WWII British Naval Superiority

At the start of the second world war, Britain had the largest navy in the world, which Germany paled in comparison to.
What stopped them from rolling up on the German coast and blowing away their entire aquatic presence?

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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_iron-ore_mining_during_World_War_II#British_attempts_to_disrupt_German-Swedish_trade
militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/merselkebir.aspx
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Not wishing to risk the fleet, on which the entire survival of the country depended.

It was put to better use protecting convoys.

Aeroplanes provided the bombing.

um, submarines.

That's pretty much the answer, I think.

Along with mines and enemy airplanes.

Not wanting to make their fleets an easy target for bombers m8

Cause of costal batteries

And airplanes

And ships

Why go on the offensive when you have little to gain from it and alot to lose

airplanes

>um, submarines.
lol no

Germany had subs and also naval cannons on the coast

Did the British Navy try to intercept the iron ore shipments that were going from Narvik to Germany? I guess those ships were driving along the Norwegian coast where German air force bases and coastal guns were situated but was it still possible to attack the ore ships?

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_iron-ore_mining_during_World_War_II#British_attempts_to_disrupt_German-Swedish_trade

France had the largest navy, but it was sunk by le eternel anglo at mers-el-kebir.

Coastal artillery. On top of it that navy was spread out across empire and they didn't have much to gain from that kind of action.

>France had the largest navy
they didn't.

It was big but not American, British or Japanese big

Coastal batteries and the Luftwaffe.

Historically, it's just enormously hard to attack enemy ships in port with your own gunships. You really had to wait until airplanes and being able to project force from further away before hitting the enemy in port became a viable, regular thing.

Doesn't say anything about whether the ships were attacked after the occupation of Norway

>be allied with france in war
>Still find an excuse to destroy french navy just for old times sake
I love Britain

The majority of the British submarine effort was focused in the Mediterranean, especially as the war progressed. Soviet submarines certainly patrolled around Norway and they would have attempted to torpedo any ship that could possibly be aiding the German war effort.

Soviet submarines broke out of the Baltic sea in higher numbers? Any source for that? I thought they were pretty much contained until mid 1944.

Coastal defenses > Navy

>France had the largest navy
no they didnt, bigger than germany, roughly equal to italy

>but it was sunk by le eternel anglo at mers-el-kebir.
in a entirely justified incident, a ultimatum was issued,the options within all being honorable the french commander at mers el kebir actually had standing orders for this situation telling him to take one of the options (internment in the USA for the duration of hostilities) if it was ever offered, he ignored these orders allowed his time limit to expire and when the british began mining the mouth of the harbour opened fire on them.

It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;

(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.

(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.

If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.

(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans lest they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance – where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.

If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.

Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands

the full text of the very reasonable ultimatum

its also worth noting that before the armistice negotiations that lead to vichy france began the british had received assurances that the french fleet would be removed from german reach and not used as a bargining chip, a promise the french broke.

the french anger is motivated more by their justified shame at their own conduct than by any guilt on the british part, the attack was militarily and strategically necessary

Not the guy you've been responding to, but in what universe was it necessary? 6 battleships, 2/3 of them old as fuck and vastly inferior even to what the Italians had, which couldn't get out of the Mediterranean anyway, are just not a big deal.

Expedient, sure. But necessary?

at that point in time 6 battleships of any size were a issue the RN battleship inventory was of a similar vintage to the french for the most part, the french ships in german service did represent a threat that couldnt be allowed to continue.

and the ulitmatum was fair

They couldn't get out of the Med, even if fuel could be found to run them, which was a perennial problem for the Italians.

Plus, in retrospect, the scuttling at Toulon showed the fear was indeed baseless.

>the ultimatum was fair.

Isn't that necessarily a contradiction? The threat, carried out from a position of superior force, was fair? Do what we say or we sink you?

the options were fair, join up and fight, surrender the ships to the british and be compensated post war, inter the ships in a port well out of german reach or scuttle the ships yourselves, any of those options was reasonable

No, none of them were fair, since they were carried out under the threat of immediate force.

If I tell you to open up your wallet and give the contents to either Amnesty International, Doctors without borders, or the Salvation Army, otherwise I'll shoot you, the fact that you have options as to which beneficial charity to give to doesn't change the underlying dynamic that I'm openly threatening you into doing something you'd never consider absent said threat.

Fairness has nothing to do with it.

>mfw reading up on history of the royal navy

Jesus christ these brits were some stupid inept fuckers

all the options were reasonable, in that the french could have taken any of them in honor, indeed the french commanders standing orders were to take the option of internment in the USA if it were ever offered.

as for threat of force, the french fleet offered a unacceptable threat to the security of britain it had to be neutralized one way or another, enough force for option d had to be available in case as happened the french commander on the spot went full retard

>Coastal batteries and the Luftwaffe.
this

same happen in the Franco-Prussian war, Krupp coastal batteries avoid the French to invade north germany

So, because the French commanders could have knuckled under without blame, that makes the demand from one sovereign nation to another about how to employ its armed forces fair?

What ethical system do you use?

