How did Hitler managed to beat both the British and French armies in essentially 10 days when the German empire...

How did Hitler managed to beat both the British and French armies in essentially 10 days when the German empire couldn't do it in 4 years in the first world war?

Hitler invaded Belgium on 10 of May, and by 20 of May, Britain and France were essentially defeated, the remainder of the battle of france was essentially mopping up on a large scale.

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Have you ever heard of "blitzkrieg"?

>le blitzkrieg meme

Literally won through sheer luck with the Ardennes gamble. A lot of things could have gone wrong for the Ardennes gamble and it would have likely been a disastrous defeat when France and UK finish mobilizing. All it would have taken is a French division guarding the Ardennes, one nearby to cut off the advance or the advance being too slow for the Germans to outflank the Allies in Belgium.

>How did Hitler manage
He didn't, anymore than Stalin won the battle of Kursk

The French sat behind the Maginot line waiting for WWI to happen. Then they got outmaneuvered because it wasn't 1914.

>How did [partly mechanized and motorized force] managed to beat [X] in essentially 10 days when the [completely unmotorized force] couldn't do it in 4 years in the first world war?
The gasoline engine made maneuver great again.

Yes from post war sources

>Because it's 1940

>France and UK finish mobilizing
But France had no reserves to mobilize. That was literally it.

frogs fucked it up

My guess is that the french army sabotaged itself cause they hated whoever was in charge since he was weimaring republicaing France and let Hitler win from there the british got fucked off the mainland and everything came to an stallment up until the USSR and Russia overpowered Germany

Britain also needed Germany to get to final boss status to reap the benefit from the postwar so that there would be no need for WW3 .

And jewery and all that needed all nations destroyed so that one hegemonic power would get a hold over the world so that all the countries would become shit and no one could do anything about it

Then the mass genocide and utterly destruction of civilization could truly begin so that no one would be ablet o challenge them as everyone else would be one mongrel race of double digit iq monkeys

its pretty self evident

Pretty much this

Even today French would surrender if France fighted a country like Russia. Putin is more than appreciated than the Oligarchs who sell our country to the Americans.

>and Russia
*and America

I dont think they just surrendered they probably made a deal before the whole war started

The French wanted to extend the maginot line into the territory next to Belgium, but Belgium protested it heavily so they didn't. The French saw it comming.

Lidell Hart's history provides a really good analysis of this actually, been reading his work recently. Basically it was as much to do with French and British complacency as German military superiority, as well as a surprise attack through the Ardennes that no-one was expecting.

Fair enough being confused by this, even Hitler couldn't believe his luck.

>Thinking Britain was at a stalemate with Germany.

The Germans had literally no idea why we were still fighting. One of the reasons they turned against the USSR was because they thought the only reason the Brits were hanging on in such a hopeless situation was because they were counting on Stalin coming to the rescue.

Bulldog spirit saved us again m8s

>German military superiority
French had both more Guns and more tanks than the Germans.

Yes, I know, but military superiority doesn't just come down to numbers. Germany's army was just a few degrees more mechanized and advanced than France's, which is why they were able to outmaneuver them. The French also had a big lack of sophisticated airpower.

The Germans thought differently too,with the French seeing tanks the way they were seen in the First World War, as auxillaries. The Germans saw them for what they were, especially when they went through the Ardennes.

Anyway, if you read my argument, the crux of it is not about German military superiority, its about how the German commanders realised how war now worked. This is where the allies failed in 1940.

>The Germans thought differently too,with the French seeing tanks the way they were seen in the First World War, as auxillaries. The Germans saw them for what they were, especially when they went through the Ardennes.
This is the answer.

Germans deployed their tanks more efficiently, into actual Panzer Divisions that could act as lone units.

The French armor was parcelled out in penny packets, reducing their overall strength.

Also, the French had horrible logistics and support for their tanks.

Their range from supply bases was incredibly small. The distance a French tank could move in one day was tiny compared to a German.

>Despite having a numerically superior armoured force, the French failed to use it properly, or to deliver an attack on the vulnerable German bulge. The Germans combined their fighting vehicles in major, operational formations and used them at the point of main effort. The bulk of French armour was scattered along the front in tiny formations. Most of the French reserve divisions had by now been committed. The 1st DCR had been wiped out when it had run out of fuel and the 3rd DCR had failed to take its opportunity to destroy the German bridgeheads at Sedan. The only armoured division still in reserve, 2nd DCR, was to attack on 16 May west of Saint-Quentin, Aisne. The division's commander could locate only seven of its 12 companies, which were scattered along a 49 mi × 37 mi (79 km × 60 km) front. The formation was overrun by the 8th Panzer Division while still forming up and was effectively destroyed as a fighting unit.[135]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Central_front

Total French tactical fail.

>French tactical deployment and the use of mobile units at the operational level of war was also inferior to that of the Germans.[65] The French had 3,254 tanks on the north-eastern front on 10 May, against 2,439 German tanks. Much of the armour was distributed for infantry support, each army having been assigned a tank brigade (groupement) of about ninety light infantry tanks but with so many tanks available the French could still concentrate a considerable number of light, medium and heavy tanks in armoured divisions, which in theory were as powerful as German panzer divisions.[70] Only heavy French tanks generally carried wireless and the ones fitted were unreliable, which hampered communication and made tactical manoeuvre more difficult compared to German units. In 1940, French military theorists still mainly considered tanks as infantry support vehicles and French tanks were slow (except for the SOMUA S35) compared to German tanks, enabling German tanks to offset their disadvantages by out-manoeuvring French tanks. At various points in the campaign, the French were not able to achieve the same tempo as German armoured units.[65] The state of training was also unbalanced, with the majority of personnel trained only to man static fortifications. Minimal training for mobile action was carried out between September 1939 and May 1940.[71]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Allies