Hannibal Barca is overrated

>I don't think he's worthy

Alright arm chair general.

>wins battles for over 18 years in Latin homeland without a single true defeat
>only losses at the very end at Zama after being recalled due to Scipio's invasion who had been preparing years drilling an army tailored specifically to beat Hannibal's army and tactics
>"all Hannibal did was little more than beat incompetent hastily chosen generals"
>"using superior forces"
>Hannibal
>superior forces when over a quarter of his army was lost due to attrition going through and over the Alps to surprise attack the Romans in the first place
retard

>wins battles for over 18 years in Latin homeland without a single true defeat
How to spot someone who knows nothing about the Second Punic War.

If he "never suffered a true defeat" why had he been holed up in Crotona, on the toe of Italy, for the past 3 years before his recall to Africa? What about his attempts to take Nola right after Cannae? His three failed attempts?

>superior forces when over a quarter of his army was lost due to attrition going through and over the Alps to surprise attack the Romans in the first place
More like 2/3, and it was an easily foreseeable consequence of marching through the fucking alps in autumn. That puts it, and the subsequent consequences of such, entirely in his fault. It also mis-represents what "superior forces" means. He had actual professional troops, and definite advantages in cavalry, against what was essentially waves after waves of citizen militias hastily thrown at him.

He didn't lose 2/3 crossing the alps. Most were left in southern France for logistics. It's why Hasdrubal had an easier time reaching northern Italy

I genuinely can't tell if you're serious or not

Hannibal
>wins 3-4 major battles in Italy and gets stuck there for almost 2 decades, unable to contribute anything to the war going on in Iberia, and unable to confront Fabius
>only lost in battle at zama when Scipio learned the limited amount of tricks Hannibal had
>wins like no fucking allies from the latins, which was the cornerstone of his entire strategy
>loses half his shit-hard vets crossing the alps

Scipio
>present at cannae and survives
>wants to kick Hannibal's dick inside out
>shits on Hannibal's brothers in Iberia, undoes all the work the Carthaginians did there and makes it roman territory
>wins over that sweet Numidian cavalry
>kicks Hannibal's dick inside out at zama
>does it again when Hannibal gets the Seleucids to take on Rome

Hannibal was good, and if Rome didn't have Fabius and scipio the war might have gone differently. But by the gods was Scipio a vastly better general than Hannibal

>I'm going to leave say, half of my army on the other side of the Alps, so that ELEVEN YEARS LATER my brother can have a somewhat easier time crossing over, in circumstances that sure as shit aren't foreseeable when I made the crossing.

user, this is a classical era war with virtually no contact with your home "state". There are no logistics to speak of. Hannibal's army lived off the land, same as most armies of the day, and had no logistical tail at all. It is utterly insane to think that he deliberately left troops there to "ease logistics", especially since they'd be a prime target for the Romans who had far more mobility, what with the enormous naval advantage.

Sorry man, what I stated is a fact. My source is Patrick Hunt, one of the most respected archeologists and historians on the topic. He had a good lecture on iTunes U on it.

Zama was an army of mainly veterans and at least well drilled soldiers (Rome) vs an untrained mob, with some new mercenaries and a relatively small core of veterans (Carthage) who also had the Calvary disadvantage. Despite that, The battle was still close.

>Sorry man, what I stated is a fact
I don't think you know what a "fact" is if you're claiming this.

>My source is Patrick Hunt, one of the most respected archeologists and historians on the topic.
Literally who?

>He had a good lecture on iTunes U on it.
So, not even published in a real journal?

Meanwhile, of the three "primary" sources writing on the war, Appian, Livy, and Polybius, none of them mention Hannibal leaving troops behind to manage logistics. None of them mention men and/or material flowing across the Alps during the campaign in a steady trickle, only sporadic reinforcement attempts, which themselves were large expeditions. I fail to see how you could use archeology to establish the purposes of men being left behind, or even if there were men being left behind. Just a quick glance at the reviews of his lecture series note that he deals with several subjects inaccurately, especially where Scipio is concerned. I'll give it a look this evening if I have the time, but this hardly seems like a sterling scholar, especially when the claim makes absolutely no sense.

>Anglo
Opinion in the trash

His book comes out July, and he's a Standford professor who leads archeological expeditions throughout the area.

Here's a list of some of his work patrickhunt.net/arch/arch.html

But hey, what does a Stanford Professor whose spent decades on the topic know compared to random anons on the internet, amirite?

Didnt u learn that Scipio Africanus discovered the continent known today as Africa?

>Rome wasn't that mighty or unquestionable. In fact, the Second Punic War was quite evenly matched, with Rome perhaps holding a slight advantage
Slight, my negroid? When the second Punic war started Rome was strong enough to match any successor state, evident by the fact that Macedonia was willing to form a coalition against them to prevent being conquered.

Foreign kings were fearful of Rome because they managed to defeat every single enemy in Italy and assimilate them mercilessly. Even when they kept loosing battles against Pyrrhus's army they still managed to win and annex southern Italy. Not only did they build a reputation of being good at war, they built a reputation of being stable, and great at integrating conquered territories into their fold, things that the Seleucids and Carthaginians couldn't do.

