Quality-wise how good was the armed forces of the USSR in 1941?
I hear it often pointed out they had thousands of tanks, aircraft, millions of troops, etc, but how old was a lot of their equipment?
How modern was it? I hear Naziboos claim that Barbarossa's successes were never in doubt because the USSR was trash in 1941 but how true was this?
With quality leadership at the helm would their training, equipment and logistics have been up to the task?
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>Quality-wise how good was the armed forces of the USSR in 1941?
Awful.
>I hear it often pointed out they had thousands of tanks, aircraft, millions of troops, etc, but how old was a lot of their equipment?
Like most European armies, a mix between stuff that was 1-3 years old and stuff that was mostly 5-20 years old. You had something like 3,000 t-34s from June to December on the front somewhere, which is more tanks than the Germans had.
The general problem with the Soviet army wasn't equipment, it was training and doctrine. Communication both within individual units and between them was awful. You had a lot of artillery, and pieces of pretty good quality, but the gunners were rarely trained in how to do things like spot what are good places to direct fire (That's a job for divisional HQ!), and a lot of them weren't paired with the trucks they did have, which were usually assigned to infantry units instead to make them advance better, but they weren't supposed to advance beyond the reach of their guns and rob themselves of their support anyway.
Their overall defensive plan relied primarily on a huge thick line right on the border, which means you
A) Get plastered by their air and artillery support right off the bat
B) Lots of your men get enveloped if the enemy makes a breakthrough somewhere and sickle-cuts around you, which is exactly what happened and how the Soviets took close to 4 MILLION losses in the first few months.
>I hear Naziboos claim that Barbarossa's successes were never in doubt because the USSR was trash in 1941 but how true was this?
If you're defining "Barbarossa succeeding" as operational and tactical successes from say June 22nd to the end of autumn in 41? Yeah, that's a pretty accurate statement. The Red Army was trash and going to lose against a modern opponent.
1/2
>With quality leadership at the helm would their training, equipment and logistics have been up to the task?
How are you defining "quality leadership"? They needed more than just good generals, they needed good junior officers, a chain of command that was willing to take risks and initiative, a sense of espirit de corps between the enlisted and the officers, and a fucking clue as to where to best allocate their transport mechanisms, even things like horses and mules, and a sense of strategy and knowledge that defense in depth seemed to be by far the best answer to the sort of attacks the Germans favored. They had none of that historically. And sure, "better leadership" could ameliorate some of it, but I doubt you'd get all of it, and that first punch would still rock the Soviets unless you completely change the entire character of their military, not only the forces themselves, but the culture in which those forces fought.
>With quality leadership at the helm would their training, equipment and logistics have been up to the task?
Well, yes, but that's basically another army, isn't it?
In any case Soviet problem wasn't equipment (it's not like Germans or Axis in general all had top-notch equipment), but exactly leadership and logistics.
They also dropped the idea of deep battle and concentrated forces they mobilized at the border, which led to their encirclement and destruction.
Add to this awful logistics, and reason why so many were captured and killed in 1941 is obvious.
Leadership was also awful, due to purges.
to be honest, it wasn't that good before the purges either.
the Red Army itself wasn't total shit, but the leadership and highest ranks were absolutely gutted during the purges and those who were left were political yes-men rather than battle hardened veterans.
Soviet equipment was lacking, however, with often no logistics for refueling mechanized divisions, or little arrangements for ammunition and food for the soldiers themselves.
Armor is probably where the Red Army had an ability to combat the Germans, with the T-34 rolling into production in 1939 and were able to counter the Panzer IV quite well, there just weren't enough T-34's around at the start of Barbarossa, with the lesser quality BT tanks picking up the slack for the early stages of the war.
tl;dr: the Soviet military was severely lacking in logistics and leadership at the start of Barbarossa, but the equipment and sheer number of soldiers were all there, the reorganization of the Red Army in October-December 1941 filled the holes in leadership and shore up logistics, so at the very least soldiers were getting ammo and enough food to not starve, but logistics and supplies would be the Soviets Achilles heel for pretty much the entire war.
