How many mistakes they could realistically avoid and how much it would help them?

>why didnt they just NOT fight on two fronts
Simply freaking epic

I'll elaborate a bit for you then
6. a change in battle strategy would not have changed enough to beat the soviets, things went about as well as realistically could be expected in 1941-1942 and Germany still came up short, their expectations of success were ruinously optimistic. When Germany failed to win in 1941 they were finished.

5. while bombing civilian targets was a huge mistake had the pressure been kept on the RAF it would not have changed much. Britain produced more aircraft and lost less pilots every single month of the battle of britain, germany would not have crippled the RAF and even if they had sealion still isn't viable without a navy

4. the halt order was given for a reason, the supply lines were badly overstretched making them vulnerable to counter attack. But even if that counter attack never materialized and the BEF was captured it would have certainly been a disaster, but it would not have changed the outcome of the war. Germany never set foot in Britain, and yes the british army would have been weaker for the rest of the war but it was really the russians who destroyed the german army anyway.

3. Greece was an embarrassing and costly campaign, but ultimately a sideshow. The tide had already turned against Germany on the eastern front when it happened anyway.

you act like they had no choice in the matter, germany had a non-aggression pact with russia that they violated when they were still fighting with Britain

You can try to justify it by saying the russians probably would have violated it themselves at some point, but that's irrelevant. Germany chose to open up a second front.

Why's that?

Nvm saw your longer post. I disagree with 4, most of Frances army was still to the east near the maginot.. I guess Hitler was just spooked with the progress he was making. There really was no excuse to not take 300,000 British soldiers prisoners. The real reason wasn't to do with supply lines (unless you have a source to disagree) but I know Hermann Goering had told Hitler Dunkirk could be won with the luftwaffe alone.

Even if they didn't bomb cities it would change absolutely nothing.

Hitler did not halt the pursuit, that's a meme. Evacuation was achieved only because the French fought tooth and nail to give Brits the time. In the meantime Luftwaffe bombed and strafed retreating forces daily.

Greece was an irrelevant front without strong British presence, and by the time Barbarossa was about to start it was already over.

The best justification they had was "we don't want to become too dependent on their imports so we'll just invade and take their resources".

from wikipedia so take it with a grain of salt
>By this time, however, Kleist's armoured forces were thinly stretched and had suffered losses of up to 50% of their tanks.[31] Kleist asked Rundstedt for a pause while the armoured units recovered and the infantry caught up, and Rundstedt agreed to this. At the same time, Göring attempted to persuade Hitler that the Luftwaffe could destroy the trapped Allied armies, freeing the German forces to turn south towards Paris. Hitler accepted this view, and on 24 May issued what became known as the Halt Order, preventing the German armour from rapidly capturing Calais and Dunkirk. The Luftwaffe were unable to destroy the Allied armies, however, and the halt allowed the British Expeditionary Force and many French troops to be evacuated from Dunkirk. This decision, for which Hitler, Rundstedt and Kleist shared responsibility, proved very costly to Germany's war effort in the long term. After the war, Rundstedt described the Halt Order as "an incredible blunder" and assigned full blame to Hitler. His biographer concedes that this "does not represent the whole truth", because the original impetus for a pause came from Kleist and Rundstedt himself.[32]

I've also read that Rundstedt's halt order was overruled by the high command, but Hitler reinstated it to show them that he was the one who was really in charge.

>I've also read that Rundstedt's halt order was overruled by the high command, but Hitler reinstated it to show them that he was the one who was really in charge.

I've read this somewhere too.

I just looked up the discussion on it in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and found this rather interesting quote from Franz Halder

>During the following days [i.e., after May 24] it became known that Hitler’s decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling,
became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed . . .Goering, who knew his Fuehrer well, took advantage of this anxiety.
He offered to fight the rest of the great battle of encirclement alone with his Luftwaffe, thus eliminating the risk of having to use the
valuable panzer formations. He made this proposal . . . for a reason which was characteristic of the unscrupulously ambitious Goering. He wanted to secure for his Air Force, after the surprisingly smooth operations of the Army up to then, the decisive final act in the great battle and thus gain the glory of success before the whole world.

