"Didn't Napoleon let you know? When you conquer Russia, better pack some fucking winter clothes!"

There is so much wrong with OP's image.

The Germans had bigger problems than just cold during Barbarossa, mostly immense equipment losses and gross underestimations of the equipment and manpower the Soviets could muster.

Hitler and the German high command assumed that the Soviet Union only had the equipment and supplies for the equivalent of 150 Divisions. The Soviets mustered up the equivalent of 821 divisions throughout the war, over 7 times the German assumption.

Between gross misinformation regarding manpower and military equipment in the USSR, the Germans also had very little in the way of replacing their own losses, with over 2/3 of their mechanized forces being either destroyed and rendered unusable by November 1941, meaning by the time they were pushing on Moscow, most of the Wehrmacht was hoofing it on foot.

The assumption that cold stopped the Wehrmacht is probably one of the most persistent myths out there despite so much evidence that the Germans were facing dire straights even without the cold biting them.

There is a great video out there listing all the problems that plagued the Wehrmacht, along with all sources and articles used for further readings.

youtube.com/watch?v=A_3R-Rkn_98

OP here. That video was pretty damn good. Never thought about Barbarossa like that. So as you've mentioned the superior numbers mustered by the Soviets, do you think having the Red Army divided across the country by a Japanese strike force would have relieved the pressure on the Wehrmachy?

This.

The Soviet potential was simply underestimated because of the German experience in WW1 where Russia was beaten with relative ease. The German generals were under the impression that they could simply repeat what they did before, except more efficiently on a tactical level.

>Take gulf states
Gulf states (I'm assuming you are talking about the Persian gulf) didn't have much oil until after WW2, and in any case it wouldn't be easier to attack places several times farther away that's across the contested mediterranean.

The Germans and Japanese did communicate and talked about a joint strike against the Soviets from 2 fronts, and it was talked about in the video, but the Japanese were adamant about NOT attacking the Soviet Union, as they were already facing 2 military titans in the from of China, and later the US when they begin their pacific campaign.

most of the basis for the Japanese aversion to pissing off the Soviets came from their disastrous defeat by the Red Army at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, where it became obvious that the Japanese land army was no match for Red Army, and already had so much of their forced tied up fighting China already.

In my opinion, it's probably right that the Japanese already had enough on their plate dealing with the Chinese, that they were mostly unable to muster up enough soldiers and equipment for a serious invasion of the Soviet Far East without sacrificing manpower in China.

Japan did not know anything about Barbarossa until it happened. Your youtube video is retarded and so are you.

It wasn't like they didn't know it got cold in Russia you know. But you have to remember, they're attacking with almost 4 million men. They need enormous amounts of supplies just to keep the advance going, food, fuel, munitions, lubricants, medicine, etc. They had enough trouble supporting their advance as it was, what with the soviets using a different rail gauge system (and blowing up tracks all the time as they retreated, and getting their rolling stock out of the way before the Germans overran it.)

How much of the shit that you don't have enough of right now are you going to throw away to make room for getting everyone winter clothing? Which, by the way, won't make any of your vehicles move any better, so enjoy still having no luftwaffe support or ability to move your armor or halftracks.

Not him, but in real life, the numbers of Soviet troops along the Japanese (well, Japanese occupied Manchurian) border almost doubled from january 1st, 1941, to December 31st, 1942. Contrary to popular myth, they hadn't left things wide open for a Japanese counterattack, and mustering up the kind of force necessary to beat back the Soviets would have meant abandoning China, which is absolutely unthinkable.

obligatory:
youtube.com/watch?v=ClR9tcpKZec

>divided across the country by a Japanese strike force
>Japan tries to attack soviet union
>marches across desolated wasteland without roads and infrastructure
>most importantly no oil that they need so much
>soviets have control over the only railroad to deploy supplies to their own troops

Soviets could have defended against Japan with minimal resources because of how awful the territory was

>It's a myth that Germany didn't prepare for winter.

It's not so much they didn't prep for it, but their armament certainly wasn't designed for winter action, which Hitler mentions in the Mannerheim recording.

>it would have been more successful if russia wasn't a backwater shithole with dirt tracks instead of roads

...

