Expanding the teletransportation paradox with the theseus ship paradox

the problem is, if the teleportation destroy your subjective self, how does it happen when the destruction and replacement with a copy happens gradually?

if the brain teleportation really kills "you" and supposedly creates another self, at which point you will cease to exist in favour of the new "self" if this process gets done gradually?

Prove that 'you' a moment from now is the same 'you' that exists this moment.
Protip: you can't.
For all we know the destruction of self that occurs in teleportation happens constantly, and each minute brings about a new entity - as new as that formed by teleportation. But you accept one form of destruction without issue, and the other you reject. There is no logical justification for this discrepancy.

so what happens to your own self if teleportations makes a double of you? how would you experience it?

Not him, but I don't see the point of your argument. There is no way to prove that "you" are the same "you" that was around a few years ago. Personally, I don't think you are.
The Star Trek style teleportation method still destroys the "you" that exists at this moment.

But you're assuming that the you on the destination isn't really you
It would be no different to when you wake up in the morning after sleeping

couldn't this lead to the conclusion that subjective death (oblivion) doesn't exist?

>It would be no different to when you wake up in the morning after sleeping
You don't know that for sure. You can't say with 100% certainty that that is the case. Your consciousness is not terminated when you sleep. Your brain merely reduces the amount of work it's doing so you can rest.
The teleportation machine eliminates your brain from existence for a brief period of time and then creates a new one somewhere else.

>You don't know that for sure.
Of course not we don't have the tech yet. But to me it seems likely to be the case.
>The teleportation machine eliminates your brain from existence for a brief period of time and then creates a new one somewhere else.
Actually it stores your brain as an information pattern, temporarily suspending changes to its structure in the process, and then reassembles it as matter somewhere else. Its not really destroyed unless something malfunctions, it just occupies a slightly different form.

> Its not really destroyed unless something malfunctions
That makes no sense. Your brain is disassembled on the atomic level and rebuilt from different matter elsewhere. This is destruction. It doesn't matter if the copy is perfect or not.

Its not destroyed. It is transposed into an information matrix.
Else how could you get it back together?

>Its not destroyed. It is transposed into an information matrix.
I don't think you understand the actual teleportation question.

>In Reasons and Persons, Parfit asks the reader to imagine entering a "teletransporter", a machine that puts you to sleep, then destroys you, breaking you down into atoms, copying the information and relaying it to Mars at the speed of light.

And I would ask you to imagine that in fact when your body is stored as information you aren't really destroyed. That would only happen if the information was deleted or corrupted somehow.
Subjectively being teleported is no different to sleeping, really.

>Subjectively being teleported is no different to sleeping, really.
Or I guess more accurately, being put under a general anaesthetic.

>And I would ask you to imagine that in fact when your body is stored as information you aren't really destroyed
This makes no sense whatsoever. The copy would be no different to third party observers, but the original would still cease to exist.

>Subjectively being teleported is no different to sleeping, really.
I have already pointed out that this is not the case because your brain doesn't cease to exist while you're asleep.

Same thing. Anesthetics don't terminate your consciousness either.

>This makes no sense whatsoever. The copy would be no different to third party observers, but the original would still cease to exist.
Its worth noting that the 'copy' would also be no different to itself. 'It' would identify as you, as much as you-in-the-morning identify with 'you'-before-bed. Are you saying the 'copy' would be incorrect? I mean your before bed self ceases to exist as soon as he falls asleep, but he does it without fear.

>Same thing. Anesthetics don't terminate your consciousness either.
Well they don't terminate brain activity but that's a whole other thing from inducing unconsciousness. Unconsciousness != brain death.

don't care if I'm still the same so long as I get some pucci

>I mean your before bed self ceases to exist as soon as he falls asleep, but he does it without fear.
You keep saying this, but you aren't backing it up with anything.

> 'It' would identify as you
So what?

>Are you saying the 'copy' would be incorrect?
Obviously. It's a clone made from different matter. The fact that it believes it is something else is totally irrelevant.

This video explains it nicely.

youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc&feature=youtu.be

I honestly don't get how can a physicalist believe teleportation doesn't cause death. If our mental states are contingent on physical processes, then it follows that destroying these processes destroy our mental states, and thus consciousness, as well. It doesn't matter if you make a copy of such processes somewhere else, a duplication of X is not the same as X, thus any mental states produced by the original X would be lost.

