How do you answer the randomness objection to libertarian free will?

Yeah the pic is from Doyle. I wouldn't construct the taxonomy in the same way but I like some of the conceptual history he has done on free will.
I don't find his response to the randomness argument that convincing either. As far as I understand, he uses QM indeterminacy to just formally contradict the settledness of the future, right? "Generate alternative possibilities."
>informationphilosopher.com/freedom/standard_argument.html

How would you more precisely use anti-materialism or interpretations of QM against the randomness argument?

I think so. But it hardly justifies free will. Just because something occurs independent of causality, that doesn't demonstrate that it is free. Besides if there is chance in choice, how is it chance? If it's chance, how is it choice? Doyle seems to make room at the Quantum level but doesn't utilize it. He says: "microscopic chance does little to affect adequate macroscopic determinism" and "Randomness in some microscopic quantum events is indeed chance." So is there some randomness not due to chance? The point isn't fully developed. Plus, consider David Eagleman: "The fathers of quantum physics wondered whether this new science might save free will. Unfortunately, it doesn't. A system that is probabilistic and unpredictable is every bit as unsatisfying as a system that is deterministic, because in both cases there's no choice. It's either coin flips or billiard balls"

The defenses are just ones I've heard in person. Some say they agree with everything I say but reject the conclusion because they believe a soul affords them free will independent of causality (asserted without evidence but it ends the conversation). Also, others think that the identification of QM as randomness is a cop out. They argue that it is only random until we understand the pattern behind it. I have nothing else to say to that other than regurgitate the academics who do hold the view that QM is random.

Also, consider George Ortega who wrote the following: "When one fires a high-energy, short-wavelength photon at another particle, one can precisely measure the particle's position, but knowledge of its momentum becomes imprecise because the collision changes the particle's momentum. When one fires a low-energy, long-wavelength photon at the particle, one can precisely measure its momentum but knowledge of its position is imprecise due to the photon's longer wavelength. There is nothing about these interactions, nor about HUP's (Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle) prohibitions, that suggest they occur in an uncaused manner. In fact, a necessary result of HUP is that the change in the measured particle's momentum is caused by the interaction. Both macro and quantum events are
governed by the law of cause and effect."

So not all opponents of free will accept QM as random.

>Also, others think that the identification of QM as randomness is a cop out. They argue that it is only random until we understand the pattern behind it.
Isn't this just arguing that QM isn't indeterministic? Or are you thinking of someone who argues that QM is indeterministic but not random?

>Besides if there is chance in choice, how is it chance? If it's chance, how is it choice?
Well what about Robert Kane's arguments that calling indeterministic choices or actions random is begging the question?
If you're not familiar: He gives these cases, one is where a husband and wife are arguing and the husband strikes and shatters a glass table in anger, but an indeterministic neural event might have occurred so that he would have stopped short mid-punch. Kane argues that the husband can't duck responsibility for shattering the table by saying it happened by chance or randomly, even though his doing so was undetermined (there was a robust metaphysical alternative possible course of events where he didn't shatter it).
Another one, if I remember correctly, is where a sniper is aiming at the president, but an indeterministic neural twitch occurs which makes him miss and shoot someone next to the president. Again Kane argues the sniper can't excuse himself by saying the killing was a random or chance event, even though it was indeterministic.

>husband can't duck responsibility
>sniper can't excuse himself
I'm not familiar with those arguments, but I'm not seeing the point here. Those arguments deal with our conceptions of moral and legal responsibility, which are all based on an axiomatic assumption of there being a free will/self-determined agency. But logically, neither of those specific examples actually point at a necessary "responsibility" in a causal sense.

>Those arguments deal with our conceptions of moral and legal responsibility, which are all based on an axiomatic assumption of there being a free will/self-determined agency. But logically, neither of those specific examples actually point at a necessary "responsibility" in a causal sense.
Wait, are you saying the agents in those cases are morally/legally responsible but not metaphysically responsible, or are you saying they are responsible (simpliciter) but that their responsibility does not imply their having acted of their own free will?
(Because I don't understand how you distinguish moral/legal responsibility from metaphysical responsibility if you think moral/legal responsibility is based on an assumption of free will.)

