How can one philosopher be so based?

>inspiring philosophy
>posting retarded christfag youtuber

Wow you guys really do have 0 arguments against Idealism.

>the properties of the mind are not that which matter can have
based on what? the video you gave doesn't really give a coherent argument for this premise

If you just watch the video you'll see that it does. At 1:20 it begins to give support for premise 2 and cites Thomas Nagel's argument:

>"... If a mental event really is a physical event in this sense, and nothing else, then the physical event by itself, once its physical properties are understood, should likewise be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn't seem to be. It seems conceivable, for any physical event, there should be a physical event without any experience at all. Experience of taste seems to be something extra, contingently related to the brain state- something produced rather than constituted by the brain state. So it cannot be identical to the brain state in the way water is identical to H20.”

Source: Thomas Nagel (2012). “Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False". p. 41. Oxford University Press.

He did go a bit loopy with the tar water stuff.

His pure idealism (except for God) kind of strikes me as being similar to the last Thursday argument.

That was a weird phase

If you're interested in a formulation of Idealism without theism there's a great forthcoming essay called "Idealism Without God" that should be published on Oxford University Press soon: philpapers.org/rec/YETIWG

The last Thursday argument just sort of rests on the ole "you can't refute me haha" kind of thinking. Idealism is presenting an argument and not merely resting on some skeptical premise. Check out the Introspective Argument: youtube.com/watch?v=4l1lQMCOguw

I saw the quote, but it's just a repetition of the idea of qualia. What exactly is the standard for a physical event to be "sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with"? I can think of at least one example that shows a relationship: we have the most receptors for light at the wavelengths of green and yellow and these appear to us as the brightest colors, while purple and red at the edge of what we can see are darker.

>seems like
>conceivable
>therefore must be

Nice logical fallacies. Moon seems as big as a coin but isn't.

Also Spinoza already btfo this argument ages ago. Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy did too.

>I saw the quote,
Then you saw that there was support provided for premise 2. An argument has been provided.

>it's just a repetition of the idea of qualia.

What does that even mean?

>What exactly is the standard for a physical event to be "sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with"?

To describe what it is like to taste sugar or feel pain etc.

No amount of 3rd person descriptions of an organism tells us what its like to be that organism and what its like for that organism to feel pain and taste sugar.

>we have the most receptors for light at the wavelengths of green and yellow and these appear to us as the brightest colors, while purple and red at the edge of what we can see are darker.

This doesn't tell us what it's like to see red. No amount of descriptions from outside the experience of an organism will tell us what's it like: youtube.com/watch?v=gZy3Ky9y_fg

>That was a weird phase
Yeah I couldnt remember the technical name of it.

>If you're interested in a formulation of Idealism without theism there's a great forthcoming essay called "Idealism Without God"

Didnt Kant or the people who follow Gerorge do that already?

>The last Thursday argument just sort of rests on the ole "you can't refute me haha" kind of thinking. Idealism is presenting an argument and not merely resting on some skeptical premise.

I saw it more as it making a huge unfalsifable claim whose only relevance can be providing justification to a particular ideology or religion. Much like the last thursday argument is for creationists.

As for that video I a tad skeptical about that producer given he has made outright lies or deceptions in other works of his - especially in his quantum mechanics video where he conflates the common understanding of the word observer with the technical understanding of the word used by physicists.

Likewise he makes huge jump when he states that mental experience is by necessity not linked to to physical substance just because its not in the external object itself.

Hence whilst redness is not in a strawberry or sweet in a sugar its a category produced by the material human brain upon exposure to it.

Likewise Nagel seems to be arguing from incredulity. Experiance can be a physical event as well

>No amount of 3rd person descriptions of an organism tells us what its like to be that organism and what its like for that organism to feel pain and taste sugar.

Not those anons but why does there being limitations to our knowledge lead to idealism?

Never heard of modus tollens or modal logic have you?

>If x is true then y should seem to be the case
>y does not seem to be the case
>x is not true

>This doesn't tell us what it's like to see red. No amount of descriptions from outside the experience of an organism will tell us what's it like
it does partially. it shows that there is a basis for what we feel in how our sensory receptors are made. to say that it cannot be explained at all is something you have yet to prove.

>basing a correct appraisal of reality on what you expect it should seem to be

More like modal bullshit amirite

>it shows that there is a basis for what we feel in how our sensory receptors are made.

That's assuming consciousness has a base and one that is grounded within the organism and it still fails to tell us what its like.

