Fall Blau could have been succesful if it wasn't for Stalingrad seems to be the popular notion

Interesting, thank you

I think it would gone yugo > Low Countries > France > soviet

That is of course assuming the international community kept its head firmly up its ass and refused to confront hitler

Just out of curiosity, how many Soviet troops were there in the Caucasus and the steppes? If the Germans had had a few extra divisions, could they have closed the gap to the Caspian?

Even if the Germans somehow got to Baku the Soviets would ust burn down the oilfields as they did in Maikop.

*would just

but the soviets cant use them aswell
Hitler was perfectly clear with the fact that they won't use the oil that was refined by the soviets

I don't have a whole lot to go on myself, I never hugely studied the Caucasus campaign, but this image

2.bp.blogspot.com/-8HgQQ6-RKFs/T179GIfHZjI/AAAAAAAAIgA/TWbANcPB_wo/s1600/GERMAN-ATTACK-CAUCASUS-WW2.png

Puts 7 Soviet Armies in the region in 1942. An Army usually constitued 4-8 divisions, although this varied ; at a rough, back of the envelope estimation, that makes about 42 divisions, which would, if they were all rifle divisions (they probably wouldn't be, but that would be by far the most common) about 10,000 men on average, so you're talking a bit shy of half a million troops.

And that's why Hitler lost the war

What if the Germans simply encircled Stalingrad and cut off access via the Volga/land to it?

Thanks. Still, from the looks of it there wasn´t much in the way of defences for the Kalmys steppes and around the Kuma. Why didn´t the Germans simply plug the gap and encircle all the Caucasian armies?

No, as they would have been able to bring it back to production.
Going in to Stalingrad and reinforcing the flanks with the 6th army was what lost him the war.

*and not

Because even encircling just their side of the Volga would involve extending their lines about 100 km, and a complete encirclement would mean even a longer perimeter, as well as making a hostile river crossing, and they didn't have nearly enough men to do something like that.

I really can't say, like I said, I never really studied the campaign in any depth. I imagine it was simply too hard to keep pushing and moving freely at the end of a very long supply tether and against close opposition.

>stalingrad would've somehow won the war
'no'

Do you think it would've been an easier ride if they somehow attacked from turkey?
And that means an axis turkey.

Gee whiz, let's just attack into mountains all day long and try to maintain operation momentum

What could've been

Who cares. The Nazis were pieces of shit and they deserved to lose.

Turkey joining the Axis would have indeed helped the Germans enormously, especially if it's before Barbarossa, not sometime in 1942 when the Soviets would have put defenses in place by that point.

But getting Turkey into the war is a near impossibility, they wanted no part in that hatchet fight.

>putting "supply lines are for pussies" in charge of a deep offensive

>Stalingrad had to be taken in order to secure the northern flank in their advance to Baku, that was mandatory.

complete bullshit.

original plans of case blue were just to demo the industry there. the city could be surrounded and cut off like st. petersburg. no one wanted to fucking get held up in urban combat that downplayed the advantages and strengths of the german military.

>Putting your best tank commander in Africa

The Soviets were pieces of shit and they deserved to lose.

Russia.

>but what if they just besiege it?
>Then you have the exact same situation.

how? laying siege to a city in ww2 is not some fucking medieval siege warfare.

besides, the city could be considered as good as laid to siege if the 6th army was deployed to engage any relief forces and the luftwaffe used to attack lines of communication/supply lines.

>Then you have the exact same situation. German army is stuck in a position barely defended by terrain and with their flanks covered by the Romanians and others.

how is the volga a barely defensible position?

of course the romanian/hungarian/italian allies were weak, but it's entirely plausible for them to defend against soviet offensives if the german land and air units were deployed to support them instead of being sent into a wasteful siege.

>Soviet artillery could reliably hit targets some 12 km distant,

and luftwaffe air support has 100s of km of operational range.

>how is the volga a barely defensible position?

Because it's hundreds of kilometers long and you don't have enough manpower to cover it all.

>and luftwaffe air support has 100s of km of operational range.

You're missing the point. As long as Stalingrad remains in Soviet hands, you'd have to give any passing convoys, either of direct military or of extracted supply, a wide berth of the city to avoid even just the attacks that can be launched from the city itself.

And covering all that distance takes a hell of a lot more manpower than was lost in street to street fighting, manpower that the Wehrmacht doesn't have to spare.

