Why did Hannibal ultimately fail? How the fuck did Rome not capitulate after so many years of getting stomped?

Rome just had more resources and was so committed that defeating them was nigh impossible.

also (((mercenaries)))

Hannibal didnt have siege equipment. Its been argued that had he marched on Rome immediately after Cannae they might have been shocked enough to sue for peace but I think this is armchair generalling. He made the most logical decision at the time to try and turn the rest of Italy against Rome which on paper worked but in reality was useless.

Carthage did infact send reinforcements but the leaders in Cathago had their heads up their asses and feared Hannibal's growing power and influence. They undermined him at every turn and Hannibal's family had to pull out all the stops to send whatever they could. But it appears Hannibal had all the military genius and defeating the other armies was easy enough for the Romans.

The Romans were also committed to total war, had citizen soldiers and a second to none diplomatic ministry. The Carthaginian political elite (minus Hannibal) had no idea what to do when Rome didnt sue for peace since they had rather limited war goals. Also mercenary revolt and numidians switching sides really fucked them over.

>Why did Hannibal ultimately fail?
Because he set up on a fool's errand. His whole plan hinged upon his belief that the italic people would raise against Rome's tyranny and help him destroy the republic, which mostly didn't happen. Basically only the greeks and the celts changed sides, only a very few italic tribes elected to defect. Without local assistance, he was cut off from reinforcements (which were actually sent multiple times, only to be annihilated by Rome before they could join him) and he was greatly outnumbered. Also in spite of his early victories against foolish politician-led armies, he had to face Fabius and Marcellus, who for all intents and purposes constantly outmaneuvered him like a bitch, took back all the lost land, and forced him back to the tip of the boot, from where he could only retire back to Carthage.

*blocks ur path*

/thread

he went to a route that though catching Rome by surprise meant that he could never bring any more mens through the same route without difficulty

no supply lines nor reinforcements meant always being outnumbered so any prolonged conflict would be fatal so he was always on the run and being cautious

REKT

Was he the better general, or was Hannibal at such a disadvantage his skill didn't matter?

>was Hannibal at such a disadvantage his skill didn't matter
Hannibal actually had the advantage, 40k (plus 80 elephants) vs 35k.

He lost good portion of his army at alps. And most of his elephants. Plus supply wagons had hard time passing and tribes attacked them. I would still say he is great logistican and general considering he pretty much plundered italia for years without anyone stopping him properly after passing from alps succesfully. Even after losing war after war rome citizens contiune to fight. Man gave money to goverment while women sold their jewelery to support the state(jewelery was used by rich women to signify status a lot so they were important for them) The doctrine of fighting until enemy gives up worked for them. It is important to note that one of main reason he failed that was cartage state never fully supported the war they were always lurkwarm about it until the near end of the cartage but that was too late.

There was big panic but not huge flight. Right after the battle city defenses were prepared

At Zama? He was handily defeated.

He asked me who had the advantage user, not who won. Hannibal lost in spite of having more resources.

Oh, even still, he was without the Numidian cavalry.

Not him, but I would point out that only a tiny portion of his infantry were actual veterans; and most of his cavalry were of Numidian allies of dubious reliability, unlike the entirety of the Roman army, which was battle-hardened and of a unified command.

It's like saying the French had more resources than the Prussians during the 1871 siege of Paris because they had more bodies on the field, nevermind that most of those were conscripts and navy personnel off their boats against trained infantrymen.

This. No matter how good the leader is, his ability is only as good as the troops and equipment he commands.

>I would point out that only a tiny portion of his infantry were actual veterans
Actually user, one third of his army was made of mercs, one third of his italian veterans, and the remaining third of levies.
They weren't fresh babies.

>There are three lines
>Therefore, all three lines are made up of the same number of people.

There's no reason to think otherwise.

He didn't have the ability to besiege Rome, Carthage refused to send him the reinforcements that he needed, and ultimately be couldn't comprehend the idea that Rome would never admit defeat even if the barbarians were at the gates.

Add all of this with fabian tactics and you get a campaign that was ultimately doomed to fail.

Other than how badly battered Hannibal's forces were by the time they were driven to Croton, how they could no longer face the Romans in open battle, and lost at such when they were fighting a mere 2 legions (8-10,000ish men), or how they escaped on a small force of boats they built themselves, relief from Carthage being unable to get through the Roman fleet.

Partisan politics back in Carthage

>Carthage refused to send him the reinforcements that he needed
Will this meme ever die? What about Mago and Hasdrubal? Between the two of them they brought another 100k men. It's not Carthage's fault Hannibal was absolutely unreachable and the reinforcements got rekt before joining up with him.

Considering one third of 35k is 12k, and that there actually were 4 legions at Crotona, the numbers seem to match up fine to me.

It doesn't really matter anyway. Hannibal lost battles in Italy too, so even if he were alone at Zama his record would still be marred.

could they really not get through the Roman fleet? You'd figure they'd see Rome was too busy getting stomped and they could get a sizeable force through and gain dominance of the mediterranean in no time.

Turning Sicily and Sardinia back wouldn't be so hard since they had only lost them a few years ago.

If he was ravaging the countryside wouldn't the Romans eventually starve to death?

I don't think the carthaginians won a single sea battle against Rome ever since the corvus was invented. Do remember that navies are quite independent from armies. No matter how badly the army might be getting stomped, the navy wouldn't suffer from it, it's not the same pool of men.

