Was the German Kriegsmarine in ww2 ever a powerful naval force capable of challenging or rivalling the Royal Navy the...

>Repulse
>Prince of Wales

Beg pardon? I'm not following how your post relates to mine.

I think he's alluding to how both those ships with sunk by Japan.

Yes, but what the hell does that have to do with the balance of naval power vis a vis Germany and Britian at the start of the war?

>Still, at 13:2 odds, things are real shit.
it wasnt so much the odds as the fact that the scharnhorst class were completely incapable of engaging an single british battleship -with the possible exception of royal oak - one to one with any realistic expectation of victory, survival perhaps if they had searoom to run, but their guns couldnt do much to a battleship and their armor wasnt adequate to keep out the british fire

>capable of challenging or rivalling the Royal Navy the same way the Kaiserlichemarine in ww1 was?
ultimately the Kaiserlichemarine wasnt able to rival the RN in open battle, the one time it tried the high seas fleet ran lie whipped dogs and its commander concluded that he couldnt face the grand fleet in open battle and live, and that was with defective ammo on the british side

The Germans failed to realize their strategic goals but tactically, they performed a lot better than the British. The problem was that they weren't 'better' enough.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jutland

>Was the German Kriegsmarine in ww2 ever a powerful naval force capable of challenging or rivalling the Royal Navy the same way the Kaiserlichemarine in ww1 was?

Neither the WW1 nor WW2 German navies came anywhere close to being able to challenge the RN. The Germans used their ships to raid commerce, NOT to directly contest the high seas.

they performed better in the battlecruiser engagement, they got schooled by jellicoe in the battleshi engagement, scheers decision to run was the only thing that saved his fleet, and even then if the british ammunition had been more effective (30- 70% of the heavy shells detonated on impact due to the sensitivity of the picric acid) the germans would have lost at least 6 battleships.

they failed their strategic goals and managed a tactical draw, escaping destruction but clearly losing the clash of the main fleets

Given that they were severely outnumbered and still managed to sink that much I'd say they performed tactically better.

not really they won the skirmish and then lost the main battle.

>The naval equivalent of sneaking up on someone, slapping them upside the head and running away then tripping on your own shoelaces
>tactically better

If you outnumber the enemy and he still sinks more than you, then he fought better than you. There is literally no way around that.

Yeah, he fought so much better that he ran away and forfeited, never achieving another victory.

wew

I would say that it requires quite a bit of tactical skill to attack an enemy that severely outnumbers you, deal heavy losses and then manage to withdraw without being completely annihilated. As I said: they failed to achieve their strategic goals (which given the odds would have been quite the feat) but they still fought tactically better, and the numbers don't lie. If you let the enemy get away it's your own fault.

Just adding on to this a bit since just the Capital ships were listed....In September 1939 the RN also had,

"66 Cruisers, mainly post-World War 1 with some older ships converted for AA duties. Including cruiser-minelayers, 23 new ones had been laid down.

184 Destroyers of all types. Over half were modern, with 15 of the old 'V' and 'W' classes modified as escorts. Under construction or on order were 32 fleet destroyers and 20 escort types of the 'Hunt' class.

60 Submarines, mainly modern with nine building.

45 escort and patrol vessels with nine building, and the first 56 'Flower' class corvettes on order to add to the converted 'V' and 'W's' and 'Hunts'. "

>I would say that it requires quite a bit of tactical skill to attack an enemy that severely outnumbers you
It's 3 to 2, hardly "severely outnumbered".

> deal heavy losses
14 ships compared to losing 11, not very heavy

>and then manage to withdraw
You just have to be a bit faster mate

>they failed to achieve their strategic goals
Yep

>they still fought tactically better
Wew

>and the numbers don't lie.
No, but you do.

113300 vs 62300 tons sunk is quite the difference.

>You just have to be a bit faster mate

Not that guy but the withdrawal was not so cut and dried.