The Second Punic war was a war between
>a city state with rebellious tributaries and a mercenary heavy military
>a country

Carthage realistically never stood a chance, Hannibal and his brothers just slowed down the inevitable.

>muh Hannibal Barca
>muh Scipio Africanus
>Implying Maharbal and Massinissa didn't basically did all the work with the numidian cavalry

Compared to our primary sources you mean.

this is underrated.

Carthage at this point was equal in power to Rome

|
>His book comes out July, and he's a Standford professor who leads archeological expeditions throughout the area.
And again, you're not going to determine a logistical/operational strategy by looking for artifacts in the Alps. His specialty doesn't even apply to the subject at hand.

>But hey, what does a Stanford Professor whose spent decades on the topic know compared to random anons on the internet, amirite?
I was more relying on actual historians who never once mention any sort of logistical trail leading over the alps, and who do mention large segments of his forces being wiped out on the march. Guys like Peter Connolly, Jeff O'Leary, and Daniel Fourie, actual historians and military writers, are going to rank higher in this sort of thing than an archeologist.

You're right, screw archeology and research. Who needs those when you have Herodotus.

If Carthage was equal in power to Rome how was Rome able to loose long enough to figure out the way to victory? They were as equal in power as a high school jock is equal in power to a boxing champion

Because Carthage didn't support Hannibal at all. After Cannae he received about 4,000 Calvary and any other reinforcements were his brothers. The war was more the Barcid Clan vs Rome

>Dismissing archeology
How do you think we know fuck all about things in antiquity. The historical records covering that period are full of errors and bias. Of the three Appian, Livy, and Polybius, only the latter is considered reliable.

Oh god, it's YOU again. Hey, remember those 80,000 other troops that Carthage raised to attack other fronts (About 3 times what Hannibal crossed the Alps with) in Rome that you completely discount because you want to pretend that the rest of the Carthaginian state was worthless? Remember that massive effort to reinforce him by sea that you ignored because "Muh rowers"? Remember how the evidence doesn't actually back your thesis at all, because pretty much every war has lobbies against it, sometimes substantial ones? Would you say that despite raising an army bigger than they ever had before and sending it across the Atlantic Ocean, the presence of the Whig Party meant that the suppression of the Amreican Revolution "Wasn't supported at all?" What about Nihonjin Hansen Dōmei for WW2 Japan? I guess they didn't support the war effort and lost only because of lack of commitment!

Me again?

Anyways, I said support Hannibal. I'm sorry somebody triggered you in the past though.

And Archeology is extremely limited as a methodology. If you want to ask "Which route did Hannibal REALLY take over the Alps", yeah, it's great, you can look for artifacts or some physical sign of passage.

Trying to reconstruct a operational decision from pieces of pottery in the Alps is nonsense. Seriously, you've heard this guy and I haven't, but how the hell does he back up his claim. So he found something or other, I presume, either in the Alps or in southern France, and how does he use the presence of those artifacts to come to the conclusion that

A) Hannibal left men behind
B) This was deliberate
C)They were there to facilitate logistical movements
D) That he was planning for his brother to reinforce him sometime in the next decade.

How do you even tell the difference between a mass of Carthaginian deserters and troops deliberately left behind on the basis of archeology?

this but they were so fucking terrified of the man that he became the boogie man in roman society

I'm not the archeological expert. Him claiming this is a big reason why I'm getting the book, I want to see. Like I said I've only listened to his lectures, but I'd rather read his work before I start to discredit.

>Anyways, I said support Hannibal.
So, let me get this straight. Sending about 20,000 men to attack Sardinia, and another force of around the same size to attack Sicily, won't support Hannibal at all, because after all, Rome wouldn't be fighting across multiple locations or anything? Only reinforcements directly fed into his army (which of course won't be able to really be supplied regularly so can only grow as big as the local food sources can supply) matter?

And by the way, how are you actually getting to your claim? I assume you're going to go on about the anti-Barcid elements in Carthage, but the mere existence of anti-war, or anti-a particular general in a society doesn't mean that it was due to their influence and not other factors that led to lack of reinforcement. Let's not forget that of the four "major" reinforcement attempts, only the first and by far the smallest actually got to Hannibal, the rest got wiped out en route. You ever think that, more than personal animosity, might have had something to do with why he wasn't reinforced?

You're claiming him as THE authority, superior to other, dissenting writers, on the basis of him making a claim and not actually seeing the reasoning behind it? What the hell?

He is probably speaking about the we wuz kangz who claim that Africa was named after him and they are angry because of this

I just doubt he's making shit up, like I said, it's a reason I'm getting the book, so I can see how he is basing the claim.

I haven't read anything saying Hannibal didn't leave troops in France, so to me it just appeared to be a possible lack of information on the topic vs he trying to disprove other historians.

>Sending armies to Sicily and Spain
>Same as sending them to Hannibal

>4 reinforcements in 15 years
1. 4,000 Calvary after Cannae
2. Hasdrubal (brother) almost a decade after Cannae
3. Failed naval attempt
4. Mago (Brother)

And by anti-barcid faction I assume you mean Hanno "the Great"? Discounting his influence is just plain silly.