>are you saying they are responsible (simpliciter) but that their responsibility does not imply their having acted of their own free will?
No, absolutely not.

>Wait, are you saying the agents in those cases are morally/legally responsible but not metaphysically responsible
I don't know what you mean by "metaphysically responsible". I'm saying that those thought experiments are at best a description of our moral/legal conceptions of "responsibility" (as opposed to an actual causal/mechanistic conception), but they tell us nothing about libertarian free will. But as I said, I'm unfamiliar with these arguments, so maybe I'm just misunderstanding the point they're supposed to support.

>Because I don't understand how you distinguish moral/legal responsibility from metaphysical responsibility
I wish I could elaborate on my position, but I don't know what you mean by metaphysical responsibility. The only distinction I made in my post was between moral/legal responsibility and "responsibility" in a causal sense.

>"responsibility" in a causal sense
This is what I meant by "metaphysical responsibility." (I take causation to be a topic in metaphysics.)
I didn't want to just say "causal responsibility" since usually causal responsibility is something everyone in the debate agrees humans can have, since it's something even inanimate objects can have ("the molecular properties of water are responsible for its liquidity at room temperature", "the earthquake was responsible for the destruction of the town", etc.).
So I said "metaphysical responsibility" to refer to the deeper form of causal responsibility I assumed you were talking about.
That should make sense of my last post.

Agency is an illusion.
We can only choose between options given to us by network patterns in the 'outside' world and the option we pick is picked by patterns in cognitive networks that are formed by interacting with network patterns in the 'outside' world.
It's all determined, being aware of the actions of networks doesn't equate to will, or agency.
youtu.be/Kn1VLE7EpD0
>Patterns all around you
>Patterns everywhere
>Patterns of behavior
>Sometimes seem unfair
>Can you recognize the patterns that you find?

>Patterns unfamiliar
Patterns lead you through (to)
>Patterns of discovery
>Tracing out the clues
>Can you recognize the patterns that you find?
>Stuck in your mind

>In this land where stability is hard to find
>You can rearrange the patterns so unkind
>Don't bother asking why a pattern never cries
>Old patterns never die they just go on and on

>Patterns multiplying
>Re-direct our view
>Endless variations
>Make it all seem new

I can give a definition of free will.

"Conscious" actions can be defined as "Actions wherein which the agent field is measured by a body which the actions causally pass through." "Free will" is a model where the agent field is produced by the formerly mentioned "body", as opposed to models where the agent field is an omnipresent quality of the universe.

>Agency is an illusion
>We can choose between options
If choice is real then agency is real, no? Unless choosing is not a mental act?
>the option we pick is picked by patterns
If we pick, then isn't it false that the patterns pick for us?
But if the patterns pick, then they have minds, don't they? Unless "the patterns pick" doesn't mean "the patterns choose" but is a metaphor for "the patterns causally determine", in which case you're only presenting an esoteric version of the argument from determinism--and why should determinism be incompatible with free will, much less with agency in general?

In the simulation hypothesis, there are two options:
> We are being played
> We are NPCs
If we are NPCs, then we are automatons deciding based on some configuration flags (genes), and there is no free will.
If we are not NPCs, then someone is playing and it would be that player's will.
Either way there is no free will.

>If an action or choice is undetermined, why is it not just random or a matter of pure chance?
It may be determined or not, the metaphysical fact of the matter is that the subjective free will one experiences literally cannot actually exist, in any possible universe.

There is no "you" as an author of your thoughts, and there cannot be. On every point on the scale of determinism to indeterminism you're just exchanging one bit of things that don't depend on you for another bit of things that don't depend on you.

But people don't experience free will. Free will is only one way to model what humans experience.

You don't, libertarian free will belongs in the trash can

>2017
>not being a compatibilist

>But people don't experience free will.
They clearly do. The existence of fatuous arguments in defense of their religious nonsense is a massive testament to that.

On a more anecdotal note, I feel it too. It's a very comfortable illusion to live with, despite knowing its falsity.

>There is no "you" as an author of your thoughts, and there cannot be.
What does this mean and why do you think it's true?

Do you only read half of my post? There are other ways to model what humans experience that aren't as flawed as "free will".

