So why exactly were the Ottomans involves in WW1 and how large was their role? They don't teach this shit in school

Their total GDP was a quarter of Italy's, not their GDP per capita, sorry.

Seriously. How the Germans thought that form alliance with two Empires in process of liquefaction in order of declare war at the majors power of the world was good idea?

Kind of a no choice deal since britain and france werent really going to tollerate a rising power right next to them who was also being an ass to them.

yep, its the gallipoli campaign if i am not mistaken

great war channel does an overlook at best, i wouldn't take their views as unbiased
i remember watching their video on armenian genocide. they used a picture of turkish children killed by armenians in 1918 the eastern front of the turkish independence war for the 1915 events, idk if that was banter but holy kek

Because Germany was an absolute monarchy and Wilhelm was a fucking retard

Wilhelm did nuffin wrong!

Turk seem to be decent at war with a strong leader( eg. Ataturk or German commanders assiting them in the few battles they won in ww1) but otherwise seem to melt away to their usual degenerate opium indulging roach ways

They had no reason to join the war except lust for power, the only reason they joined is the acts of the Young Turk Party.

Also they held off the allies pretty well.The Russian front was gone because revolution. They won Gallipoli and humiliated the British in Iraq at the Siege of Kut. If the Germans didnt surrender I reckon they could've continued fighting despite their lack of manpower.

Germany was not an absolute monarchy, and it wasn't just Wilhelm. These delusions permeated all elements of the German government, military and civilian

>Young Turks are miseducated cunts in every stage of history

The worst part about this meme is that it purposely leaves out the events of July 29-31 in order to make Germany the aggressor.

No declaration of war or invasion happened between july 28 and august 1 though
Germany was the agressor

I'm glad to see you missed the point entirely. Russia and France mobilized first with the intent to go to war. Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia to cease mobilization to prevent war which was refused. The idea that Germany was in any way an aggressor and not offensively defending itself is a meme. I don't even know why Veeky Forums continually spouts it. It's common historiography.

Mobilization is not a legitimate casus belli. A country has to accept another country mobilizing, as long as it doesn't actually attack, just like how someone wouldn't be allowed to just shoot anyone that buys a gun, even if he might buy it with the intent to harm you.

"Offensively defending" by rushing ahead an invasion without there even being a transgression yet is just the same thing as attacking.
It is not self-defense.

A man stands in front of you with a firearm and loads it. A man stands behind you with a firearm and loads it as well. You know that once their firearms are loaded they're going to shoot you. Would shooting first not be self-defense? Is Han shooting Greedo unjustified? That's what Germany faced on August 1, 1914.

>They had no reason to join the war except lust for power
ottomans didn't join the war to gain territory, they joined for self-preservation

>Would shooting first not be self-defense?

It wouldn't, as you and your pal are currently beating up the two men's friend.

>as you and your pal
Their friend just killed my buddies nephew in cold blood.

Germany ordered the mobilization on the 31st, but Austria already partially mobilized on the 25th ("Kriegsfall Balkan").

Wouldn't therefore Russia and France as Russia's ally be legitimized in responding to the Austrian mobilization?

Germany mobilized in response to Russian mobilization, not the other way around.

Yeah, and Russia mobilized in response to Austria, not the other way around.

But they did not fail in most of their engagements, they did not make any offense either. I think their entrance just made Allies to send more troops to weird places around the globe. If you think about it Gallipoli is basically a distraction from the real war.

And they did not disintegrate during the war. At least not early enough in the war to have any significant effect. I think there's like a few weeks in between their armstices.

As for the reasons, I think they were trying to get back what they've lost during Balkan Wars and also get back Egypt or restore authority over Middle East. Also I think some of the people in government were already rooting for Germany even before the war, seeing them as their gate to westernization efforts, and Germany was in need of allies.

>they did not make any offense either
Correction, they did conduct some offensive operations but what I meant was they did not make any progress in these operations.

They tried and utterly failed to seize the Suez Canal
Also they were effectively knocked out of the war by 1918.

Russia unilaterally mobilizing against Austria to support Serbia set off the war. The French were forced to mobilize due Article 2 of the 1892 Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention:

"2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers."

No formal treaty between Russia and Serbia, thus no casus foederis, ergo no casus belli since mobilization isn't a "legitimate casus belli".

>They tried and utterly failed to seize the Suez Canal
I did correct it afterwards.

>Also they were effectively knocked out of the war by 1918.
Which is the year the war ended, what is your point? Armistice with Germany was signed on 11th of November in 1918, Ottomans signed theirs on 30th of October.

