Given the industrial discrepancy between Japan and the United States what steps could Japan have taken to actually win WW II?
I've come up with a few:
1. Actually embrace the pan-asiatic idea legitimately; would have made conquering China, and actually integrating it into part of the Empire much more realistic and other Asians would look at Japan as liberators instead of conquerors- however this would require Japan of the time not being Japan at the time; similar to "well if the Germans weren't Nazis".
2. Don't declare ware on the US; simply declare war on the colonial powers and "liberate" their asian assets. If the United States later declares war, the lack of the "sneak attack" and need to "avenge" Pearl Harbor completely changes the US narrative and increases the possibility that Japan could negotiate peace; if the US even entered the war at all.
3. Completely commit the Fleet to the Atlantic to subdue England. This would require actually working with Germany in a integrated strategy to subdue Britain after the fall of France in 1940. The whole of the Japanese fleet, including the Submarine force, would allow for a complete Naval blockade of Great Britan; if this failed to bring Britain to the peace table then the Japanese fleet could provide the naval assets that the Germans otherwise lacked to undertake Operation Sea Lion. The greatest obstacle to this strategy (aside from convincing people to do it) would be the logistics of moving the entire fleet to the Atlantic.
Having read many books, watched many documentaries, etc, over the years, I don't really see any other strategies the Japanese could have utilized to get the colonial powers to sign a peace treaty and give them both peace, with the West, and "legal" rights to the territories they seized.
3 is completely idiotic. Even if you could convince the Japanese to send their entire fleet to serve the interests of a completely different country, and you could get them across the entire fucking world to harbor in France or Germany or somewhere, and the Germans had the harbor and port capacity and supplies to host them (Remember, they didn't even have enough spare oil to let the Italian fleet roam freely, now we're talking another fleet that's enormously more massive), it wouldn't matter anyway, because the war in the Atlantic was more or less dominated by land based planes, and the combined carrier power of the Japanese aren't going to fend off hundreds of Spitfires escorting giant bombers with bomb-loads 6-7 times that of your little torpedo planes.
As for the other two, #1 is hardly clear that a nicer foreign policy would actually yield greater production fo war material, especially give how backwards places like China were, let alone anywhere else in the co-prosperity sphere. I doubt you'd be able to squeeze much more out other than hauling away raw materials for consumption in Japanese factories, and it would take a lot of time.
2) does show theoretical promise,e but gambling on the opponent's war weariness is necessarily risky, as you have no real way of gauging when the Americans are going to decide it's too much trouble. I don't really have the theoretical tools to gauge its effectiveness, and I honestly doubt anyone does.
Isaiah Rodriguez
Honestly the more i think about it, the more i think the real outcome was the best case scenario for the japanese. #2 seems like the most probable outcome, without pearl harbor i highly doubt germany wouldve declared war on the United States, and it wouldve been very hard for Roosevelt to convince the American people to go to war with Germany. A declaration of war by the US on japan would seem a greater possibility, however the full might of the US would be directed against the japanese, most likely resulting in an earlier defeat.
Cooper Perez
>e, without pearl harbor i highly doubt germany wouldve declared war on the United States, and it wouldve been very hard for Roosevelt to convince the American people to go to war with Germany. He says while the U.S. had been fighting an undeclared war with Germany for months and polls consistently showed more and more of a public leaning towards intervention in Europe. It's not a question of if the U.S. gets involved in Europe, but when.
Jackson Phillips
Okay, i can see your point. But US war with japan without also being at war with Germany wouldve resulted in a speedier defeat for the Japanese
Kevin Jenkins
There where no winning strategies for Japan, really. They lost at the Marco-Polo Bridge. They should have consolidate the power they had then, before starting the Sino-Japanese war, and should have kept on their strategy of Puppet states. The Axis was a mistake. Ideally they would have kept on neutral terms with the West and maybe could have gobbled up all the 'communists' in the late 40s and 50s...
Joseph Gonzalez
Possibly. I'm not actually so certain of that.