It means that "you" are not some absolute self, and such notions are incoherent. As for why, refer to the rest of the post.

I only read the half of your post that was relevant to the thread, but I'd be ecstatic to hear what you meant by that.

...

We can choose between options but whatever "choice" we make is determined by patterns. So humans are not the agents.
>unless choosing is not a mental act
Creeping Cartesianism
Choosing is a mental act but mental acts are not independent phenomenon, they are a property of open systems that emerge from a deterministic relationship with their environment and act on information interpreted from their environment. It's like a switch on a circuit board, information passes through it, what that information does is dependent on the information and not the switch. The structure of the switch also emerged from its environment. All mental processes are exogenic
I'd say all adaptive systems are minded, and that's not esoteric its biosemiotics.
While not all systems are minded, All the systems making a choice are, that means the mind, and many systems outside it. Patterns aren't what's making the choice, they are how the choice is presented and how it is made. They are properties of systems and not the systems itself.
>how incompatible
Because free will and agency require endogeny that just doesn't exist on a macroscopic scale.

I think nature is better explained as a reactor where auto-poetic systems emerge from synergetics.

...

And from my perspective here the only agent is nature itself, if it is in fact a closed system.

Hahaha, no.

aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/free_will.html

There is no argument against hard determinism other than theoretical sub atomic behaviours which don't translate to large scale (or have a huge body of proof) and as such are irrelevant.

Hard determinism is the philosophical and scientific truth.

Free Will still remains indefensible (at least preliminarily). The idea that we produce thoughts and sustain them has been dealt with it the literature pertaining to free will. Sam Harris makes the point that the phenomenon of attaching authorship to thoughts is illusory. Rather thoughts emerge and we experience them. Wegner and Llinas cover this too (keep in mind Wegner was a Harvard Psych and Llinas was a pioneering Neuroscientist).

What about arguments FOR hard determinism? I am generally a determinist but was wondering what lead you to your conclusion considering you seem strong in your conviction. I usually entertain QM in these convos but either of our positions still result in no Free Will. Also, what about Kaku. He is a physicist that values QM. He has a 2 min video about it and free will here: youtu.be/DMNZQVyabiM

But we know from actual experience that isn't true

Quatum mechanics are irrelevant to the point. The entire thing is based on observation which is a form of causation. If you observe for waves or particles you will get them over the other. IIRC in quantum encryption you can even lower the mumber of possible states during flux with certain materials. The big thing is that one of the more recenet experiments has implied that the behaviour of a particular particle is truly random. I disbelieve this and would suppose that, like all results that are observed without accounting for all the interacting factors that there is a level of error stopping our understanding of why certain things behave in the fashion we observe
If it IS true random then it doesn't matter because it's sub atomic and it's behaviour doesn't translate up into the larger scale
In this case everything obeys causality and all factors were determined at the begining of time. With the introduction of external factors the interaction will simply play out accordinly

>without the introduction*

Well, for the most part I agree. I posted the quote above from Ortega who argues that QM "demonstrated" by HUP is itself a product of causality. Also, Doyle (from which OP's picture comes from) agrees that sub-atomic events rarely effect the macro world. So yeah, what you say makes sense to me. And obviously we agree that free will is indefensible. Wha interests me these days is how such knowledge should be used to effect policy and criminal punishment. Thoughts?

Nothing should change. The best part about free-will not existing is that it might as well exist. If someone doesn't choose to change they won't change. Just because their answer is predetermined changes nothing of the factors that led into the decision.
Abloo bloo, the kid had hard cirucmstances means nothing even without determinism. What you have is actions and consequences.
If something induced that action, you should change it. If the action has occured you have no recourse but to address it.
If your failings as a leader have led the people to starve and others are stealing food your met with two points:
a) ethically you cannot blame them for a situation you created. They aren't abberant just reactive.
b) theft will further distabilise the rule collective and has to be pragmatically quashed ethical or otherwise

It all depends on the context, and the results of the consequences you mett out.

>free will is indefensible
It's not though. We don't live in a deterministic universe.

And your evidence for this? I'll take anything theology, philosophy or science, hit me.

I take it you're not the guy above who just said Hard Determinism is true. Are you referrin to the presence of Q Indeterminancy or something else. Who is determinism not true?

