If I am understanding Kant right...

kant's claims rely on subjectivism being false, so of course he has a contorted and wrong argument claiming of it's falsehood. while I admit I have only read excerpts and abridgements of his work during school, it's more than enough to know that he was a man set in stone against phenomenological reason. commendable and "cool" in a sense, but utterly wrong.

perhaps you will explain to me how phenomenological reason is paradoxical, instead of just claiming that there is an explanation? are you capable?

You're the same cunt from the bell curve thread. I have nothing to prove to you, and you have no inclination toward actually understanding anything, so I'll pass here, too.

what? not sure what you're talking about. you simply claimed that kant explains that subjectivism is paradoxical. are you able to explain this yourself, or not?

Kant is a meme

just as philosophy as a whole. Study STEM subjects instead

you cannot have STEM without a philosophical basis. math is logic. logic is philosophy.

It would take me about 2 hours to do a proper write-up. I don't feel like wasting that time on you.

I don't believe you at all. I think you have no fucking idea. if phenomenological reason contradicts itself, even ONCE, and you're aware of it, it would take but a sentence to demonstrate the contradiction.

Here you are again, shuffling the goal posts around, even when no one else is on the field.

You kant say that man!

what do you mean "moving goal posts"? I'm asking for an explanation and you aren't giving me one. I don't think you're able to.

>phenomenological reason

What do you even mean by this?

Kant contends that the soundness of any judgment is contingent upon its possible application to an empirical object, i.e. a 'phenomenon'. Is that what you mean? Or do you mean the 'experience' of temporal 'flow'? Or do you mean the constitution of an object qua object for consciousness? Or do you mean something like intentionality? Do you realize the phenomenologists, but Husserl in particular, viewed their own work as completely contiguous with Kant's? Even Heidegger?

I mean, it's going to be a long discussion if I have to explain what phenomenological reason is. to keep it succinct, in this context it's the determination of objectivity from the first-person perspective.

the next four of your questions are completely irrelevant, I think you are just trying to be wordy in a bluffing attempt to appear well-educated here, but ultimately it's fallen flat because you don't seem to understand phenomenological reason or how any of what you've just said is relevant at all.

ironic that you mention the two specific famous phenomenologists who have falsifiability issues, it's as though you have seeked them out. I could sit here and name drop all day, but what I'm interested is relevant discussion of the material, not flinging around names and books, all of which that have been mentioned in the thread thus far being obscenely archaic and outdated.

>in this context it's the determination of objectivity from the first-person perspective.

Let's start here then. This is another lynchpin in Kant's whole project. I mentioned Heidegger because he was the most successful in drawing out this aspect of the CPR in his 'exegetical' What is a Thing?

The 'paradox' of subjectivism is that objectivity is determined through subjective principles of universal validity and the unity of consciousness through time. That is the basic contention in the CPR.
I cannot explain how Kant refutes 'phenomenological reason', as, by your definition of the term, he endorses it.

>names and books, all of which that have been mentioned in the thread thus far being obscenely archaic and outdated.

The only books that have been mentioned in this thread are the Critique of Pure Reason and What is a Thing, and both of these mentored after this was posted.

You're also recycling your rhetorical exvcescences from the other threads you're shitposting in, which is just tacky desu.

forgive me, I've misinterpreted "radical subjectivism" to be referring to a phenomenologist stance of determining objectivity from a relative perspective within the context of the post it was mentioned. I am not even familiar with subjectivism outside of absurdist arguments, it's not a field that interests me for what I hope are obvious reasons.

I do have a question when it comes to his argument, though. I fail to see how the idea of "universal validity" lies in contrast with a stance of subjectivism, as a subjectivist wouldn't consider universal validity to exist.

also, I don't believe that kant can be arguing in favor of the way I have defined it if he considers senses being untrustworthy as contradicting the ability to observe consistency from a first-person perspective. if your senses are "skewed" compared to some hypothetical existence that you can only pretend exists, you will never know any difference. considering a hypothetical supraphenomenological existence outside of your senses alone is inherently religious in nature.

existence for a man with down's syndrome will consistently be existence with down's syndrome, for example.

I think you might be paranoid, user. did someone as beautiful as I am grace you with their presence in another thread, and now you're confused?

