Could the Soviets have won without the Lend Lease policy?

>Deep Battle is inefficient

no desu

>deep battle isn't resource intensive

>Knowing shipments of X and Y are coming means you can convert your X and Y factories to Z much earlier

It doesn't mean much if you're going to get aid 3 years down the line and if you don't make those conversions to Z, you die right now. And I'm unaware of any Soviet production shifts away from ammunition and vehicles (The biggest products of Lend-Lease) towards production in other fields, although I'll admit my knowledge in the subject is hardly extensive.

Deep battle, or at least Tucashevsky style Deep Battle, is enormously inefficient, especially on your logistical tail. Units consume the most in way of supplies when they advance, not necessarily when they heavily fight. The more mobile the offensive, and the more of your force taking part in it, the more fuel and ammo and everything else you burn through.

Deep battle calls for multiple attacks everywhere, and attempts to advance everywhere. Every unit needs to be fueled and stocked for a big push in the advance, because you're not really sure where the enemy lines will crack.

Yes

Source?

It isn't very resource intensive when you're capable of being supplied by your allies at a rate such that you don't even need to fucking worry about it. Even without it, it's still not as resource intensive as you're implying. Front wide attacks were extremely rare. It was usually operation wide at most. The whole idea was to concentrate such that you could blow a hole(s) in the line and flood the gap rather than reconning and creating a spearhead at a pre-existing gap. It was always contact, concentrate, close. Plus, the line was always so deep that it was no more logistically difficult than German operations due to how the frontage and Soviets logistics worked. If anything, the Schwerpunkt method is even MORE logistically demanding once the gap has been breached compared to Deep Battle because you need to work even harder to prevent encirclement by prepared defense in depth.

They didn't even know what they'd recieve until early 1942.

>And Lend Lease (Moscow Protocol) equipment was in front of Moscow in November of 1941.
1. [Citation needed]
2. One rifle? Or 50% of the equipment?
3. The only weaponry that had arrived by December 1941 were from Britain.

>Front wide attacks were extremely rare. It was usually operation wide at most.

The Soviets did it constantly, from 1942-44. Mars and Uranus at the same time. Kursk (The Soviet counterattack part) was conducted simultaneously with the offensive at Smolensk and that one near the Pripet I'm blanking on the name of. Bagration was conducted simultaneously with Vyborg–Petrozavodsk and the Vilna offensive.

> The whole idea was to concentrate such that you could blow a hole(s) in the line and flood the gap rather than reconning and creating a spearhead at a pre-existing gap.

No, the idea was to spread out, make multiple attacks, and force the enemy to collapse trying to stop them all at once. Concentration and flooding the gap is primarily how the Germans did things.

>Plus, the line was always so deep that it was no more logistically difficult than German operations due to how the frontage and Soviets logistics worked.

It is enormously more difficult than how the German operations worked. Breakthrough elements in German offensives were small, usually less than 10% of the force, and were designated in advance. They were given most of the supplies and most of the command infrastructure to handle supplies before the attacks started. The Soviets, because they were attacking over a wider area and weren't sure where the breakthrough would be, either had to

A) Duplicate the entire setup for every single division or multi-divisional formation in the offensive.

B) Eviscerate the divisional logistics setup and do everything at the HQ level, resulting in a lot of bloat and inefficiency.

They usually went for B, and that's one of the reasons they had so much trouble getting shit to where it was needed, even when they had the shit available in theory.

1/2

> If anything, the Schwerpunkt method is even MORE logistically demanding once the gap has been breached compared to Deep Battle because you need to work even harder to prevent encirclement by prepared defense in depth.

What? First off, you try to avoid putting your Schwerpunkt where the enemy has a prepared defense in depth. There's a reason Citadel went belly up. Secondly, no, giving a lot of supplies to a small portion of your army and comparatively little to the bulk of it comes out to less than giving pretty decent levels of supplies to everyone.

Which leads us back to the conclusion, which you put first

>It isn't very resource intensive when you're capable of being supplied by your allies at a rate such that you don't even need to fucking worry about it.