>to say that it cannot be explained at all is something you have yet to prove.
The burden of proof is on the claimant not the skeptic even though arguments have already been provided. If you want to claim you can explain consciousness in such terms you'll have to prove it's possible to bridge the explanatory gap: plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#ExpGap

Nice straw man. It's more like:

>taking the implications of materialism and negating them thus allowing one to validly infer, based on the rule of inference known as modus tollens, that materialism is false

you need to learn how to logic

Havent seen you on here for about a year Berkeley user whats been happening?

you are the one making the claim. I'm saying that the world could be a simulation or maybe not. you're saying for sure the world is a simulation.

>That's assuming consciousness has a base and one that is grounded within the organism and it still fails to tell us what its like.
perhaps I would be better off saying there is a correlation between what we know about our sensory receptors work and what we perceive. I still find this as counter to your claim that there is no way to deduce what we perceive from how sensory receptors are built and the objects themselves

>you are the one making the claim.

I did and gave arguments. You're the one implying consciousness has a base and that the base is within the organism. You don't just get that one for free. If you want to claim consciousness arises from the brain or something like that then you'll have to give an argument. Idealists don't get a free lunch and neither do materialists.

>you're saying for sure the world is a simulation.

I'm saying the world is made up of consciousness and I have an argument (The Introspective Argument). You're trying to sneak materialism in without having to argue for it.

>perhaps I would be better off saying there is a correlation between what we know about our sensory receptors work and what we perceive.

Yes, this was stated in the video. There's a correlation between mental states and brain states. The problem is a specification of a creature in physical terms leaves unanswered the question of whether or not the creature is conscious. This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject.

>logic is real
>ideas are real

Stopped reading there

I am not Berkeley user but I wish I could have talked to them. Not too many Idealists around these days. Idealism declined without dying.

>logic is real
I didn't use the phrase "logic is real" whatever that's supposed to mean. Just that there are rules of inference. If anyone is to make a deductive argument it will be valid or invalid based on these rules. You're using them right now to try to argue with me...

>ideas are real
what? you deny consciousness or something?

>I am not Berkeley user but I wish I could have talked to them

Oh, there was only one of them and he spammed threads similar to the OP for about a month.

>Not too many Idealists around these days. Idealism declined without dying.

What are your thoughts on Kant and the German idealists?

There is a pretty well informed Kantian here and on lit who always posts with death masks

>You're the one implying consciousness has a base and that the base is within the organism.
I didn't, I showed that example to counter your claim that it's impossible for physical qualities to explain what we perceive. I showed an example of how we can deduce from light receptors how we see light. we can even deduce what wavelengths a bee or some other animal would see. this isn't absolute proof, it's only intended to counter the claim in your argument

>Oh, there was only one of them and he spammed threads similar to the OP for about a month.

Weird. Were they troll posts or was he actually trying to have a discussion?

>What are your thoughts on Kant and the German idealists?

I think Kant's epistemological idealism is weak. He should have gone full idealism but I have a ton of respect for him. He's brilliant and so are the German Idealists like Fichte and Hegel. I think if one is to be a western sort of theist then their sort of idealism would be the most rational way to go about it.

>There is a pretty well informed Kantian here and on lit who always posts with death masks

I'll have to keep an eye out for this guy. Thanks for the heads up.

>I didn't

You did but you then toned it down a bit and made it about correlations.

>I showed that example to counter your claim that it's impossible for physical qualities to explain what we perceive.

And that example failed. It doesn't tell us what its like to see red. It doesn't bring us one step closer to bridging the explanatory gap at all. The idealist has the epistemic high ground here, not the materialist.

>Weird. Were they troll posts or was he actually trying to have a discussion?

In parts, however the intent was mainly to troll and fluster the phrase BTFO and why arent you X was used a lot.

>I think Kant's epistemological idealism is weak. He should have gone full idealism but I have a ton of respect for him. He's brilliant and so are the German Idealists like Fichte and Hegel. I think if one is to be a western sort of theist then their sort of idealism would be the most rational way to go about it.

What are your thoughts on Hume and Lokes relationship with Berk?

>I'll have to keep an eye out for this guy. Thanks for the heads up.

No worries, for the record dud you make that Berkely pepe yourself?

>In parts, however the intent was mainly to troll and fluster the phrase BTFO and why arent you X was used a lot.

Haha yeah he might not have been an idealist like I hoped, maybe just a troll.

>What are your thoughts on Hume and Lokes relationship with Berk?

I thought Berkeley was a great critic of Locke. Berkeley was really just following the line of Locke regarding primary and secondary qualities. If all we come into contact with are secondary qualities why assume there are these so called primary qualities? Hume was following a similar line with his bundle theory. Subtract the qualities of experience from an object and you're left with something indistinguishable from nothing.