>Because it's hundreds of kilometers long and you don't have enough manpower to cover it all.

why should they cover all of it?

the strength of the german military relies on freedom of movement and the ability to surround and destroy an enemy formation.

in theory, as long as the 6th army was able to identify a soviet army that crossed, they could've deployed to engage it or even retreat as need be.

attempting to seize stalingrad was the worst possible thing to do. it deprived the 6th army of freedom of movement by committing them to urban warfare, which played to the strengths of the soviets.

>As long as Stalingrad remains in Soviet hands, you'd have to give any passing convoys, either of direct military or of extracted supply, a wide berth of the city to avoid even just the attacks that can be launched from the city itself.

launching an attack from the city is the worst thing the soviets could do, because the mostly infantry soviet units would just be destroyed in the open steppe by panzer divisions operating in very favorable conditions.

i honestly don't think you know jack shit about anything to do with the military. as long as the 6th army maintained a cohesive and mobile formation supported by the luftwaffe, working to deny lines of communication and avenues of approach to and from stalingrad, then the germans would've maybe held the caucasus until the winter.

>why should they cover all of it?

Because that's military theory 101? Present a clear front whenever possible? Because you actually don't want the Soviets running amok in your rear echelon areas? Becuase the Soviets can attack almost anywhere they want and you don't know where that will be?

>the strength of the german military relies on freedom of movement and the ability to surround and destroy an enemy formation.

Something that they never once did while trying to pursue a lateral objective and being attacked from the flank.

>in theory, as long as the 6th army was able to identify a soviet army that crossed, they could've deployed to engage it or even retreat as need be.

In theory, the 6th army would be busy trying to actually seize this objective, since you are after all going after Baku (or something else down there) and will have to be guarding the flank with only a portion of its strength. And if you retreat, you then jeopardize everything to your south.

>attempting to seize stalingrad was the worst possible thing to do. it deprived the 6th army of freedom of movement by committing them to urban warfare, which played to the strengths of the soviets.

It was a fucking necessary thing to do, because attempting to circumvellate it and keep the Soviets bottled up costs far more men than urban combat.

>launching an attack from the city is the worst thing the soviets could do, because the mostly infantry soviet units would just be destroyed in the open steppe by panzer divisions operating in very favorable conditions.

First off, I'm not even suggesting they leave the city. You'd need to, at the very least, stop the Soviet batteries in the city itself from shooting at your guys.

Secondly, lay off the hex games. Tanks are primarily exploitation vehicles, not "bash your way through the front" vehicles. Infantry was perfectly capable of fighting against armor in the open, and would do so frequently in the second world war.

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Thirdly, you might want to look up an orgchart. By december of 1942, The 6th army was 3 panzer divisions to 13 infantry divisions, one Jager division, and 3 motorized infantry divisions. The Soviets, meanwhile had considerable armor support and were not "Just infantry" because the attack was not solely organized out of the city itself.

>i honestly don't think you know jack shit about anything to do with the military.

Pot, meet kettle.

>as long as the 6th army maintained a cohesive and mobile formation supported by the luftwaffe, working to deny lines of communication and avenues of approach to and from stalingrad, then the germans would've maybe held the caucasus until the winter.

user, let me try to explain something called "scale" to you. The 6th army constituted roughly 20 divisions. That is, very roughly, 300,000 men. (That is, if they're at full strength; they weren't after the heavy fighting around the Don basin, but let's just ignore that for now) If you want to ignore Stalingrad and prevent counterattacks out of it, you need to have troops facing in that direction. The problem is, you don't know where the counterattack will come from, and the Soviets generally have better intelligence than the Germans do; they were consistently able to bring up local superiority in excess of frontwide superiority at points of contact, and would do so throughout pretty much all of the war post 1941's debacles.

Just the distance from Stalingrad to Astrakhan is 435 km. To cover that stretch, you'd have a pathetic 689 men per km on average. The Soviets will mass up at some point, and roll right through you like you're not there. You'd need to know, ahead of time, where the attack will come from, and the defender doesn't get that luxury unless there's some sort of constricting factor (usually logistical) forcing the enemy to attack at a certain point. Which you don't have here, because the Soviets are floating a lot of their supplies by river.