That doesn't mean it's not resource intensive. It means it IS and someone else is footing the bill. Especially if you start with the OP premise, that there is no lend-lease, the problems with the system will become apparent quite quickly.

Plus, even the Soviets had enormous logistical strain. It usually was months between offensives; as they had to rebuild and resupply everything.

No, they admitted it themselves

No. I think WW2 was the first war that wasn't really won on the battlefield but in the factories of the American midwest and Russia.

By every fucking standard the Germans had the superior commanders and fighters but they got completely clobbered because they couldn't match the industrial output other Allies had.

What good is circlejerking over the Tiger tank's parameters when you can only build two thousand of them?

Win as in get to Berlin by 1945? No, but not lose either.

Won? No chance, maybe force some stalemate after losing a lot of ground

They would have defeated barbarossa just as easily, but would have had an almighty struggle invading germany

>Moscow in November of 1941.
Amerilard education posting blatant nonsense, color me shocked

Where do you guys get these fantastical ideas about Lend Lease? I get that a lot of the information coming out about the true nature of early Soviet supply has only been published in the last decade due to declassification but it's like some of you otherwise intelligent people are intentionally neglecting it.

The largest of the USSR's automobile and truck factories, particularly Gorkiy and the expanded AMO (ZIS) plants in Moscow all shifted almost entirely to tank production.

Nonsense. They knew where they needed help just as they did when requesting aid through Britain/US in WWI, the irony being it was almost the exact same shopping list. See: forbes.ru/mneniya-column/istoriya/288019-lend-liz-fakty-i-mify

The Moscow Protocol was British Lend-Lease. Not all Lend-Lease was from America, just like Britain provided all the spark plugs for American B-17 bombers. The first British LL tanks were fighting in November of 1941 in front of Moscow. See:

tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518040600697811

>Where do you guys get these fantastical ideas about Lend Lease? I get that a lot of the information coming out about the true nature of early Soviet supply has only been published in the last decade due to declassification but it's like some of you otherwise intelligent people are intentionally neglecting it.

The notion that the overwhelming majority of Lend Lease arrived in the second half of 1943 onward is neither new nor based on Soviet documents.

>The largest of the USSR's automobile and truck factories, particularly Gorkiy and the expanded AMO (ZIS) plants in Moscow all shifted almost entirely to tank production.

And how do you know that wouldn't have happened anyway? After all, when being pushed back, logistical needs take a back seat to raw firepower; it's the advance that has the enormous logistical constraints.

And user, let's not pretend British Lend Lease was a drop on American Lend-Lease, nor that Typhoon was settled from the actions of medium tanks.

It wasn't the first post but it was close enough
>fpbp

Yes but the Lend Lease act saved hundreds of thousands of Soviet lives if not a good million or so

>The notion that the overwhelming majority of Lend Lease arrived in the second half of 1943 onward is neither new nor based on Soviet documents.

As I said, the new information is about Soviet-side supply, you can't adequately judge the value of shipments without it. Pointing out that 30% and 40% of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow in 1941 was of Lend-Lease origin isn't done in an attempt to take credit for the defeat of Typhoon, it's simply putting delivered equipment into perspective instead of relying on the old and inaccurate fallback that "Lend-Lease was only 4% of GDP" which was based on sloppy calculations using tonnage alone.

Of course Lend-Lease was never about tanks, 75% of all supplies were machines, industrial equipment and raw materials;

>In particular, our country received 295.6 thousand tons of explosives accounted for 53% of all produced by domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is a ratio of copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138% wool - 102%, sugar - 66%, and canned meat - 480%.

but the military equipment supplied by the early protocol shipments allowed the Soviets to recup 30-40% of military equipment losses suffered by the Red Army to that point, according to Russian sources, and was extremely important in shifting Soviet production toward the war.

dvinaland.ru/-6jp2w4rx
ru.arctic.ru/analitic/20160818/414517.html
иcтopик.pф/special_posts/знaчeниe-лeнд-лизa-для-cccp/

>they
Who?