Now some may argue that we are not the same matter that we were some years ago, but note that I said "physical processes", not "matter". While it is true that the matter that composes us can change, there's a continuity of physical processes that allow our consciousness to exist, continuity that would be forever lost in the case of Star Trek-like teleportation.

Look man I'm going to bed because its near 3am here but to set you on the right track this video is basically photographs steal your soul tier thinking.

Photographs don't kill you.

Nor does teleporting

This.

Dont all cells in your body get destroyed and repaired constantly?

Are you the same you from ten years ago?

The real you is not your body or mind but how you react to things and what your preferences are.

Look at it like this.

A friend and you buy a game through steam.

You both install and play it, the game is installed on 2 different machines but it is still the same game right?

So if you get knocked out you are not the same you anymore?

Are we just matter?
If so are we a specific type of matter?
If we are just a specific type and replacing the parts makes us not who we once were, then there must be more than the material to us.
However if we are simply material, then you are asking "Is future me the same as past me?"
In the realm of physics I fail to see a difference as both questions (one in my analogy and the one you asked) are posed upon motion.

>a duplication of X is not the same as X
Why is it that time is a flow yet motion is not?
seeIf what you said was true then wouldn't moving forward in time be constantly moving our mental state "breaking" it?

This is much easier to understand if you believe in many-worlds.

Lets say you have 3 points in time t1, t2 and t3. At each point in time the universe splits.

You you have you t1, which splits at t2 into t2a and t2b, which at t3 splits into t3a1, t3a2, t3b1, t3b2. Each one of these was t1 in the past. t1 becomes all of these in the future. Even though t3a1 is not the same as t3a2, and never was t2b.

This is much the same as you share grandparents with your cousin, but you are not your cousin. Yet the grandparent can say you are both his grandchildren you you can both say he is both you your grandparent.

The difference is you are able to observe that you have a cousin. If your grandfather say, impregnated his wife without knowing, went off to war, and then his wife put that child up for adoption, you would not realize you had a cousin. Your parent was the single child of them, and you're the single child of your parents. As far as you can tell there is only one-to-one grandparent-grandchild relation. But with many worlds it is always like this, it is impossible to observe cousin worlds.

The point is of course that true identity only exists at a single point in time. Your current you is the descendant of you of 5 minutes ago. And there may be in fact hundreds of current yous that are the descendant of the you of 5 minutes ago, and the you of 5 minutes ago is the ancestor of all of these new yours of 5 minutes later.

A human is the sum of all his experiences. If you construct a body and a brain it would not be "you" unless every experience and mark of time on the body is preserved

there are still uncertainties involved in the storage of memory in the brain. Chief among my concerns when talking about atomic reconstruction of the brain and/or entire body is whether electric charges, impulses, etc. would be conserved. How would you go about establishing trajectories and magnitudes of the trillions of nervous impulses going back and forth every second?

Until it can be established that there is a physical, perhaps etched record of memory in the human brain I would never believe any teleportation technology, believing it would only create a dry husk, perhaps capable of maintaining a heartbeat but brain-dead as a rock

>since "you" are experiencing that illusion
The self is not a passive(observing) component, because it wouldn't be able to produce any actions in that case, which it demonstrably DOES.. It's a willing(acting) component.

>I honestly don't get how can a physicalist believe teleportation doesn't cause death.
It causes death and then rebirth. There's no continuity of consciousness.

>It doesn't matter if you make a copy of such processes somewhere else, a duplication of X is not the same as X, thus any mental states produced by the original X would be lost.
It's identical. A property of identities is that x=x.

>While it is true that the matter that composes us can change, there's a continuity of physical processes that allow our consciousness to exist
When you lose consciousnesses that continuity ends. Your consciousness is the conscious part of your brain booting up the hardware and memory of your physical mind when you wake up. The continuity of consciousness relies of the pattern of your matter.

Your teleportation copy you is a direct causal result of the destroyed you. The pattern is not lost at any point in time, and exists in some form as data or some physical mechanism, directly causing the copy you.