Bumping this for later.

Are you talking about synthetic a priori judgements or his empirical psychology of reason?
Bachelors are unmarried men is analytic a priori. Bachelor and unmarried man can be used interchangably in any sentence for semantic purposes.eg Bill is a bachelor. The unmarried man is Bill.

Three sided figure are triangles is also analytic a priori. eg Arthur folds three sided figures. That triangle was folded by Arthur.

Arithmetic is synthetic a priori. 2+2=4. Four is not defined as 2+2. Jane has one and three coins. Jane has four coins. Jane has two and two coins. These are quantitatively equivalent statements

It's a fine distinction. What I THINK Kant is doing is anticipating Frege, Peano, and Hilbert in noticing that serialization is somehow fundamental to math. When we do math, we learn a priori things we could not have known before by simply searching the meaning of one number. How do we learn this? We recieve a manifold of sensible inutions in the form of space and time and we apply schemata (rules) on these senses to realize that 2+2=4. And yes, he's quite right that we can sometimes get a prori judgements wrong as he makes some claims about geometry that non-euclidian geometry shows are false. Synthetic a priori judgements are central to the whole Kantian project, so he claims, they are needed for metaphysics to be coherent.

>If I am understanding Kant right

Difficult to do.

> he is saying logic cannot always be trusted because much of it is based on observation

No - the content of logical judgements is derived from experience. For example, in the syllogism

1. All mammals have backbones.
2. All whales are mammals.
3. Therefore, all whales have backbones.

it is the a posteriori data of experience that provides the sensory content of our concepts "backbone" and "whale" and "mammal." In other words, if we never had sensory experience of actual backbones and actual whales and other actual mammals, we would have no data from which to conceptualize "Backbone" and "Whale" and "Mammal" - we would have only the mere forms of concepts without any content. It would be like me asking you to conceptualize a florgapunger; you've never empirically experienced a florgapunger, nor have you had described to you what the empirical experience of a florgapunger is like, so all you can think of is some thing-in-general - in other words, some thing that a) has properties attributable to it, b) explains consequences that follow from it, c) is a member of the set of all possible beings, and all the other fundamental conceptual conditions that Kant calls "pure concepts" or "pure forms of thought." These are the categories, the mere functions that comprise the mental power (or "faculty") called "understanding," which imposes predictable, law-governed order (thinkability, intelligibility) on the spatiotemporal sensory content given to it by a separate mental power called "sensibility."

> which comes from one or more of the five senses

"Observation" implies an observer who is conscious of the observed experience - and such consciousness involves not only sensations appearing within the faculty of sensibility, but also involves the understanding (which is the name for the collective functioning of the twelve categories). Observation requires the faculty of understanding because without the contribution of the understanding, there would be only a spatiotemporal confusion of immediately intuited sensations without any intelligible relation *among* one another - only an unpredictable barrage of "now" sensations lacking the law-governed intelligibility of a unified causal sequence. Yet it is just this unity of experience - the unity that relates sensations from five minutes ago to the sensations from three minutes ago to the fleeting sensations passing before me every moment, binding all of these sensations into an understandable series of events - that allows for the recognition of an "I," a "myself," a conscious subject that is the observer, the experiencer.

> calling into question the idea of an objective reality

Objective reality can only be called into question if you misunderstand the nature of "objectivity." If you define "objective reality" to mean "what there is independently of my mind," then you've used an absurd definition, because you could never know a thing independently of how your mind knows it; how could that-which-isn't-being-thought-of be thought of? Instead, we should define "objectivity" in whatever way is most knowable for us, so that a fact is "objective" only if there is no other way for a human to know it.

Kant's tremendous importance comes from the following premise: the meaning of "knowledge" depends greatly (if not mostly) on the intrinsic nature of the mind doing the knowing; knowledge does not only depend on the mind-independent nature of the thing attempting to be known. As he puts it, we should not simply assume that our cognition has to conform to objects - we should be open to the premise that objects must conform to our human ways of cognition. A knower can only know through its innate way of knowing - and different kinds of knowers can conceivably have different ways of knowing.