They also claimed to be the saviors of Eastern Europe

It is historical consensus that Lend-Lease had no significant effect until mid-1942. That's not newly known.

>Pointing out that 30% and 40% of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow in 1941 was of Lend-Lease origin
[Citation needed]

And no your Forbes "source" didn't have this in it, nor did the other.

>As I said, the new information is about Soviet-side supply, you can't adequately judge the value of shipments without it. Pointing out that 30% and 40% of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow in 1941 was of Lend-Lease origin isn't done in an attempt to take credit for the defeat of Typhoon,

It is entirely done to take credit for Typhoon, because it's a favorable statistic, is often cited as "the brand new information that shows the value of LL", and is misleading as hell, especially since some 85% of all armor, Lend-Lease and not, on the Soviet side in that time period were lighter tanks, and that in relatively static forest fighting, tanks of all sorts, especially larger tanks, are very much a tertiary arm, it was infantry and artillery that saved Moscow, not tanks. Nobody seems to mention the number of howitzers the British sent to Moscow, or how much of a percentage that added to the Soviet artillery total, because that one isn't nearly as good looking.

>it's simply putting delivered equipment into perspective instead of relying on the old and inaccurate fallback that "Lend-Lease was only 4% of GDP"

That has absolutely nothing to do with what I've said in this thread at any point.

>Of course Lend-Lease was never about tanks, 75% of all supplies were machines, industrial equipment and raw materials;

You are still not addressing my points at all. In fact, I'm starting to think that you don't even understand my point at all, which is a little sad. It's quite simple. Of the amount of aid to the USSR shipped under Lend-Lease, combined U.S. and British, about 85% of it arrived AFTER JUNE 1943. Lend Lease's effects were most pronounced in the late war, not the early war.

1/2

>but the military equipment supplied by the early protocol shipments allowed the Soviets to recup 30-40% of military equipment losses suffered by the Red Army to that point,

You'll forgive me if I disbelieve that, since the only one of your links that addresses such a point comes from a blog and contains no internal citations, and the fact that the relatively tiny amounts sent over in the part up until 1942 were

A) Not primarily military equipment, as you yourself point out

B) Vastly insufficient to equip some 250 divisions, which would be around 30% of what the Soviets historically raised in that time frame.

youtube.com/watch?v=7Clz27nghIg&list=PLJFDAXWRg5ybMO0DbsDETIXj3p1yZxSvK

By the way, maybe something was contained in the third link of yours, but I couldn't get it to work.

>It is historical consensus that Lend-Lease had no significant effect until mid-1942. That's not newly known.

I'm sure in the 1970's that was true. If being spoon-fed peer reviewed academic journals doesn't change your mind, I can't do anything for you.

Again, tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518040600697811

>According to Rotmistrov, at the end of November 1941 there were only 670 Soviet tanks for the Fronts before Moscow, that is the recently formed Kalinin, Western and South-Western Fronts, of which only 205 were heavy or medium types. Most of this tank strength was concentrated with the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the South-Western two tank brigades (30 tanks). Alternative figures suggest that of 667 tanks with front-line units of the Kalinin, Western and right wing of the South-Western Fronts as of 1 December 1941, 607 were with the Western Front, of which 205 were KV series and T-34s, with the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the South-Western Front having 17 and 43 tanks, respectively, none of which were apparently KV series or T-34s. Either set of figures is a significant improvement on the 141 heavy and medium tanks available to the Western, Reserve and Briansk Fronts before Moscow as of 1 October 1941. In the light of these statistics, it is reasonable to suggest that British supplied tanks made up in the region of 30–40% of the heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and that they made up a significant proportion of such vehicles available as reinforcements at this critical juncture.
-British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for Moscow, November–December 1941—A Research Note

Oh, and one last aside. Why are you presenting so much focus on the arctic route? Vladivostok carried far more of pretty much everything.

Not him, but you haven't "spoon fed peer reviewed academic journals" You've quote mined one, sent in a few blogs, and failed to address most of the points laid against you.