No. First, as I said before there's a contiunity of physical processes, not simply "matter", thus the analogy doesn't hold. Second, teleportation is not motion, but a duplication, and subsequent destrucion, of the original brain. Third, the issue of personal identity over time is largely solved if one adopts an eternalist ontology of time. See

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four-dimensionalism
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdurantism

I don't see how that follows

>It causes death and then rebirth. There's no continuity of consciousness.
Actually from the point of view of the destination, there is continuity of consciousness.

>If you construct a body and a brain it would not be "you" unless every experience and mark of time on the body is preserved
So a senile person is not a real person, got it.

>there are still uncertainties involved in the storage of memory in the brain. Chief among my concerns when talking about atomic reconstruction of the brain and/or entire body is whether electric charges, impulses, etc. would be conserved.
You know damn well for the purposes of this discussion they're talking about perfect replication including mental state.

>How would you go about establishing trajectories and magnitudes of the trillions of nervous impulses going back and forth every second?
Gee Bill, how would you replicate the 7*10^27 atoms and their atomic, molecular bonds and their relative cartesian coordinates? Oh wait, this is hypothetical.

>Until it can be established that there is a physical, perhaps etched record of memory in the human brain I would never believe any teleportation technology, believing it would only create a dry husk, perhaps capable of maintaining a heartbeat but brain-dead as a rock
This is retarded, babies are born as brain-dead rocks and you're a solipsist and everyone who was a baby and didn't exist at some point in time previously is a brain-dead dry husk rock.

>It's identical.

Identical in properties doesn't entail being the same object. Imagine duplication without destruction of the original, would the duplicate be the same object as the original? Of course not.

>When you lose consciousnesses that continuity ends. Your consciousness is the conscious part of your brain booting up the hardware and memory of your physical mind when you wake up.

Mental states are never fully interrupted. Even when you are sleep, your brain is working and you have a tacit perception of the passage of time and a continuity of personal identity.

>Actually from the point of view of the destination, there is continuity of consciousness.
That depends on what you mean by continuity. There's a causal continuity. The destroyed you caused the copy you's current state of consciousness. The pattern information used to generate the new consciousness of the copy self is never lost. So by that argument, there is continuity. But there's also a discontinuity in consciousness, as consciousness does not exist in it's current form of consciousness, only as a causal relation.

I mostly said that way to tie it in with the idea of the discontinuity of consciousness through unconsciousness. You can actually only confirm consciousness at a single point in time. You can't see into the future, and you can't know if you were conscious in the past.

Why is it not simpler and less problematic to conclude that souls don't exist? Why does everyone act like that is a somehow "greater" paradox than the paradoxes used to disprove the idea of the soul?

As long as the projection remains stable and consistent, the projector can be whatever it may.

>Identical in properties doesn't entail being the same object. Imagine duplication without destruction of the original, would the duplicate be the same object as the original? Of course not.
Yes, they're identical, they share an identity. That's what being identical means. The moment you differentiate between them as having different identities, they are no longer identical.

>Of course not.
You're an idiot. If, along with a copy you, I made a copy of the universe to put the parallel you in a parallel universe, so you could not be distinguished by any external point of reference, and there is no external point of reference, and no means to distinguish one from the other, they are identical, and share an identity property. With no external point of reference you could not determine which one is the original. They are in essence identical. At that point the only identity is a relative one. You are not the other one. But you would have no greater claim to being the original.

The only reason why a copy you is a copy you is because you have an external point of reference which makes the identical bodies not actually identical.

>Mental states are never fully interrupted.
Consciousness.

>Even when you are sleep, your brain is working and you have a tacit perception of the passage of time and a continuity of personal identity.
That exists if you make a copy.

I guess it comes down to how you define 'you' or youness. If 'you' is your physical particular physical body, then teleportation destroys your consciousness and creates another, different one. However if you take youness to be defined by a pattern/arrangement of matter, rather than a particular instance thereof, then the post-teleport retains your consciousness, and is in fact completely you.

>so a senile person is not a real person, got it
memory loss is tragic precisely because it makes an individual lose their experience. I don't think anyone would argue that memory loss doesn't make someone lose part of who they are. My family has a history of Alzheimers and I know precisely how difficult it is to be around someone who has lost a large part of themselves.