Japan starts the war with a pretty clear advantage in carriers and naval aviation, if not necessarily in mass, definitely with qualitative edges like pilot experience. An Essex class carrier, the mainstay of U.S. war production, takes about a year and a half to go from being ordered to being commissioned. They could get more of them laid down in more shipyards, but it's still going to be mid 1943ish at the earliest when you see them in service, and probably later as they scramble to figure out how many they actually need.
Historically, by 1943, the U.S. had the clear on the water naval advantage, and the sticking point was then trying to figure out how to actually put invasion forces of islands together, and producing enough landing craft (which they badly underestimated how many they needed, another thing unlikely to change if the U.S. is solely fighting Japan), and then it was just a series of move to the next island hop, smash, and consolidate; they were far more limited by how much force they could bring to bear in a specific locale than they were to overall amount of force they could produce in the U.S. and dedicate to the war with Japan.
Mason Carter
1. Like, don't try to conquer all of Asia, just be a powerful industrial nation with massive influence on Asia
Oliver Martin
How about instead of gearing for war across the pacific, Japan utilizes it's resources more towards the war in Manchuria and Siberian invasion when the Germans initiated operation barborosa. That way when the Germans see there initial push in the early months of the German -Maria war, the Japanese could've tanked through Siberia, or at least gotten more troops sent to the Soviet eastern front. Best case the Soviets are completely unprepared and the Japs make it possibly as far as the urals before supply lines are utterly exhausted, worst case the japanese take Manchuria and half of Siberia before they cannot advance further. That way if the Soviets capitulate then Japan could take advantage of Russia's rich oil fields, then there's no reason to attack the US for slapping an embargo on them. Also for the Axis as a whole, delay the war for 5 years and do massive military build up until 1945, then go ham
Benjamin Price
>How about instead of gearing for war across the pacific, Japan utilizes it's resources more towards the war in Manchuria and Siberian invasion when the Germans initiated operation barborosa. Because that would be retarded. Because Siberia was not undefended, and the amount of troops actually transferred from there was minimal. Because invading Siberia involves attacking a hellscape where there's snow on the ground 9 months a year, and you have ONE railroad, which the Soviets can easily tear up behind them as they retreat, and oh yeah, they have about 1.5 million troops in theater.
They wouldn't make it to the Urals. They'd be lucky to make it to Chita, which is thousands of kilometers away from anything actually important.
Levi Martinez
The Red Army blew the IJA the fuck out at the Battles of Khalkin Gol.
That's the primary reason the Japanese leadership decided to go south for new clay.
Robert Perez
Honestly, any scenario in which Imperial Japan goes to war with America is one in which Imperial Japan loses.
Their best bet would have been to concentrate on both oil exploration/production in areas under their control and the war with China. A conquered China could have then been a spring-board into Indo-China, India or even Russia (after a good decade or so of colonization/consolidation and modernization).
Easton Wood
It was agreed that only 10% of the total US war effort would be dedicated to japan. Could you imagine what the difference would have been if it were 20%, even 30?
>Three U.S. Army divisions were deployed to Australia and New Zealand in February and March 1942 at the request of Prime Minister Churchill so that divisions from those countries could remain on operations in the Middle East. Through this sizeable deployment to the Pacific, the U.S. aided the Europe First strategy by defending Australia and New Zealand and thus enabling experienced troops from those countries to remain deployed against German forces.[11] Nonetheless, the inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.[17]
Furthermore, a lot of the assets necessary to deliver the deathblow to Japan are capital warships, which cannot really be sped up in their construction; if they start building more, even 2-3 times as many more, that still won't change that you're going to have a fuckhuge fleet sometime in 43-44, not any earlier.