Also, if you're interesting in new research into the Eastern Front and the Red Army, Hill's new book is due out later this month.

amazon.com/Red-Army-Second-World-Armies/dp/1107688159

>Why are you presenting so much focus on the arctic route?

It's where the Moscow protocol shipments came in.

>It's where the Moscow protocol shipments came in.

No, the 1st Protocol stuff was sent through all three major routes, Arctic, Persian, and Vladivostok.

sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2007/12/19/168522.html

American Lend-lease to the Soviet Union can be divided into the following phases:

- "pre Lend-lease" 22 June 1941 to 30 September 1941
- first protocol period from 1 October 1941 to 30 June 1942 (signed 1 October 1941)
- second protocol period from 1 July 1942 to 30 June 1943 (signed 6 October 1942)
- third protocol period from 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944 (signed 19 October 1943)

- fourth protocol period from 1 July 1944, (signed 17 April 1945), formally ended 12 May 1945 but deliveries continued for the duration of the war with Japan (which the Soviet Union entered only 8 August 1945) under the "Milepost" agreement until 2 September 1945 when Japan capitulated. 20 September 1945 all Lend-Lease to Russia was terminated.

In addition to the aircraft deliveries American Lend-lease deliveries to Russia included also more than 400.000 trucks, over 12.000 tanks and other combat vehicles, 32.000 motorcycles, 13.000 locomotives and railway cars, 8.000 anti-aircraft cannons and machine-guns, 135.000 submachine guns, 300.000 tons of explosives, 40.000 field radios, some 400 radar systems, 400.000 metal cutting machine tools, several million tons of foodstuff, steel, other metals, oil and gasoline, chemicals etc. A price tag was naturally attached to all deliveries, with following typical fighter prices:

P-40 Kittyhawk - 44.900 dollars, P-39 Airacobra - 50.700 dollars and P-47 Thunderbolt - 83.000 dollars.

Regardless of Soviet cold-war attempts to forget (or at least diminish) the importance of Lend-lease, the total impact of the Lend-Lease shipment for the Soviet war effort and entire national economy can only be characterized as both dramatic and of decisive importance. The outcome of the war on the East front might well have taken another path without Lend-lease.

lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/articles/geust/aircraft_deliveries.htm

>mfw America gave so much shit to the soviets they couldn't erase it from history

user, how does ANY of that address the point I have been making throughout the thread?

> the overwhelming majority of Lend Lease arrived in the second half of 1943 onward is neither new nor based on Soviet documents.

Why so many Russian shills in every Lend Lease thread?

Don't you guys have some elections to hack?

Get back to work!

This x2000000000

The reason Germany was so succesful early on was because the allies hadn't gotten their production going. When they did, they pumped out 20x more guns than the allies. The Soviet Union was literally able to mobilize the entire country.

Wait Vladivostok? So they werr sailing right past Japan?

Not like Japan could do much about it. Their navy was focused on the South and after summer 1942, it couldn't even hold that.

they were flagged as soviet vessels, meaning japan was bound by treaty not to attack them

Japan wasn't at war with Russia so attacking ships with items bound for them, which Russia technically paid for via loan, would make a very complicated matter for the Japs

Pretty much. Japan let some 45% of Lend Lease through by volume with nary a peep.

Mainly bevcause they didn't want to piss off the Soviets, and the notion that any American material sent to the Russians is stuff they're not using to stove in their own heads.

It's still probably one of the biggest blunders in WW2.

Oh come on, it wouldn't take much to stop the shpments, if they were serious about it. A few cruisers would be able to blockade the port, and Japan can throw in a lot of land basted air if the Americans start escorting the shipments. Avoiding sending carriers into the teeth of prepared land based air was the cornerstone of American strategy in the Pacific.

Yeah you are right

The Germans were pissed with Japan about that but the Japanese had a deal with the soviets not to fuck them up, so they left them alone

It was one of the bargaining tools the japs used on the soviets during the pre-nuke part of the war when Stalin was milling around before Yalta

>Oh come on, it wouldn't take much to stop the shpments
They couldn't even protect their own shipments into Korea and Manchuria.