" Throughout the night different opposing ships came into contact in an arc as the German fleet proceeded from west to east across the tail of the British fleet. The two fleets were on similar courses so the encounter was drawn out over several hours, but at no time did the British get a clear picture of what was happening. The action was characterised by determination and nerve on the German side to keep a steady course despite continual encounters with British destroyers, but by confusion and failure to report events by the British. Individual British ships showed considerable courage and determination in carrying out attacks, but their efforts were spoilt by confusion, which meant many ships turned away from possible targets, uncertain that they were enemy vessels."

"The German battlecruisers were ordered to the rear of the fleet at night because of the damage they had sustained. Seydlitz was only able to make 16 knots and was ordered to make her own way to Horns Reef. Moltke also lost contact with the fleet and had to proceed independently. At 2230, Captain von Karpf on Moltke sighted ships of the second battle squadron and was seen by the rearmost battleship, Thunderer (Captain James Ferguson). Ferguson neither fired upon Moltke, nor reported his sighting, because it was considered inadvisable to show up our battlefleet. Moltke steered away to the west, before trying again later to turn SSE to Horns Reef. At 2255 she again sighted the British ships and turned back undetected, and then once again at 2320. Hipper then ordered Moltke to proceed south, so that she could pass ahead of the British fleet, which she did around 0130."

"Seydlitz was sighted at about 2400 by Marlborough, who did nothing. The second ship in the squadron, Revenge (Captain Kiddle) challenged the unidentified ship, and received the wrong response, but took no action. Agincourt (Captain Doughty) at the rear of the line spotted her but did not challenge her so as not to give our division's position away. Light cruisers Boadicea and Fearless (Captain Roper) also spotted Seydlitz, but followed the example of the battleships and did nothing. Roper stated that by the time he could identify the ship, it was too late to fire a torpedo at her (Fearless was capable of 25 knots compared to Seydlitz's maximum 16 knots because of the damage). Seydlitz, already badly damaged and unable to put up much of a fight, was able to limp back to Germany"

A New York Citynewspaper of the time summed it up... "The German Navy has assaulted it's jailer but is still in jail"

Yeah, but the High Seas Fleet wasn't on the high seas, was it? It came out, slapped the Brits a couple times, and ran back to port.

As I said: the strategic goal was not achieved. This doesn't change the fact that the battle was well fought tactically.

The only things that can be considered "well fought" tactically was the Battle Cruiser action and the withdrawal. In the action between the main fleets the Royal Navy handily outfought the High Seas Fleet.

Neither the WWI nor WWII Germany navy was worth the effort expended on it in effort and resources and as they couldn’t defeat the British navy, (let alone combined Allied navies) the Germans should have used the time, money, labor and materials elsewhere.

Good point. No real argument about it except semantics.

Why wasn't the German Navy in WW1 made to play a more active part in the war? Half the reason Germany surrendered was because of food shortages caused by the British naval blockade. For Christ's sake, the Kaiser made the German Navy as strong as it was specifically to fight Britain!

Because the Royal Navy was enormously stronger, and unlike WW2, the range on coal-powered ships wasn't that great. So a loose blockade in the North Sea could be enormously effective, even if the High Seas Fleet slips out somehow, they're going to have to go somewhere to re-coal, and there's not really much out there in the way of friendly ports. historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-one/causes-of-world-war-one/the-naval-race-1906-to-1914/

The Royal Navy, on the other hand (nevermind guys like the French and Italian fleets who are there too) can go just about anywhere and hit just about anything.

I can only repeat: if I meet an enemy who outnumbers me and I deal heavier losses to him than he does to me then I fought well - better than the other in fact. Whether I fought well enough for it to matter regarding my strategic planning is a different matter.

The High Seas Fleet Battleships did fuck all damage to the Royal Navy's BBs. The reverse was not the case. Zee Germans managed to get their T crossed TWICE and both times turned away in flight. The three BCs lost by the RN were the only things of real value lost on the British side. The Warrior and Defence, for example, was no different to the Pommern which was sunk much later in the battle.

In the main action...notice MAIN action, the Germans came of second best by a long way.

The germans could've bombed or shelled the supply lines at Verdun and they didn't.

