Empire of Japan

No. That's retarded. The Pacific Fleet only had 2 carriers assigned to it at the time, out of 7 in the American fleet. The Americans would go on to construct 14 more Essex class vessels during the war, each of them far more powerful than any of the pre-war carriers. They had the industrial slack to build even more should that be necessary, as well as shitting out things like battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc.

The loss of two carriers early on would not substantially alter things, because the Japanese had no realistic means of striking at U.S. production, and had raised their threat profile such that the U.S. was willing to take whatever it took to bring them down.

Yes, they had a choice not to pursue aggressive expansionist policies and no the USA wasn't obligated to continued exporting resources to them to help further their ambitions of dominating the entirety of the Asian Pacific.

If they had destroyed 2 carriers(big if) at Hawaii, the battle of Midway might not have been the disaster for the Combined Fleet that it was(or happened at all). And perhaps other successful operations would have precipitated Admiral Yamamotos proposed plan for an invasion of Hawaii, and deny the US a safe strategic base.

It would probably not have mattered in a long war no, but Japan seemed like they wanted to end up in a position to negotiate a peace with the US. That might have been a possibility if Hawaii had been taken.

Yeah you tell 'em! Don't let the gaijin slander grorious nippon!

*charges like a screeching autist directly into machinegun fire and dies*

It seemed like they were willing to make concessions about China, even blow the entire invasion off, but there was a lot of problems in negotiations with the US. From what I've read of Hull, he seemed very stubborn in the negotiations, almost even hostile to the Japanese.

Japan certainly started things with their attacks on China, but they did try to achieve a peaceful solution. The emperor and prime minister tried numerous times to get some sort of peaceful solution with the Americans.

>If they had destroyed 2 carriers(big if) at Hawaii, the battle of Midway might not have been the disaster for the Combined Fleet that it was(or happened at all)
It likely wouldn't have happened, but that's not particularly relevant to overall winning chances.

>And perhaps other successful operations would have precipitated Admiral Yamamotos proposed plan for an invasion of Hawaii, and deny the US a safe strategic base.
No, full stop. That is simply not in the cards. Even if the Japanese have naval superiority in the region, it's one thing to control the seas, and it's another to be able to invade a heavily fortified enemy encampment literally thousands of kilometers away from your closest base you can launch the invasion from. By mid-42, Pearl Harbor was defended by about 2 divisions for land invasions and hundreds of land based airplanes, most of whom are larger and significantly more powerful than the sorts of planes that the Americans were fielding on their carriers. A r return in force to Hawaii is suicide, even if every American carrier is on the bottom of the Pacific.

>They went in with the guise of saving china from themselves

How high are you that was never their reason, they viewed the chinese as inferiour subhumans and wanted to take muh Lebensraum sounds a lot like the ideas of an austrian gentleman right?

The situation has to be considered from the point of the attitudes that were held and presumed to be held at the time, not the realities of the situation.

The US, at the time, believed that Japan's expansion was dangerous, when the Japs attacked the British and the Dutch, and made surprising gains, this threatened US Pacific territories and showed the US that Japan was now completely unafraid of attacking any nation, no matter how powerful. The US was still recovering from the 1929 crash, and was not directly interested in offensive war; they wished to maintain neutrality as long as possible. The US sanctioned Japan economically, and provided aid to its enemies, but was not sure if, especially after the defeats the British suffered in South-East Asia, that it could defeat Japan in a military conflict.

This gave the appearance that the US was indecisive, cowardly, and possessing little resolve for war.

The Japanese, in a lightning campaign, had surprised even themselves with how fast they overran the British defenses in SEA (specifically Singapore, which both sides presumed would hold out for months if not years). They had experienced nothing but continual victory, first against the Russians 3 decades earlier, then the Chinese, now the Dutch and British. They were riding high, and they had noted that one of the main instruments of their success was their people's willingness to fight and die zealously, surviving incredibly harsh conditions in the army, and yet happily laying down their lives at a moments notice. This allowed them to stretch supply lines beyond what was thought possible, and conduct attacks quicker and more ferocious than anyone would expect. They believed this elan was the key to their victory, and seeing the British surrender at Singapore, and the American reactions to their campaigns, and the American desire for neutrality, they assumed a decisive crushing blow to US naval power would frighten the US out of a war.

Cont.

The Japanese command, especially the army, believed that the US would never be a match for their aggressive style of warfare, as up until this point, the US had never distinguished itself in an uphill struggle in an international war. US soldiers were not globally well thought of. Everyone presumed that the French, Germans, and British, had the finest armies in the world. The Japs thus assumed since they had defeated the French and British in SEA, and had the Germans on their side, that the US would be no match.