I won't rehash what the other guys have said because they've basically answered that. I'll just add that the Nazis expected an easy victory against the USSR because they gave the Russians a couple knock out punches in WW1 and they imploded last time. And Russia was quite a bit more backwards compared to Germany at the time. I mean, Germans had proper toilets while Russians were using an outhouse. The contrast between both societies was huge. From the perspective of a Nazi these people wouldn't have a hope if the Wehrmacht could roll over the nations of Western Europe
Technically speaking the Soviet army was the finest in the world, and technologically the most advanced. Its early defeats were not due to training or equipment but due to the Fascists launching a massive surprise attack while the Soviet government was misled into working towards peace with Germany. The fascists that invaded even had numerical superiority (but ultimately lost due to a variety of factors, not the least was poor leadership due to the Nazis interfering with generals).
I wonder how it would have gone if the Soviets had invaded Europe first.
>Technically speaking the Soviet army was the finest in the world, and technologically the most advanced. Its early defeats were not due to training or equipment but due to the Fascists launching a massive surprise attack while the Soviet government was misled into working towards peace with Germany. The fascists that invaded even had numerical superiority (but ultimately lost due to a variety of factors, not the least was poor leadership due to the Nazis interfering with generals).
????????????
nice """""argument""""
>nice """""argument""""
Wasn't an argument. I was just wondering what you just typed.
Are you ESL? Genuinely confused.
At the current exchange rate you effectively earn more with flipping burgers in Burger King for minimum wage instead of shilling for 15 rubles.
>tfw the soviets never finished re-equipping their infantrymen with SVT 40s
what could have been.
Very well they just couldn't handle the enormous power of all those 10 German soldiers that attacked them. Nobody could, though.
How do you figure that? A fair number of officers and junior officers had been involved in WWI and the civil war. They had institutional experience that you can't expect to be replaced quickly.
I just want to make a note that in the very first months of Barbarossa, the Germans had a difficult time knocking out the KV-1 heavy tanks. Their arsenal didn't have much that could destroy it, but their better tactics and leadership overcame that.
>not due to training
>finest in the world
>surrendered so often and in such large numbers that Stalin had to decree that anyone who surrenders will be considered a traitor and their families will be persecuted
And how was the german army? Was it really a top army that lacked nothing and one of the best that humanity has seen ?or is it a meme myth?
Red alert
>Was it really a top army that lacked nothing
They lacked a lot of things
That's all irrelevant, troops cut off tend to give up in massive numbers. Look at Stalingrad or the hundreds of thousands of Germans captured in 1944. Dumbass.
>A fair number of officers and junior officers had been involved in WWI and the civil war. They had institutional experience that you can't expect to be replaced quickly.
And Russia's performance in WW1 was nothing to write home about, neither was the high degree of military incompetence on all sides in the RCW, nor the abortive invasion of Poland anything to boast with.
Even the "crushing" victory at Khalkin Gol, done with a primarily non-purged officer corps, needed to stack pretty much every single advantage on the Soviet side: outnumbering the Japanese close to 2:1 in men, over 6:1 in tanks, 2.5:1 in planes, 2:1 in artillery, and close to 4:1 in mechanical transport, and they still suffered more losses than they inflicted, on the defense.
Their artillery doctrines for how to communicate up and down the ranks for things like where fire support was to be directed to and how to work out coordinates for laying down fire hadn't changed since WW1, and was the single most proximate cause for all those start and stop offensives they had throughout the entirety of the war: They simply didn't have the capacity to compute new targets without having a bunch of people at a divisional or even higher level work out where to land the shots, so at the opening of offensives, when everyone knew where their target was, they were devastating, but as they started to move and the combat became more fluid, they missed most of their shots.
Yeah, I mean, it was better than what happened when you put people in command based on party loyalty, but Russian and later Soviet military leadership from ww1 to the purges was pretty awful to begin with.
They lacked a ton of things, most especially motorized and mechanized transport. What made the German army work was extremely high levels of inter-arm coordination. Sure, their tanks and artillery pieces might not have been as good as their adversaries on a mechanical basis, but if the artillery fire lands on a point of resistance quickly, and the tanks are radioed to where a weak part in the enemy line is and this is the opportunity to rush through; well, that means more.
The soviets were armed to a ridiculous extent. The purges and general problems in leadership, officer corps, doctrine and motivation of the troops negated this though. The surprise offense in 41 completely destroyed their morale and only nazi occupation policies and the realization that even living under stalin is better than german extermination restored the morale.