here's a pdf of the book
tronest.cn/user/tronest/ebook/The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich.pdf

the discussion of the halt order starts on page 657

>For the second time in the campaign, Hitler found himself in complete accord with Rundstedt. He was delighted by the measures the Army Group commander had already taken, and agreed particularly with the necessity to husband the armour for the next phase of the battle. Orders were thereupon sent out calling for the indefinite halt of the Panzers and bearing the stamp ‘By the Führer’s orders’– which made total compliance mandatory.
It was, as two eminent German historians have pointed out, a situation ‘probably unique in modern German military history’. What Hitler was in fact doing (not for the last time) was deliberately short-circuiting his top Army advisers, the O.K.H. As might be expected from the stands previously taken, Brauchitsch and particularly Halder strongly disagreed with Rundstedt’s and Hitler’s appreciation.
>The following day (24 May) Halder’s entries continue in much the same vein:
"the power of resistance of the enemy is no longer to be rated very highly, apart from local fighting. Thus matters will take their own course; we must only have patience, let them mature."
>That night, Halder baldly records the transmission of the ‘Halt Order’, adding that it was "on express wish of the Führer! Within the area specified, the Luftwaffe is to settle the fate of the encircled armies!!". The exclamation marks themselves contain a wealth of meaning. Ulrich Liss, the Intelligence chief of ‘Foreign Armies West’, noted that the usually punctual Halder arrived nearly an hour late for the O.K.H. evening conference, ‘in a clear state of rage, such as I have never before nor afterwards seen him in. “For the decision that has just been taken, the General Staff is not to blame…” were his approximate words.’
To Lose A Battle, Alistair Horne

10: impossible the British Navy was too strong at the time and the only seaworthy ships that could carry troops were crappy barges.
9: That alone wouldn't mean much, the scenario, as-is, would see the USA going to get involved in the war in a way or another. But naturally if other policies are applied...
8: Relevant insomuch it drained some resources better spent elsewhere, but my guess is that it didn't impact much on the war effort in itself.
7: He could have tried, but I doubt it would have been much more successful than "vanilla Barbarossa," since the Japanese, even without the USA around, were heavily tied in China and considered Stalin didn't leave the border unprotected nor he lacked of plans in case of Japanese invasion.
6: This would have definitely helped, but it would have required a major change in Hitler's personality.
5: Now we're talking. Bombing British cities instead of focusing on military bases was a major mistake: attack the bases would have forced the English to move the operative more in the north, which, while they still covered English targets well, they didn't do it as quickly. This in turn meant that now bombarding cities as a "side effect" would have brought to the result he heoped to achieve (AKA the UK public getting so demoralized it decides to ask to give up). However, that last part remains far-fetched without other factors.
4: An even worse Dunkirk would have indeed been a major hit at British morale, as well as a good way to get decent free equipment. But not decisive in itself.
3: This would have helped a little, but honestly that was mostly in Mussolini's hands than Hitler's.
2: Again, more dependent on Mussolini not being a delirious moron than anything else.
1: Not likely, the economy was going to collapse if a war didn't start soon enough.

Overall, I think that 6+5+4+2/3 would have brought Hitler's Germany to victory, even if not to a "Europe's all Nazi" level.

Why didn't the Germans use chemical weapons against the British public? It would have forces a surrender.

Little thing called the geneva convention

>There was a Holocaust.
I think the "there was no holocaust" is more "the holocaust was a waste of time and resources that they should have done later" than actual denial.

Pretty much none of the ones mentioned are feasible ways to turn things around for Germany.

#10: Britain is not going to be invadeable, since the British have air superiority and naval supremacy, neither of which are trends that the Germans can plausibly challenge.
#9: THe U.S. was already in an undeclared war by the time Hitler declared war, and gearing up for the fight with Japan. War was inevitable, and they had already sunk several u-boats in their "Atlantic perimeter".
#8: The Holocaust, while enormously cruel, did not represent a significant amount of German resources. Furthermore, aspects of it, like the slave labor programs and the hunger plan out east, were pretty much necessary for the badly creaking Nazi economy to work.
#7. First off, "coordinate with Japan" implies that Japan has strategic goals that align with Germany, which is far from clear. Secondly, I presume it means invade Siberia in a plan north, which is absolutely retarded for several reasons. Japan could not achieve numerical superiority against the large Soviet far east force without stripping China bare (unthinkable), secondly, they were under an oil embargo at the time, and Siberia did not offer immediate prospects of fuel, so their effort would clank to a halt within months at most. And even if it did somehow succeed, the Soviets can retreat along the TSR, and burn it behind them, leaving Japan the master of the wasteland around Manchuria, of which the only strategic target was Vladivostok, hardly a crippling blow.
#6 Hitler's blundering with actual tactical plans was mostly later in the war when they were lost anyway. His biggest earlier move was to approve Manstein's plan, which is what gave them a chance in France.