...

people overemphasize the winter thing, far more effective was the soviet skillfull use of operational depth, which nazis somehow didnt realy consider

nazi tactics relied on overwhelming the enemy trough speed, air supremacy and motorized firepower, the whole blitzkrieg thing

this functioned well in places like poland or france, but in a place like russia you cant rely on that working, since no matter how fast or well armed you are eventuialy youll get streched out like chewing gum on bad roads, no roads, lack of fuel, impossible logistics, or even just getting lost in the middle of nowhere etc

basicaly the soviets would mostly just back off, and they always had another couple hundred kilometers to do that, then concentrate forces on important points, nazis didnt always have another couple of hundred gallons of fuel, and no matter how well they blitzkrieged one place they still had to get to another place, and another

this is similar to how they kept getting screwed by yugoslav partisans, somehow they didnt realy get the idea that the enemy can just deny them the fight and move over another hill, or mountain, or mountain range

realy, blitzkrieg was a rather shitty idea all in all, it worked best in developed, industrialised countries, with little or no local guerrila resistance

>this functioned well in places like poland or france, but in a place like russia you cant rely on that working
Germans suffered worse attrition in France. It worked but only because so many things that could have gone wrong went their way.

...

>basicaly the soviets would mostly just back off, and they always had another couple hundred kilometers to do that, then concentrate forces on important points, nazis didnt always have another couple of hundred gallons of fuel,
Lack of fuel is not what slow you down. You hit other bottlenecks much earlier, such as equipment breakdowns and simple attrition. Tanks back then couldn't go 100km without half of your division breaking down.

Must have been demoralizing advancing mile after mile into this shit.

>Soviet human wave meme
Before 1941, the Soviets were outnumbered in most engagements, most notably the Battle of Moscow, in which the outnumbered Russian defenders beat back the Germans handily. Germany just couldn't sustain an offensive deep into Russia, and their elan collapsed as soon as they faced organized resistance.

It always bothers me that people assume the Soviet military leadership were absolute retards that just threw men into a meat grinder until it worked.

and another thing too

dont know how much experience anons have with russian technology, i can tell you its crude and rough but it works and dosent realy have a tendency to break down unless you realy fuck with it

i mean you can hammer nails with after diging it up from mud it and it still wortks

theres a point in this, in that they literaly adapted their technology to the fact they live in russia, because practicaly anything tends to break down once in russia

tiger tanks can be as god-tier as whatever, but once they get stuck and start breaking down and falling apart they are as useles as a wooden cart

>people assume the Soviet military leadership were absolute retards that just threw men into a meat grinder until it worked.
Not that this didn't happen. Zhukov had to issue an order forbidding frontal attacks at one point in 1941.

Once the Russians were on the offensive they did do the human wave thing right?

Someone once told me they had less weapons than soldiers, but that seems a bit unbelievable.

Not him, but no. What they did do was something called Masikrova, elaborate deception plans, which often meant that German forces were out of position to deal with the offensive. Come Bagration in 1944, you had a roughly overall 1.8:1 advantage on the Soviets for the entirety of the front in manpower and a lot of common pieces of kit (not airplanes though).

When they attacked, it was almost always well in excess of this, 5:1 or so at the point of breakthrough. But that was achieved by pinpointing weak spots and overwhelming them, not an endless zerg rush.

And no, they were not using fewer weapons than soldiers. Their divisions, averaging 9,000 people on average, were consuming about 250 tons of supplies every day on the offensive.

>kriegsmarine

kinda hard when your steel reserves are all in Russia

>fucks up invading a then-weaker nation, allowing them time to reverse the gap in capabilities and defeat you

'nah its their fault for not building us roads'

underrated post

>muh russian winter
Winter in Russia is not any colder than anywhere else in Europe (hurr on the same latitude). It was the nigger-tier roads in Russia and the VAST amount of occupied land and stretched lines that caused troubles.

>Masikrova
It's Maskirovka, dude.

You're right, sorry for the typos.