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Different user then the one you are replying too. Why do you think that it would be more costly to hold the Volga rather then besiege Stalingrad? The city fighting in Stalingrad required over 20 divisions, that's not even including the Romanian and Italian units used to defend the flanks. They could use that force to properly dig in on the western side of the Volga instead of concentrating it at one point.

>Just the distance from Stalingrad to Astrakhan is 435 km. To cover that stretch, you'd have a pathetic 689 men per km on average

This is a fair point. But I don't think you taking into account the amount of German soldiers from other parts of the eastern front being funneled into Stalingrad. Several Division were taken from the Rzhev Salient and were thrown into the Stalingrad meat grinder. Those divisions could of instead been used to dig in on the western side of the Volga, thus making your defensive line better. We know that the Rzhev salient never fell, so those divisions wont even be missed. The German army still had manpower to draw from in 1942 from other places as well. The forces used during Operation Winter Storm could be used instead to also bolster German lines toward the Caspian Sea. Not to mention now that you aren't fighting in a meat grinder you have more man power to spare holding the front.

You seem very knowledgeable on the subject so I'd like to hear your take on this.

>Because that's military theory 101?

the fuck is military theory 101? a class in trump uni?

post ww-1 warfare is all about maneuver warfare and that's how the germans got as far as they did in barbarossa. perhaps you've heard of this in your military theory 101 class?

>Something that they never once did while trying to pursue a lateral objective and being attacked from the flank.

not only do you know nothing about the military, you don't even know history. case blue was started exactly in this way: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue#Opening_phase
>the Soviets rushed reinforcements into the town, to hold it at all costs and counterattacked the Germans' northern flank in an effort to cut off the German spearheads.
> 5th Tank Army, commanded by Major General A.I. Liziukov, managed to achieve some minor successes when it began its attack on 6 July, but was forced back to its starting positions by 15 July

>In theory, the 6th army would be busy trying to actually seize this objective
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue
>Army Group A was tasked with crossing the Caucasus mountains to reach the Baku oil fields, while Army Group B protected its flanks along the Volga.
>Army Group B, under Maximilian von Weichs (Volga campaign)
>Sixth Army

>It was a fucking necessary thing to do, because attempting to circumvellate it and keep the Soviets bottled up costs far more men than urban combat.

please exactly elaborate in what way cutting off stalingrad's lines of communication in the open steppe is better for a german mechanized army than assaulting and occupying the city. go ahead, i'll wait.

>You'd need to, at the very least, stop the Soviet batteries in the city itself from shooting at your guys.

the soviets are using artillery shells that come from outside, not catapults with stalingrad urbanites. cut off the supply lines and you stop the artillery.

>Infantry was perfectly capable of fighting against armor in the open,

stopped reading here. i'm not going to waste my time arguing with a literal retard that can't understand how ineffective soviet conscripts are against panzer divisions operating on an open steppe.

>Why do you think that it would be more costly to hold the Volga rather then besiege Stalingrad?

because he's hitler shitposting from 1945 in his berlin bunker on an enigma machine powered by pure retardation.

>They could use that force to properly dig in on the western side of the Volga instead of concentrating it at one point.

The western side of the Volga is hundreds of kilometers long. If you want to try to defend it all, you're going to need a hell of a lot more force. If you want to string them out over the 435 km stretch, that's 1 division per 21.75 km. That's a less dense defense than what the Germans put up when they got curbstomped in Bagration. There's also the left side of the Volga to consider, but that's probably a different operation than a dive south maneuver.

>You seem very knowledgeable on the subject so I'd like to hear your take on this.

My take on it is this. As far as I know, nobody has ever broken down the casualties in the battle of Stalingrad to say these many men and material were lost getting to the city, these many men were lost fighting street to street, and this much was lost in the Soviet counterattack.

However, the overall Axis losses were about 850,000, and you had an encirclement and mass surrender, which produces a lot of casualties, and very, very heavy fighting just to get to the city's gates. (You have guys like Glantz saying that Stalingrad was really lost at the Kotlyuban battles) The amount of casualties sustained in city fighting in about 2 months is probably far less than the open fighting beforehand, nevermind the Soviet counterattacks which did succeed. Generally, large destruction of men and material happens on failed defense, when they break through your front areas and start chewing up the much more sensitive rear ones. Failed offense, while bloody, generally doesn't lead to such wholesale slaughter. I can't prove it, but my hunch is that a relatively small amount of the losses were sustained in the actual assaults and not the other fighting, which is the only part you'd "save on by attempting to invest the city. Thus, investing is probably a bad move.