1/2

#5. While probably a good idea, it's hardly going to be enough. Even if they stuck to airfield bombing, what do you do if FG 11 moves to bases in the midlands?
#4 Yes, I'm sure you know better than Rundstedt and Kluge. It'll work just fine to send half-strength panzer units unsupported into a swamp!
#3. Literally so what? It's not like you can start Barbarossa much earlier. Their 1942 offensive, free of such distractions, also started in late June.
#2. How are you going to avoid that?
#1. When your enemies have much larger economies than you do, your foreign reserves that your rather large volume of trade depend on are running out, and everyone else is sick of your shit and militarizing, time is most definitely not on your side. If anything, the strategic mistake was not striking earlier, shortly after the annexation of Czechoslovakia and integration of Czech assets into the Wehrmacht.

Shit tier list.

Crushing Dunkirk was an extremely dubious proposition. The panzer groups were exhausted and the pocket was heavily defended with the rest of the French Army still extant on the other side, leaving the possibility they might regroup and attack if Germany committed the panzers to attacking Dunkirk.

Invading Britain was unlikely to succeed unless the Luftwaffe decisively defeated the RAF. The Germans had minimal sealift and no experience of amphib operations. They did not have naval superiority. The invasion force would be numerically inferior and its supply lines would be tenuous.

10: Germany didn't even have proper landing ships and the Royal Navy would like a word with those landing ships, if they existed. The RN in the North Atlantic would have to be crippled first and Germany couldn't even defeat the RAF.
9: Irrelevant, honestly. As a member of the Axis, with their best friend Japan at war with the US, one or the other would have declared war sooner than later.
8: The Holocaust indeed hindered the German army's logistics, something they were always struggling with.
7: The Japanese defeat at Khalkin Gol and their continued involvement in China made the Japanese refrain from attacking the Russians again. I doubt the Japanese army could have done much in such a war, just look at their tanks, for example.
6: They've got a point here. Hitler's decisions were more than just questionable and led to absolutely unnecessary loss of life.
5: That was a mistake too. However, the Battle of Britain was becoming too costly anyway in the long run.
4: Wasn't the main issue here that the armoured divisions were way too far ahead of the infantry and the supply lines were overextended as fuck?
3: I doubt it would have changed much.
2: The war was lost anyway at that point and it's not like the Germans had a big choice.
1: Vierjahresplan of 1936 prepared the German economy for war, Germany's state deficit was already colossal at this point, it was an economic strawfire that would have crushed Germany if they hadn't entered war.

They were already gassing other civilians so I don't see why not :^)

because then this happens
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vegetarian

World would've been a better place had that operation been put into action tbqh.

They weren't... they only started mass executions once they realized they were going to lose the war. If they had been successful they would have taken a more humane approach (deportations, living in segregated ghettoes) to "the jewish problem" but with time running out they had to resort to a "final solution" aka killing them all so that they wouldn't be around even after the Nazis had fallen.

10. Sealion was entirely unfeasible and no expert debates this.
9. The war was fought for lebensraum to put Germany on a quantitatively equal footing to the USA as the base for what Hitler considered an inevitable conflict for world domination. The post-Wilson USA, especially under the leadership of FDR, could not abide international tyranny in Europe, see Mein Kampf
8. The Holocaust was entirely bound up in the war and the very raison d'etat of the Third Reich, see Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism
7. Japan was completely uninterested in fighting the USSR, see Khalkhin Gol
6. Germany wouldn't have gotten that far if Hitler weren't already interfering with his generals, see the Battles of Netherlands, Belgium, and France, also again the very war was bound up in Hitler's personal designs and cult of personality, see Mein Kampf and Arendt
5. Luftwaffe was outmatched with the RAF in any case by the time this decision, an act of desperation, was made. The statistics are widely available and speak for themselves.
4. German supply lines were arguably stretched to their limits at Dunkirk, see Keegan: The Second World War, also this would not have made a significant difference in the big picture, US production and Soviet divisions would have defeated Germany in any case.
3. Germany had to deny the Allies a foothold on the continent, this was strategically necessary.
2. The war on the eastern front was inevitable, as above the Third Reich existed to wage a massive war for lebensraum against the USSR. Germany didn't declare the war on the western front, and given that the eastern war was going to happen, had no control on whether the western war would happen or not, that was an act by Britain and France.
1. See production trends in Germany and USSR in both the 1930s and the 1900s-10s, and you will understand that both World Wars were a bid by Germany to defeat Russia before they become too strong for Germany to defeat alone. See also Kissinger: Diplomacy

>>If Germany had exhibited more patience before starting the war
>implying they started the war