It's enormously more difficult to defend slow, unarmed transport vessels moving along generally known routes than it is to attack the other side's. Think of how puny the German fleet was compared to the British, let alone the combined British+American Atlantic commitments, but in 1942, they were chewing up literally millions of tons of shipping.

They could have easily stopped stuff going through the Sea of Japan at any time prior to mid 1945.

>They could have easily stopped stuff going through the Sea of Japan at any time prior to mid 1945
If they had the navy for it. OH WAIT! The relevant portions of it were crippled at the Battle of the Coral Sea. OH WAIT! Midway ensured that Japan had to allocate all of their naval and air resources South to keep from getting fucking rolled. OH WAIT! The rest of the fleet was wiped the fuck out at Leyte. OH WAIT! Attacking a ship where the route is unknown is far more difficult than defending a known route. Seriously, fuck off. Japan didn't do anything about it because they couldn't do anything about it.

>Why so many Russian shills in every Lend Lease thread?

As a rule of thumb, you can tell how bad a contemporary war (like Syria) is going for America by the the number of self-aggrandizing books and statements made about WW2.

>If they had the navy for it.

Which they did.

>The relevant portions of it were crippled at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

They still had over 30 cruisers post Coral sea. It wouldn't take much to stop shit.

> OH WAIT! Midway ensured that Japan had to allocate all of their naval and air resources South to keep from getting fucking rolled

I forget, how many of those cruisers were used in face offs against the U.S.?

> The rest of the fleet was wiped the fuck out at Leyte.

Asama, Idzumo, Aoba, Myoko, Nachi, Ashigara, Haguro, Takao, Tone, Oyodo, Kitikami, Isuzu, Kashima, Kashii, and Yahagi were all still around post Leyte. They are more than enough to sink convoys. That's not even mentioning all the land-based air that could be brought in to attack anything trying to head to Vladivostok.

>ttacking a ship where the route is unknown is far more difficult than defending a known route.

Ok, now I'm mad. No it fucking isn't you goddamn retard. Seriously, battle of the Atlantic. Germany has 4 battleships, 2 of them crippled by treaty limitations, no carriers, a handful of cruisers, and some u-boats with piffling armament, against the goddamn Royal Navy, which outweighs them 5:1. They were on the constant offensive until 1943. They sunk almost 16 million tons of shipping, which is equal to the entire merchant fleet the UK had pre-war. It is TREMENDOUSLY fucking easier to attack and defend, and that you don't know this just means you are ignorant. Now sit down, shut up, and let the adults talk. Wiki up the Mediterranean theater, and you'll see a hell of a lot more successful convoy attacks than successful convoy defenses.

>Japan didn't do anything about it because they couldn't do anything about it.

Except they could, and you're stupid. They did not need the same assets to stop unescorted convoys through the heart of their territory that they would need to fight TF 16 at the edges of it. This is obvious to everyone who has an IQ in the triple digits.

doesn't Japanese naval doctrine preclude their submarine arm, and thefore im guessing everything else from merchant raiding, instead hoping to fight major surface actions?

Yes and no. They wouldn't avoid taking potshots at commercial ships if they came across them, but they didn't go out of their way to fight a commerce war a la what the Germans would doing.

So yes, the submarines were generally (mis)used as ambush forces for capital ships instead of picking at haulers in accordance with this.

That being said, there's a big difference between the military supplying of naval bases scattered all throughout the pacific, and shoveling millions of tons of supplies through your proverbial backyard. What the Japanese wanted was a short, sharp war, something in which their production disadvantages wouldn't doom them from the start. Nibbling away at American military supply vessels slows them, but it doesn't stop them, especially since they can't actually reach the American economic base.

This is either butchery of significant economic input on one hand if the convoys aren't defended, or a battle at an extremely advantageous location(if they do try to defend the convoys.

Krushchev and Stalin say: no.

Considering what they actually wound up doing, B is highly highly unlikely.

No.

This is a sensible post.

Yes

Invading Russia meets reality eventually

Doesn't matter *where* the Germans slow to a halt, once it happens they get rolled back

Yes, it probably would have taken a little longer though.