I love how every thread about a possible better outcome for the germans are generally "no" or "would never have happened".
What makes the soviets so far stronger in these debates than they actually were?

>post ww-1 warfare is all about maneuver warfare and that's how the germans got as far as they did in barbarossa.

Can you show me where the Germans opened up a deliberate gap in their lines in Barbarossa? You know how they were always attempting to close salients because of these sorts of risks? Ever hear of the Kiev operation?

>not only do you know nothing about the military, you don't even know history. case blue was started exactly in this way

So, you mean, a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ARMY was holding a different section of the line instead of the same one trying to both hold its flank and advance at the same time? Nice false equivalence.

>Sixth Army

Yes,. you know, the objective of protecting the flanks, which will not be accomplished by stringing it out over a couple hundred kilometers.

>lease exactly elaborate in what way cutting off stalingrad's lines of communication in the open steppe is better for a german mechanized army than assaulting and occupying the city. go ahead, i'll wait.

The part where yo cut off Stalingrad's lines of communication is an even fucking bigger task than just guarding the left bank of the Volga, and requires occupying a fucking colossal amount of territory, which the Germans do not fucking have the manpower to do; most likely they wouldn't be able to even if they had nothing else on their plates, but please remember that this is supposedly in support of a drive on the Caucasus, so, you know, you kind of need to have troops for that too.

>the soviets are using artillery shells that come from outside, not catapults with stalingrad urbanites. cut off the supply lines and you stop the artillery.

And how the fuck are you going to cut the supply lines? Going to attack all along the Volga and drive another couple hundred km when you already can't get past the city itself and the banks are held by a force that outnumbers you? Don't forget that you don't exactly have a lot of road lines (let alone rail lines) that cross those rivers without going through the city, so I have no fucking clue how you're going to supply this hypothetical offensive.

Read this and please stop being stupid.history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-21/cmhPub_104-21.pdf

Armor was not intended to go crashing head on into Soviet formations, even "Conscript infantry".

>I love how every thread about a possible better outcome for the germans are generally "no" or "would never have happened".

This might come as a shock to you, but it's because the Germans fought a pretty good war, all things considered, and there's not much to easily improve upon in their offensive stages.

>What makes the soviets so far stronger in these debates than they actually were?

What involves making the Soviets stronger than they were? This involves believing that the Germans could not in fact wildly attack colossal areas that they did not historically attack and occupy because magic ubermenschen soldiers apparently always win no matter how thinly you spread them out.

"Beseige stalingrad" requires you to hold an enormous fucking area. Holding enormous areas takes a lot of manpower, and the Germans didn't have enough of it as it was, let alone trying to lengthen their perimeter, which helps the side with more men (That's the Soviets, by the way).

>bulge

OwO whats this?

>i'm being belligerent, that makes me a good debater

The bulge you would necessarily create in the German line by trying to carve out an area outside of gun range from the city itself while simultaneously bottling up forces within or nearby the city from counterattacking.

i really shouldn't be responding but watching you dig yourself a deeper hole in new ways is terribly fun.

>Can you show me where the Germans opened up a deliberate gap in their lines in Barbarossa?

how is this relevant to maneuver warfare or how germans managed to encircle entire soviet armies in barbarossa?

> Ever hear of the Kiev operation?
>The 1920 Kiev Offensive (or Kiev Operation)

not sure how a soviet-polish war is relevant here but ok, i'll admit i never heard of it. please explain how its relevant?

>So, you mean, a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ARMY was holding a different section of the line instead of the same one trying to both hold its flank and advance at the same time? Nice false equivalence.

again, i'm not sure what you're talking about. but the basic fact is that voronezh, the germans were flanked but managed to break it and push back then continue onwards toward the actual objective securing army group b's flank, which you said never happened.

>Yes,. you know, the objective of protecting the flanks, which will not be accomplished by stringing it out over a couple hundred kilometers.

which is not the best idea. you're autistically obsessed with this "man the lines!!1!1!!" when that's not even how the wehrmacht operated according to principles of maneuver warfare.

>The part where yo cut off Stalingrad's lines of communication is an even fucking bigger task than just guarding the left bank of the Volga, and requires occupying a fucking colossal amount of territory

please explain how cutting lines of communication = occupying territory. also

>And how the fuck are you going to cut the supply lines?