The Germans could have won if they didn't lose.

objectively true

Jellicoe crossed their T twice. It would've been a massacre if the HSF stuck around to see the end.

t. Guy who has absolutely no knowledge of turn of the century naval tactics, but read the casualties summary on Wikipedia and KNOWS he's right

I can only repeat: the numbers don't lie. The Germans were fewer and yet dealt higher losses to the British than they received. Whatever theoretical potential you interpret into the fighting is completely irrelevant because of the result.

>Whatever theoretical potential you interpret into the fighting is completely irrelevant because of the result.

That has got to be one of the most ignorant statements I've ever seen on Veeky Forums.

This is really stupid. You're one of the asshats who'd meme that Vietnam was a us victory, or that Kursk was a German victory because of muh' body count

And you're a moron who does not know the difference between strategy and tactics. Body count is a quantity that is completely independent from loss and victory. Even a battle that was tactically won by completely annihilating enemy forces can be a strategic loss. Important to decide whether you've won or lost is whether you've managed to convert your tactical, military action into strategic benefit towards winning the greater conflict. Germany failed to do this. They did not manage to break British naval superiority and in assuming that I was claiming anything of that sort you've merely proven that you're not an attentive reader. However, besides being unable to do this Germans still fought well. They were outnumbered and still dealt heavier losses to the enemy than they've received, which is clearly apparent to anyone looking at the numbers.

>OP tangentially mentions the kaiserliche marine as being capable of competing with the royal navy
>people start arguing about who won the battle of Jutland
lul

>Body count is a quantity that is completely independent from loss and victory.

It's also completely independent from tactical success. You keep saying that because the Germans lost half as many men while outgunned they won a tactical victory, while completely ignoring the fact that the battle itself lasted almost 2 days, and comprised many different actions, in three specific phases, some of which the KM performed well in (battlecruiser engagement specifically) and some where they were overmatched and defeated on a tactical level by the RN (specifically the 'battleship' main fleet engagement).

To say 'The KM lost less and therefor was tactically victorious' while simultaneously trying to both define 'tactics' versus 'strategy' and completely ignoring the fact that, tactically, the battle was not one single, abrupt engagement, shows that you have no idea what you're talking about, and should probably go back to Wikipedia and reread the articles there.

Or perhaps you could explain to me how Jellicoe's outmanoeuvring of Scheer caused the complete collapse of KM aggression and forced them to withdraw, and yet was a tactical victory for the KM?

Or how the fact that the RN scored just as many hits as the KM, but caused far less damage due to poor quality shell construction constituted a 'tactical victory' for the KM?

the numbers dont lie, the do not however tell the whole story either, notably even the most heavily damaged battleships tended to have relatively few casualties, and the numbers of severely damaged ships are not recorded on wikipedia

scheer considered it a defeat that he was lucky to salvage his fleet from the british considered it a frustrating battle because the germans managed to get away.

both sides new that jellicoe had out fought scheer and that scheer had gotten unreasonably lucky.

in the brief battleship engagement the high seas fleet suffered damage enough to put half the fleet in repairs for months, the british ship most heavily damaged was HMS warspite -exposed to the fire of most of the german fleet and with her steering gear damaged b a direct hit she was hit 15 times by 11 and 12 inch shells the overwhelming majority of which were 12 inch hits and required a mere 2 month of repairs whereas many of the german ships were not repaired for 3 or more months with seydlitz not being repaired until october.

the day after the battle the relative strength of the respective fleets in terms of battleworth vessels actually favoured the british more heavily than before the battle

Tactical success can be measured in numbers fairly easily. The KM sunk more being outnumbered and thus was tactically more successful.

>Tactical success can be measured in numbers fairly easily. The KM sunk more being outnumbered and thus was tactically more successful.

THIS IS FUCKING INCORRECT.

I don't know if you're trolling or genuinely suffering from an autism spectrum disorder, but after all these people telling you that you're being ignorant of the actual facts, you must be one or the other given that you keep spouting this stupid fucking juvenile shit, convinced that you're right.

No, that's fucking retarded. Tactical success is measured by whether you achieve your objectives, not by kill count.

>you're being ignorant of the actual facts
The facts are represented in the numbers. See .

What are the objectives in battle if not sinking the other side?