Human wave is a meme concept.
Soviets had a mobility based military doctrine similar to Blitzkreig (hell, it was blitzkreig before blitzkreig considering they've started developing it after first polish disaster) with similar ideas - breakthrough, get behind, encircle, cut off key positions and fuck it all up.
Grinding the enemy down with human waves was not something anyone ever seriously planned on the grand scale because that's retarded and wasteful.
Their doctrine did involve using massed troops but that's just because of the way their army was build. Germans started WW2 with some really well trained divisions before degrading in quality and fielding freshly trained troops (anything Germans fielded after 1939 was worse trained so they couldn't even blitz with those forces the way they used to), soviets didn't have that luxury.
They also had trouble implementing the doctrine at times because of the Purges and Stalin did try to meddle into military decisions on a few occasions. That caused increased military losses, but as WW2 went on they've learned and developed it really well. In addition they've dedicated a lot of time to studying German military art (I actually remember reading about some captured german general giving lectures to Russian commanders) bringing them even closer to blitzkrieg.

Truth be told the winter is different in Russia due to the fact that their landmass is further away from oceans and as such the winters are actually colder.

>realy, blitzkrieg was a rather shitty idea all in all

Something rarely mentioned is the school of thought coming out of WWI that artillery had been proven obsolete by the tank and mechanization in general.

>In spite of shell-power and motorization, the great artillery battles were a grim and costly failure. The answer to the tactical stalemate had been sought in tonnage of projectiles, but its true answer was to be found in surprise and the maintenance of forward movement.

Early WWII is full of occasions in which all sides are forced to rethink it, nor did any belligerent have purpose-built anti-tank guns at the beginning of the war

British in North Africa;
>The weapon which we need out here is a self-propelling gun. It must have speed so that it can dash in and fight the enemy panzers and then dash away again. It is the obvious successor to the tank itself. The gun is more important in modern war than the tank.

>The Royal Artillery considers that guns are already so far ahead of tanks that no new armored vehicle can be satisfactorily developed during this war that could regain superiority. The artillery piece has completely gained the whip-hand over the tank. The armored vehicle is helpless in the face of a properly handled gun. This superiority has come to stay. The tank must await an infantry break-through to get an enemy soft spot and is no longer the assault weapon that it was designed to be in the first World War and a role that it filled early in this one.

Then we see the Second Battle of El Alamein begin with a five and a half hours of artillery bombardment and creeping barrages throughout.

Roosevelt to Congress in 1943;
>In tank production we revised our schedule-and for good and sufficient reasons. As a result of hard experience in battle, we have diverted a portion of our tank producing capacity to a stepped-up production of new, deadly field weapons, especially self-propelled artillery.

How much colder would it be from German winter tho?

Muh Russian winter is a meme. Along with muh human waves and muh Hitler didn't listen to his generals are other ones that Wehraboos use to excuse German defeat.

This is a pretty good vid from an actual historian explaining:
youtube.com/watch?v=I98P1AxQRUM

>realy, blitzkrieg was a rather shitty idea all in all

Something rarely mentioned is the school of thought coming out of WWI that artillery had been proven obsolete by the tank and mechanization in general. Early WWII is full of occasions in which all sides are forced to rethink it, nor did any belligerent have purpose-built anti-tank guns at the beginning of the war.

British Major General Fuller (early proponent of armored warfare) in 1931;

>In spite of shell-power and motorization, the great artillery battles were a grim and costly failure. The answer to the tactical stalemate had been sought in tonnage of projectiles, but its true answer was to be found in surprise and the maintenance of forward movement.

British in North Africa;

>The weapon which we need out here is a self-propelling gun. It must have speed so that it can dash in and fight the enemy panzers and then dash away again. It is the obvious successor to the tank itself. The gun is more important in modern war than the tank.

>The Royal Artillery considers that guns are already so far ahead of tanks that no new armored vehicle can be satisfactorily developed during this war that could regain superiority. The artillery piece has completely gained the whip-hand over the tank. The armored vehicle is helpless in the face of a properly handled gun. This superiority has come to stay. The tank must await an infantry break-through to get an enemy soft spot and is no longer the assault weapon that it was designed to be in the first World War and a role that it filled early in this one.