>I haven't read anything saying Hannibal didn't leave troops in France, so to me it just appeared to be a possible lack of information on the topic vs he trying to disprove other historians.
First off, nice goalpost shift; I haven't read anything claiming Hannibal did leave troops in France, which is distinct from claiming that he didn't leave troops in France. Furthermore, it's not what I've claimed. I've claimed two things.

1) That there was no "logistical" reason to leave troops behind. Logistics is one of those annoying little words when it comes to military science and history, and a lot of people use it incorrectly. But I've never heard anyone ever claim that Hannibal was receiving supplies across the Alps, so anyone left behind certainly wasn't being done so in a logistical role.

2) Hannibal incurred massive losses crossing the Alps, in between bad weather, regular disease and desertion, insufficient food, Roman efforts to resist the march, and attacks by the locals, especially the Alloboges.

Again, I'm not even sure how archeology is useful in determining which forces were detached, if any, when, and especially for what purpose.

>Sending armies to Sicily and Spain
>Same as sending them to Hannibal
Why aren't they? On what basis are you making a military decision on part of Carthage? How do you know where the best place to concentrate effort is? How do you know how much each locale can support? How is Carthage even supposed to know the situation Hannibal is in, given how difficult it is to maintain communication with him? Very few of the reinforcements actually reached Hannibal, and if I'm sitting in the Carthaginian senate, I'm thinking that a soldier sent to help him out only has a roughly 1 in 20 chance of actually getting to him. Much better to use those forces elsewhere, where they can actually survive to get into the fray.

>4 reinforcements in 15 years
And what is a "reasonable" effort, which you're implicitly asserting they did not send? What knowledge of Carthaginian resources and strategic needs are you basing this on? How are you factoring in the datum that most of the reinforcements dispatched to Hannibal never reached him, or the fact that he was continually recruiting from locals in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul. Hell, for an army based mostly around mercenaries a la Carthages, recruiting is simply a matter of having enough money to hire the right people. Why raise troops in Carthage and send them over when Hannibal could and did recruit enormously as he marched?
1/2

>military history fags jack off about how great it is when generals acknowledge that soldiers are the real heroes
>except for when they talk about Hannibal at Zama
Hannibal fags are the absolute worst

>And by anti-barcid faction I assume you mean Hanno "the Great"? Discounting his influence is just plain silly.
Prove it was his influence and not other factors that led to the lack of reinforcement attempts. Again, let's draw a parallel with the British response to the American revolution. The Whigs were the dominant "party" in British parliament until 1783. They were against intervention in the American revolution, or at least an expensive one. Nevertheless, Britain raised an army that was bigger than its entire peacetime force, and shipped it across the Atlantic at COLOSSAL expense, and kept it there for years. Good job for those peaceniks, right? Now go ahead and prove that it was due to their influence and not say, a view of thorwing good money after bad, taht another force wasn't raised and sent after Yorktown.

There mere existence of an anti-war faction, even a prominent anti-war faction, is not in and of itself proof that decisions were made because of that factions' influence. Especially when you're talking about a risky, possibly even insane reinforcement of a general who is very, very far outside your sphere of influence. We've already agreed that 3/4 of the reinforcements by expedition, and a hell of a lot more than that by actual men sent, never got anywhere close to Hannibal.

2/2

Casualties and losses:
Rome: 4000-5000
Carthage: 33,500-40,000

Furthermore during Hannibal's victories in Italy, he had his veteran army facing hastily-raised civilian soldiers (led by fucking idiots), but hannibalfags never think that has any relevance. For my part, Hannibal's victories were brilliant displays of tactical genius but his entire campaign was a strategic farce. Scipio on the other hand played the game right from start to finish on a tactical and strategic level.

Sorry, I didn't intend to shift any goalpost.

Keep in mind I haven't listened to this lecture in years, so I don't remember all the details in my head. I honestly can't argue much about it because I'm going off of recollection here. I'm hoping his book provide further explanation.

And nobody argues Hannibal didn't lose a serious amount of troops crossing the Alps. This argument is just that it wasn't the insane amount originally believed.

Except the soldiers original destined for Hannibal (led by Mago) were sent to Spain. Hanno diminished the impact of Cannae and his influence was a major factor in this diversion

And yes, sending troops to another part of the continent is completely different then sending them directly to a specific general in terms of support. For instance would I be supporting a general on the eastern front the same by sending my troops to Italy instead? Fuck no. Am I putting support into the warfare? Yes, although depending on the circumstances not nearly as much in a decisive manner. Such as, sending troops after a crushing victory to assist the siege of the enemies capital.

>The Hannibal was all tactics no strategy meme

All these anti-hannibal fags in here.

Not him, but his strategy was fundamentally based around a misapprehension concerning Roman ability to both keep a hold of their allies and replace losses. Considering that he knew (or at least should have known) about the war with Pyrrhus and the first punic war, these are not things he should have overlooked. It was a bad plan, and his tactical genius gave it a chance of working, but that doesn't change that it was a bad plan from the get go.