Germans were outnumbered yet managed to sink more. That means they were tactically more successful. No way around it.

>What are the objectives in battle if not sinking the other side?

See, if you had the first what you were on about, you wouldn't need to ask this question.

This is basic military knowledge; the objective is very rarely to kill all the enemy combatants, as this is rarely possible, rather, the objective will be any number of things, usually achieving local strategic superiority, forcing the enemy to withdraw, claiming important geographical positions, demonstrating the willingness and ability to confront and defeat the opponent, demonstrating superior combat and manoeuvring capabilities so as to intimidate the opponent from future confrontation, etc.

The RN objective was not 'sink the entire KM'. That is fucking retarded and would never happen. Thus saying 'b-but the KM lost less tonnage' is meaningless. The RN's primary tactical goal was to inflict a morale defeat on the KM, which obviously would involve sinking a lot of their ships, but more importantly involved the need to demonstrate superior offensive manoeuvring capability, superior firepower, superior resolve in presenting an engagement, and the willingness to commit an unmatchable force to battle.

The strategic goal of the RN was to intimidate and nullify the KM, in order to prevent them from ever leaving port. Most of the admiralty acknowledged that it was simply unfeasible to sink the ENTIRE German navy, so their strategic aims were to make the situation uninviting for the KM to ever present battle, thus rendering their enormously expensive dreadnought fleet completely irrelevant in the war effort, and a giant money sink to maintain.

On a tactical level, this meant that Jellicoe fought conservatively and bluntly; he did not give Scheer any openings, he fought a textbook, tight battle in the main engagement, and demonstrated the superiority of the RN's ability to manoeuvre under battlefield conditions.

We talking WWI? Because during the first round they might have been able to pull it off.

Fuck Falkenhayn btw, Willy III dindu nuffin wrong.

Continued because of the character limit.

The KM's strategic situation was entirely different; they needed to even the odds. Their tactical goals WERE to sink as much of the RN as they could, they were to conduct their battle aggressively and offensively so as to cause as much damage as possible, with a view to evening the RN's numerical superiority, and potentially gaining victory enabling them to win the war at sea and potentially thus the war as a whole.

To this end, Scheer and Hipper fought a very attack oriented battle, and most importantly, the decisive factor war Jellicoe's outmanoeuvring of Scheer, which convinced him that he would risk too much if continuing his attack, and that the RN had changed the tactical landscape to the point where any attack would be too costly (and thus not fitting their strategic objective). This was the point at which Scheer decided to withdraw, in the face of an implacable and well positioned RN line.

The RN's goals can thus be clearly observed not being the destruction of the KM fleet, merely its containment. In other words, the RN was on the defencive, their objective was to repulse the KM and send them back to port. Of course this involved making the defeat as devastating as possible (sinking more of the enemy is GOOD, but not THE GOAL), thus Jellicoe wanted to continue the battle, Scheer frustrating him with his escape, but ultimately, the aims of victory were for the KM to sink enough RN tonnage as to even the odds strategically, and the RN to force the KM to concede the field and withdraw to port, preferably with the belief that they were in no position to challenge RN naval supremacy.

Ultimately, the RN succeeded in their goals for the battle, while the KM failed, this is why the war at sea was won by Britain and not Germany, and why the Germans never again seriously challenged RN naval dominance, but instead opted for guerrilla-style submarine campaigns.

Lots of words while saying very little. In a naval battle all of the objectives you describe are achieved by sinking the enemy, which is why the Germans did more than the British despite being outnumbered.

The rest is excuses for military incompetence.

Certainly, the British achieved their goals, but that doesn't change that they paid a higher price than they'd have to given the odds.

>In a naval battle all of the objectives you describe are achieved by sinking the enemy, which is why the Germans did more than the British despite being outnumbered.

No.

As has been said OVER AND OVER, the tactical objective in a naval battle (and any other kind of battle) is subjective to the strategic war goal.

The RN's objective was containment and defence of their superior strategic position.

The KM's objective was causing decisive casualties in the RN fleet.

The KM failed their tactical objective, while the RN succeeded in theirs.