A lot of this comes down to the Japanese cultural distaste for democracy. Japan had, up until this point, always been a very stratified nation, having only abandoned feudalism 70 years prior. Their soldiers had complete faith in their officers and would dutifully die at a moment's notice, their people had absolute faith in the Emperor and his military command to win the war, no matter how much hardship they endured, they KNEW they would prevail, because they KNEW they had superior discipline of spirit.

The US lacked this entirely. They questioned the decisions of their leaders, they disobeyed their officers, they were a people without honour, and to the Japs, a people without honour stood little chance in battle.

The Japs genuinely thought they would win. They massively miscalculated the US will to fight on in the face of adversity, and the US pride in their nation (which had not previously been demonstrated in an international conflict). They did know full well that the US was bigger and richer than them, but they didn't believe it would matter, as so was the Russian Empire in 1904.

They made the same miscalculation the Germans made with Barbarossa.

Maybe because the US' own geopolitical ambition in the Pacific.

Just a note, the invasion of Singapore happened after pearl harbor. Japan struck Pearl Harbor first, then attacked the Dutch east indies and British SEA.

>when the Japs attacked the British and the Dutch, and made surprising gains,
What the fuck are you on about? Declaration of war against Britain and the DEI was simultaneous with war against America. By the time they had their victory in Malaya, they were already well committed.

>invasion of hawaii
>muh midway

not this shit again, just to remind you hawaii was one of the most fortified island at the time, same goes with pearl harbor.

They could have ended the war in China anytime they wanted.
They didn't and bit off more than they could chew.

>was one of the most fortified island at the time
same shit was said about Singapoore

Look at the distance from a friendly port to Singapore for Japan. Now do the same for Hawaii.
Invading Hawaii is a logistical nightmare.
Even if they do some how take it, they need to still worry about Alaska as a port and staging ground.

Singapore was attacked out of a friendly country (Thailand) in a mostly overland campaign where the Japanese had local air supremacy. None of those factors apply in invading Honolulu. The Japanese were really fucking terrible at beach storming, and you can't really get around that if you want to invade Hawaii. Furthermore, I don't think you grasp how badly distance works against them.

timeanddate.com/worldclock/distances.html?n=2243
It is almost 4,000 km from Kwajalein, their closest base, to Honolulu. The cargo vessels that the IJN was using to transport supplies could cruise between 9-13 knots, or 16 and 2/3 to 24kph. That means even the 'fast' supply ships are taking almost 2 weeks round trip every time you want to reinforce or resupply your invasion. (Assuming, of course, you can go in a straight line with no hassle, which is also extremely unlikely even in the event of significant IJN advantage vis a vis the Americans; look at how much trouble the RN had against u-boat raiders at keeping cargo ships alive in combat zones) And those little bases in the Marshalls are going to have a really tough time supporting the tens to hundreds of thousands of troops you'll need to subdue Hawaii.

Whoops, forgot to include this link concerning Japanese cargo vessels.

ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/ONI/ONI-208-J/ONI-208-JSup3.pdf

[Citations needed]

Kill yourselves you weeb revisionist scum.

you know you're pretty fucked up if even nazis are shocked by your crimes

This same revisionist shit is in every Pacific Front thread. Are you the same user?

Wew user your timeline is all fucked

lol haha, is this what weebs actually believe in?
Japanese never ever thought about pulling out of China. They did the negotiations to see if the embargo could be lifted off, since americans were pretty stubborn about it, they went ahead with their planned invasion.

the Japanese had been taking over the Chinese underground for a century before WW2, all the major drug lords and pimps were Japanese, and they used this influence to weaken and take over China from the inside. That was always the endgame, Japan had their eyes on China and their surrounding territories ever since the Japanese government realized that they had a huge logistical and technological advantage over their neighbors via US support.

What's truly ironic is that America was the catalyst for Japanese imperialism and the arbiter of its destruction, like a guy having to take ol' yeller out back and put him down.
"I brought you into this world, now I'm going to take you out."

The Nazis were saints compared to the japs

...

>Did they have a choice but to go to war, or did the US back them into a corner?

when it came to where they wanted to expand, which was Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, then yes, the Japanese knew that any moves made to take the European colonies in Asia certainly meant war with the US.

The Japanese were getting desperate for resources such as oil and rubber, both shortages would be solved by taking Indonesia, but the US presence in the Philippines would interrupt shipments to the front in China.

Japan was faced with 3 options;

1. continue the war in china only and face the risk of resource shortages before all of China can be nailed down, and there was little chance of Japan actually subduing all of China with the resources on hand.

2. Expand north and seize oil and resources from Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, which they tried and the Soviets gave them a black eye at Khalkhin Gol.

or 3. take the European colonies in SE Asia and the Pacific to fix the resource shortages.

They took option 3 after option 2 failed, and conducted Pearl Harbor with the hopes of knocking out the US Pacific Fleet long enough for Japan to establish their supremacy in the Pacific Ocean. The gamble failed spectacularly and the Pacific War raged on.