The performance in 1941/42 wasn´t much better, the failed counteroffensives show that pretty well. Stalingrad is more to attribute to german overconfidence, overstretching and un reliable allies. When lend and lease started trickling in 43 the soviets had learned a lot and were able to start winning because lend and lease negated a lot of the disadvantages the soviets had and allowed them to stomach the massive losses their successful offensives caused. By the end of the war the soviets were a formidable army, forged by massive casualities and learning from the germans.
>They simply didn't have the capacity to compute new targets without having a bunch of people at a divisional or even higher level work out where to land the shots, so at the opening of offensives, when everyone knew where their target was, they were devastating,
Funny, isn't it? Their whole doctrine evolved to crush the enemy's position with a huge pre-emptive artillery strike, and then assaulting what remained of their positions.
I want to know more.
>The soviets were armed to a ridiculous extent.
Soviet army lacked in artillery and support equipments like telephones and radio. They had a lot of tanks but most were obsolete and without fuel and ammo, and to make matters worse they didn't have trucks for their infantry so their tanks were sent without infantry support to be destroyed. Soviets were even more poorly armed than the Germans.
1941: Morally broken redneck conscripts
1944: Avatars of death and destruction
The General problem with the Soviet army in 1941 was the training, doctrine and the fact that Stalin purged the Russian army of 50000 of it's officers prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
But at least they were swift learners.
I remember making an identical statement a month ago.
Yeah, it stick to me
As has been mentionned before, would also add terrifyingly bad logistics: weapons, ammo, but especially mechanical parts and fuel for vehicles had a hard time reaching the units which needed it.
Not either of these guys, but aside from the inter-arm cooperation (which was very advanced for its time, though Germany was surpassed by the Allies by the end of the war) Germany had a couple of other key strengths I can think of:
-Very well trained NCOs, probably the best out of all the belligerents during most of the war. To give you an idea, they were expected to be able to replace superiors up to two ranks above them on the fly if need be. Their sense of initiative and responsibilty did wonders when combined that with the mission-based orders and general high degree of lattitude afforded to subordinates. Contrast that with other armies, especially the Red Army, which suffered from stiff over-centralised command.
-At least until 1942-3, the average German trooper was quite well-trained, better than his opponents at least. Troop quality markedly declined after the disastrous losses though. The same applies (to a lesser extent I think) to their pilots, and by the end of the war they were sending undertrained recruits to the meatgrinder against the USAAF/RAF
-On the Eastern Front, and arguably in Italy as well, German troops showed a real doggedness and determination even in the face of very adverse conditions. When Hitler ordered the troops to stop their retreat in 1941, the men on the ground actually managed to make that order a reality - a remarkable defensive performance. A case could be made that Nazi propaganda had really done its work in persuading the men in the USSR that the Soviets were out to utterly destroy Germany, hence the almost fanatical resolve of the men there.
While Stalin didn't kill all his generals, he did execute several key commanders and field officers of the Red Army.
The purge led to inefficient and broken divisions that took massive casualties early in the war. Stalin eventually realized that placing inexperienced officers and authoritarian commisars in charge wasn't helping.
Thanks for this resumed info.
Appreciated.
After the fall of berlin the russians moved through to attack the japanese. There are accounts of how the russians found japanese actics laughable after years of fighting the germans. One example is how the japanese didnt even bother to bury their mines.
The IJA was peasant tier tbqh. The Navy always had first dibs on production thus the army was poorly armed. The officers were mostly traditionalists heavily affected by social snobbery while the common soldiers were subjected to disciplinary measures like heavy beatings.
The only reedeming feature (military wise) was the fanatical devotion. Soviets would have torn them to shreds even in 41.
As mentioned, the purges were a major factor. For context, the Soviet Armored Academy lost -all- of its instructors three times between 1937-39, though they weren't as inexperienced in 1941 as some claim. Zhukov was in Mongolia putting early forms of 'deep battle' doctrine into action in 1939, two entire fronts sent their armored forces into Poland, and another front into Finland. Finland was exceptionally bad, as the experience of fighting against the Mannerheim Line resulted in an emphasis on attacking fortified lines, which would be of no help in 1941.