Thus the whole argument of 'b-but muh K/D ratio' is completely fucking irrelevant.

This has been stated over and over I don't know how much more clear it can be made.

>the tactical objective in a naval battle (and any other kind of battle) is subjective to the strategic war goal.
And how is the tactical objective achieved if not by sinking the enemy? Do you think they'll just leave if you wait long enough? Sinking the enemy is tied to the tactical objective since that is what you have to do no matter what you're actually trying to do. The British managed to meet their goals despite fighting worse. They were more yet received higher losses. That's what the numbers tell you. Anything else is making excuses, which is what you're doing.

>And how is the tactical objective achieved if not by sinking the enemy?

HOLY.

FUCKING.

SHIT.

How dense can you be?

I have literally just made 2 entire posts almost at the character limit on this subject.

In the RN's strategic position, if they engaged in a battle, they would be tactically conservative and defencive. They did not need to sink the entire KM to achieve their tactical aims and emerge victorious, they needed to maintain control of the geographical area. Yes the admiralty would have loved another Trafalgar, but Jellicoe fought a manoeuvre oriented battle because in order to be victorious, all he needed was for the KM to concede and withdraw, as intimidated as possible.

The RN had everything to lose, and nothing to gain by fighting an offensive, aggressive battle (which Beatty tried and very nearly lost his entire fucking squadron doing). If the RN recklessly attacked the KM, they opened themselves to potentially massive losses, which was the tactical and strategic aim of the KM.

This means they fought to secure their position, and deny the KM tactical success. They succeeded in this and thus emerged victorious. As a result, the KM never again seriously challenged the RN.

>Sinking the enemy is tied to the tactical objective since that is what you have to do no matter what you're actually trying to do. The British managed to meet their goals despite fighting worse. They were more yet received higher losses. That's what the numbers tell you. Anything else is making excuses, which is what you're doing.

Ok please explain to me how the Soviets lost the Battle of Moscow with their stupid human wave attacks and shitty K/D. Zhukov was a retard amirite.

Not him, but if you want a really clear example, go look up the Battle of the Coral Sea, over on the Pacific side of WW2.

America loses a carrier, (they only had 4 at the time in the theater) but they stop the invasion of Port Moresby, and one that the Japanese can't easily resume as soon as the American fleet leaves; the monsoon season was just about to start and that gives the Americans months to reinforce, since you don't want to attack in that kind of shit weather. The tactical objective was achieved even though they barely did any damage to the IJN forces.

Or think of any of the submarine strikes at convoys which sank escorts. That probably costs the defender a lot more tonnage than the attacker, but if the convoy gets through, the tactical objective of the defenders is achieved, in spite of their losses

"Tactical objectives" are fucking hell achieved without needing to out-sink the enemy.

>In the RN's strategic position, if they engaged in a battle, they would be tactically conservative and defencive.
"tactically conservative and defensive" are nice euphemisms for a lack of tactical finesse.

>Ok please explain to me how the Soviets lost the Battle of Moscow with their stupid human wave attacks and shitty K/D.
I have no idea what you're even trying to argue. Are you denying that you can fight better than the other side and still lose? Wars are rarely decided on singular battlefields.

>"Tactical objectives" are fucking hell achieved without needing to out-sink the enemy.
You're not reading attentively. I never argued that you have to out-sink the enemy, I said that achieving tactical objectives is tied to sinking the enemy (or at least threatening to do). Nobody is arguing that the British failed to achieve their goals either, I'm merely saying that they showed no tactical finesse in doing so as Germany managed to sink more of them despite outnumbered.

If one's objective is merely to prevent a breakout, then even a 3 to one casualty difference against the defender is a tactical victory.

Tactical finesse /= killcounts

You're like McNamara or Kissinger on this, and that's not a good thing. Jutland was a tactical and strategic defeat for the Germans, and their ability to inflict higher casualties on the enemy was not the result of "finesse" but rather a display of them attempting and failing in their objective to inflict decisive casualties.

