Theoretically assuming Darius the Great didn't die in 488 BC...

Theoretically assuming Darius the Great didn't die in 488 BC, how could he have done things differently with his planned second invasion of Greece?

Also curiously, how would've, if he had been in the same scenario, would Cyrus the Great deal with the mainland Greeks in Europe vs Darius the Great and Xerxes attempts?

*486 BC

Mixed up my date there.

Xerxes' big strategic error was not besieging Athens after his defeat at Salamis, as the defeat was in no way decisive and it wouldn't have taken a large army to do so. Darius seems to have been a more apt strategician, so he probably could have realized that and may have annexed European Greece. Cyrus would have probably considered them pointless people from the boonies and expanded farther Eastward to India

>Xerxes' big strategic error was not besieging Athens after his defeat at Salamis,
uwotm8? Athens had already been taken and burned to the ground before Salamis.

To be honest, probably not that much different. Unless he's willing to come west personally, he's probably just going to be handing the campaign off to some general/warlord. The Persian system of fighting just didn't work that well in Greece, and the only way the Persians were likely to win would be to play the game they would start to do later; pay Greeks off so they spend all their time fighting against each other. Maybe he'd have done it, but maybe not.

*the athenians
They were on the edge of surrender, but Xerxes didn't make the final push

Uh, didn't Darius utterly smash the Ionian Greeks who used the same system of warfare in Anatolia?

>They were on the edge of surrender, but Xerxes didn't make the final push
No they weren't, ESPECIALLY not after the big win at Salamis. They were sitting fine where they were, and worst came to worst, now that they controlled the seas, they could always just pull back to somewhere in the Peloponese. Not to mention that without a friendly fleet in the area to bring in supplies from home, your army is going to get real hungry real quick.

Darius never warred against the Ionians during the revolt, he just sent his sons-in-law.

>Xerxes' big strategic error was not besieging Athens after his defeat at Salamis
But Xerxes burnt down Athens before the battle of Salamis
are you an idiot?

The Persian fleet was some 600 triremes, of which they only lost 200. It was a big victory but in no way knocked the Persians out of the war. Persia still controlled the Ionian coast, Egypt, Cyprus, etc. Xerxes could have garrisoned Athens, consolidated control over Attica and Boeotia, and then picked apart the Peloponnese (probably using Argos as a foothold). I guess he was just impatient

see

maybe spend more time provisioning his troops and less time flogging the Hellespont

Anatolia has enormously more wide-open space, and settled Ionia in particular was mostly around river valleys. A lighter, more mobile army is going to do enormously better there than in Greece with all those cramped mountain passes. Plus, there was local forage for horses there, which did not exist when you're campaigning south of Thessaly, which makes the Persian cavalry really hard to use.

Also, it's not at all clear that the Ionians did use the same military system, or did so nearly as effectively. The Wars of the Delian league go very badly for Persia, even outside their home grounds in Greece proper.

I'm pretty certain he was leading the decision making and strategy his generals took against the Ionian Greeks even if he wasn't directly present considering at that time he was putting down rebellions and revolts in Persia. I don't think its a question of his capabilities because he's proven to be an effective commander and general on his own like his Scythian campaign and dealing with said rebellions. IIRC it was believed he was going take personal charge of the next invasion before his death.

Either way my point is the Persians did have experience fighting and beating the Greeks who used hoplite and heavy armored infantry. Maybe it was the change when Xerxes started pushing the Persian army toward more being based around archery and missile troops and light cavalry vs the combined arms of Cyrus and Darius?

Well from reading Olmstead, the guy himself asserts Xerxes would've won against the Greeks if he held back from trying to force a fast victory at Salamis which would've deprieved the Athenians of their allies and forced them to come to terms.

I really doubt the Ionian Greeks differed that greatly from mainland Greeks militarily speaking.

Like others have pointed out, European Greece was good for the hoplites and bad for the cavalry (which formed the basis of the Persian army), and combined with Xerxes's impatience made for a strategic blunder. IIRC Darius's 490 campaign wasn't a super dedicated one, because he didn't want to take too many soldiers away from his empire

>The Persian fleet was some 600 triremes, of which they only lost 200.
Which puts them at parity at best, and maybe slight naval inferiority. Good luck getting regular transport ships through that sort of thing. They're really slow and vulnerable, what with being that wide.

>It was a big victory but in no way knocked the Persians out of the war.
No shit sherlock, but why do you think he gets rid of about 2/3 of his army after it? For the funs? Or because he coudln't supply that many troops and had to do something?

>consolidated control over Attica and Boeotia,
He DID consolidate his hold over Boetia, and Attica is a worthless, burnt out ruin at the moment.

> then picked apart the Peloponnese (probably using Argos as a foothold)
Yeah, attack right through that giant wall they built over the isthmus. That'll work just great, a frontal assault against a heavily fortified position when your enemy has an army more suited for static warfare than you do.

>I guess he was just impatient
No, he was simply aware of basic operational factors, like the one that says not to put your army in a foodless mountainous peninsula over the winter so they can all starve and die of disease.

>Well from reading Olmstead, the guy himself asserts Xerxes would've won against the Greeks if he held back from trying to force a fast victory at Salamis which would've deprieved the Athenians of their allies and forced them to come to terms.

>Basing your entire opinion on 70 year old scholarship of a guy who isn't even a dedicated military historian.

>the guy himself asserts Xerxes would've won against the Greeks if he held back from trying to force a fast victory at Salamis which would've deprieved the Athenians of their allies and forced them to come to terms.
This is already after he loses roughly half his fleet to bad weather and can't bring them to a decisive naval battle at Artamesium. Time is very much not on his side; and trying to press the advantage isn't impatience, it's proper strategy.