Why cut the line at sending out the order of mobilization? Why not cut it at weapon imports and manufacturing? That's already "loading the gun" to me.

"Preemptive defense" or "offensive defense" might as well start there, giving everyone the right to invade Germany in 1890 or so.

>No formal treaty between Russia and Serbia, thus no casus foederis, ergo no casus belli since mobilization isn't a "legitimate casus belli".
Mobilization isn't a legitimate casus belli and doesn't require one to be legitimate, but actually declaring war is a legitimate casus belli.

Russia also warned the Austrians thrice (on the 7th, 16th and 18th) that they would intervene. A warning in which a guarantee for independence is given is a legitimate casus foederis.

>"Preemptive defense" or "offensive defense" might as well start there, giving everyone the right to invade Germany in 1890 or so.
Especially consider the German naval race with Britain. Germany building the ships would amount to "loading the gun".

Where is the "turkish" namefaggot shitposter, why isn't he shitposting?

lynched by kurds hopefully.

checked

What did Azerbaijan do in ww1? They were involved with the ottomans I think.
I've be getting interested in the more minor belligerents

Literally did not exist.

>actually declaring war is a legitimate casus belli

For Serbia, yes. For Russia, not really.

>A warning in which a guarantee for independence
>Implying Serbia was going to be annexed

Could have simply been Austrians forcing Serbia to accept the Ultimatums.

inb4 Austrian representatives = occupation = annexation

>warning
>legitimate casus foederis
>no treaty

Does not heeding a warning constitute a casus belli in and of itself? Do good relations between countries automatically grant alliance status and thus an obligation to come to their aid?

No treaty, no casus foederis. It's that simple.

>Could have simply been Austrians forcing Serbia to accept the Ultimatums.
The terms of the ultimatum were unreasonable to the point of being the same as relinquishing sovereignty, which even the Austrians themselves knew and intended:
> „Wie immer die Serben reagieren – Sie müssen die Beziehungen abbrechen und abreisen; es muss zum Krieg kommen“.

The Serbs also actually complied with the terms of the ultimatum regarding the investigation, except for the usage of Austrian officials, which would violate their sovereignty. Even the Germans perceived the reply of the Serbs as being accommodating. Wilhelm himself called it a "Kapitulation demütigster Art" (capitulation of the most humble kind).

Furthermore, they planned to make them cede a shitload of territory. The Austrians plans were known to everyone involved, because Austrian diplomats from the London embassy fucked up and let the British know.

>Does not heeding a warning constitute a casus belli in and of itself? Do good relations between countries automatically grant alliance status and thus an obligation to come to their aid?
What do you think the purpose of a treaty is?
What do think guarantees are and what they require?

>If the Germans didnt surrender I reckon they could've continued fighting despite their lack of manpower.

They were getting rolled up in Palestine and Mesopotamia by 1918, if only because Enver was trying to claim land in the Caucasus instead of using the manpower to actually shore up defenses to the south

>guarantee independence
>sovereignty

And the goalposts have shifted. So you are equating a temporary relinquishment of sovereignty to an annexation? Does losing territory mean the Serbian state would cease to exist?

>What do you think the purpose of a treaty is?

I take it that by omitting to actually answer these questions you agree that the correct answer would be "no" to my questions.

As for the purpose of a written treaty, it is to explicitly lay out the terms of the commitments two or more states have agreed to in writing. Must I also list out the benefits of having it in writing as opposed to just being an oral contract?

An oral guarantee is well, simply a promise to act to uphold certain conditions. The least you could require is that in be in writing, lest a party be aggrieved in some way or another. Clearly stipulating the aforementioned conditions in writing tends to obstruct possible behavior done in bad faith or outright reneging on responsibilities. It also serves as evidence to third parties of the reality and the binding characteristics of said relationship. Otherwise, we're merely left with conjecture. Conjecture that is prone to being conveniently rationalized to suit one's position.

Again, no treaty = no casus foederis = no cassus belli. Try not to stray too far from the point.

>it's a "Germany dindu nuffin he a good boi" episode

Ottomans was this nation ruled by 8 people.

>So you are equating a temporary relinquishment of sovereignty to an annexation?
I'm equating that to dependence, not annexation. Dependence can take various forms, like you being ruled by a puppet government or being prevented to persecute criminals in your own territory the way you want. The Russians warned the Austrians not to violate Serbia's political autonomy.

Does losing territory mean the Serbian state would cease to exist?
No, but if you take a country and balkanize it to the point of it being reduced to one city, it might as well.