I disagree. A lack of free will totally absolves people. That couldn't have done otherwise or thought otherwise (if you're a hard determinist). Acknowledgment of QM only adds random difference.
"If something induced that action, you should change it"? You cannot do so freely, that's the point

Absolution takes away personal agency. If you tell the populace nothing they do is their responsibility then they will act foolishly.
You might say they were predetermined to do so, however it was your deliberation and choice to introduce them to these ideas that induced that state.
>but if I did that it would be because I was predetermined to do so
Right, however you haven't done so meaning the factors are an unknown and your beliefs of predetermination may lead you to suboptimal choices as you believe yourself, as an agent, to be powerless.
The hound race has a winner before it starts but if the hounds were to believe that the race will occur no matter what and sat around it would not occur.
Acceptence of and position on predetermination is yet another interacting factor on your determined behaviour.

In a world with no free will their is no random. For if it is all predetermined then nothing is ever chanced it is merely scripted to appear as such.

For randomness or chance to exist free will must exist

I agree with the first part. Vohs and Schooler have a study based on it the effects of not believing free will. Yet, I think it can lead to better rehab schemes.
The last half of your post is the typical conflation of Determinism with Fatalism. Intentions and effort still matter because they lead to great reward. These is true despite the the absence of free will. And we can't conflate Determinism and predictability either. We can't really know the outcome of things in advance.

"
For randomness or chance to exist free will must exist" elaborate. Explain the mechanics of your worldview

So then why do you absolve those who do the wrong thing? I don't believe I've conflated anything personally. I myself believe in determinsim but still operate unlike others. However in your perception wherein all merit and agency is removed from the individual what reaction would you expect?

1. If their is no free will then all actions and reactions are predetermined
2. If all reactions are predetermined then all events are predetermined. Else you could not partake in the predetermined reaction to it.
3. Since all actions, reactions, and events are predetermined their exists no possibility for randomness and chance to effect any outcome.
4. Therefore in order for randomness and chance to exist events cannot be predetermined.
5. If events cannot be predetermined peoples reactions cannot be predetermined.
6. Reactions are actions in response to something. Therefore those actions cannot be predetermined.
7. Because we have found an instance where an action cannot be predetermined then free will exists in those instances.
8. Free will exists.

Sorry, my semantic mistake. I wouldn't absolve them criminally just morally. A murderer is as unlucky as person who is either born with cancer or develops it later. They're simply a victim also. Punishment still serves 3 useful purposes. 1. Deterence, 2. Rehab and 3. Locked up for societal safety. So I support it to some extent. But I reject the abundant animosity harbored toward criminals. They're victims too. Disbelief in free will isn't so chaos inducing though. We don't belive and nor does a plethora of other people. It's only increased my compassion.

>1. If their is no free will then all actions and reactions are predetermined
That is a very humanist way of looking at things. Also wrong. If there _is_ a factor that is truly random and can causally affect other processes then it doesn't matter whether free will exists or not because nothing could be determined in a universe that cannot be modeled.

Your conclusion is succesfully persuasive of your premises are. I disaree with P1. "If their is no free will then all actions and reactions are predetermined." Such a premise disregards QM

>They're victims too
Nobody is a victim and everyone is. If every agent operates under the same conditions (that of not having control of your circumstances) I do not think it affords you special forgivness. Your actions are what defines you, no matter how determined they are.

Only if*

This is a thread about free will
Free will is only a problem for humans
Therefore a humanist way of looking at this problem is one of the more correct ways of solving this problem

Your trying to divorce something from the problem that is intrinsic to the problem. Which in itself is wrong

Regardless of whether the problem exists from a human perspective or not your logic was based on a physical premise. That premise is demonstratably wrong. Regardless of the rationale used from that point on it is wrong because your premise is wrong.

But they're only broadly the same circumstances. You overlook the important subtleties - the different genes and different environment. So yes they're all the same in the sense that none have control but they have different circumstances, which, again, you ignored. If you had Ted Bundy's genes and environment, you'd be as unlucky as him. Be grateful that you don't.

And? Is not the point of predetermination about events and actions? Its hard to have an action happen in a purely nonphysical manner. Same with events.