>Hanno diminished the impact of Cannae and his influence was a major factor in this diversion
How the hell do you prove something like this? How do you know the motivations of individual Carthaginian senators?

>For instance would I be supporting a general on the eastern front the same by sending my troops to Italy instead?
Yes, yes you are. Because those resources sent countering your soldiers in Italy otherwise would be re-allocated elsewhere. Taking WW2 as an example, the Allied invasion of Italy forced Germany to divert nearly a million troops that were supposed to be reinforcing the Eastern Front by nearly 25%. Attacking Italy was in fact supporting the Soviet war in the east efforts, and probably a hell of a lot more effectively than trying to ship troops either through the Persian corridor, across Vladivostok, or down through Murmansk to coordinate with a suspicious ally who might or might not want your forces in his country.

> Such as, sending troops after a crushing victory to assist the siege of the enemies capital.
Please. Hannibal couldn't even take Nola. An extra 12,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry maybe (but probably not) could give him the ability to take a small, relatively unfortified town, but not the ability to crack Rome. Remember, Hannibal DOESN'T have a logisitical tal the way we think of in modern warfare. He has no regular shipments of food, replacement equipment, siege engines, etc. He can't afford to starve out Rome, he'll starve first. He probably can't even afford to take a couple of weeks sitting in one area of hostile territory to construct engines to assault the city. Don't forget to add in long communication times; if Hasdrubal's attempt was anything to go by, even a successful Carthaginian reinforcement attempt would reach Hannibal sometime in 214, when Rome was already able to send tens of thousands of men to other fronts that could easily be recalled to counter these forces, if not intercept them en route.

He was assuming better support from Carthage, it's hard to fight a war when everybody else on your side is underperforming like champs.

>He was assuming better support from Carthage,
Was he? What are you basing this on?

I'm not trying to be insulting here, but are you American? (I'm a yank myself). But assuming you're the same guy from upthread, this whole

>Hannibal was doing everything right and only lost because the "civilian authorities" in Carthage didn't support him enough.

Seems a very American, and specifically post-Vientam American sort of mentality. Why is it so hard to believe that Hannibal simply was not a good strategist and made a large, central misapprehension? It would hardly be the first or last time, even for amazing generals.

>It was a bad plan
He got Capua and Tarentum two MAJOR allies. It was not a bad plan. From his pov it might have even been working.

I'm basing this off of the support the Carthaginian mainland actually provided, such as when Mago came back from after Cannae.

They chose to send troops to Sardinia, Spain, and Sicily afterwards, everywhere but Italy until a decade later. If anything the issue was Carthage's strategy, not Hannibal's.

Neither of those were Latin polities, the core of the Roman alliance. They were not "Major" allies the way that the Etruscians, the Umbrians, or the Roman colony communities were. Polybius puts the Campanians and all the Greeks together as having 67,000 infantry Iuniores and 9,000 for cavalry, which combined are lower than things like the Samnites or the Latin colonies. (Although Hannibal also made significant inroads among the Samnites, who were pretty spread out, so you didn't get one big victories.) Not to mention that most of his allies would not in fact aid him in taking out the Romans, just declared independence and defended their own territories.

>I'm basing this off of the support the Carthaginian mainland actually provided, such as when Mago came back from after Cannae.
You can't get that based on what Carthage actually sent. What makes you think Hannibal was planning on having a steady stream of reinforcements? What makes you think he didn't realize the enormous difficulty in getting them to him in Italy? What makes you think that it was Hannibal's strategy that was good and Carthage's that was bad, and not the other way around, especially given the ridiculous difficulties pulling off Hannibal's strategy?

Look at Hanno's actions through both wars. He avoided war with the Romans to even the extent that he demobilized the Carthaginian navy in 244 during the first Punic War, giving Rome time to rebuild it's navy.

He was a wealthy and influential politician who constantly pushed to focus on Africa, since his wealth stemmed from his high taxes of North Africans and agriculture.

He constantly favored the commerical class of Carthage over the barcids AND he had a great deal of sway (due to his dominance over the north African area).

>faboying over generals who died millenia ago and who you have nothing to do with
Get upset over more important shit, goddamn.

Your entire argument, as far as I understand it is

>Hanno was an important and influential Carthaginain politician( Agreed)
>Hanno was anti- war with Rome, and Anti-Barcid (Agreed)
>Therefore, Carthaginian strategy did not "properly" reinforce Hannibal, specifically because of his influence.
>therefore, Carthage fought this war sub-optimally, when putting more forces with Hannbial was the right move to do.

It's those second two prongs that I think you can't demonstrate in the first and are just flat out wrong on the second. Sure, he was influential, but again, the mere existence of an influential politician against the war doesn't mean that it's because of his influence and not other factors that reinforcements were not sent.

