Nazis held the numerical superiority in '41 and still failed to beat the Red Army.
Why did they cry so much about the numbers? At peak Soviet Union had only 2:1 numerical superiority against them, it's not even that bad considering the fact that in terms of quality(equipment, tactical prowess) German army had the advantage.
Yeah, till Hitler sacked his commanders and started making strategic calls himself. He should stuck to speeches
This, Hitler (simply put) thought he was Julius fucking Caesar and tried to command his armies as well as control his nation, which we all know is usually too much for one man alone.
It would have been an even more extreme stomping had the 1930's soviet purges hadn't gutted the command of the red army
And how could it have went differently?
I guess we will all agree that after failed Nazi had no chance of beating Soviet Union as it became a war of attrition where the USSR has natural advantage(even after losing territory with 70 mil people). But what did Hitler do so wrong to fuck up Barbarossa? That he refused to immediately push to Moscow after they took Smolensk? Army Group Centre would simply get outflanked and destroyed.
How many nations were Germany fighting at the time?
How much support was the Soviets getting from FDR?
>I have no idea what I'm talking about, the Post
The Soviets weren't getting any direct aid from the U.S. until U.S. entry into the war in December 1941.
And the Germans had effectively closed all fronts they were fighting on when they opened the Eastern Front, except North Africa, to which they committed a piddling 2 divisions.
Meanwhile, the Soviets were also fighting more than one nation.
>How many nations were Germany fighting at the time?
Considering that like two thirds of the Wehrmacht was on the eastern front, they weren't really that pressured on the western front until the latter part of the war. They were already pouring most of their resources into the east.
>How much support was the Soviets getting from FDR?
Not enough to have made a huge difference.
Because wehraboos and Neo-Nazis cannot admit that their boys lost do to incompetence
>Nazis held the numerical superiority in '41 and still failed to beat the Red Army.
You seem to forget that the Red Army rapidly amassed far more men than the Axis could after the initial invasion.
A large portion of the Axis force was also made up of shit-tier Romanians and Hungarians with old equipment.
At the outset of Barbarossa, it was way more than 2/3, more like 85%. More if you don't count static formations (garrisons and the like).
and to support the FDR stuff, see pic related.
The Red Army outnumbered German forces on the ground more significantly after Stalingrad. Kursk saw 4:1 in troops, with an overwhelming advantage in aircraft and artillery.
But this advantage was totally due to poor planning and intelligence on the part of the Germans. They insisted on keeping huge divisions in France, Germany, and Scandinavia well before D-Day, even though neither the US nor Britain were ready for an invasion of Europe yet.
Hitler's disregard for military advice, paired with his absolute power over the German government, hugely hindered the war effort. I assume that Nazi racial theories also played a role. Many German leaders believed Russians were so inferior that they would not be able to win.
>Kursk saw 4:1 in troops
No it wasn't even 3:1 but I agree at that point the numerical superiority of the Red Army just got unbearable.
It's not like you can win 1v2-3 for a long time even with a superior army.
I would point out that
A) Soviet advantages in particular pushes in terms of men, aircraft, artillery, etc., generally exceeded their overall ratios of said assets even when only working on what was available on the Eastern Front. It's operational superiority, not strategic superiority.
B) By around the same time of Kursk, you had significant deployments to stop the very real Anglo-American forces in Italy, as well as places they could easily springboard to from Italy. While not as big as the forces later hitting France, 22 divisions is no joke, especially since most of your Italian forces recently dissolved and someone has to pick up their garrison duties.
C) A lot of the forces sent West (initially, at any rate) were 'static'. They had extremely little logistical support allocated to them, and they often weren't trained to fight in larger formations. They were garrison and peacekeeping forces, by and large, and would have had little utility on the Eastern Front.
Plus, you know, you kind of need to keep occupied countries occupied, or they start not working for you (what little they are doing) and opening the gates for enemies and all sorts of inconvenient crap.
>Nazis held the numerical superiority in '41
Not towards the end of the year
The red army had limitless reserves of manpower. The wehrmacht killed/captured close to 5 million men and thousands of tanks and guns. After smolensk and kiev they just didn't have the time to deal the final blow before winter set on. Not to mention the lines of supply were now stretching further.
Red army deserves credit too. They stiffened when they were on the brink though I think even with the capture of Moscow the Germans could not have held it (probably a Stalingrad situation).
Case blue was pretty much the same deal just with a more catastrophic result. And by then lend lease was underway.
Hitler's failures are overblown by revisionist generals. A straight drive to Moscow would have left huge pockets of Soviet men in the rear. Barbarossa was ambitious as all hell. The problem was waging a war along racial lines and not ideological (anticommunist).
Still the soviets were likely too far along with industrialization and simply had too much manpower for Germany to overcome in expecting a quick victory.
Has there been a better depiction of the war?
You absolutely can if your enemies are tactically incompetent.
By most accounts, Soviet strategy was better than German strategy.
This is generally true, but you're missing the forest for the trees.
The biggest German strategic error was trying to conquer the Soviet Union in the first place.
Relevant.
...
Quite probably, although their very long term prospects against the West alone also don't look so good; if nothing else, the atomic bomb comes along in 1945 and starts really fucking them up.
Also, regarding strategy in general; your usual definition is one of rationally applying resources to achieve aims. The Nazi aim of removing the USSR and repopulating a lot of its territory with Germans is unlikely to succeed no matter how well its resources are applied. Whenever you have at one hand closely held but on the other hand unattainable aims, most calculation tools start to break down. Al-Queda's stated goal of removing U.S. influence from middle-east politics is probably even less likely than Germany's goal of annihilating the USSR; does that make Al-Queda strategy non-rational, and its pursuit of such (strikes against the Cole and WTC?) strategic errors?
Operations! Not strategy!
The Soviets lost twice as many soldiers even though they had a huge defensive advantage. No amount of mental gymnastics will change that. The Red army was shit.
The overwhelming casualties on both sides were caused when the soviets were attacking, not on Citadel itself, idiot.
More than likely. We've seen what the Russian winter does to invading armies, and it probably would have been magnified if the Soviets weren't making do with what they had, not to mention the absolute madmannery that was Berlin.
I've read the Soviet German War document linked here previously, and it did not say anything significant to deny the general nature of poor Soviet performance in 1941 due to poor commanders and political interference, a relative failure of the 1942 winter offensive despite success at Moscow, Soviet victory at Stalingrad and Kursk despite casualties at Kursk, and that the Germans were eventually outfought by the Russians. It supports if anything what the info text had said.
except for the part about the russian army being competent. basically the entire war for them was throwing men at a thousand kilometer front until a sector caved then pouring through that opening and pretending all along the plan was to bust through at that location. it also understates the amount of material that was handed to them via lendlease