And the fleet was pretty worthless, we've been over this. It can't pose a threat to Britain because even if every last ship goes to the Germans, they have no way to get out of the Med.

What it was was expedient. It helped Britain win the war, mostly by galvanizing support, both from the U.S. And from wavering elements within Britain; it showed that the UK was willing to fight even after a tremendous reverse.

But it wasn't fair (nor unfair really, just expedient) and it certainly wasn't militarily necessary

after the french had already violated their previous agreement to move the fleet out of german reach before any armistice then yes the british had every right to demand the french act with honor under threat of force, it shouldnt ever have been a question, as soon as it was clear that armistice was to be sought the french fleet should have been moved elsewhere.

as for the threat of the french fleet in the med, forcing the straights of gibraltar was not impossible, especially with air support from north africa and quite possible spanish collaboration, and the french would have drastically altered the balance of power in the med if they had been taken to join the italians.

the british action at ers el kebir was measured, strategically sound and honorable, the french decision to force a conflict when offered honorable terms was foolish, petty and dishonorable and they have only themselves to blame for their losses

>after the french had already violated their previous agreement to move the fleet out of german reach

>Algeria
>German Reach.

Idiot.


>as for the threat of the french fleet in the med, forcing the straights of gibraltar was not impossible,

It was never done.

>especially with air support from north africa

How? German troops didn't enter French North Africa until they pretty much collapsed Vichy entirely in November 1942. You know what the Frogs did at that point? They scuttled their fleet. In Toulon. Which is in France. The notion that the Germans could have just seized the fleet in Algeria is absurd.

>quite possible spanish collaboration,

So now the French can be held accountable for what a total third party in Franco might or might not do?

>and the french would have drastically altered the balance of power in the med if they had been taken to join the italians.

Not really, no. I mean fuck, you still have the oil problem, and have you seriously looked at the Bretagne class? 2 of those battleships were totally worthless, even against the ww1 era but slightly modernized ships the British were using as their mainstays.

2 BB inferior to the Scharnhorst and Gnisenau, 2 old junkers, a seaplane tender, and 5 destroyers do not constitute a major threat at sea in any sort of objective reality. It would not have "altered the balance of power" in any meaningful sense.

>the british action at ers el kebir was measured, strategically sound and honorable,

It was a panicked decision, based on the notion that a German invasion could arrive in England any day, and was in no way honorable, something that the actual commander at the scene said that he and the entire empire feel ashamed over it.

militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/merselkebir.aspx

It was strategically sound, but because it advanced things on a political front, not a military one. The French ships themselves were largely irrelevant.

"of particular significance were the seven battleships of the Bretagne, Dunkerque and Richelieu classes, which collectively represented the second largest force of capital ships in Europe behind the British"

The French are angry over the incident because it allows them to ignore the fact that there own conduct was both cowardly and shameful.

It was a completely fair offer, given that the alternative was the ships falling into Germany's hands. In wartime the rules have to change to ensure victory.

Stupid inept fuckers who conquered the largest Empire in history, mainly on the strength of their naval forces.

Only four were present at Mers El Kebir. By far the most modern, the Richelieu, wasn't sought after by the British, because it was.... surprise..... in an area actually under German control at the time.


Funny that.

It was an expedient offer. And I don't mean to cast any sort of blame at the British for acting as they did. But pretending these things were vital to the war effort is absurd, and as Toulon demonstrated, they almost certainly would NOT have fallen into Germany's hands if the British did not sink them.

>and as Toulon demonstrated, they almost certainly would NOT have fallen into Germany's hands if the British did not sink them.
a chance that could not be taken

>a chance that could not be taken

ANd on what ridiculous basis are you asserting that?

Looking from hindsight, it's quite clear that there was no real threat.

Even at a then-present perspective though, it's far from clear that

A) The ships would be seized
B) Even seized, they could be fueled
C) That even if they were seized and could be fueled, that they could get out of the MEd
D) That they would be effective if the above were reached
E) That attacking them like this wouldn't galvanize Vichy into being an active supporter of the Germans instead of a conquered nation being driven into things
F) That international opinion (Well, U.S. opinion, which is what matters) would be favorable.

It could EASILY have been a net strategic negative, only knowing what you could have known in 1940. Pretending that this is some absolutely critical juncture and it was necessary is wilful blindness.

It's more like telling a man who is about to get robbed to store his valuables in a bank, loan them to a friend or donate them. At gunpoint, of course. But he'd be an idiot not to take one of the options anyway.

>What stopped them from rolling up on the German coast and blowing away their entire aquatic presence?

They simply weren't willing to take that chance.

It is the same reason why the British Admiral at Jutland allowed the Germans to retreat without bothering to pursue them.

He simply wasn't willing to risk the fleet when he already had naval superiority.

>What stopped them from rolling up on the German coast and blowing away their entire aquatic presence?
This was answered by Bismarck long before Hitler.

>"If the British Army landed in Europe, I'd get the Belgian police to arrest them."

Coastal batteries are far better at killing ships than ships are at killing them. There was also the risk of mines in coastal waters and being bombed by planes.