Dominic Richardson
Well they could try bombing the hell out of it, but there's not much point in bombing nothing at all. Maybe create a campaign through China, claiming Soviet allied states like Mongolia and Xinjiang instead of pooling resources into the pacific, then attacking through Afghanistan into the khazikstan region, going north of the Caspian sea and possibly linking up with the Germans? I'm stretching it here and its a very unlikely plan, but a plan nonetheless
Christian Price
Yes, the logistics of the scenario is the most difficult part; as I noted. Specifically the Oil. There are a few counter-factual scenarios where the oil could be obtained (perhaps from the Soviet Union); and the Japanese are available, able and willing to concentrate their ships and aircraft in the European theater; along with the Italians for an attempt at Operation Sea Lion in early 1941.
Regardless, the British aircraft carrier capability of 1940 wasn't much in comparison to the Japanese. They used outdated and slow biplanes. A Japanese naval expeditionary force consisting of the carriers, a few escorts, and it's submarine element had the capability to completely cut off England from all oceanic traffic in 1940; while simultaneously staying out of the range of land based planes and being capable of destroying any elements of the British Fleet sent to engage them.
Of course, the question then arises- how would the fleet actually get there- only two options are obvious: either work with the Germans and Italians to seize the Suez canal; or work out the logistics for going around the Horn of Africa (very difficult). Though, it is an interesting question as to whether they could sail through the Arctic circle, while hugging the coastline of the USSR, to sail from Japan to Germany, if the Soviets agreed to supply the oil (probably too icy, even in the summer- don't feel like researching it).
At any rate, what other options does Japan have to actually emerge from the conflict victorious while achieving its strategic goals?
Nolan Sanders
You're missing the point; twice actually.
First off, if you're planning an invasion of Britain proper, it won't be your carriers vs their carriers. It'll be your carriers vs their land based planes. At its height, the IJN's carrier air arm could field about 5-600 planes, and most of those will be smaller, weaker planes than me-109s or Spitfire 2s, let alone land based bombers that are being thrown around. Even in a blockade situation, to avoid the strikes of land based planes, you're going to need to set your blockade about 700 nmi out, which is the operational range of things like Beauforts. That leaves you very spread out, and it also leaves very little of the Atlantic uncovered, pic related.
And I wasn't even directly considering the logistics of getting the fleet to Europe. Once you get the fleet ot Europe, it needs to be fuelled. And the Euro-Axis are already facing endemic fuel shortages for their owther forces. Adding whatever the IJN guzzles isn't going to help much, as the Japanese own fuel sources from Indonesia simply aren't going to be defensible supporting an operation halfway around the world.
>At any rate, what other options does Japan have to actually emerge from the conflict victorious while achieving its strategic goals? Zero. To have any chance of "victory", it needed to moderate its strategic goals to things that were more attainable.
Xavier Hill
Japan literally can't win a war against the US. The only winning move against the US is to not play. Japan should have joined the Allies to be on the winning side of the war.
Benjamin Perry
>3. Completely commit the Fleet to the Atlantic to subdue England.
Dude. Just imagine the logistics of Japan trying to operate in the Atlantic during WW2.
Carter Allen
Pearl harbor was an inside job
John Parker
They couldn't. The only reason they got so far was because logistics in the pacific was a nightmare for the allies.
Cooper Rodriguez
Best option for the axis was to invade USSR right at the start, at 1939. For that, they would have to ally Poland.
A combined invasion from Poland, Finland and in Siberia by Japan, would send te soviets into disaray, specially because they were still building up by then, and thus they were far weaker.
Remove the soviets out of the picture right from te batch, and then they could concentrate on France and the UK, but not necessarily right after they deal with the USSR, they could consolidate first...
Chase Roberts
Roosevelt would have just pulled another Lusitania or Golf of Tonkin.
Dylan Anderson
How are you going to ally with Poland? How are you going to stop the French and British from attacking you in the back while you're pre-occupied with invading the USSR? Why would Japan help out after Khalkin Gol and losing those other border skirmishes? How are they going to pull troops away from China to "help" in this campaign, and how are they going to supply them up there?
Ayden Powell
There's no way to just ally Poland.
Germany should have kept Poland as a buffer state, and then when the soviets invade it, they might even be able to drag the West in to help them against the red menace.