When it comes to someone in a coma or something that has complete memory loss, it is true that their 'person,' is lost. Only the physical mark of age, and the scars that prove that their human experience actually happened, still endear friends and family to someone like that.

>you know damn well for the purposes of this discussion they're talking about perfect replication including mental state
I forget I'm not on Veeky Forums, it doesn't actually make any sense for me to talk about mechanics of this hypothetical invention, you're right.

>This is retarded, babies are born as brain-dead rocks...
See, this doesn't make sense to me. Time has passed since babies were brain-dead. It is inferred that they have had decades of experience prior to using this device, which grants them a unique persona, an individual humanity that is different from anyone else's. If they lose this, they are losing their humanity.

This is like destroying a complex sculpture and saying "it was clay in the beginning, and it is still clay" This is true but the complex and irreplaceable structure that was painstakingly created is lost, and even if you spent years reconstructing it you cannot match it completely.

You refuted my claim that experience cannot be replicated from matter without offering any actual reason I could find

>Yes, they're identical, they share an identity.

They are identical in ontologically objective properties relating only to their composition of matter. This does not entail they are the same in their ontologically subjective properties.

>If, along with a copy you, I made a copy of the universe to put the parallel you in a parallel universe,

Looks like the idiot here is you. Why did you bring parallel universes into this? The question was simple: does duplication without destruction creates two "yous" that share the same consciousness? Is the duplicate the same thing as the original? Saying the answer is yes brings a new plethora of problems. Saying the answer is no undermines your position.

>Consciousness.

Consciousness is a mental state

>That exists if you make a copy.

Begging the question

I supposed another way of phrasing the question is:

If you were put in a sealed box vacuum box, and your complete pattern was converted into digital information, then all your matter was vaporized into it's component atoms. Is that matter you?

If we use the digital data that was saved to realign those same atoms that were previously in the form of you to the form of you saved in the data, is that you? Same pattern, same atoms.

There's a continuity in pattern, and a continuity in physical matter, but there's a loss of continuity of that pattern in respect to that set of matter. Death and loss of consciousness is obvious in this case.

Using the term death however is misleading because traditionally when death occurs there is no reconstitution of your body to a living state. Its like how we had to change the definition of death as our ability to revive people whose heart had stopped improved.
If you can put my disintegrated atoms back together have I really died or just suffered a temporary injury with an accompanying bout of unconsciousness?

Why are you people still treating semantics like reality?

It's an entertaining and enlightening diversion.

Why shouldn't we? If we are going to argue anywhere about things that don't exist, Veeky Forums is the best place to do it.

>memory loss is tragic precisely because it makes an individual lose their experience. I don't think anyone would argue that memory loss doesn't make someone lose part of who they are. My family has a history of Alzheimers and I know precisely how difficult it is to be around someone who has lost a large part of themselves.
But they're not a person. Your requirement was EVERY experience as part of the identity property. If I forgot what I ate for lunch yesterday, I'm not me.

>See, this doesn't make sense to me. Time has passed since babies were brain-dead.
This if we take an infinitesimally small time after the creation as delta t approaches zero, time has passed since the copy was a brain dead mass of atoms. Your argument is only that at point t=0, the time when the copy is created, and negative values of t when copy you is just a mass of atoms, is brain dead.

That's what your argument boils down to. All negative values of t are brain dead. All positive values of t have brains. You're simply debating that at point t=0, this is not even a span of time, not a trillionth of a second, but a single point, the point of creation, which side is belongs on.

>This is like destroying a complex sculpture and saying "it was clay in the beginning, and it is still clay" This is true
This is true

>but the complex and irreplaceable structure that was painstakingly created is lost
In the form of clay. It still exists in some form of information. This pattern is just now separate from the clay.

>and even if you spent years reconstructing it you cannot match it completely.
It's matched completely in this hypothetical though experiment. That's the point of the thought experiment. It's not an attempt to say you can't actually make an exact copy of something. The premise is that you can. It isn't, what if it copies you but a little different. The premise is an identical copy.

>You refuted my claim
You offered no real reason for it.

What if you saved their pattern, then let them live in the box for 10 years, then atomized them, then restored them to their saved state. Was their experience of those 10 years just a temporary injury? Whatever happened in those 10 years, gone forever.

