What would Thomas Aquinas have to say about two balls on a newton's Cradle...

What would Thomas Aquinas have to say about two balls on a newton's Cradle? My philosophy teacher told me that this would be a question on my exam tomorrow. Does anyone want to give me some help?

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faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM10/PSMLM10.pdf
lyfaber.blogspot.ca/2011/03/formal-distinction.html
en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabellianism
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What balls?

I see only a representation of balls that may or may not exist and there is no concrete way of knowing.

praise God ok?

I'd help, but I have to get a 500 word essay done by Thursday.

>two balls on a newton's cradle?
dude testicles lmao

General question but how does the trinity mesh with divine simplicity?

Something about the first mover maybe?

He'd probably think it's pretty neat.

I know I do

It's a mystery.

Or proof that Islam is closer to the divine

secundum quod huiusmodi

For the same reason divine immutability does not imply immobility. Trinity doesn't divide the divine essence. We are not partialists or tritheists.

Feser's paper on inertia and medieval conceptions of motion would be helpfull here.

faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM10/PSMLM10.pdf

For Scottists: The trinity is distinct formally but not really, insofar as they can be distinguished but never actually seperated. So in one sense divine simplicity holds insofar as the three persons share in one essence absolutely, but they are still multiple according to certain distinguishing qualities inherent to them.

>For the same reason divine immutability does not imply immobility. Trinity doesn't divide the divine essence. We are not partialists or tritheists.

How can you have distinction without divide?

>For Scottists: The trinity is distinct formally but not really, insofar as they can be distinguished but never actually seperated. So in one sense divine simplicity holds insofar as the three persons share in one essence absolutely, but they are still multiple according to certain distinguishing qualities inherent to them.

Same question as above

>Scottist
?

>How can you have distinction without divide?
My cock makes your mother's labia distinct, but they remain undivided.

>Thomas Aquinas
probably jerk his miniscule circumsized dick whilst rome burnt.nero

Consider the bit of shape and color in any given object, you can't just physically separate the color itself out without some sort of body/shape/substratum that it inhers in still remaining. Still we can distinguish the color from the shape/body/substratum in any given object coherently. This isn't however just a distinction of reason, the shape/body/substratum really is not the color and the color is not the shape/body/substratum, but neither will exist without some form of the other. They cannot be separated concretely from one another, but we can note the way in which one is not the other and be talking about something objective about reality and not just our way of thinking about it.

It is a third mode of distinction between a "real" distinction based around concrete divisibility and a "mental" distinction by which we are simply considering something from two different perspectives. Duns Scotus called it a "formal distinction", it was one of his philosophical innovations . One important to his work on the problem of universals and individuality, along with certain theological issues. There is a controversy over exactly what he meant by the distinction. Some focus on it as an example of a category of distinctions between "real" and "mental", insofar as they are admixtures, somewhat real and somewhat mental, while others want to say that it is just a different kind of "real" distinction that is based on natural definitional principles as opposed to concrete separability.

lyfaber.blogspot.ca/2011/03/formal-distinction.html


A follower( to a greater or lesser degree) of the philosophical and theological positions of " The Subtle Doctor" John Duns Scotus.

>circumsized
Christians didn't circumcise

>Consider the bit of shape and color in any given object, you can't just physically separate the color itself out without some sort of body/shape/substratum that it inhers in still remaining.

Is that really an correct comparison to make with the unmoved mover?

Likewise this explanation seems to produce modalism.

Well I'm just demonstrating how the distinction works. Of course the unmoved mover has no shape so It can't be the same kind of things that are being distinguished in the material object that are being distinguished in the divine essence. But the means of distinction involved in both cases are the same, and that is unproblematic as far as I can tell.

>Likewise this explanation seems to produce modalism.

It depends on what you mean by that. Scotus does utilize "modal distinctions" as well, but that is not what is going on here. For Scotus a "modal distinction" would be based on degrees of intensity of a single quality, so an example of that would be a low vs high quality of heat. I would have to know what exactly your view on "modalism" is so to comment on that any further.

Not him, but modalism is considered a heresy.

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabellianism

>is the nontrinitarian or anti-trinitarian belief that the Heavenly Father, Resurrected Son, and Holy Spirit are three different modes or aspects of one monadic God, as perceived by the believer,

Ah ok, it's definitely not modalism then. Formal distinctions aren't based on the perspective of the believer, the formalities are objectively distinct, just not separable enough to constitute the "real" distinction status.