Charles Martinez
>Germany should have kept Poland as a buffer state
Pretty much this. There was no reason to invade Poland other than Hitler's highly questionable "lebensraum" theory.
This is dependent on the idea that somehow Germany convinces both Poland and Finland to help invade the USSR, meaning that Hitler would basically need mind control powers.
Nathan Martin
How badly did they lose to the Soviets? I mean just looking at the numbers could the outcome be worse than what they were expecting from the US? I know hindsight is 20/20 but the IJA weren't stupid they knew fighting the US would be an uphill battle. Did they gauge that the USSR could fight a 2 front war better than the US could?
Matthew Sanchez
Compare Japanese tanks to Soviet tanks of the same era and you'll understand why most people are very skeptical that the IJA could have given the Red Army a hard time. However, despite this I still say that attacking the USSR would have been the better decision to make simply because the alternative is attacking the USA which is worse.
Jack Hill
the American demands for the lifting of the oil embargo on Japan were withdrawal from China
If Japan had agreed to that America was perfectly ok with them controlling Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria as their puppet.
Leo Perez
Zhukov pulled off a textbook double envelopment after a river crossing using his air, armored, and artillery superiority to encircle and destroy a Japanese infantry division.
Cameron Roberts
I'm not missing the point; I'm just asking- what strategy could actually bring Japan the peace it wanted where it could "legally" keep the colonies it seized in Asia because it negotiated a favorable peace, something along the lines of the Russo-Japanese peace treaty. Obviously, having the Japanese commit their entire navy; and a large part of their air force, to provide the naval assets, that Germany lacked, in order to attempt Operation Sea-Lion is a scenario that seems is almost more accurate to catagorize as historical fantasy than historical fiction- given the logicistical difficulty involved. However, that dosen't mean that it isn't interesting to talk about... nor does it mean that it isn't one of the few ways the Axis could have forced the British to surrender, or successfully invaded England.
If you want to talk about scenarios that are much more logistically and politically feasible; that could have potentially altered the war- then the question I would ask would be- how much difference would committing the entire Japanese Submarine force to Atlantic Operations in 1940 or 1941 made?
Mason Nguyen
>how much difference would committing the entire Japanese Submarine force to Atlantic Operations in 1940 or 1941 made? None.
Jason Lopez
>I'm not missing the point; Yes you are.
>nor does it mean that it isn't one of the few ways the Axis could have forced the British to surrender, or successfully invaded England. It isn't you idiot. The entire IJN would be meaningless in an invasion that is dominated by the tiny width of the English channel. The thousands of land based planes on both sides would brush aside the relatively small and underpowered naval air contingent of the carrier force without even noticing they're there. There's a reason why the British never used their own carriers to try to stop the Blitz, nor to escort their bombers on strikes against targets in Germany. It takes an enormous effort to throw carrier planes against land planes and win.
That's before you get to the logistical problems, which by the way, aren't primarily about getting to Europe, it's about fueling up once you're there. But even if we wave a magic wand and eliminate all logistical concerns of the fleet whatsoever, the IJN isn't giving the Germans the capacity to pull off a sealion.
>If you want to talk about scenarios that are much more logistically and politically feasible; that could have potentially altered the war- then the question I would ask would be- how much difference would committing the entire Japanese Submarine force to Atlantic Operations in 1940 or 1941 made?
They only had 63 when war broke out with the U.S. combinedfleet.com/ss.htm I'm not sure how few they had before hand, say in 1940. I'm going to say "very little", especially given their lack of a convoy war doctrine.
Thomas Thomas
>how much difference would committing the entire Japanese Submarine force to Atlantic Operations in 1940 or 1941 made?
You realize that would only add 33 additional submarines to the Axis presence in the Atlantic?
Gabriel Clark
>I'm just asking- what strategy could actually bring Japan the peace it wanted where it could "legally" keep the colonies it seized in Asia because it negotiated a favorable peace Literally nothing could have done that.