To divorce this premise from its physicality is also strange as the physical realm is how all things are done. From the processes of life to the thoughts we have all have a physical basis. Events also are based in the physical realm as those events effect something with substance. Else they wouldnt be an event.

What premise would you use then, if you where to use the idea of randomness = free will?

>You overlook the important subtleties
I don't overlook them, I choose not to indulge them. Should I be pittied for my circumstances? I wonder. The reality is that any person from any circumstance can become a story of success or a story of failure. There is no 'good' circumstance. Just congruent ones. If you're a rich kid with genetic and environmental predispositions to be a loser and go full supereme gentleman should you be pittied for your circumstance or scorned for your mishandling of them?
Determinism has no effect on the micro-scale interactions of life. It's revelations are existential.

" The reality is that any person from any circumstance can become a story of success or a story of failure" - Nope. You just make that conclusion because you view a person who has APPARENT good circumstances but, again, you ignore the subtleties. For instance, one may grow in an abusive environement but come out seemingly ok. Another may have SIMILAR (never the same) experiences but come out badly. What of Mono Oxidase A an enzyme that helps reduce stress? People with this are generally more insulated against emotional stress. It's far more complicated. Should the bad ones have made more of this enzyme? Your position is untenable if you dont believe on free will.

How do I ignore them? I am aware of neurology. I am not a professional but I'm not a layman either. The reality is whether it's nature or nurture you will be what you are, sure
Your phenotypes don't define you as they interact with your environment. Your environment does't define you as it interacts with your behaviour. Your behaviour doesn't define you as it interacts with your phenotypes. The self is a constantly shifting abstraction which is both effected and often affects the factors it interacts with. People can, and usually do change their environment to their likeing as much as possible. Of course however, the degree to which you can or will do it is predetermined but what does it matter?
Bad things are bad, good things are good. Such criteria are based not on causation but on content.
People still make choices. Those choices are determined but the implications of those choices and their reflection on the content of your character remain.

People (as an organism) change their environments but not as an agent. They cannot freely change the environment. A choice to change at time x is determined by the events before it and regresses to conception. You can't have determinism and the model you adopt.

And you ignored them by saying anyone of any circumstance can be a success or failure. I thought you ignored the complexity. Maybe you didn't. But circumstances cause the outcome.

What implications exactly?

They can be a success or a failure if you consider the individual inherent (in terms of genetics and disposition before envrinmental alteration) and the environment the circumstance. It was a matter of definition.

>what implications
That people who affect you negatively without reasonable cause (a matter of perspective) are bad. That people who give in to temptation where others would not have are weak and so on and so forth. The discussion of ethics is idiosyncratic and removed from the point. My point is that those ethics held by an observer still apply regardless of causation.

People can leave environments which relative to their existence is an act of changing their environment.

>There is no argument against hard determinism
Hard determinism is incompatibilism plus determinism.
As points out, free will skeptics almost never argue for determinism.
Why think everything has a cause? Why think all causation is deterministic?
>theoretical sub atomic behaviours which don't translate to large scale as such are irrelevant.
This complacency is never well-argued, I find.
I remember one philosopher pointing out it's not like quantum mechanics governs some distant little corner of the universe, though the "levels of reality" metaphysic can deceive you into thinking like that; everything, including us, is made of quantum physical matter. What actual arguments are there for believing absolutely all quantum indeterminacy is confined to the nano-scale? Come to think of it, how would you even test whether macro-scale causation is completely deterministic?
Besides, it was already pointed out above ITT that Bob Doyle accepts the "nano-scale confinement" thesis but uses quantum indeterminacy to generate alternative possibilities for his (semi-)libertarian position anyway.

Yeah, but they cannot freely leave. If they leave, leaving was a product of causality and randomness. So if you leave a bad environment, you are lucky. If you leave a good environment, you are unlucky.
As I said: "A choice to change at time x is determined by the events before it and regresses to conception"

Not the guy you're addressing but I always found it weird when people assert that Free Will is in the sub-atomic level. As you said, "everything, including us, is made of quantum physical matter." Meaning chairs and tables surely have QM operating at their sub-atomic level. Do they have free will. I usually ask them. It seems an assertion that QM itself doesn't save free will. Only when people consider the QM and the brain, which leaves a gap in their reasoning. You might find Gerard t'Hooft interesting. He is a physicist who posits that QM may have an underlying deterministic level.