>Using the term death however is misleading because traditionally when death occurs there is no reconstitution of your body to a living state. Its like how we had to change the definition of death as our ability to revive people whose heart had stopped improved.
Then the definition of identity needs to adapt as well.

I'm pretty sure your own subjective experience would simply cease to exist i.e. you die during teletransportation.
It's hard to conceive this until we imagine a scenario where teleportation is not instant, where the whole process ends up creating your new teleported self minutes before destroying the original. Since the idea of having two simultaneous experiences is pretty much ridiculous, the teleported being is currently having an experience completely different from your own and thus isn't you. And when the process ends, you die, bye.

>
They are identical in ontologically objective properties relating only to their composition of matter. This does not entail they are the same in their ontologically subjective properties.
You can't prove ontological subjective. By doing this, you're literally just says "that's just my opinion man"

>Why did you bring parallel universes into this?
To make the point clearer, and remove any external points of reference by which to determine which is the original, and because there's more grounds to believe in many-worlds than there is for perfect duplication.

> The question was simple: does duplication without destruction creates two "yous" that share the same consciousness?
No, obviously not. Hence the point that there's a relative difference. You are not the other. It's only this subjective point that can be proved.

> Is the duplicate the same thing as the original?
Yes, at the point in time of the creation. They diverge after that.

>Saying the answer is yes brings a new plethora of problems
No it doesn't. It's a single point in time.

>Saying the answer is no undermines your position.
You're coming at this like the only reasonable answer is no.

>Consciousness is a mental state
Not all mental states are consciousness. Can you even logic?

>Begging the question
It's a premise of any hypothetical where you have a perfect copying device.

So according to you is not you.

what about the Theseus Ship case I mentioned?

>subjective experience
You literally cannot define this. Stop talking until you learn to use real words.

Even if somehow posts of my authorship were "me" for whatever ridiculous reason, then would still not be me.

I was not aware the thought experiment included this many parameters, ensuring all my objections could be waved away.

I'm not entirely sure what possible other stance I could take that would remain a valid viewpoint when your basic question includes guaranteed success as a parameter

My central thesis was that I do not believe there is a way to codify and replicate experience, which I believe is an integral part of the incorporeal abstraction many refer to as the soul. I believe any hypothetical device that claims to do this is a physical impossibility.

I think we were arguing about different things

You can't demonstrate that a "soul" is a necessary part of any existing phenomena.

here u go my bru
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_character_of_experience

Here's the crux of what's being argued, illustrated.

If the red line intersects the black line or not, or if there's a discontinuity, and the red line shares no points that are the same as the black line.

Not (You), but you, as in the property of "you" being discussed.

>You can't prove ontological subjective. By doing this, you're literally just says "that's just my opinion man"

So, you are basically saying consciousness and subjective experience doesn't exist. You are a p-zombie.

>To make the point clearer, and remove any external points of reference by which to determine which is the original, and because there's more grounds to believe in many-worlds than there is for perfect duplication.

Problem is, your example goes against your own case. You said so yourself, "You are not the other one.". Even if my duplicate in a duplicate universe had the same material composition as me, if I died at any point in the original universe I would simply cease to exist. My consciousness would "transfer" to the duplicate, even if he was identical in material composition at the point in time I died. Likewise, duplication and desctrucion would not "transfer" my consciousness into the duplicate, my consciousness would simply irreversibly end, and a new one created.

>Yes, at the point in time of the creation. They diverge after that.

Except its not. It has the same material composition, but it's not the same thing, the original object exists separately, and it's not contingent on the duplicate in any way.

Are two chairs with the exact same material composition the same chair? Two molecules? Two atoms? Two quarks? Your theory of identity is embarrassingly weak.

>Not all mental states are consciousness.

How is this relevant to the argument? Consciousness "arises" from other mental states, thus the causal mechanisms that sustain conscious experience is never fully interrupted in a living person.

>It's a premise of any hypothetical where you have a perfect copying device.

Only if you assume your reductionist theory of identity. Hence, begging the question.

>I was not aware the thought experiment included this many parameters
Then you should read up on the thought experiment moron. It's about if you could create a perfect copy, not assuming that prefect copies are impossible. Why are you so fucking stupid? Recontextualizing the question by bringing in different contexts around the same premise is the standard way of arguing this thought experiment.