>I really doubt the Ionian Greeks differed that greatly from mainland Greeks militarily speaking.
So what? The vast difference in outcome of military conflict is due to magic? Or maybe the Persians just sent all their worst soldiers at the mainland Greeks but their best at the Ionians for some inexplicable reason.

It's not like they didn't have all of northern Greece to pick off extra food from, and he could just send supplies overland from Anatolia if need be.
>Yeah, attack right through that giant wall they built over the isthmus.
do you know where Argos is?
>No, he was simply aware of basic operational factors, like the one that says not to put your army in a foodless mountainous peninsula over the winter so they can all starve and die of disease.
They had enough food for the 480-479 winter, stop exaggerating. Xerxes's strategy from the beginning was impatient and a huge mistake.

I'm pretty confident Olmstead is one of the best modern sources on the Achaemenids Persians, user.

He just has an inexplicable attraction to Xerxes

The only thing I've seen him say is that he views the idea of Xerxes being a "evil" king or a "corrupt morally decadent one" is something he wanted to rebuke and counter. Otherwise don't really see much that makes him a Xerxes lover or anything.

i mean the user

Xerxes definitely rushed things. The debacle at Salamis could've been entirely and utterly avoided if he didn't force the Athenian allies hand. Simply blockading and holding them would've won over several of the other city-states and brought them sueing for terms of peace and treaty.

He could've just played the Greeks off each other like Artaxerxes II did after the Corinthian war

>It's not like they didn't have all of northern Greece to pick off extra food from
user, according to some estimates, the invasion force Xerxes brought along was as big as the entire adult male population of Greece. There is no fucking way that it can be supplied locally.

>and he could just send supplies overland from Anatolia if need be.
Just driving the grain carts over the hellespont?

>do you know where Argos is?
Of course I do. How the hell are you going to GET to Argos? Don't you remember how the Greeks were fortifying the Isthmus of Corinth to the teeth?

>They had enough food for the 480-479 winter,
You do remember the part where Xerxes heads back home with the bulk of his army over that winter, right? That implies that no, he did not in fact have enough food to keep them all over the winter.

That's like saying that just because JamesMacPherson is a first rate ACW historian, he's clearly the best authority out there on the Mexican-American war, because it featured a lot of the same important figures on the American side. If you want to study a war, you really need to know about both sides, and something about military theory in general.

And he's a scholar, not a source, unless he can channel long dead Achaemenids.

Cyrus would've won not through blatant power but through guile, strategy, and smarts. Probably do something cunning like invite all the political and military leaders to a meeting in some island between Persian Asia and Europea in the Aegean Sea and then have all of them executed except those that swore loyalty to them but the kicker would be he'd have messengers sent into mainland Greece ahead of the survivors detailing how merciful he was in protecting them against turncoat traitors and win the affection of the Hellenes even more.

I'm not saying he should leave his entire army there, but that he should set up a permanent garrison in Boeotia and foster discontent amongst the cities in Greece until they willingly enter the Persian fold.
>Just driving the grain carts over the hellespont?
when you control the entire hellespont, it shouldn't be too hard to get some grain over
>How the hell are you going to GET to Argos?
by boat? There are plenty of ways to do this (engage the Athenian navy while sending a secondary force to Argos, for example)

>I'm not saying he should leave his entire army there, but that he should set up a permanent garrison in Boeotia
He essentially did. They lost at Platea, but before that, Mardonious showed no signs of leaving anytime soon.
> foster discontent amongst the cities in Greece until they willingly enter the Persian fold.
And how are you going to drive them apart? How much time, energy, and money are you going to spend on such an uncertain endeavor? What if you get directly attacked before you can split the alliance apart?

>when you control the entire hellespont, it shouldn't be too hard to get some grain over
You DON'T control the entire hellespont. Remember how Themistocles leads the fleet to the pontoon bridge and hangs around long enough to show that he could have destroyed it easily but doesn't? The Greeks can break your grip any time they want.

>by boat?
Yes, that's why they bypassed the force at Thermapolaye instead of trying to drive through. OH WAIT NO THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED AT ALL IN A FAR MORE FAVORABLE NAVAL SITUATION.

>There are plenty of ways to do this (engage the Athenian navy while sending a secondary force to Argos, for example)
That will never work. If you go with a 200-250,000 man estimate for his forces, and assuming that the 400ish trierimes you have left are
A) completely unmolested
B) Have the same carrying capacity as 2nd Punic War era Roman Quinqmarines (50 soldiers each)

You will be ferrying your men over 20,000 at a time so they can be slaughtered on the beach a la Marathon while the Greeks wonder why you suddenly took leave of your senses. And of course those ships do NOT have the same capacity, they're much smaller. And they will be attacked along the way.

But enjoy your delusions. I'm sure no amounts of fact or reason will get through. Xerxes just lost the war because he was an impatient person, just like those Roman biographies always tell us that nothing else exists except one prominent characteristic of the leader

>And how are you going to drive them apart?
Cities like Argos and Thebes offered no resistance, and incorporating them as new satrapies wouldn't be particularly difficult. It's not like you have to conquer all of Greece in a single campaign season.
>The Greeks can break your grip any time they want.
Then get it from North Greece, you control a huge portion of fertile land.
>Yes, that's why they bypassed the force at Thermapolaye instead of trying to drive through
wow its like Xerxes is a terrible strategist or something, who could have guessed?
>a la Marathon
You'd be landing in friendly territory when the enemy has little knowledge of your plans, all of which makes it different from Marathon.

Xerxes could've played a much longer strategy over years, worming his way into Greece (which is more or less what his successors did). But he was impatient

I'm just bumping this thread because I want to read it later.

Bumping.

>tfw not living in a persianate society because they couldn't go all the way