>what is covering axes of approach, area denial and air interdiction

> Going to attack all along the Volga and drive another couple hundred km when you already can't get past the city itself and the banks are held by a force that outnumbers you?

you do realize the germans had an air force? the so-called "flying-artillery"? it wasn't just used to airlift Göring's fat arse around.

>Armor was not intended to go crashing head on into Soviet formations, even "Conscript infantry".

where did i say armor crashes head on into soviet formations?

it's almost like the guns on tanks are actually used for shooting things at a distance and not just for symbolic representations of colossal aryan manhood.

>how is this relevant to maneuver warfare or how germans managed to encircle entire soviet armies in barbarossa?

Because maneuvering warfare isn't just running around randomly and never holding to static positions. Even in "maneuver warfare" you have enormous numbers of divisions legging it, and logistical concerns slow things down, you can't always run wherever you want.

They also encircled entire armies while attacking, not while spreading themselves on a line and then just sitting there defending it.

>not sure how a soviet-polish war is relevant here but ok, i'll admit i never heard of it. please explain how its relevant?

No, I'm talking about the 1941 diversion of significant elements of Army Group Center to attack Kiev, becuase of the salient that the Southwestern Front occupied in the German positions.

>again, i'm not sure what you're talking about

Reading comprehension would be helpful here.

>but the basic fact is that voronezh, the germans were flanked but managed to break it and push back then continue onwards toward the actual objective securing army group b's flank, which you said never happened.

That is not what I said never happened. I said that no German formation simultaneously successfully advanced on an objective while fending off a flanking attack; something that your "plan" requires, since you want to, as an alternative to taking Stalingrad, attack an area that can be used to cut supply to the city, which will require taking or at least contesting an enormous amount of land, all the while defending yourself from whatever sallies come forth from the city while trying to push through the other forces the Soviets have in the area.
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>which is not the best idea. you're autistically obsessed with this "man the lines!!1!1!!" when that's not even how the wehrmacht operated according to principles of maneuver warfare.

user, the "principles of maneuver warfare" did in fact involve holding territory. They did in fact seek to shortern their lines whenever possible. They did in fact risk and sometimes lose to Soviet counterattacks, and blithely assuming that they can leave something like the entire stretch of the Volga hanging is stupid.

>what is covering axes of approach, area denial and air interdiction

Ok, so the axes of appraoch for Stalingrad include

1) The entire Volga river, both upstream and downstream

2) a rail line heading east through the city and over the Volga.

How many hundreds of kilometers do you want to cover to try to cut off access?

>area denial

You mean, 'physical occupation'. WHich is going to take even more men.

>air interdiction

user, the Transport Plan that the Allies did in 1944 against France didn't completely interdict German ability to move stuff in France. They were using thousands of 4 engined bombers. The Germans have roughly 750 planes in the theater at the time of the battle, about half of whom are fighters, and the bombers of which are necessary for tactical support. The idea that you'd be able to air interdict a Soviet counterattack is laughable.

>you do realize the germans had an air force? the so-called "flying-artillery"? it wasn't just used to airlift Göring's fat arse around.

So did the Soviets, and the Germans didn't exactly have a great track record of using air assets alone to either eliminate or interdict forces. Operation Uranus struck with over a million men. You really thing 350ish bombers are going to stop them or their supply networks?

3/3

>where did i say armor crashes head on into soviet formations?

The part where you just summarily dismissed the notion that infantry could fight with armor in the open, nevermind it actually doing so on both sides of the War in the East, let alone anywhere else in WW2.>it's almost like the guns on tanks are actually used for shooting things at a distance and not just for symbolic representations of colossal aryan manhood.

Way to strawman. But let me spell it definitively, since you seem to have a problem with figurative language.

Armor formations engaging in head on contests with infantry, even in open terrain, tends to end badly for the armor. If nothing else, infantry formations are always accompanied by artillery support, and organizationally, anti-tank weapons were incorporated in that artillery support.

digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=dodmilintel

Armor excelled at breakthrough or highly mobile sorts of operations, getting into the flanks or rear or other softer targets. Directly engaging an infantry division with an armor division in a head on clash is an almost criminal waste of an armor division, and was rarely done. Rather, the Germans attempted to engage infantry with infantry, and mass armor for a breakthrough once a weakness presented itself. However, simply assuming that infantry get overrun by armor is stupid and baseless.