So for instance, in the post-Cannae environment; that 16,000ish men that ultimately went to Spain. How can you tell from literally just that whether individual senators voted to not send reinforcements based on Hanno's influence vs say, not thinking that the reinforcements could get there, or that said forces were better employed in other theaters? How can you reduce a complicated decision with multiple interlocking factors into "It was Hanno's influence"? Because war decisions are very complicated. Again, let's bring up the comparison of Parliament during the American revolution. After the defeat at Yorktown, how much of a decision to not send further troops, which was easily in Great Britian's capability, stemmed from Whiggish opposition to the war? How much stemmed from a "let's not throw good money after bad" sentiment? How much stemmed from a look at the state of finances? How much stemmed from ongoing hostilities with France and Spain? How much stemmed from wanting to expand the British presence in India?

Using the same logic you've been displaying, the mere existence of Whiggish opposition to the war, means that none of the following factors matter; it was Whiggish opposition to the war that led to the decision, period.

Hannibal's strategy
[X] Crush Roman forces
[X] Gain the support of powerful southern Italian City-States
[X] Send mago to Carthage for support
[ ] Receive support within that decade...oops

I love the whole assumption that somehow Carthage had no resources to build a navy. Hanno was just adamant about avoiding naval warfare and honestly committing much to a war (see his actions in the first Punic War). If they could build a fleet after the second Punic War, then they had the capability to build them after the first.

Hanno/anti-barcid strategy
[X] see how Hannibal does
[X] since he didn't outright take Rome, avoid directly assisting him in order to distance yourself from Hannibal for future peace negotiations
[X] Send his brothers to fight in Iberia and Italy, once again distance yourself.
[X] Send reinforcements to Italy without enough rowers
[ ] ???
[ ] Victory!!! (A.k.a make peace so you can carry on with your mercantile business as usual)

> Loses over 2/3s his men in crossing the Alps
>Uses his surprise attack with no real strategy except being a basic bitch raider in Italy
>Great General

Overrated as fuck desu

>Whigs
I've been ignoring this for a reason. It's a completely different situation. Apples and oranges.

We are talking about after a crushing victory, from a nation who was doing fine financially, only at war with one republic vs at war with multiple Nations and facing a former colony.

Instead, sent the troops to Iberia after the defeat at dertosa, along with Hasdrubal Gisbo an avid anti-barcid general.

This is false

How are you this retarded?

>[X] Gain the support of powerful southern Italian City-States
This is wrong, or at least incomplete. He was aiming for the support of the central Italian cities, the ones that were vital to the Roman war effort that he never got. He made considerable attempts to pick them up too, what with the whole free release of prisoners and making sure not to ravage their territories.

As it was, he got the outlying, largely unimportant cities of the south, not the vital ones of the center.

>[X] Send mago to Carthage for support
And let's not forget, the reason that he didn't get this support wasn't because of Hanno's influence, but because after the loss at Dertosa (already close to a YEAR later, meaning that the army was still being built and in and around Carthage at this time regardless of strategy of deployment), they thought that Spain was more critical.

>Hanno was just adamant about avoiding naval warfare and honestly committing much to a war (see his actions in the first Punic War).
See, here you go again. Hanno's opposition!= strategic determinations were made BECAUSE of Hanno's opposition.

> If they could build a fleet after the second Punic War, then they had the capability to build them after the first.
That's retarded. They never built a fleet up into hundreds of vessels. They never retrained the same level of rowers that won them their victories in the first punic war. They sent out a couple of brown water fireships to burn a fleet incoming on a siege.
>I love the whole assumption that somehow Carthage had no resources to build a navy.
They had a navy. One that lost to the Romans the first time around and would almost certainly lose to them this time around, after sinking enormous amounts of resources into it. A trireme required around 200 men to row it, and the quinqmarines they were using by the Punic war were even bigger. Losing a fleet of a hundred ships would be like losing two entire Hannibal armies, and that can EASILY happen.

It is ENTIRELY the same situation. You're saying that YOUR one factor that you're focusing on is THE reason that such and such strategic decision was taken by an entire body of men, while providing no evidence whatsoever other than the fact that you had one influential person opposed to a particular course of action.

Seriously, I'm sick of your arguments, show some fucking proof. I want a rundown of the Carthaginian senate, and which ones voted to send reinforcements to Spain based on which factors. Which ones were doing it because of Hanno's influence? Which ones were doing it because Dertosa scared them and they thought Spain was more important? Which ones did it because they didn't think Hannibal needed or could in fact use more reinforcements? Which ones did it because they thought other fronts of the war were more important? Which ones did it because they didn't think that the reinforcements could make it through to Hannibal?

Bear in mind, we don't even know how many people were IN the Carthaginian senate, so I don't think you really have a case. The point wasn't to compare strategic situations. The point is that you have a huge number of factors going into making strategic situations and reactions to it, and saying

>EEET WUZ BECAUSE OF HANNO! NOTHING ELSE MATTURED!
is stupid.

>he doesn't fanboy over generals who died millenia ago
You can fuck off out of Veeky Forums

I notice a distinct lack of rebuttal to any of the claims made.

Literally why are you on this board then, faggot? Go back to Facebook.

>Actually dismissing Hanno's and the anti-barcid's influence in mainland Carthage at the time
Sorry I don't have the exact votes. I guess we can never know why anything happened ever.

