In the past, during the French Revolution...

In the past, during the French Revolution, people considered that mandatory conscription and wanting to bear weapons to defend the Homeland were virtues of a good democratic citizen. How come that now, most democratic countries reject mandatory conscription and the right to bear arms? What did happen during the last 200 years that now wanting to die for your Homeland to preserve its Liberty and Equality is seen as reactionary and bad?

Or, broadly speaking, how come we today dont promote the virtues of a Republican citizen, like Patriotism, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, the desire to break away the shackles of the past, an so on?

Other urls found in this thread:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Valmy
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jemappes
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Neerwinden_(1793)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Verdun_(1792)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Black_Mountain
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rivoli
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Russian_invasion_of_Holland
twitter.com/SFWRedditGifs

Our respective governments think it's dangerous

Most folks in France did not want to be conscripted. Conscription was a very big contributing factor in the civil war in the vendee.

The republican order of battle reflected this disparity between those who wanted to fight and those who did not, those who voluntarily enlisted were posted as skirmishers and light infantry, positions that required quite a bit of dedication but were actually a lot safer than standing in line with the regular conscripted infantry. You'd have dedicated revolutionaries in the line infantry, but not in the first rank.

Too expensive. That's literally the reason military service was abolished.

>What did happen during the last 200 years that now wanting to die for your Homeland to preserve its Liberty and Equality is seen as reactionary and bad?

Hitler happened and nationalism became evil in the West (chinks and third worlders still have it)

Conscuption was actually well received by most French people in the early Revolutionary Wars
Vendeans scums were special monarchist snowflakes, not the norm by any mean

The French Revolutionary Army had generally high moral and was full of fervor, which more than once scared the european professional armies made of people there for the money only and not motivated by any ideological belief

That explains why France went from being attacked from all sides in 1792 to controlling Northern Spain, Italy, Western Germany and the Low Countries in 1799

"why don't you want to fight for your corrupt government user? their cause is the true cause!"

Two world wars highlighted the brutality of war and mankind's moral compass evolved.

I'm not saying that the french were no better than their contemporaries, I'm simply saying that we ought not exaggerate. By acknowledging limitations in the french model, we can see why it might not necessarily be universally applicable, as OP seems to want it to be. The war in the Vendee pulled in around 100,000 soldiers from the frontlines to the east, and involved only a marginally smaller number of rebels, who of course were therefore not involved in the fighting in the east.

The war in the Vendee is unique more in its size than character. Multiple revolts occurred over the imposition of conscription within non-metropolitan france. If not revolts, simply desertion. The French had a shit ton of deserters, though conscription meant that the amount of soldiers it had at its disposal meant that even if half the army deserted it would still have an army twice that of its opponents.

Look, if it was well received, there would be no point in conscription, would there? You'd just have an all volunteer army, wouldn't you? Again, the french innovation was in having enough committed soldiers among the ranks of the conscripted, and knowing where to put them for maximum effect.

Maybe because war is a terrible thing to be avoided as much as possible?

In the period of the revolutionary and later napoleonic wars, naw war was pretty neat and did things that we would prefer war does.

>though conscription meant that the amount of soldiers it had at its disposal meant that even if half the army deserted it would still have an army twice that of its opponents.

Yeah nah
The French had the biggest army in Europe by far, but the huge number of countries opposed to them meant that the French and coalition armies had roughly equal numbers in the end (at least until some members of the coalition started to be kicked out of the war following humiliating defeats)

OP here. Even if modern States really dont go to war anymore, why do we forget about teaching the virtues of a democratic citizen? I think our Western democracies would be better valued if people were more enthusiastic about defending the advantages of democratic rule, rule by law, basic rights and liberties guaranteed by legal documents against tyrants, despots, and religious zealots.

And how come Hitler made Republican Nationalism look bad? Hitler was a totalitarian ruler, and I was talking about being ready to go to war in order to defend democratic rule and basic liberties.

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And how come Hitler made Republican Nationalism look bad? Hitler was a totalitarian ruler, and I was talking about being ready to go to war in order to defend democratic rule and basic liberties.
Because Hitler was not initially a totalitarian leader; he was appointed chancellor by a freely elected president (a president he had run against in a democratic election) in a republican nation.