>Because maneuvering warfare isn't just running around randomly and never holding to static positions.

now that you've demonstrated a basic understanding of what maneuver warfare is not, could you explain what the fuck your point was in

>Can you show me where the Germans opened up a deliberate gap in their lines in Barbarossa?

>No, I'm talking about the 1941

it's almost like you don't know how to talk about history and spout vague, easily misunderstood bullshit.

>Reading comprehension would be helpful here.

funny enough, i could say the same thing to you, but i'd be wasting my breath. i don't think you understand a single goddamn thing i'm saying, and i haven't even graduated from college.

> I said that no German formation simultaneously successfully advanced on an objective while fending off a flanking attack

wow, the germans fight dirty, what with these use of tactics and strategies to win! an army helping another army that's being attacked in the flank? dishonorabu!

>something that your "plan" requires, since you want to, as an alternative to taking Stalingrad, attack an area that can be used to cut supply to the city, which will require taking or at least contesting an enormous amount of land all the while defending yourself from whatever sallies come forth from the city while trying to push through the other forces the Soviets have in the area.

>something that your "plan" requires, since you want to, as an alternative to taking Stalingrad, attack an area that can be used to cut supply to the city, which will require taking or at least contesting an enormous amount of land all the while defending yourself from whatever sallies come forth from the city while trying to push through the other forces the Soviets have in the area.

germans operating efficiently in a non-urban environment where panzers and aircraft can be used to full effectiveness in contesting land against an enemy? balderdash! better stuff those mechanized units in a city where the panzers are walled of nice and cozy and every CAS request is danger close with an almost equal chance of hitting friendlies in a sea of rubble!

>user, the "principles of maneuver warfare" did in fact involve holding territory.

yes, but they mostly emphasize mobility. hence the "maneuver". i take it english isn't your first language. not bad for a first effort, you almost sound like an understandable idiot.

> and blithely assuming that they can leave something like the entire stretch of the Volga hanging is stupid.

while committing to urban warfare and leaving your flanks manned by inferior, thinned out auxiliaries is preferable?

it's a shit position but the best choice is to retain cohesiveness and mobility at the cost of covering the river.

>Ok, so the axes of appraoch for Stalingrad include

1) The entire Volga river, both upstream and downstream

i didn't realize soviet tanks and trucks were amphibious. someone should've told them, then they wouldn't waste time building bridges at a few key points to cross the river.

>You mean, 'physical occupation'.

google isn't that hard:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Area_denial_weapon
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denied_area

>The idea that you'd be able to air interdict a Soviet counterattack is laughable.

i know, it's almost as laughable as the idea of the army and air force using different methods of area denial, air interdiction, land interdiction, etc in concert to achieve the same goal instead of relying on one method! fuck nerds, amiright?

> and the Germans didn't exactly have a great track record of using air assets alone to either eliminate or interdict forces.

yea, it's almost like the luftwaffe forces and efforts were wasted in prioritized air support for units attacking stalingrad. lazy fuckers, honestly.

>The part where you just summarily dismissed the notion that infantry could fight with armor in the open

but where exactly did i say armor just crashes into soviet formations? please quote me saying something like that. i'll wait.

>Way to strawman.

it's not a strawman you autistic devil fart, it was sarcasm. but let me spell it out since you can't into language:

tanks obviously engage infantry at ranges infantry aren't effective. and believe it or not, but the open steppe is a wide place with not so much cover, where panzers can comfortably shoot infantry and AT at hundreds of kilometers while italians clap politely. as opposed to, you know, a fucking city.

>now that you've demonstrated a basic understanding of what maneuver warfare is not, could you explain what the fuck your point was in

That you can't simply afford to ignore Soviet troops on the east side of the Volga. Ignoring them is a great way to get into trouble while you're focusing on the Caucasus, and repeatedly shouting "I'll just use maneuver warfare" is a meaningless defense.

>it's almost like you don't know how to talk about history and spout vague, easily misunderstood bullshit.

Or that I have mastered a little something called "Context" and assumed you were reasonably familiar with something during Barbarossa and a Soviet threat to a German flank.

>funny enough, i could say the same thing to you, but i'd be wasting my breath. i don't think you understand a single goddamn thing i'm saying, and i haven't even graduated from college.

I've understood it just fine, which is why I've been trying to explain to you why it won't work.