>I never argued that you have to out-sink the enemy, I said that achieving tactical objectives is tied to sinking the enemy (or at least threatening to do)
Except when it isn't. Again, consider the "get the convoy through" scenario. Or, in this case "Keep the blockade together" scenario.

>tactical victory.
Again you're arguing something entirely different. I'm saying that Germany fought better in this battle given that they were outnumbered yet still managed to sink more than the enemy and managed to retreat.

>better
You keep using that word, as well as
>tactical finesse

However, given that they accomplished none of their objectives, and were outmaneuvered, how does sinking a few more ships qualify as "better"?

By sinking a few more ships and managing to get away while being outnumbered.

If the situation was as clear cut as you claim I wonder why after the battle happened even the British were uncertain whether they'd won or suffered a defeat.

A keep the blockade together scenario involves sinking the enemy (or threatening to do so) when he attempts to keep you from keeping the blockade together.

Why is killcount relevant when no objectives are accomplished? The battle was indecisive, why resulted in a de facto British victory. The brits were confused because they didn't understand why the Germans had sent in the whole fleet if they didn't have the stones for a full on Mahan style battle to the finish.

You're being purposefully obtuse. If the side attempting to keep the blockade together loses 10 men for every one their opponents do, it's still a victory if they hold the seas at the end of the day.

Killcount warfare was a bad Vietnam era meme

>A keep the blockade together scenario involves sinking the enemy (or threatening to do so) when he attempts to keep you from keeping the blockade together.
No, it literally doesn't. Getting slow, vulnerable, generally lightly armed or completely unarmed cargo vessels through any sort of combat zone is incredibly hard. Consider how much trouble the British had with the u-boat forces in WW2, and they were outtonned by the Royal Navy by what? 500:1? Restricting overseas trade to Germany has 0 direct relation to the strength of the High Seas Fleet. What's important is that the Royal Navy keep enough firepower in the area that merchant ships aren't crazy enough to try to run through, and can be turned back or sunk if you do get a lunatic coming along. The only reason that the HSF's strength in any way is relevant to this equation is that if it grows big enough vis a vis the Royal Navy, they can disperse the blockade. Sinking German warships accomplishes literally nothing unless they get so many of yours you can't keep the blockade together and you need to even the odds a bit.

>Why is killcount relevant when no objectives are accomplished?
Killcount was the objective on the German side.

>The brits were confused because they didn't understand why the Germans had sent in the whole fleet if they didn't have the stones for a full on Mahan style battle to the finish.
Or maybe they were confused because they lost more men than the Germans that day despite outnumbering them.

You're posting in bad faith, or are extremely dense kaiserboo.

>No, it literally doesn't.
Yes, it literally does. If your enemy attempts to do something which you don't want him to do you'll have to shoot him or at least threaten to do so to make him reconsider.

>If your enemy attempts to do something which you don't want him to do you'll have to shoot him or at least threaten to do so to make him reconsider.

Wow looks like you outlined two options there, only one of which involves sinking the enemy ships.

Really makes me think.

>Yes, it literally does. If your enemy attempts to do something which you don't want him to do you'll have to shoot him or at least threaten to do so to make him reconsider.

>Still fucking missing the point.
The blockade isn't aimed at the High Seas Fleet. It's aimed at every guy who owns a cargo ship that sees profit in hauling stuff to and from Germany. The blockade held just fucking fine without any naval action at all, only suddenly NOW they need to kill German warships? No, they didn't, and they never did. I'm really having trouble thinking of a simpler way to explain this, it's incredibly obvious to anyone who spends 5 minutes thinking about it.

If the German warships attack you, then you'll have to try to sink them. And it turns out that the British weren't really all that good at it. They were just good enough to maintain the status quo, but due to numbers not due to tactical finesse.

The second option is not an option if the enemy is already firing at you. At that point you'll have to shoot back.

>The second option is not an option if the enemy is already firing at you. At that point you'll have to shoot back.

But you still don't need to fight as if you must kill them all, just enough to drive them off and keep them scared.