If he actually ravaged the countryside he'd lose the allegiance of the greeks who defected in the south and be trapped even worse. Besides Rome had naval superiority so foreign food was an option.

>I don't think the carthaginians won a single sea battle against Rome ever since the corvus was invented. Do remember that navies are quite independent from armies. No matter how badly the army might be getting stomped, the navy wouldn't suffer from it, it's not the same pool of men.

the corvus(which lasted little from being so dangerous and was replaced with the harpax) didn't change as much as the general act of boarding, but even then the Carthaginians were adapting to it by the end of the first war and loading heavy, well trained infantrymen in their ships.

and Roman marines were literally just legionaries stationed on ships, they weren't an individualized corps from the legion. The actual men from the fleet were the rowers and navigators.

So that force gets mauled, and loses people. Then they have to head back to Africa based on whatever boats that they can build quickly and/or commandeer, and taking at least some of the cavalry with them (horses taking up quite a bit more space than people). At least at Lilybaeum, 20 quinqmarines could hold about 1,000 troops, for 50 infantrymen per ship. To evacuate 12,000 infantry plus an undisclosed number of cavalry requires a fleet of carrying capacity in excess to 240 quinqmarines, something far beyond of what Carthage was able to put together even in official relief missions, nevermind slapped together on site.

Even assuming Hannibal still had 12,000 infantry left to evacuate with, which seems doubtful, it's quite unlikely they all made it across and were still there, what with people being left behind, and desertion and disease that always happened in ancient war.

>could they really not get through the Roman fleet?

Not him, but they really could not. Got their noses bloodied quite badly when they tried, offhand, I cant think of a single naval battle they won in the second war. Their fleet had been trashed pretty had in the 1st punic war a generation earlier.

>The actual men from the fleet were the rowers and navigators.
Which is why you can't just suddendly raise a fleet like you could an army. Rome had naval superiority, and no curbstomping on land would give Carthage more ships.

user quinquiremes were warships, not troop transports. You better believe there were roomier ships than those around.

Which is why I said carrying capacity equivalent to, not that he literally built 250 quinqmarines.

It still would have taken a fuckhuge fleet to transport 12,000ish infantry plus however many cavalry he's got; and he's not in a friendly position where he can ferry his men back and forth. For starters, the odds of his (makeshift) fleet getting intercepted increase with each trip, and then there's the problem that as you drain strength away from the toe of Italy, you leave yourself open to attack while your force is split.

The idea that Hannibal could have built a fleet to transport that many men out of the resources on hand is absurd.

>The idea that Hannibal could have built a fleet to transport that many men out of the resources on hand is absurd.
The idea that Hannibal formed a whole line of battle with much less men than the other lines is not much better.
What would have been the point? Just use those men to reinforce the rest.
In the end what we know is that he had enough men to form a line of battle, and that it was important enough to be mentioned.
And we also know that the front of his army was held by mercenaries, not levies. So in the end, Hannibal wasn't just there with prepubescent fuckboys and the elderly holding his dick, he had a viable army. And elephants.

>The idea that Hannibal formed a whole line of battle with much less men than the other lines is not much better.

Not at all. Differing size lines of battle was the norm.

>What would have been the point? Just use those men to reinforce the rest.

The point is easy organization and having your best men uncommitted at the initial thrusts of the battle, where it would be hard to re-deploy them if it turns out you need them somewhere else.

>And we also know that the front of his army was held by mercenaries, not levies.

user, "mercenary" in Roman time is literally anyone fighting for any sort of reward. At battles such as Cannae and Ilpia, Roman sources note that the local mercenaries were significantly less skilled and cohesive than the Carthaginian forces from Carthage. There is no indication of their quality, and given the reputation of people like the Balaerics and the Ligurians as primarily skirmishers, it might not even have been a melee line at all.

Furthermore, the front troops are often, if not the least skilled, the least cohesive and reliable in maneuver; commit them first so that

A) They have nowhere to run if they're going to break

B) The fact that they can't maneuver much doesn't mean anything

is why the Romans traditionally put their own least reliable men of the Polybian legion in the front, with their best in the back.

>So in the end, Hannibal wasn't just there with prepubescent fuckboys and the elderly holding his dick, he had a viable army.

You're moving the goalposts user. The French had a viable army at Paris in 1871 as well; it's just that their "Numerical advantage" was primarily a chimera by adding in scarecrows, something that seems very likely in Hannibal's case, given that his numerical superiority was pretty small at Zama anyway.

>And elephants.

Which did fuckall as the Romans weren't so stupid as to stand in their way and get trampled by them.

Because Quintus Fabius Maximus was actually competent

Roman resilience and fortitude. After devastating losses like Cannae they just wanted victory more.

His third line has been called the most experienced in history, they were the veterans of war against Rome and were entirely undefeated.

That is neither true (For instance, Croton again) nor relevant to the point I had made, which is that it's ridiculous to assume they were a third of his infantry forces just because they were in their own line.

>seine equipment
didnt he have enough time to build them?

He had no logistical support. His army ate and was paid by what they could steal from the locals. He couldn't afford to stay still for any length of time.

gratias ago

I wonder how the romans looked back on the cowardly but smart fabian tactic.