>wow, the germans fight dirty, what with these use of tactics and strategies to win! an army helping another army that's being attacked in the flank? dishonorabu!

Who is bringing notions of honor or fairness into it? But you have been claiming that it would be a superior plan to"beseige" Stalingrad without actually taking the city using the forces of the 6th Army. This would necessarily entail both an advance somewhere along the Volga, to cut lines of communication (actually, probably advancing in several areas along the Volga) while simultaneously defending against any possible counterstroke from the city.

1/4?

>germans operating efficiently in a non-urban environment where panzers and aircraft can be used to full effectiveness in contesting land against an enemy?

And yet they did not attempt to do the sorts of things that you're recommending, because they're worried about things like leaving hundreds of kilometers long open unguarded flanks.

> better stuff those mechanized units in a city where the panzers are walled of nice and cozy and every CAS request is danger close with an almost equal chance of hitting friendlies in a sea of rubble!

Are you seriously implying there were major armored pushes into the city itself? Do you not realize how many more infantry divisions the 6th army fielded as opposed to armor? The Germans weren't particularly stupid, and were attempting to use their foot forces to take the city.

>while committing to urban warfare and leaving your flanks manned by inferior, thinned out auxiliaries is preferable?

Your flanks will be much longer by bypassing the city. That's literally the enitre point of trying to take it, to shorten the amount of area you need to defend since you won't be advancing into an area where you're facing enemy thrusts from multiple sides. If they coudln't hold their flanks historically, what makes you think they could do it when adding to the perimeter length?

>it's a shit position but the best choice is to retain cohesiveness and mobility at the cost of covering the river.

Yes, it's a shit position, but you won't be able to "retain cohesiveness and mobility" because mobility on an operational scale requires fuel, munitions, and food, a regular supply line. And that supply line needs to be guarded against maraudering Soviets who might want to smash it. Which in turn means that every section of your front needs to be covered by something, which then means that as you stretch forward like this, you get less mobile, not more.

2/4?

>i didn't realize soviet tanks and trucks were amphibious. someone should've told them, then they wouldn't waste time building bridges at a few key points to cross the river.

The Soviets have access to a little piece of technology called the "boat". amazon.com/Battle-Stalingrad-Vasili-Ivanovich-Chuikov/dp/B0007FOI56 Chuikov, in his memoirs here, talks about how he was most worried in late October when the Volga had partially frozen and barge travel to resupply was not reliable.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Area_denial_weapon

And how many of these were effective in WW2 absent supporting, active troops to ensure they weren't removed? Minefields themselves were considered worthless unless you had something to stop sappers from removing them.

>i know, it's almost as laughable as the idea of the army and air force using different methods of area denial, air interdiction, land interdiction, etc in concert to achieve the same goal instead of relying on one method! fuck nerds, amiright?

Your army, in order to scatter "area denial" weapons, needs to get into the area to be denied (and then presumably withdraw), Your tiny force of bombers is not going to be up to the task, so better plan on how you're going to cross the Volga and occupy shit.

>yea, it's almost like the luftwaffe forces and efforts were wasted in prioritized air support for units attacking stalingrad. lazy fuckers, honestly.

And, you know, all over the Caucasus, skirmishing along the river, fighting off other Soviet forces in conjunction with the Heer, like their actual doctrine told them to do.

3/4

4/4

>but where exactly did i say armor just crashes into soviet formations? please quote me saying something like that. i'll wait.

I never said anything of the sort. YOU, in this post sarcastically assumed I said something of the sort, presumably in response to my statement which was clearly meant to be figurative of a head on attack against infantry, and not literally driving on top of them, as I pointed out Is English a second language for you?

>tanks obviously engage infantry at ranges infantry aren't effective.

Actually, they do not generally do so, because infantry have things called "Anti tank guns", which can generally engage at ranges of equal or even exceeding armor. There's a reason why armor was used as an exploitation weapon, and not a direct head on weapon.

usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/wwIIspec/number08.pdf

(Skip to "The attack, page 41)

It could have been successful had hitler stuck to his original plan to have one division cut off traffic on the Volga (which was done by mid September) and the other 3 go towards the caucuses.

There wasn't very much relatively (maybe half a dozen) at until October

Not an argument.

>The Soviets have access to a little piece of technology called the "boat".

I didn't think I could laugh this hard, bravo user

>germans somehow manage to take moscow

ok now what

Best Hitler comparison of the year