Then we see the Second Battle of El Alamein begin with a five and a half hours of artillery bombardment and creeping barrages throughout.

But we also see similar bombardments at the outset of battles like Gazala, which didn't go so well for the Brits, and Battleaxe also had a large artillery barrage. Hell, El Alamein is usually considered won when Rommel's trademark "dash south with panzers and cut up to the left somewhere" failed due to dug in ATGs, and not due to field guns at all.

And yeah, it wasn't used as an assault weapon (or at least not that often or successfully) but that breakthrough, the ability to attack the second echelon behind the tactical phase of operations, was one of the big changes between WW1 and WW2, and a lot of that is attributable to the tank and the halftrack.

I'm not so sure relying on British tactical analysis, especially early war tactical analysis when they were several steps behind the Heer, is such a great idea.

Roosevelt to Congress in 1943;

>In tank production we revised our schedule-and for good and sufficient reasons. As a result of hard experience in battle, we have diverted a portion of our tank producing capacity to a stepped-up production of new, deadly field weapons, especially self-propelled artillery.

Artillery was one of the few areas the Soviets had superiority in, and both the Battle of Kiev and later Moscow saw German armor stopped and overwhelmed by artillery. During the Bulge, Elsenborn Ridge was the only sector of the American lines where the Germans failed to advance, despite the best German armored units being committed there, because American artillery happened to positioned there.

1941 happened to be a record cold year.

>Artillery was one of the few areas the Soviets had superiority in

Numerically, they had superiority in almost all fields of kit at the outset of the war. They also were decidedly tactically inferior until 43-44, and that artillery advantage often ended with lots and lots of guns getting overrun.

>and both the Battle of Kiev and later Moscow saw German armor stopped and overwhelmed by artillery.

[citation seriously needed]

Especially since Typhoon barely had any tanks remaining operational by the time they got to Moscow itself, and were mostly worn down fighting nearly 3 times their opposite number in Soviet armor.

>latitude is the only thing that determines climate
Western Europe is maritime and has mild winters. Russia is continental climate and has harsh winters.

Yeah, after WW2, the oil just magically appeared there.

kek

>I'm not so sure relying on British tactical analysis, especially early war tactical analysis when they were several steps behind the Heer, is such a great idea.
Germans didn't use the tank as a breakthrough weapon either. From the beginning it was up to the infantry to achieve the breakthrough, which the tank would exploit.

>Germans didn't use the tank as a breakthrough weapon either. From the beginning it was up to the infantry to achieve the breakthrough, which the tank would exploit.

>And yeah, it wasn't used as an assault weapon (or at least not that often or successfully) but that breakthrough, the ability to attack the second echelon behind the tactical phase of operations, was one of the big changes between WW1 and WW2, and a lot of that is attributable to the tank and the halftrack.

At least in the sort of stuff I've usually read, the "breakthrough" phase is defined not as the part of breaking through the initial line of resistance (although I can see why you'd equate the two), but actually moving past it, and starting to chew up whatever is behind that line of resistance. But that is what I meant, hence saying things like "the ability to attack the second echelon behind the tactical phase of operations". The tank's primary purpose was to get behind the main enemy frontal position and go after softer targets.

But if the oil isn't discovered? If the infrastructure for drilling it and transporting it isn't there?

Yeah all Germany had to do was develop the tech to drill for oil, send the equipments and engineers, build oil fields, build tankers that can ship the oil back, and send the oil back home to Germany.

Of course they are doing this after building a large enough fleet to defeat the Royal Navy and subdue Gibraltar, and building up a merchant marine to ship multiple divisions to the Gulf region and keep them supplied.

Don't forget getting to or past Suez (or all the way around Africa!), which historically, they never quite managed, or in fact got anywhere close to doing.

>But that is what I meant, hence saying things like "the ability to attack the second echelon behind the tactical phase of operations". The tank's primary purpose was to get behind the main enemy frontal position and go after softer targets.
That's what it says in 's quote:
> The tank must await an infantry break-through to get an enemy soft spot
It just uses 'infantry breakthrough' as a shorthand for 'infantry setting conditions for a breakthrough'

If they wiped the sea of the Royal Navy, taking Suez should be a synch.