You just disagreed with me, and then you affirmed exactly what I said.
On paper, the coalition could field equal numbers. On the battlefield, well, it takes time to move soldiers from places like england or russian to France or the holy roman empire. The french found their soldiers in a much smaller geographical area, and could vastly outnumber the coalition on any battleground is so chose, merely because the area it had to cover with its numbers was much smaller than that of its opponents. This is, of course, because the french had conscription and the first coalition did not.

>On paper, the coalition could field equal numbers. On the battlefield, well, it takes time to move soldiers from places like england or russian to France or the holy roman empire. The french found their soldiers in a much smaller geographical area, and could vastly outnumber the coalition on any battleground is so chose

That would be true if all the coalition members attacked in just one place, which wasn't the case
Spain attacked on the South-Western French border, Austrians and Italians attacked on the South-Eastern one, Prussians and more Austrians attacked on the North-Eastern one, Brits, Dutch and more Germans attacked on the North and more Brits launched seaborne invasions on the Western coast

So in the end, the French had to scatter their army at each end of the country and ended up fielding equal numbers as the coalition

And? This isn't modern war, there's no constant lines with multiple operational victories eventually being considered a strategic victory by their sum. soldiers still generally concentrated together, met on a field, and then had at it.
It was a simple matter for the french: they could concentrate more arms in a given area than the geographically disparate coalition. Beat off the members in one locale, move those soldiers to overwhelm in another locale, rinse and repeat. The french did not have to cover great distances to do so, at least certainly not in comparison to their opponents.
These days, the concept is called "interior lines". When the enemy is separated off from each other, you've got the flexibility to put soldiers wherever they're needed (because you're just moving back and forth) while the opponents are not, because they cannot reach other in any timely fashion.

>And? This isn't modern war, there's no constant lines with multiple operational victories eventually being considered a strategic victory by their sum. soldiers still generally concentrated together, met on a field, and then had at it.
Irrelevant to the point
Fact is, France alone had an army as big as the entire enemy coalition, but needed to scatter this army all over the places while each country in the coalition could keep theirs mostly united
End result was the same

>The french did not have to cover great distances to do so, at least certainly not in comparison to their opponents.
During the initial phase in which France was being invaded indeed, but when France chased its enemies inside their own lands it became the contrary

No, it did not. You've ignored basically the bulk of my post.
Again: french soldiers could move within France to any front they pleased, the coalition could not. Even when their territory expanded, this remained the case, especially when that expansion also meant to closing of fronts, starting with the dutch.
This is basic Clausewitz, bruv. if a force is divided, you deal with it one by one, by which case one is always leveraging numerical superiority in each engagement.

Because it's stupid. Even today, people sway one way or the other.
How can there be equality when there is empire/country elitism? Fraternal? What about sorority? Patriotic as in Patriarch, as in again a bunch of guys playing with each other without girls. You may have forgotten what with that heavy male chip on your shoulder, but notice you wouldn't even be here but for females.

They don't want people to have the training and firearms to rise up against them.

>Again: french soldiers could move within France to any front they pleased, the coalition could not.
They could on the entire Eastern half
The Low countries front could be linked with the German front, which could be linked with the Italian one

>This is basic Clausewitz, bruv. if a force is divided, you deal with it one by one, by which case one is always leveraging numerical superiority in each engagement.
That's what Napoleon later applied in the Napoleonic Wars, but the French Revolutionary Army didnt
You seem to imply that the French army stacked all its force on one front and then moved to another one until everyone was defeated, but this was never the case
The French army remained separated and kept fighting on each front at the same time, thus only being able to field equal numbers as the opponents

Would you really die for a country that withholds gfs from you?

