movement. Instrumentalism is the modern variant

I rely pretty heavily (perhaps too much) on the critical apparatus by Guyer & Wood. To be honest, I'm not sure how a 'two realms' interpretation is even on the table -- since Kant denies any kind of non-sensible intuition (barring God), how can a distinct noumenal realm be intelligible in his system?

As far as I recall, Kant talks about a positive and a negative sense of 'noumena'. The negative is the one I outlined above, and the positive one is the Platonic picture of grasping forms, which he denies. Is this really up for debate?

>he's a titan and succeeded in his major aims revolutionizing philosophy but like whatever dude serious reading is hard

For the record, I don't think Kant thinks noumena are different from things in themselves -- I just think the former term is misleading (Schopenhauer complains about it somewhere).

Found it: en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon#Schopenhauer's_critique
This complaint can be extended to Kant's idiosyncratic appropriation of other traditional philosophical terms like "objective" and "transcendental"

The man practically wrote in Latin French and German at once, I don't think he considered semantic concurrency to be a serious matter

Fair

>the positive one is the Platonic picture of grasping forms, which he denies. Is this really up for debate?
It appears to me that the two-world (or dual-object) interpretation is some manner of classical interpretation, as in German (and other) idealists read the CPR and Prolegomena that way, then a Peirce, a Searle, et al., when they read "thing in itself", they wouldn't really read and interpret Kant ("Kant-in-himself" if I may use that wordplay) but read his works through the lenses of the later German idealists.

So the dual-aspect interpretation where:
>'things-in-themselves' are shorthand for the phrase, 'things considered in themselves' (Dinge an sich selbst betrachten)." Although we cannot see things apart from the way we do in fact perceive them via the physical senses, we can think them apart from our mode of sensibility (physical perception); thus making the thing-in-itself a kind of noumenon or object of thought
would be the result of a closer, more faithful study of Kant that only recently would become the academic orthodoxy.

the section on noumena in CoPR is quite short, and is even condensed to a paragraph or two in PtaFM; it is almost unbelievable that someone would take such pains to pretend to have read what amounts to less than fifteen pages.

the other guy is correct and you are retarded

I'm sorry, who the fuck are you?

heh, me? Just a man. You well? Can't you discern at least that much?

thanks for the history lesson, much appreciated
this is the kind of info that I wouldn't be able to get from just reading Kant

This. Spacetime is not a sensible object. Read your Kant OP

Yes it is you fucking retard

The condition of the possibility of an object of cognition is not itself a possible object of cognition. In the words of Heidegger, it is not a thing but nevertheless not nothing.

oops, meant for anyway, read your Kant

when was the last time you saw pure, unoccupied space? what does it look like?
what is the texture of temporal sequence? what does it smell like?

Obviously but your problem is using the qualification "sensible". Spacetime is absolutely sensible even if not sensible AS an object. Its a tremendously important distinction in a thread talking about the N-P divide

You're a pseud idiot who never read Kant.

gonna pull out my kant dictionary real quick and look up 'sensibility'
oh look here we go: 'with the discussion of sensibility in section 2 of ID [inaugural dissertation] emphasizes the ways in which it differs from the rationalist account of sensibility as a confused perception...in section 3 "on the principles of the form of the sensible world" Kant distinquishes sharply from empiricist arguments. He identifies two principles of the sensible world, space and time. Kant argues that *neither principle may be abstracted from the senses*, but that both are presupposed by them (sections 14-15) and are this pure and not empirical principles.'
>never read Kant
lol i wish

>neither principle may be abstracted from the senses

are you equating "sensible" with "having to do with sensibility"? most would understand "sensible" as meaning "possible as an object of sensible cognition"
merely verbal disputes strike again!

>thanks for the history lesson
I didn't know it was history, or a lesson. The stuff in the greentext is Kant being quoted.