>I'm not entirely sure what possible other stance I could take that would remain a valid viewpoint when your basic question includes guaranteed success as a parameter
Because some people believe that a perfect copy would not be you. Are you really this retarded?

>My central thesis was that I do not believe there is a way to codify and replicate experience
Define experience. Because there's a causal relationship between your original you and the copy you.

>soul
Just went full retard.

>>Using the term death however is misleading because traditionally when death occurs there is no reconstitution of your body to a living state. Its like how we had to change the definition of death as our ability to revive people whose heart had stopped improved.
>Then the definition of identity needs to adapt as well.
Yeah our language definitely lacks adequate development in this arena, probably because the hypotheticals being discussed are impossible essentially.

So then we all agree that it doesn't exist, as the definitions provided there demonstrate that it's a paradoxical concept.

> My consciousness would "transfer" to the duplicate, even if he was identical in material composition at the point in time I died. Likewise, duplication and desctrucion would not "transfer" my consciousness into the duplicate, my consciousness would simply irreversibly end, and a new one created.
Mfw I realise you're talking about consciousness like Christians would talk about a soul.

>there's a guy ITT denying the existence of subjective experience

top kek

Not at all. In fact, you are the one making the mistake of thinking consciousness can magically "transfer", like a "soul" would, after duplication.

Weak non-argument anyways.

I don't see where you are going here. The question is not whether the current me is the same me 10 minutes ago. It's whether a being identical to me, physically living, breathing, and thinking side by side right next to me, is actually me.

How did everybody start viewing the soul as a passive observer? Do they not realize that the idea of a soul would not exist if it was passive? The act of speaking about the soul must necessarily be caused by the action of the soul, i.e. the soul must be active.

You are being totally incoherent every time you refer to the soul as something observing/not acting.

le ad hominem face

>So, you are basically saying consciousness and subjective experience doesn't exist.
That's not the point no, but I can see how it came across this way.

>Problem is, your example goes against your own case. You said so yourself
I agree up to this point. What I meant with you tossing subjective out there is that you've given up on objective. You have no way to verify which subjective point of view is objectively true, from either of the resultant identical.

So in your argument are both subjectively true and false in a state of superimposition at the same time? What are you trying to get at "muh subjective"?

>Except its not. It has the same material composition, but it's not the same thing, the original object exists separately, and it's not contingent on the duplicate in any way.
Your assumption is that identity is a singular property, which I don't agree with. An identity is a pattern which many, one or no things may conform with. That is, any non-negative integer, 0, 1, 2, etc. There may be at a point in time, only one thing in the universe that meets the pattern identity criteria. There may be a point in time that no object meets this criteria. There may be a point in time that two things that conform with the identity pattern.

>Are two chairs with the exact same material composition the same chair? Two molecules? Two atoms? Two quarks? Your theory of identity is embarrassingly weak.
My theory of identity is the ability (not your ability, but any inherent property of the object to distinguish itself) to distinguish between the two as identifiably unique. In any teleported scenario, you're going to have the external point of reference of location. If I can't distinguish between two atoms, they are identical. If I can distinguish between two atoms as the one here and the one there, they are not identical.

Its more that consciousness is literally generated by your brain, given its structure and overall state. If you replicate that state elsewhere, the conscious experience of both brains will be identical. In this sense they both 'share' a consciousness.

So consciousness is exactly the same as a soul but it for some reason cannot "transfer" to anything.

cont.

Then the question becomes one of, is location, the external point of reference, part of the identity? You could argue as such, that because the teleporter created a copy of you that is identical in very way except for location, it isn't you because it does not share the same location. But then this means that identity is bound to a particular location.

>How is this relevant to the argument? Consciousness "arises" from other mental states, thus the causal mechanisms that sustain conscious experience is never fully interrupted in a living person.
The teleporter is a causal mechanism. It causes atoms to construct identical states somewhere else.

>Only if you assume your reductionist theory of identity. Hence, begging the question.
I am absolutely okay with a one-to-many identity property as time flows, as I'm someone who is open to the many-worlds theory of the universe, where one-to-many identity is how things work. I think one-to-many still applies even if you simply use many worlds as a though experiment hypothetical.

This is a silly argument. Just because we are unsure if our consciousness survives moment to moment doesn't mean we should accept a definite destruction of continuity through teleportation.