There was also the value of the fleet itself. Britain had a bigger fleet than it could afford to maintain never mind replace. The two up policy that the British had been running for some time until the treaties with the USA had pretty much been it's only and biggest deterrent. If the fleet was even partially damaged, British prestige and security would be at risk. The security of the empire which spanned too much disconnected territory also relied on the British fleet.

There is also a logistical issue with that idea. What would that actually achieve? Hammering coastal positions would do little to hinder the Reich and would just leave the fleet vulnerable and expend valuable ammunition.

The Soviets had a northern sea fleet too

Submarines, not getting caught far away from home, not having protection for anything else.

Much easier for Germany to attack them if they are on the German coast.

>submarines
>land based aviation
>coastal batteries

Also waiting for Hitler to go full retard and launch Sealion and leave the Kriesmarine and German Army on the Western Front at the bottom of the channel.

You're nitpicking. People are merely saying that the British made every attempt to give the French a way out of being scuttled, in the face that the ships falling into German hands was out of the question. Your analogy is also shit, considering some of the options meant the French would get their ships back after the war or, alternatively, could just keep their ships and sail with the British fleet.

Yes, it was given with the threat of force, because just letting the French go and turn their ships over to the Germans wasn't an option, and the French doing that would've literally hampered the war effort that Britain had joined with France in in the first place.

No it wasn't fair, so what?

Being fair to the French was not the priority. Doing everything and anything to support the war effort was.

No, I'm not. I'm rebutting the user's upthread's rather idiotic wondering why the French didn't just surrender their fleet over to the British like they apparently "should" have, and wondered why someone would refuse an ultimatum like that.

> because just letting the French go and turn their ships over to the Germans wasn't an option,

Except it wasn't a realistic possibility, and subsequent events rather amply demonstrated that. And even if the ships did go over to Germany, they can't leave the Med, so who cares?

Yeah what kind of interest does Britain have in the med right? None! hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah

Nah I'd say the other user is right, the commander's refusal at Mers el Kebir is able to be understood in context but it is still idiotic.

>beating up a bunch of literal who countries with handle paddled bamboo kayaks for a navy

royal navy was a farce

americans are worse desu

>It was an existential threat, they HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO SINK THEIR FORMER ALLY'S SHIPS
>Oh, well, I guess that it (maybe) could have made a tertiary theater a little bit harder to project force into the center around Italy, ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

Are you stupid, or just extremely ignorant?

You do realize the French commander wasn't actually told about the part about interning in America being a possibility, yes?

Dunkerques weren't outdated and Richelieu and Jean Bart could be finished rather quickly had Germans negotiated proper terms of cooperation with French which wasn't out of the picture.

While Dunkerques were not that scary on paper, it were still 31 knot fast ships that could destroy any heavy cruiser RN had and outrun any battleship they've had but Renown and Hood(by 1940). Which was enormously dangerous.

On top of it you have to remember that France focused its naval armament on lighter ships like submarines, destroyers and light crusiers and at the same time - the Achilles' heel of German navy was lack of decent "base" of escort ships.

The Dunquerkes were undergunned, albeit fast. Somewhat similar to the Scharnhorst class. The Richelieu class weren't on the table, being in shipyards in France and not out in a vulnerable port in Algeria.

We're not talking about the modern ships, the big "target" at Mers El Kebir were those old Bretagne class junkpiles.

>While Dunkerques were not that scary on paper, it were still 31 knot fast ships that could destroy any heavy cruiser RN had and outrun any battleship they've had but Renown and Hood(by 1940). Which was enormously dangerous.

Which again, won't matter much, because they can't actually get out to the convoy war in the Atlantic. If they did somehow get grabbed (and fueled), they'd be playing the same game the Italians were, mostly convoy defense in the central Med. Speed doesn't mean much there.

>On top of it you have to remember that France focused its naval armament on lighter ships like submarines, destroyers and light crusiers and at the same time - the Achilles' heel of German navy was lack of decent "base" of escort ships.

Which weren't on the offer. Mers El Kebir had 2 Dunquerke class BB, 2 Bretagne class BB, 1 seaplane tender, and 5 destroyers at the time of the attack. There's every possibility that the move would have pushed the rest of Vichy's fleet, like those far more modern cruisers, and subs which could slip the mines of Gibraltar, into active and willing Axis participation.

Darlan wasnt, the french admiral in command at mers el kebir was, he failed to pass that on to Darlan

It was pretty much unbeatable throughout the 19th century. If they were incompetent it's probably because naval power became a sort of cheese tactic, and the sheer ease of it invited complacency.

Who's being retarded? The British literally provided IN THEIR ULTIMATUM several alternatives to sinking their former ally's ships. They didn't just roll up and open fire.

The French navy wasn't insignificant and Britain REQUIRED naval superiority for their security.
Just handing over potential naval advantages to your enemy is retarded (and no, the French navy resisting the Germans wasn't a foregone conclusion, especially if the ultimatum was rejected which PROVIDED A CHANCE to resist the Germans). The Mediterranean wasn't an irrelevant theater either. Just giving up advantages because your (surrendered) ally's navy wasn't playing ball is strategically retarded.