Imperial Japan was a disorganized clusterfuck that never really had full control over its own military, let alone the capacity to undertake some kind of grand strategy. They had an unusual combination of a national victim and god complex, in which the whole world was out to keep them down, and yet no matter what the odds, they would always prevail. Adding into the mix was state shinto, which combined with other toxic elements of the Japanese culture to give us commanders on almost all levels who were >belligerent to the point of stupidity >unable or unwilling to withdraw no matter the circumstances >perfectly willing to throw lives away on "honorable" attacks >insubordinate to the national government and more often than not independently acting
You have to remember that >Invasion of Manchuria >Invasion of China >Battle of Khalkhin Gol and other border incidents >Invasion of French Indochina were not the product of any national policy, but the result of belligerent local officers being "proactive" and forcing the hand of the IJA and ultimately the government to fully commit. You're not talking about a rational group here. Short of a decisive shattering defeat as happened at Khalkhin Gol, the IJA will not back down, and even then all they do is shift their focus to some other theater.
Japan under no circumstances had the industrial capacity or manpower to win the war it blundered its way into. And as the IJA showed time and again, there was no way that Japan would be able to coordinate any strategy that could have won them the war.
Samuel Bennett
You do realize that increases Axis Submarine forces in the Atlantic by somewhere between 30-70%, depending on when committed, during the time period where British shipping was simultaneously the most vulnerable to attack and most difficult to replace (ie before the US joined the war). 33 additional subs could have been enough to achieve the blockade "tipping point" in the early part of the war.
Michael Cook
The British were nowhere near the "tipping point". Hell, German submarine attacks hadn't even cut into the increase in war production that Britain was continually undergoing as they mobilized.
Donitz said that he needed 300 ocean-going submarines to wage a successful campaign against the British economy. In real-life, he reached 300 submarines in 1943, when it was far too late to produce the desired results. Having some additional submarines early in the war would indeed have allowed the Axis to hit Britain much harder during the early stages of the war, but I still don't think that the numbers are high enough to produce the sort of devastating economic collapse that Donitz wanted to trigger in Great Britain.
Alexander Kelly
Right; that would be a more realistic way to use the IJN than for Sea Lion; to enforce a complete naval blockade of England. Which, as you pointed out, is almost logistically and politically impossible.
However... since we're going out on a limb, we might as well finish the line of thought. The only "realistic" source for the amount of Oil needed to pull off IJN operations in the Atlantic would be if the Soviet Union had agreed to sell it, and it was shipped by rail to the French Coast.
However, if you're going to go that far out on a limb; you might as well go into complete fiction and have the SU signing a passive alliance with the Axis, having them take Persia for the Indian ocean ports, and having Hitler agree to get he "Lebenstraum" in Africa instead of in Russia. (ie complete "unrealistic" fiction).
In short- the only winning Japanese strategy was simply seizing the European colonies, and not provoking a war with the United States; for while the Japanese couldn't project power into the Atlantic/European theater very easily; neither could any of the European powers do the converse- to reclaim their colonies once lost.
In short, their only hope of "winning" was the idea that American Moms and Dads probably would not be committed to going to war to reconquer Europe's lost colonial conquests after they had been "liberated" by the Japanese. (aka how many Americans would want to send their Son to go and die in order reconquer Indonesia for the Dutch?)
Charles Brooks
I'm not familiar with the War in the Pacific, but what if Japan managed to seize and fortify Hawaii? As far as I know it's the only stepping stone for the American navy into the Pacific.
Jack Scott
>but what if Japan managed to seize and fortify Hawaii? They couldn't. Pearl Harbor alone was at the very edge of their ability to place a fleet, and that's with no hostile fleets trying to stop them. Actually launching an invasion of Hawaii would have been impossible.
Brody James
Long story short- no, even if they took it, they wouldn't have been able to hold it, or even keep it well supplied, in the face of the United States overwhelming advantage in the production of.... every single thing needed to wage war.