I guess Cato didn't heavily influence the destruction of Carthage either.

>As it was, he got the outlying, largely unimportant cities of the south, not the vital ones of the center.

Except they were important

>And let's not forget, the reason that he didn't get this support wasn't because of Hanno's influence, but because after the loss at Dertosa (already close to a YEAR later, meaning that the army was still being built and in and around Carthage at this time regardless of strategy of deployment), they thought that Spain was more critical.

Anti-barcid influence
-Look at Hanno's actions in the first Punic War and after against Hamilcar
-lack of support in the second Punic war
-Their renouncement of Hannibal during peace negotiations
-their attempt to undermine him after Hannibal got into public office

The anti-baric Carthaginian aristocracy, headed by Hanno, obviously had nothing to do with the lack of reinforcements to Hannibal

>See, here you go again. Hanno's opposition!= strategic determinations were made BECAUSE of Hanno's opposition.

Except this opposition caused the lack of reinforcements. And you underestimate Hanno's influence (see the mercenary uprising)

>They had a navy. One that lost to the Romans the first time around and would almost certainly lose to them this time around, after sinking enormous amounts of resources into it. A trireme required around 200 men to row it, and the quinqmarines they were using by the Punic war were even bigger. Losing a fleet of a hundred ships would be like losing two entire Hannibal armies, and that can EASILY happen.

Except the Romans naval losses were more severe, and the final Carthaginian loss in the first Punic war was because it was an emergency supply drop and the fresh sailors didn't empty the cargo before the battle. They (Hanno being panicked and asked for peace, which pissed off Hamilcar (who had yet to lose a battle). Leading the way to the second war

>Sorry I don't have the exact votes. I guess we can never know why anything happened ever.
Precisely, we can't know exactly what happened. And therefore, attributing a complex decision to one and only one factor is stupid, which is why insisting on a causal link, especially when we have other, mutually supporting factors, is ridiculous.

I'm not saying Cato didn't have an influence. I'm saying that Cato's influence IS THE ONE AND ONLY REASON AND THERE WERE ZERO OTHERS CARTHAGE WAS DESTROYED
is incorrect.

>Except they were important
What makes them important? They couldn't help him assault Rome itself. They couldn't stop Rome from keeping its "war economy" up. They mostly allowed Hannibal to operate as a fire brigade in southern Italy while they got crushed one by one by one, and not taking the offensive, while slowly being whittled down and eventually confined to the toe of Italy, while Rome was simultaneously attacking everywhere else.

>Anti barcid infleuence argument
Let's look at other factors
>Expense, difficulty, and probable failure of sending reinforcements to Hannibal
>Other fronts that needed men
>Time delays in even finding out about it (Remember, they were still debating and thus having the troops near Carthage almost a year after Cannae!), and further time delays in getting the reinforcements to him.

Clearly, it's Hanno and his magic influence and not the other factors that led to this decision.

>Except this opposition caused the lack of reinforcements.
How the fuck do you know this? You keep repeating it, and you keep failing to prove it. Do you do formal logic?

If A (Hano anti-Barcid/anti war)
And if B (Reinforcements were not sent to Italy)
A causes B is not in any fucking way supportable. This is why I brought up the Whigs, and why I can bring up a dozen other similar situations. You have presented fucking nothing showing it was this particular factor, and not any of many other factors, showing the lack of reinforcements.

>Except the Romans naval losses were more severe,
So? Rome has amply demonstrated their ability to absorb losses. What's relevant is Carthage's ability to absorb losses, which is miniscule in comparison.

> and the final Carthaginian loss in the first Punic war was because it was an emergency supply drop and the fresh sailors didn't empty the cargo before the battle.
Assuming Polybius is more or less right that you need 420 men to properly crew a quinqmarine, then Mylae cost them 19,320 men, Ecnomus cost them just under 40,000, and Aegates a bit over 50,000. But sure, it was because of an emergency supply drop and not the loss of more men than Hannibal's invasion force in Italy and every single reinforcement attempt put together.

Fleets in antiquity are enormously expensive both to build and to maintain, and insanely costly if they're wiped out. You know why they had "Fresh sailors"? Because most of their experienced sailors had DIED.

Let's say Carthage supported Hannibal and all the aid that went to Iberia went instead to him. Let's also assume his plan works and he manages to subdue enough Italian cities to siege Rome. By the time his army saw Roman walls the legions would've conquered Iberia and subdued all African tributaries. They would then most likely sail to Rome to defend it, which they could because of their naval superiority. But if they didn't you have a scenario in which Hannibal's army is besieging Rome and the legions are besieging Carthage. You have an army of citizens fighting for their country and an army of mercenaries fighting for money they know they can't realistically receive as Carthage went to shit.