Royal Navy loses in WW2 (WW1 in insert)

>If the German warships attack you, then you'll have to try to sink them.
Not really, no. You could retire without battle, you could simply attempt to keep things stalemated as long as possible, you could attempt to run around in circles until their shit ass range forces them back to port, etc. The Royal Navy really gets absolutely nothing from sinking HSF ships, so no, trying to sink them is not something they "have" to do at all. What they "have" to do is keep their own losses to a minimum.

>But you still don't need to fight as if you must kill them all, just enough to drive them off and keep them scared.
'drive them off' usually involves shooting at them with serious intent. And if you outnumber the enemy and he still kills more of you, then you didn't do a particularly good job. Maybe you did a good enough job, depending on the strategic situation, but it's not going to be more than that.

If you outnumber the enemy there's no good reason to avoid combat as you should be able to defeat him in combat.

>If you outnumber the enemy there's no good reason to avoid combat as you should be able to defeat him in combat.

Yeah this is about the level of insight I'd expect from a 12 year old.

If you think numbers = win, you should probably not be trying to give your opinion seriously on this subject.

Maybe you would be better off asking questions, rather than arguing with people who clearly know more of the absolute basics of military conduct than you.

>If you outnumber the enemy there's no good reason to avoid combat as you should be able to defeat him in combat.
Why? Defeating them in combat gets you nothing. Why take that chance? Even in the best case scenario, your strategic goals are not advanced and you will take some losses, no matter how slight.

So letting a numerically inferior enemy sink enough of you to the point where when the battle is over you're not even certain whether you've won or lost is the British battle tactic? To me it looks more like you're making excuses for a mediocre performance.

>"tactically conservative and defensive" are nice euphemisms for a lack of tactical finesse.
which is odd because Jellicoe did decisively out finesse scheer, managing to cross his T twice and inflict heav damage in a very short sace of time, any reading of the actual events of the battle leads inevitably to that conclusion.

Tactically conservative and defensive was the decision to turn away from and not towards the torpedo attack and battlecruiser charge that scheer used to cover his escape.

the decision was made because it was more important in strategic terms to preserve british capital ships than sink german ones and the fact that the germans were running meant the british had alread achieved their main aim of ensuring that the high seas fleet didnt break out and break the RN blocade of german

>So letting a numerically inferior enemy sink enough of you to the point where when the battle is over you're not even certain whether you've won or lost is the British battle tactic?

What the fuck?

There was never any question as to whether or not the British won.

The questions were about the actions of the particular admirals and whether or not they should have done different.

>So letting a numerically inferior enemy sink enough of you to the point where when the battle is over you're not even certain whether you've won or lost is the British battle tactic?
That's not what happened at all, but enjoy your delusions.

honest assessment of the commanders

Jellicoe 8/10 did everything right in terms of major decisons in the battle, main failing was he failed to emphasize enough to his captains the value of immeditate and accurate reporting of contacts during the night actions, had he been better informed b his subordinates he almost certainly would have taken enough of the german cripples in the night to even the exchange rate.

Beatty: 3/10 communications problems left his battlecruisers short of the fifth battle squadron during a large part of the engagement and left one german battlecruiser unengaged during the initial exchanges, and his encouragement of sloppy magazine safety policy directly contributed to the british losses he did however successfully draw the germans onto the grand fleet, didnt lack courage or resolve and remained relatively calm in the face of his force getting shot up but dash and vigor didnt compensate for poor judgement

Scheer : 5/10 essentially blundered into the grand fleet,, got the stuffing kicked out of his leading squadrons, got his T crossed twice and barely managed to avoid being destroyed, gets credit for not actually getting his fleet wiped out and for having practised the 'turn and run' manuver but still a poor performance overall

Hipper: 7/10 handled his initial clash with beatty well, and got his ships home, not brilliant but competent and brave

SeemsGood

I bet you think the US Navy failed in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal since despite being evenly matched in ships, they lost more than the Japanese

They did failed.

just the few books i read about the german operations, orders, ideas etc
some are 1st hand sources cited, i dont know why ppl dont read books here, its much better than wikipedia or "documentaries"

In what way?

RN gunnery performance in 1914-1916 suggests that the Germans missed a grand opportunity to inflict a serious defeat by remaining defensive until the late war.

They lost more ships than the japs