>the kind of info that I wouldn't be able to get from just reading Kant
But the reason I made that post is that by reading Kant right you do not read him wrong, and can spot the misreadings of so-called professional so-called philosophers as a consequence.
As with any other text, what is important in reading Kant is not what the academic orthodoxy thinks, or what other philosophers think: what matters is what Kant thinks.

if something is presupposed by another, then that other may not be abstracted from that thing, being the ground upon which that thing stands.
in other words, i do not arrive at the 'concept' of space by encountering objects 'in space' and then abstracting from these objects, for i must already understand objects to be situated 'in space' to even have an 'experience' of them.

>most would understand "sensible" as meaning "possible as an object of sensible cognition"

I have no idea why you would assume this. They're sensible for the reason they are the condition for all sensibility available to us. The fact we can not conceptualize them as objects is irrelevant matter to their sensible identity.
Regardless my emphasis has been and remains that Spacetime is absolutely not noumenal.

This is important as this thread from the beginning has been about clarifying to the OP what the noumenal is (or is not rather).

You're mistaking intuition for cognition. Yes you absolutely can understand objects in space without having a CONCEPT of space. Its rather the opposite way around, intuition of objects in space is the pre-requisite for coming to a concept of space

please note the scare quotes around the my 'concept'
so, to glean my meaning just replace this with 'principle' or even better 'pure form of intuition'
but this would just recapitulate kant's funky lexicon, and i see a ton of people using these terms without any seeming understanding of what they mean
just regurgitation
so sure, you do not need to have an empirical concept of space in order to understand objects and their relations
however, the principle of space is presupposed in any experience of objects, as they necessarily must appear 'in space' to be experienced. but we do not experience 'space itself'.

I'm talking about the stuff about the influence of German idealists' interpretation of Kant. Having just read Kant and not much criticism/interpretation, I had no idea why anyone would have a 'two realms' interpretation, but that post cleared it up a bit.

Just because physics finds a label for something doesn't mean it has anything to do with metaphysics. The most science can do is create models of something called strings, that then make accurate predictions about the material world. That doesn't mean the world is "made of" them or that you can reduce all things to abberations in space time. Why would space time as a mathematical abstraction be connected to our own perception of it?

But "sensible" is the proper one to use here in contradistinction to what OP seems to believe about spacetime, i.e. that an object can "be" spacetime. I only meant that space and time are not objects of the senses, they are the very things that allow for objects to be presented to the senses as phenomena. To say spacetime is not an intelligible object would be true, but sort of irrelevant in this case, because we are clearly dealing with someone who doesn't understand the distinction between the form and content of perception. The first thing that needs to be made apparent is this division: spacetime from the real objects within it. This is why I said spacetime is not a sensible object. I don't mean that it has no relation to sensibility, that it is entirely intelligible, I mean only that it is not a particular object that can be perceived within itself.

not sure why you're so insistent on a point of semantics
the idea isn't that Kant thinks spacetime is noumenal, it's that it is formal (which I think we all agree on as an interpretation of Kant)

>but we do not experience 'space itself'.

But only in the same sense we don't experience colors in themselves or dogs in themselves. Its a difficult distinction.
I can not accept a perspective of space as anything but sensible even if it can't be an object to itself.

>it's that it is formal

True but what isn't?
The mere undisturbed manifold, but yet all we can say of any given manifold is that it is spacetime. You see the problem

>what isn't
Content! Both mere sensations and full-fledged objects of intuition. What was the problem again?

so, i don't think you're too far from kant's own position. space and time are the *forms* of intuition; they are not separable from this 'faculty'. to treat them as independent, purely intellectual objects is to fall into a kind of conceptual error, 'transcendental illusion'.
so yes, space is 'sensible' insofar as it is the form of all externally sensible objects.

>and full-fledged objects of intuition

Ah but these are by definition formal. The content experienced as a mere manifold is not of course but that is all we can know of the thing in itself. Which you'll well to note is often spoken (speculatively) in the singular