Veeky Forums needs more posters like this one:
and less like
who know shit what they are talking about or just shitpost without giving the thread any content. Sad thing is that here we give more attention to the second kind of poster than to the first one.

What the fuck was wrong with his face? Was he an ayylien?

Nah just 80 and dead.

AYY YO
*changes name to Immanuel with an I
Hol up
You sayin
*does transcendental deduction*
You sayin, ahahhah
*never leaves Königsberg*
You sayin' we shluld make sum finna Copernican Turn?

You don't understand even the basics of Kant.

> he's comparing the only reality he can know to a hypothetical, unobserved reality
He does not "compare" anything. He only says that what we call "reality" is inseparable from our cognitive faculties, and if we remove these there would be no "reality" that we could think of, which is basically saying "You can't think what reality is like when it is not thought, nor sense what it is like when it is not sensed".

>kant is a professional at being wrong and eloquent simultaneously
>kant
>eloquent

>it is not a "leap of faith" to determine that 2+2=4, it's observation, even though addition and numbers are abstract concepts
Kant never says that a priori synthetic judgments are a leap of faith.
I can't understand what point you are trying to make in what you say after this nor how it relates to Kant.

> another example is that objectivity must exist, because if it were to not, it would be objective that it does not exist, proving the existence of objectivity.
Kant never says "objectivity does not exist" but that space and time have only empirical instead of transcendental reality. He doesn't deny the "object" (it would not make sense to talk about a subject without an object), he only denies that we can know a "transcendental object", which should be obvious, for, as I said, you can't know how reality is when you are not knowing. Object and subject are correlates and constitutes what he calls "empirical reality", it doesn't make sense to talk about an object without a subject, as it doesn't make sense to talk about a subject without an object, or about either having any meaning outside this relation.

cont.

Now, let's translate your objection in Kantian terms:
> Transcendental objectivity must exist, because if it were not to, it would be transcendentally objective that it does not exist, proving the existence of transcendental objectivity
What you are talking about is that any judgment about the nature or existence of a transcendental object is a transcendental use of reason, and that is correct. What Kant says is not that "transcendental object" doesn't exist, but that it doesn't make sense to say anything about its existence or nature, for, saying again, you would be trying to think about something entirely separated from you. So, we can say that it "doesn't exist" but only in the sense that by that we mean "it doesn't make sense to attribute existence to such a thing".
Now try to carefully study a philosopher before talking shit about him.

ilu kantbro

Nah they just put Warheads on dead guys' tongues like the greeks did with coins

Also, question: as I understand it, the transcendental deduction of the categories proceeds from the table of judgments, these being all the possible forms of judgments that can be made about an object. Kant gives this table as exhaustive, but as far as I can tell doesn't actually give a deduction of the table itself, how and why it is exhaustive and how he can 'know' that. Am I missing a move on his part?

You are not missing a move, he does make a leap. Schopenhauer criticizes this and many other faults in Kant's philosophy, without recognizing his merits and genius. If you are interested in a critique of Kant's philosophy read Schopenhauer's appendix to The World as Will and Representation, but I recommend reading The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason first.

> without recognizing
remove the "without" here
I was going to write "without depreciating" and changed my mind halfway, my bad.

You're missing the point. What if logic doesn't always hold? There is no external way of verifying logic. You just become self referential. How do you know you aren't insane and don't have a fundamentally broken conception of logic?

Veeky Forums needs less posters like you, because it's a fucking pain to follow up responses and see it's just your shit post yet again. You haven't contributed anything, fuck off.

*smooch*

I posted
and
Sorry if I caused so much trouble for your following responses. Was you, by chance, mentioned in the second list?

Not him, but I was going to engage in discussion with you until I realized you made this post. I'm on both sides of the "and less like" line. Metaposters are like gossiping women.

> I'm on both sides of the "and less like" line
What did you mean?
Anyway, yes, I have let my anger make a "shitpost". I just felt the urge to point out how threads on Veeky Forums are always ruined by people who don't really care for what a philosopher thinks and instead just spill out memes, insults and oversimplifications. It is really frustrating to enter a thread and see it in such a state, to post something, expect a good answer and only meet with dishonesty and scorn, — way more frustrating than trying to follow responses and meet with the same shitpost in some threads sometimes.