This all led to the disbanding of the Tank Corps to be reorganized into smaller units and a shift in doctrine, changing the tanks role in 'deep battle', and giving breakthrough responsibilities to cavalry units. If reorganizing major sections of your military wasn't bad enough, the regression in doctrine essentially put the Soviets behind the Germans. When the Soviets saw what happened in France they immediately began organizing mechanized corps of their own similar to the German Panzer divisions, but doing so required disbanding, yet again, both cavalry and tank units.
I'm not sure you could think of a worse time to be invaded.
Forget even 41, they whooped them in Khalkin Gol hard.
The Navy was Japan's best trump card but after Midway their slight chance of survival dwindled to nothing.
It's almost a comedy of errors in a way. These new tank and mechanized units would require 1,890 KV heavy tanks, 3,780 T-34 medium tanks, 4,064 light tanks, and 40,000 trucks. In 1940 only 243 KVs and 117 T-34s were produced. The allowance of trucks alone would use up over 25% of all the motor vehicles in the entire Red Army for just 12% of the divisions. Not a single unit was completely manned or equipped, instead being partially equipped with substitute surplus light tanks in inadequate numbers to train.
>In the year they were in existence, only one mechanized corps managed to get in divisional exercises: none of the other tank or mechanized divisions had ever had a chance to exercise as a unit before they had to do it under fire, in the midst of the German surprise attack of 22 June 1941. Tank drivers in the units in the Baltic Special Military District averaged just 1-1/2 hours' driving time. Many units were missing 50% or more of their non-commissioned officers and junior officers.
>1940 ended with the Red Army in the throes of massive expansion. 125 new rifle divisions had been formed, the number of rifle corps had almost tripled, and while the number of separate tank brigades between January and December 1940 actually increased (from 36 to 45) , the resources were also being stretched for 20 tank divisions and 9 mechanized divisions. The only concession to the equipment shortage was that the number of KVs in each tank division was reduced from 105 to 63. This meant that the shortfall of KVs at the end of 1940 was only 1017, instead of 1857. In February 1941 the Red Army started forming 20 additional mechanized corps.
>On 15 March 1941 the Soviet industrial plan for military goods authorized a late 1941 production rate of 290 T-34s and 110 KVs per month. At that rate, the Red Army would not have had all 61 tank divisions equipped with modern tanks until September 1944. Among other things, just to reach that level of tank production in peacetime, production of armor plate and structural steel for two battleships, two battlecruisers, and several lighter cruisers for the Soviet navy was stopped completely.
>how old was a lot of their equipment?
Pic related
>burying your mines
dishonorabu
wat
Kinda hard to fight when your trying to figure out which leg is yours.
Even if you live. The shock of it. You just witnessed the ground explode, your comrades ripped apart, the screams, whistling , shock waves. And all of a sudden you got Ivan's tanks roaring and a "urah" by Ivan's screaming for blood. That war was a different mentality
Hi Stalin
>carthaginian fries
DELET THIS
Training was poor, the purges crippled everything strategic and most things tactical, and the vast majority of anything but small arms were old and shitty and unmanned. Most of the VVS was destroyed on the ground. Most of the T-34s were in Siberia. Most all of the actual military men were in gulags.
By December a lot of this changes, but before this the Soviets incur unheard of losses in men and material due to superior numbers and inferior everything else. Stalin knew how badly he'd fucked up by gulaging so many commanders most of them, 75% or so, were back in command within a year.
Also the massive amount of Siberian reserves mobilized help save the streets of Moscow from a siege, and those troops were well trained, equipped and led, not to mention they had a hefty amount of T-34s made pre war which would have been of good quality.
There were many competent soldiers and men in the USSR but they were mostly in jail or out of supply in 41.
>and technologically the most advanced
Yeah, not even close. America says hi, vatnik.
Nice report
I want more of these examples lel
It's not true. They're still digging up Japanese mines in places like Cambodia. Hell, the Japs even used their hand grenades as mines and they're still digging live grenade mines out of China as well.
True indeed. Apart from terrain like jungle that negated a lot of the weaknesses the IJA had they were essentially Italy tier. In Asian they mostly encountered the chinese who couldn't even supply enough or second rate colonial troops.