>You have no way to verify which subjective point of view is objectively true, from either of the resultant identical.

The argument is not about "points of view". You're missing the point by a mile when I say "ontologically subjective". Read John Searle.

>What are you trying to get at "muh subjective"?

See above.

>My theory of identity is the ability (not your ability, but any inherent property of the object to distinguish itself) to distinguish between the two as identifiably unique.

So, your view of identiy is a strong verstion of the Identity of Indiscernibles, a view that has plenty of criticism, and plenty of holes in its reasoning.

You seem to think your minoritarian theory of identity is somehow a given and can't be questioned. I view this as absurd.

How did everybody start viewing the soul as a passive observer? Do they not realize that the idea of a soul would not exist if it was passive? The act of speaking about the soul must necessarily be caused by the action of the soul, i.e. the soul must be active.

You are being totally incoherent every time you refer to the soul as something observing/not acting.

>This is a silly argument. Just because we are unsure if our consciousness survives moment to moment doesn't mean we should accept a definite destruction of continuity through teleportation.
If you cannot even prove that something (the continuing self) is real, does its potential destruction really merit worry?
I mean you say definite destruction but you can't prove what you claim is destroyed existed to begin with.

>ontologically subjective
As far as I can tell, you're not using it in a way that supports your argument, and you're just using it as a cop out. If you weren't getting strange conclusions and making up random complications, I'd say the difference is where the line is drawn, but you seem to just bring up random incoherent arguments like claiming you can't make a perfect copy.

>Identity of Indiscernibles
I view a symmetrical universe as supporting, which should be clear from previous posts. I don't see a contradiction. There's just always two bodies that fulfill an identity property, there's only a relative difference. If you want to bring up ontologically subjective, then a single property of identity is inadequate to describe the situation.

No reasonable person can't deny the existence of subjective experience. In fact, subjective experience is the only thing we can be sure exists.

Someone needs to be given the D

That is a non-argument. "Pfft, isn't it obvious?" is not a proof of anything.

>and you're just using it as a cop out.

The fact that you keep bringing this non-argument shows you don't even understand what I mean by ontologically subjective.

>but you seem to just bring up random incoherent arguments like claiming you can't make a perfect copy.

Nice strawman.

>I view a symmetrical universe as supporting, which should be clear from previous posts. I don't see a contradiction.

Nice wikipedia philosophy.
Read this
plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/

It's easy to see why this view is considered as counterintuitive and untenable my most.

It literally is obvious. How do you think you experience the world? How do you think you know anything? What do you think is "you"?

It's truly revolting that some people take absurds views like eliminative materialism seriously.

>How do you think you experience the world?
Senses?
>How do you think you know anything?
Memory?
>What do you think is "you"?
A gross misunderstanding of the will.

>The fact that you keep bringing this non-argument shows you don't even understand what I mean by ontologically subjective.
No, it's the fact that you bring up arguments like clay, EVERY experience, transfer of consciousness and whatnot.

I mean, if your argument was
>identity only exists as an ontologically subjective subjective property and you can not have an objective definition
sure it would be hard to argue with that, you're undermining the premise of the thought experiment which presupposes something can be the same in some sort of objective sense. But you haven't articulated something like that except name dropping "ontologically subjective"

>Nice strawman.
They appear to be your posts, but I could be wrong.

>It's easy to see why this view is considered as counterintuitive and untenable my most.
Many worlds is also considered counter-intuitive. Criticisms of indiscernible rely on the premise that unique identities must exist as a premise. Two sphere is a symmetrical universe. There's no contradictions if you simply see identities as definitional. I know you'll probably say identity is more than definition. You're free to argue that. But if what connects identity through different points in time is causality, then teleporters have causality.

You seem to think that if you name drop enough without articulating your point, you win.

Most reasonable people think metaphysics is stupid.

Also define reasonable people and we in terms of subjective experience.

>Most reasonable people think metaphysics is stupid.
what an ignorant and arrogant statement

But it's true. You're being unreasonable if you think it isn't.

it's not "stupid"
right or wrong it was crucial for the development of philosophy

That doesn't mean that most reasonable people don't think philosophy is stupid.

without philosophy you won't have science and you won't have rights