You faggots know you can literally just look this stuff up right, there is no need to argue based on conjecture. Here are some of the major battles of the war

Battle of Valmy (20 September 1792): 32,000 French vs. 34,000 Austrians
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Valmy

Battle of Jemappes (6 November 1792)
40-43,000 French vs. 13,796 Austrians
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jemappes

Neerwinden (18 March 1793): 40-47,000 French vs. 39-43,000
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Neerwinden_(1793)

Battle of Wattignies (15-16 October 1793): 45,000 French vs. 22,400 Austrians

Fleurus (26 June 1794): 82,000 French vs. 70,500 Coalition

You can look up more if you want, but it looks like they were roughly even, with the French generally having more men

>looks like they were roughly even
Cumulative total of 239-249 on the french vs 180-185 on the side of the coalition. There are of course other engagements as per each campaign, but from the set given it seems that the french had a sizeable numerical superiority in the sum total of engagements.

Not really. Again, this isn't modern warfare, there is no continuous front. Armies concentrated, marched, and looked for favourable engagement. If one marched into France, it got farther away from its allies, while the french got closer. French armies could link up to hit up coalition armies, coalition armies often could not. By the time they were gaining ground, they'd already mostly beaten the major coalition members to the degree that they could not go on the offensive to the same degree as they had done in previous campaign seasons. Tactical numerical superiority became strategic numerical superiority.

>Cumulative total of 239-249 on the french vs 180-185 on the side of the coalition. There are of course other engagements as per each campaign, but from the set given it seems that the french had a sizeable numerical superiority in the sum total of engagements.
I just picked the five most important battles of earlier years of the War of the First Coalition, there is no point treating them as a representative sample. The point is there were battles where the French vastly outnumbered their opponents (Jemappes, Wattignies), times when they outnumbered their opponents slightly (Neerwinden, Fleurus) and times where they were outnumbered (Valmy). They were able to win in every circumstance, so you can't take numbers as a major advantage. If we want to extend this out farther in time, later on Napoleon was almost always outnumbered, including at some of his greatest victories (Austerlitz, Jena)

Quite cherrypicked except for the first two (that were indeed very relevant but at the very beginning and on the same theater)

Here are some important battles that give a different view
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Verdun_(1792)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Black_Mountain
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rivoli
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Russian_invasion_of_Holland

Now these are kind of cherrypicked as well, but if you look at the average battle of the Revolutionary Wars, the French numbers rarely overwhelmed the coalition
At most they'd somtimes have a slight numerical advantage of a few thousands men, but barely enough to compensate the lack of professionalism of their peasant army

>Quite cherrypicked except for the first two (that were indeed very relevant but at the very beginning and on the same theater)
It's not cherrypicking, I picked the most significant battles from the first two years of the war. I myself did not know what the result would be, I was honestly curious.

Because we've moved away (in the US at least) from levee en masse and back to boutique armies. Small, well equipped, well-trained. There is no need to have your citizens armed and trained to fight because you won't be using them in that capacity, unless they decide to join the military. In which case, you give them the training then.

This is the kind of army that Napoleon cheerfully smashed up with his conscripts. It's very effective, but not invincible (particularly if poorly led) and very slow to replace losses while maintaining quality.

Of course the US still has conscription laws on the books and most every male is obliged to register with the selective service commission when he attains his majority. So in the event of serious need, they can (and will) still call up the masses to fight.

Professional armies are all the rage these days and it's become a byword for "good", but conscripts can be just as effective, if you know what you're doing with them and they have good morale. This is part of why Vietnam was such a debacle. The conscript army was neither well-led nor was it well-motivated.

>there is no point treating them as a representative sample.
Then the sample itself is of little use in context.

Of all the engagements, Valmy was the exception. Y'know, that was a big victory for the french, they'd gone from losing to winning very soundly in a very interesting engagement. Consider Austerlitz, a brilliant battle with brilliant tactics against all odds. We remember that more than we do the boring engagements that took place according to convention, directed by generals and marshal's who were brilliant but not Napoleon.

Consider Wellington's campaigning in Spain. Where he had the choice of engagement, he only did so with considerable numerical superiority. You can win while outnumbered, it's great to do, but the rule of thumb is that if you can outnumber your enemy you should. Unless one is Napoleon, banking on cunning tactical maneuvers is rather dangerous.