It goes back to the premise of the war, a colony that relies on mercenaries and tributaries cannot possibly defeat a centralized nation that was way ahead of it's time and won wars while being outmatched. Even if you give unrealistic bonuses to Carthage and handicap Rome you'd fall to the same conclusion. Carthage was just another civilization that the militarized Romans ate up in their conquest of ancient nations, the Punic wars were just like the wars before and the wars to follow, the only difference being the Carthaginians put up a fight so people think they actually stood a chance. It's the same with them as it was with the other Latins, the Gauls, Brits, Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and what have you. Republican Rome was simply better at statecrafting in the same way the Mongols were better at conquering. No matter how hard you try to deny them, these are truths and looking at history you'l find it very hard to dispute them

was he really that perfectly bald?

when he was old he was bald
as a young man i.e. when he fought Hannibal, he had long hair

Literally the only reason Rome won the Second Punic War is because they're fucking Rome. They're the only nation who could get their ass kicked that hard for that long and not sue for peace. Them being total maniacs who would rather sacrifice every child in their nation then lose won them that war. Anyone else would've lost.

Military forces were better than citizen armies. Rome's army only became professional later on. And everything else you said is just Romanboo bs.

*Mercenary forces, not military

>Not to mention that most of his allies would not in fact aid him in taking out the Romans, just declared independence and defended their own territories.

typical Italians

It had a few, but nowhere near enough for the number of troops in the field.

Even then, the men they had were entirely incapable of handling complex plans, being the militia that they were.

Scipio and Fabian were contemporaries and had zero issues.

Holy shit, no. Carthage had a fraction of the manpower, a far weaker navy, and fewer allies.

It was at a disadvantage in every fucking area, with their ONLY strength being in ready cash. Something they couldn't count on, because they relied on maritime trade and Rome had naval superiority.

>And Archeology is extremely limited as a methodology. If you want to ask "Which route did Hannibal REALLY take over the Alps", yeah, it's great, you can look for artifacts or some physical sign of passage.
>Trying to reconstruct a operational decision from pieces of pottery in the Alps is nonsense. Seriously, you've heard this guy and I haven't, but how the hell does he back up his claim. So he found something or other, I presume, either in the Alps or in southern France, and how does he use the presence of those artifacts to come to the conclusion that
You are making an actual, honest to god appeal to authority, Fucking stop it.

If a lone astrophysicist came out and said the sun was made out of the burning cum of thousands of chinese men, would you accept it as true because
>MUH PHD
even when everyone else in the field says he's wrong?

Protip:
The correct answer is no.

>I love the whole assumption that somehow Carthage had no resources to build a navy.
Losing a substantial navy would have literally lead to immediate, irrecoverable demographic collapse, you idiot. A substantial naval force could total nearly 100,000 men, and fleets could be-and were-lost to a man in storms, let aloe battle. They were literally better off losing the war than taking that risk.

"don't risk demographic collapse" is literally the biggest reason Carthage did ANY of the things it did militarily after the loss of the sacred band.

Unfortunately for them, you couldn't recruit a mercenary navy.

>Except the Romans naval losses were more severe
Rome could afford them, and literally had naval allies to pick up a lot of the slack when it came to manning a navy.

Carthage didn't.

You clearly do not understand the implications of Carthage being a colony city with a fucking racial caste system. They. Could. Not. Take. Losses.

If the equites all died, rome needed to find new cavalrymen. And they did.

If the Phoenicians all died, the libyans would fucking revolt.

>If a lone astrophysicist came out and said the sun was made out of the burning cum of thousands of chinese men, would you accept it as true because

And holy FUCK
>BUT IF HE GOT REINFORCEMENTS
Then Rome recalls its forces abroad and crushes Hannibal. End of war.
Rome literally exiled 10,000 men while Hannibal was still rampaging unconstrained in Italy.

20,000 men wouldn't have fucking mattered. The demogrpahics were too heavily in favor of rome.

It's that fucking simple. Rome chose to prioritize more important theaters of war. Carthage did the same, because Spain was what fucking mattered. Italy was a pipe dream Spain was a source of incredible wealth, and cheap, plentiful warriors who could and would go toe to toe with Romans on a consistent basis. It's also absolutely fucking vital if you want to march to italy-and that is the only way you can reliably get men there unless you want to tangle with a superior fleet.

Lose it, and you lose the damn war.

Worse, losing it means the tribes will flip allegiance to rome, and good fucking luck retaking it at that point.

And fucking sure enough, once Rome had Spain, Carthage was absolutely fucked and had zero strategic options aside from prayer.

Rome literally lost a quarter of the total population of Carthage in two years, just in italy. They lost so many equites in battle that the makeup of the roman cavalry-and role of an ENTIRE SOCIAL CLASS- changed. Forever.

They continued fighting, otherwise unaffected. Losses of that magnitude would literally destroy Carthaginian society. Carthage had zero fucking chance of winning in italy, and everyone who wasn't a barcid knew it.

Hannibal was a retard who looked at phyruus and said:
>sure, it didn't work for one of the best of Alexanders officers under near ideal conditions
>but what if I try it under terrible conditions?

...

It's about as reasonable a proposition as "man with no logistical tail leaves thousands of soldiers behind to ease his logistical tail before entering into a war of attrition"

or
"man leaves a bunch of libyans and spaniards to try to help a bunch of libyans and spaniards get across the alps that none of them have ever seen or know anything about in ten years or so."