Hoyos actually wanted to make Serbia cease exist ("völlige Aufteilung").
In a ministerial session on the 19th, the Austrians decided not to annex anything and just grant most of Serbia's territory to neighbouring countries, but the Russians couldn't have known that for sure.
On the 29th, a communique was sent from the Austrians to the British that the Austrians wouldn't know what they would do to Serbia in the case that they won, so annexation was still quite possible.

In the first place, I'm wondering why you care so much about whether there was an intent specifically to annex, when most people already consider a violation of territorial integrity enough of a reason to go to war.

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>As for the purpose of a written treaty, it is to explicitly lay out the terms of the commitments two or more states have agreed to in writing.
And the unilateral version of that is a memorandum, like the one sent by Russia that told the Austrians "if you attack Serbia, we will intervene".

>An oral guarantee is well, simply a promise to act to uphold certain conditions.
One of the first things any law student all over the world learns is that oral commitments matter (although they're hard to provide evidence for and international law has higher barriers than civil law), but in the case of the Russians warning the Austrians, they sent it to them written down. Thrice.

>Again, no treaty = no casus foederis = no cassus belli.
I'm wondering what's your source of law for that is, considering that there were no iura ad bellum until after WWI.

>I'm equating that to dependence, not annexation.
Yet again goalposts move ever more. So was Russian intervention due to: a) independence, b) unviolable sovereignty c)territorial integrity or d) no Austrian interference in Serbian political autonomy(but Russian is ok I suppose)

Keep in mind, this should still have some sort of "legitimate" casus belli. Remember, this all started due to:

>Mobilization is not a legitimate casus belli

>No, but if you take a country and balkanize it to the point of it being reduced to one city, it might as well.

So are we going to discuss figuratively or precisely? Do you enjoy leaving things up to interpretation when sovereignty and war is at stake?

>In the first place, I'm wondering why you care so much about whether there was an intent specifically to annex, when most people already consider a violation of territorial integrity enough of a reason to go to war.

Territorial integrity of Serbia, yes. Not of Russia. Again, we are discussing the validity of Russian unilateral mobilization against Austria, not Serbia having the right to defend its own sovereignty.

>And the unilateral
So you agree it was a unilateral mobilization? Ergo no casus foederis?

>(although they're hard to provide evidence for and international law has higher barriers than civil law.

Again, >>Does not heeding a warning constitute a casus belli in and of itself?

>I'm wondering what's your source of law for that is, considering that there were no iura ad bellum until after WWI

>Mobilization is not a legitimate casus belli. This might not even have been you but this has been the matter at hand. Why even bring up much less expect "legitimate casus belli" in the first place (aka anachronistic and retroactive application of international law)? By applying this logic, then my position is that Russia is at fault. If we agree that playing the casus belli game is retarded then there is no discussion to be had.

derped

>Mobilization is not a legitimate casus belli.

This might not even have been you but this has been the matter at hand. Why even bring up much less expect "legitimate casus belli" in the first place (aka anachronistic and retroactive application of international law)? By applying this logic, then my position is that Russia is at fault. If we agree that playing the casus belli game is retarded then there is no discussion to be had.

>So was Russian intervention due to: a) independence, b) unviolable sovereignty c)territorial integrity or d) no Austrian interference in Serbian political autonomy
My initial claim was that the Russians intervened to preserve Serbian political autonomy, which I equate to independence. I use that wording because that's the wording in the warnings to Austria ("politische Selbstständigkeit").

The territorial integrity issue was an addendum, which is marked by the word "furthermore".

>(but Russian is ok I suppose)
Since when is joining a war on your side a violation of your political autonomy? That sounds like anything that in any way impacts Serbia politically, like someone signing a trade agreement with a third party 5000 miles away, is that.

>validity of Russian unilateral mobilization against Austria, not Serbia having the right to defend its own sovereignty.
I think you mean "legitimacy", not "validity". Validity would be a pretty low bar.

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>So you agree it was a unilateral mobilization? Ergo no casus foederis?
Unilateral mobilization yes, no casus foederis no.
Guarantees can be given unilaterally or multilaterally and they give the guarantor a casus foederis towards the guarantee, but not the other way around. You're right in the observation that this certainly isn't the traditional alliance (foedus), but I would still call what Russia gets through the guarantee and Serbia being attacked a casus foederis. If it's not that, there's still a casus belli, just with a different name. If you can think of a more fitting term to describe the case, I'll use it.