>No worries, for the record dud you make that Berkely pepe yourself?

Yes I did. I just took a picture of Berkeley and pasted a pepe hand there haha

I did tone it down because I wasn't being careful with my language. informal Veeky Forums posts tend to lack precision in language.

>And that example failed. It doesn't tell us what its like to see red.
it does partially. you made the claim that you can't explain it at all. I showed that in some respects we can. because it cannot be fully explained now =/= it cannot be explained

>I did tone it down because I wasn't being careful with my language. informal Veeky Forums posts tend to lack precision in language.

It didn't come off that way quite frankly. You sounded like everybody else who takes materialism for granted. But I'll err on the side of charity on this one.

Just know that materialism is not a default position. If we are to believe that material objects exist and that they make up the totality of existence then we're going to need arguments for that.

>it does partially.

No it doesn't.

>because it cannot be fully explained now =/= it cannot be explained

This is a straw man. If consciousness is physical and thus subject to the same analysis as everything else then we are right to expect for evidence from the materialist regarding consciousness. This explanatory gap shouldn't be there and the fact that it does implies there's more to consciousness than materialists want us to believe.

>No it doesn't.
but it does. more light receptors would mean the eye catches more light at those wavelengths causing it to appear brighter. this lines up with what we see in regards to yellow and green being brighter and red and blue being darker.

>This is a straw man. If consciousness is physical and thus subject to the same analysis as everything else then we are right to expect for evidence from the materialist regarding consciousness. This explanatory gap shouldn't be there and the fact that it does implies there's more to consciousness than materialists want us to believe.
how is that a strawman? that's literally the argument in the quote that you gave:
>If a mental event really is a physical event in this sense, and nothing else, then the physical event by itself, once its physical properties are understood, should likewise be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn't seem to be.
for idealism to be 100% certain to be correct we must have 100% certainty that that physical stuff can't explain the mental.

>but it does.

No it doesn't. It doesn't get us any closer to explaining what its like at all. It's just more 3rd person descriptions of top of 3rd person descriptions. It doesn't give us the 1st person subjective "what its like"-ness

>more light receptors would mean the eye catches more light at those wavelengths CAUSING it to appear brighter.

so are we back to causation again? I thought you were sticking with the whole correlation strategy instead...

>how is that a strawman?

Because you're reducing my argument to something that's its not. I'm not arguing from ignorance, I'm not saying "you can't explain x so it's wrong!" I'm saying materialism implies y, but it's not y, so materialism is false. That's modus tollens, that's a valid form of argument.

>for idealism to be 100% certain to be correct we must have 100% certainty that that physical stuff can't explain the mental.

All we would have to know is that you can't reduce the mental to the physical and with this argument we just showed that you can't. Objective 3rd person descriptions will never equal 1st person subjective experience no matter how complicated you make the description. You can use all the eloquent language you like but no amount of word games will make a virgin a non-virgin. If a virgin wants to know what its like to have sex they'll have to experience it for themselves, no amount of scientific jargon, no matter how complicated, will change that.

>It doesn't give us the 1st person subjective "what its like"-ness
the whole point is that it does. it explains one characteristic of how we see color. brightness is definitely part of the "what its like"-ness of sight.

>so are we back to causation again? I thought you were sticking with the whole correlation strategy instead...
I'm saying "cause" because I'm going through whether a material explanation has explanatory power. I didn't intend to establish for certain that it does cause what we see.

>All we would have to know is that you can't reduce the mental to the physical and with this argument we just showed that you can't.
right here again is you making a claim without backing it up.

>the whole point is that it does.

No it isn't. The second you acknowledge any sort of difference between brain states and mental states, and the moment you start describing brain states, you're no describing mental states at all. You're just describing more about 3rd person objective qualities. You're failing to capture the 1st person subjective qualities of experience in the description, which means your description is fundamentally incomplete.

>I didn't intend to establish for certain that it does cause what we see.

Then maybe you should stay away from the word "cause"

>right here again is you making a claim without backing it up.

I've been backing it up this whole time. Our exchange here has primarily been me trying to help you understand the argument presented for this claim. You seem a bit mixed up. Let's back track a bit: we're talking about premise 2, arguments were made for this starting at the 1:20 mark of the video and Thomas Nagel's argument has been cited as well. So as we can clearly see, arguments have in fact been presented for the claim that you can't reduce the mental to the physical.

Let's stay on track here.

The problem of external objects afflicts God who is result of sensation.