Why aren't they just taking Caucasus when they are this powerful?

>If the Germans didn't fucking go full autist and just tried to rebuild the country after the Great War

Reminder they started the war by just doing that.
In a sense, trying to get back the lands stripped from them after WW1 could be counted as "rebuilding"

from a certain point of view

The Soviet return after 1942/3 fucked Germans through all the seasons, so I highly doubt a lack of preparedness for winter was the only thing that explains their loss.

Yes, but that doesn't necessarily mean that artillery>Armor, which is what I was going for.

They're two entirely different weapons systems with entirely different battlefield roles, and expecting them to perform each other's duty is kind of ridiculous.

Artillery is usually a tactical weapon. Armor is usually an operational weapon. Without artillery, you're going to have a devil of a time making a breakthrough anywhere at all. Without armor though, you're probably going to see a lot of repeating of WW1 style "oh today we advanced 2 miles, now tomorrow we get to try to do it all over again!" as the enemy can react forces into place quickly enough to prevent rapid advance and getting at their tails.

>C&C Kirov
>tracksuit squat
>breeki bandit
>that deformed heavy

>It always bothers me that people assume the Soviet military leadership were absolute retards that just threw men into a meat grinder until it worked.

The K/D ratio is still largely in favor of Germans in almost every battle, even when they loose at the end

>why does an army that launches a surprise attack then defend for the rest of the war have a higher K:D ratio?

Yeah, so what ?

Are you retarded?

>Germans perform better on the tactical level when attacking
>of course they would, it's only logical
>Germans perform better on the tactical level when defending
>well of course, that's where the natural advantage is

Or maybe Russians are crap soldiers.

>It always bothers me that people assume the Soviet military leadership were absolute retards that just threw men into a meat grinder until it worked.

In the early phase of the war every military command had an NKVD officer watching the generals' every move.
If anybody decided on a course of action that didn't sound like 'hold this position at all costs' or 'charge on a wide front, drive back the fascists' the NKVD tended to get shooty/Gulagy, which crippled military leadership.

It wasn't until STAVKA convinced Stalin to stop fucking with the bulk of military decisions and to keep the NKVD on a tighter leash that the Russian military could operate with tactical/strategic inventiveness the Eastern front craved. And boy, Deep Operations and maskirovka sure did work.

Of course, Stalin still fucked with the course of the war somewhat, which lead to a number of unsuccessful broad-front offensives.

>defending army is poorly prepared while invading army is well prepared
>invading army is well prepared and defending army is also well prepared

One should plan for something that was known for a long time, happen every year, and even has a name, Rasputitsa.

>"No russians didn't mindlessly send their soldiers to death, they were good at tactics, and German had often the advantage at numbers!"
Then I point out the superior German K/D
>"It's just because germans had better surprise attack and defense xDD You retarded"

Just fuck off you stupid vatnik

Well, the Russians always had a larger tank park, more planes, more artillery, and more troops than the Germans.

They just sucked.

>always
Not always, for example not during the start of Barbarossa.

P.S. they won.

>not during the start of Barbarossa

user, the Russians had the largest military on earth at the start of Barbarossa.

Not him, but the German* forces outnumbered the Soviets at the outset of Barbarossa by about 4:3.

I'm counting German allied troops as with the Germans, they weren't all ethnically German.

>Winter in Russia is not any colder than anywhere else in Europe
>Winter in Russia is not any colder
>Russia is not any colder
>not any colder
kys

...

Average winter temp in Berlin: 6 C
Average winter in Moscow: -13 C
Average winter in Volgograd (stalingrad): -16 C

get educated

you

idiot

LOOK AT THIS BIG NAO FLUCTUATION IN THE EARLY 40'S AND CHOKE ON IT YOU SLUT

I swear to god it's like most of you slept through high school geography. (protip look at the light blue bar which records winter temperatures)

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1256/wea.248.04/pdf

This tbqh.

- - - average
____ 1941/42

>recover lands stripped from them in WW1

>Austria
>Sudaten

In case you're such a brainlet you don't even know what a NAO is

I agree lad, statistics are a marxist SJW meme