>Why even bring up much less expect "legitimate casus belli" in the first place (aka anachronistic and retroactive application of international law)?
I think the fundamental disagreements are about what constitutes "starting the war" and when it is justified to intervene militarily.

You say Russia is "at fault", which doesn't sound like a mechanistic causal description, which could go further than the Russian guarantee and trace the responsibility back to the Austrian ultimatum, or assassination of Franz Ferdinand, or the determinants that brought about the desire to assassinate him (Serbian nationalism after the Balkan Wars), and so on, until the Big Bang.

Rather, you're saying that Germany was allowed to declare war (that it was a legitimate casus belli and therefore Germany is not at fault), because you're attributing some sort of unjustified action to Russia: Either the mobilization, or the military assistance from the guarantee.
You claim that Russia is not allowed to mobilize without there being a casus belli (the casus foederis being only one possible casus belli), and you claim that Russia doesn't have a casus belli due to there being no formal treaty signed (at least AFAIK).
Am I correctly describing your position so far?

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Didn't exist idiot

>My initial claim...
So we were arguing semantics for? Basically none of these reasons constitute a "legitimate casus belli". Or that's my argument at least, since all these points are infringing upon the sovereignty of an "ally", to which Russia had zero de jure obligations.

>Since when is joining a war on your side a violation of your political autonomy?
>Implying Russians had no involvement in the lead up to WW1 until just before mobilizing

Dimitar Rizov, Nikolai Hartwig, Pan-Slavism, etc. Unless we now drop figurative language and adhere to strict definitions and terminology. Still not quite sure which one is deemed appropriate at this point.

>Validity would be a pretty low bar.
A validity to justify a casus belli legitimacy for mobilization which would in turn escalate the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Which it did not have. The bar has been pretty clear the whole time.

>Unilateral mobilization yes, no casus foederis no.
Guarantees can be given unilaterally or multilaterally and they give the guarantor a casus foederis towards the guarantee, but not the other way around. You're right in the observation that this certainly isn't the traditional alliance (foedus), but I would still call what Russia gets through the guarantee and Serbia being attacked a casus foederis. If it's not that, there's still a casus belli, just with a different name. If you can think of a more fitting term to describe the case, I'll use it.

Aaand here's the crux of the argument. My position is that due to it being a de facto unilateral guarantee does not constitute the grounds for invoking a casus foederis, and thus a "legitimate casus belli". Be my guest if you wish to adscribe a term for this sort of situation, because I hold no interest in playing the blame game but mocking the endeavor entirely.

>attributing some sort of unjustified action to Russia

The mobilization, which is the origin of this conversation.

>You claim that Russia is not allowed to mobilize

They can mobilize, but that mobilization cannot be considered casus foederis, due to it being entirely unilateral in nature, unlike the French mobilization (which is a clear case of casus foederis). This was my main point, that 1) the French had a justified mobilization and that 2) Russian mobilization was not a casus foederis mobilization and had no de jure justification (in jus ad bellum) to do so.

>Am I correctly describing your position so far?
Yes, apart from the clarifications.

>german be a gud boy didnu nothin
fucking lol

There was a conflict between Comitee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki) and the Padisah on the issue of involving into the possible war. Even Ittihad ve Terakki was not convinced to get into war totally. Talat Pasha was fool heartedly went onto it but the other fractions in the Comitee (including ataturk and Cemal Pasha) were in the opposition. The leader of Young Turk Revolution (II. Meshrutiyyet) Enver Pasha was not sure about this issue but Talaat Pasha had a very high influence on him.

Leaving those things apart, in fact, Ottomans were forced into a war by Germans. They sent two german ships, namely, Goeben and Breslau to the Mediterranean sea. Ottoman Empire then took this two ships into its navy and changed their names as Yavuz and Midilli. Those ships attacked to Russian docks by the order of Germans, out of the will of the Padishah. The Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau gave Talaat Pasha an opportunity to put his efforts on his thesis that 'the war was inevitable and if we lag in involving to, we will miss the potential benefits'. He also proposed that it might actually give a chance to the Ottoman Empire to gain the lost territories in Balkans or Middle East.

The gossips of oil reserves in Mousul (It was proposed by abdulhamid II) was the second theory about motivation of war.

The majority of Ottoman intellectual were against the war and also Ittihad and Terakki but Talaat Pasha organized a fake coup to shut them down. The war also provided him to increase his powers.

t.turk

BLANK CHEQUE
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They heard that Australia and New Zealand needed to create national identities, so they volunteered to have a big battle at Gallipoli so that Australians and New Zealanders could learn about mateship, courage, sacrifice and so on.