"man leaves thousands of mercenaries to sit around unpaid and not fighting, expects them to sit still"

"man leaves thousands of mercenaries who don't speak the local language sitting on the land of a bunch of celts, expects them to survive"

It's an incredibly fucking absurd proposition.

Cumsun is frankly more plausible.

>You are making an actual, honest to god appeal to authority, Fucking stop it.

And whenever you read a history book, you are trusting the source.

>If a lone astrophysicist came out and said the sun was made out of the burning cum of thousands of chinese men, would you accept it as true because

O ya, this is totally the same thing.

>MUH PHD

Well a Stanford Professor who has spent decades in that area researching probably knows more than you.

>even when everyone else in the field says he's wrong?

Ok, point to the people who say he is wrong. Who has debunked Patrick Hunt's claim? There's a difference between making no mention of something and disproving something.

Stop right there

>Losing a substantial navy would have literally lead to immediate, irrecoverable demographic collapse, you idiot. A substantial naval force could total nearly 100,000 men, and fleets could be-and were-lost to a man in storms, let aloe battle. They were literally better off losing the war than taking that risk.

O ya, as history showed, that's the case. And since your whole argument is demographics, enlighten me on the demographics of thr Carthaginian Empire

>"don't risk demographic collapse" is literally the biggest reason Carthage did ANY of the things it did militarily after the loss of the sacred band.

Literally bs. They used citizen armies even during the Punic War. The big deal with the sacred band was it was made up of extremely wealthy citizens.

>Mercenary navy

They didn't need to, Carthage (the city) alone had a huge population at the time, the city larger than Rome's. This isn't counting other cities in it's control

>You clearly do not understand the implications of Carthage being a colony city with a fucking racial caste system. They. Could. Not. Take. Losses.

By this point, Carthage was no longer just a colonial city, it controlled all the Phoenician holdings in the rest. And racial caste system? Holy shit, Carthage is in India now? Their system related more to the Greeks if anything.

>Mercenary forces were better than citizen armies.

not during total war they're not

they exist to be paid not to fight existential threats to themselves.

Literally everyone to EVER cover the second punic war disagrees with his claim. Everyone. You want names? Richard Miles makes absolutely no mention of this in his book.

>Well a Stanford Professor who has spent decades in that area researching probably knows more than you.
Appeal to authority.

>O ya, as history showed, that's the case
Simple fucking math shows it, and is borne out by their not attempting to seriously challenge Rome at sea again. Losing would have been fucking disastrous, and they knew it. For fucks sake, losing yet ANOTHER fleet was what caused them to end the first war.
>And since your whole argument is demographics, enlighten me on the demographics of thr Carthaginian Empire
The city had 400,000 people, total, by the third war.
People. Not citizens. Not men. People. The Carthaginians were nowhere near as populous as the Romans. They knew it and so did everyone else involved in the fucking conflict. Nor did they have large bodies of near identical people living under them.

>Literally bs. They used citizen armies even during the Punic War.
No they fucking didn't, unless the city itself was under direct threat. They contributed cavalry to their armies, and very small bodies of infantry. Mercenaries and libyans were the overwhelming majority of their armies.

>They didn't need to, Carthage (the city) alone had a huge population at the time, the city larger than Rome's
Thank you for showing you aren't actually able to follow that discussion

>And racial caste system? Holy shit, Carthage is in India now?
How many Libyans do you think had citizenship? Why the fuck do you think that 70,000 of them sided against carthage in the mercenary war?

>By this point, Carthage was no longer just a colonial city, it controlled all the Phoenician holdings in the rest.
Which were worth jack shit next to the latins alone, let alone them and the etruscans.

They actually arguably were. Hannibal survived largely because he had a large number of battle hardened soldiers with him.

Mercenaries didn't give a shit about the harvest, couldn't be fucked with by ravaging their territory, and could-and would-pay for themselves if you won battles consistently. You'd just lose out on loot.

Mercenaries used properly were fucking excellent. Carthage's problem was that they didn't use them properly and made a lot of utterly retarded decisions when handling them.

Richard Miles not mentioning something doesn't disprove a claim

And everything else you said is incorrect but now I don't have time to respond. Quick response

> 400,000
For the city along. Not the empire

> No they didn't use citizen soldiers after
They absolutely did. This is a fact.

>Libyans revolted
No shit hanno had high taxes.

They absolutely are.

Mercs
> Professional soldiers

Citizen soldiers
> Farmers levied to fight during harvest

Mercs were by far better soldiers. They wouldn't have been used otherwise. It's only professional standing armies that really replace mercenaries, but that is more expensive upkeep than mercs.

>Richard Miles not mentioning something doesn't disprove a claim
No primary source mentions Hannibal leaving men for logistics.

No modern account mentions it. The Do, however, give detailed accounts of hannibals movements and actions, with ZERO FUCKING MENTION of your idiotic idea. Because it didn't happen.

Because leaving men for "logistics" when you are not receiving outside supplies is a fucking non sequitur.

>They absolutely did. This is a fact.
Name the many battles where an army of Carthaginian citizens fought.

You'll find precisely none except in Africa.