>Nothing should change. The best part about free-will not existing is that it might as well exist.
If free will and moral responsibility are unreal because of physical determinism, then humans are like pinballs. No meaning or value in life survives that.

Imagine an old pinball machine is locked away in a basement but its defective springs make it occasionally launch a ball. Imagine a murderer is chasing a person through that basement and the pinball machine randomly launches a ball which happens to break through the machine's rotted wood, roll onto the floor, and trip up the person being chased so the murderer catches them.

You could never say that pinball was guilty of wrongdoing. But on a free will & responsibility skeptical view, any seemingly morally significant or meaningful action any human ever commits is like what that pinball did. Sure, humans are more complex, but the consciousness and volitions that factor into what humans do are just comparable to the shape and weight of the pinball: they determine how the thing moves through its environment once set in motion.

Imagine there was a tiny consciousness confined to the pinball and witnessing all it did from the inside. Now you have Sam Harris's view of persons. It is impossible for such a pinball person to do anything that has ethical significance: nothing it does can constitutes wrongdoing or its opposite. It cannot have real virtues or vices since it can't be deservedly criticized or praised for anything about it. It is thus impossible for it to be a person at all.

Neutron Stars exhibit quantum behavior and they're as large as Manhattan. The point is for hard determinism to be true EVERY part of the universe needs to be 100% deterministic. This is clearly not true since there are things that exist as a cloud of probability and have unpredictable behavior. Trying to draw a line and saying it doesn't matter because quantum mechanics only show themselves at sub atomic level is a copout because it means you're trying to split the universe into two distinct sections to preserve your precious determinism. It either is, or isn't and if our current understanding of QM is correct then it isn't.

Hard determinism is such a hilariously stupid position that I can't believe people still actually hold it. You DO make decisions guys, it's not an illusion. The idea you were 'fated' to do everything you've done belongs in new age magazines for schoolgirls.

Do people who believe in free will ever acknowledge the atrocities that their ideology has lead to, and say that they were all justified?

Determinism says the people who committed those atrocities aren't morally responsible and cannot be held accountable for their actions, which is even worse

So if a bear is attacking people in a city, nothing can be done to stop the bear because the bear isn't morally responsible for its actions.

You're a fucking retard.

Technically whether you stop the bear isn't really up to you anyway. The decision has already been made, you'll just go through the motions. Determinism is fun.

So then you have no argument. Guess we're done here.

What? I said that if determinism is true than people cannot be held accountable for their actions because they never had a choice whether or not to do those things. If you had a choice that's not determinism, your actions now and ALL actions you will ever make in the future have already been decided. Then you made a dumb analogy taking exception to that and using an example of people making a choice, which again, makes no sense if we're saying determinism is true.

Just because you don't like the implications of determinism doesn't mean they're not real issues. Perhaps if you find it that distasteful you should ascribe to the idea we actually do have free will and are responsible for our choices instead?

>the implications of determinism
There are no implications. You're acting like a person with no "moral responsibility" is completely immune to influence from outside forces. A serial killer isn't suddenly unstoppable because there is no free will.

No but then again no-one is stopping him because he's doing a morally bad thing, they're stopping him because they never had any choice, it was per-ordained.

So yes people who do morally bad things suffer consequences even though according to determinism they never actually had any choice in the matter, but ONLY because other people never had any choice but to stop him. Do you understand that? There is no moral responsibility AND people never have any choice in what they do. Police capturing bad guys is not a choice, it was pure cause and effect. Criminals commuting crimes is not a choice, pure cause and effect. Everything we ever do is not of our own will it is a chemical reaction that determines what we do.

So yes. No moral weight to any action but then again you will suffer consequences because chances are there are other people who never had any choice but to stop you. We're all slaves to chemical reactions, and if you believe that and judge anyone ever for their actions you're a hypocrite because you had no choice in whether you were a good person or a bad person either.

You do make choices but the question is if you're free to make them. An organism seemingly decides one thing over another but that doesn't allow for the conclusion that they were free to do so. This is true whether hard determinism is true or not.