What's the big deal about Rommel taking some desert clay then losing it right away...

>the first advance at a reasonable pace, ensuring that they still be supplied from Toubrouk and Tunis
>the second rampages on, waving aside the need for food, water and oïl because he believes capturing Cairo will solve everything, but in the process, damages his position and starts a slow retreat back to Sicily for the German and Italian armies
Hmmmmlmmm.

Because on paper, the British forces in North Africa were enormously stronger than the DAK and the Italian forces. On the ground, however, things were different. British tactical thought was behind the German equivalents in 1941-2, and while everyone likes to focus on the logistical constraints the Germans faced, the British had quite a lot of problems too, esepcially when they pushed west of Tobruk; it's not exactly a surprise that Rommel's offensives did so well against strung out half-exhausted units, and the only battle he really faced in a pitched mode when outnumbered in detail and won was Gazala.

But of course, it's hard to break down all the little tactical and operational details for a military amateur like Churchill, let alone the general public. And it sure as hell *looked* like the British forces should be able to send Rommel packing with little trouble. But they seesawed, and endured months long sieges, and had a damn tough time of it.

So what do you do if you're someone like Aulinchek, or Wavell, trying to justify this lackluster performance to your civilian boss? They won't understand the actual factors, if they even have the patience for it. So you hype up Rommel as some kind of god-tier general, a modern Napoleon, or at least someone like a Robert Lee. And then of course, Rommel's involvement in the july 20 plot made him palatable to admire post-war in a way that other German generals like Kesselring or Model weren't.

Rommel is a huge meme.

Rommel was retarded and didn't understand logistics, news at 11.

>Rommel's First Offensive
>Tobruk
>Gazala
they lost plenty of times

I wouldn't call losing all the territory in Libya you just captured winning

>Because on paper, the British forces in North Africa were enormously stronger than the DAK and the Italian forces
British forces in North Africa initially consisted of 2 divisions. Then it became one army consisting of 4 field divisions, 1 garrison division, and a couple of independent brigades. Rommel's force consisted early on of 3 divisions of DAK, 2 Italian elite armored divisions, and several infantry divisions. Doesn't sound like "enormously stronger" on paper to me.
Now I'll just leave this post here and wait for you to start moving the goalposts.

>Italian advance at a pace they know they can be resupplied by their own navy
>Germans autistically stomp through the desert thinking the Italians will be able to resupply them or that they'll capture anything they need

>Tobruk
Initially Rommel was dealt a massive blow to his ego at Tobruk when he was BTFO by a surrounded, starving and outnumbered British garrison. It was from that moment that he learnt to fear the British warrior.

yeah, but he still took it next year and it was his biggest victory yet

Tobruk was garrisoned by Australians.

Thats a pretty big stain in his record

>British forces in North Africa initially consisted of 2 divisions.
German forces in North Africa initially consisted of nothing, it was the Italians job. And by the way, since Compass demonstrated that those two divisions could easily crush 7 Italian ones, I really like how you're counting the Italians as something worth considering, and not a complete waste of space.

Then, when we get to the Germans themselves, we only get 3 divisions by December of 1941. By that point, the British have 6 divisions in Crusader itself, and if we count an independent brigade as roughly 1/3 of a division, we have another whole division and a second understrength one. That is of course ignoring other troops left behind in Egypt, or the ones fighting in Syria.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crusader_order_of_battle

tl;dr. Check your numbers, they're seriously wrong.

No, it was garrisoned by Plucky Brits

There were Poles and Czechoslovaks in there, it was a pretty multi-national affair

>German forces in North Africa initially consisted of nothing, it was the Italians job
And at the time when it was just Italians, it was an entire Italian army vs 2 British divisions. Not exactly an enormous British advantage on paper.

> Compass demonstrated that those two divisions could easily crush 7 Italian ones, I really like how you're counting the Italians as something worth considering
And here we start the goalposting.

>Then, when we get to the Germans themselves, we only get 3 divisions by December of 1941. By that point, the British have 6 divisions in Crusader itself,
Except the DAK was not fighting by itself. DAK was accompanied by Italian armored divisions, motorize divisions, and infantry divisions.

>By that point, the British have 6 divisions in Crusader itself,
And DAK + Italian forces number 10+ divisions, of which 3 are armored divisions.
But go ahead and explain how the British were enormously stronger on paper despite being outnumbered almost 2:1.

Your entire argument hinges on assumed equality between Italian formations on one hand, and German or British ones on the other. Nobody holds that to be the case, and certainly not the people conducting the war in 1940-1943. The Italian forces were under equipped, under trained, and very badly led. Everyone knew this, and calculated accordingly.

Your entire argument was that British had an enormous advantage on paper compared to Germany AND Italians, but the Axis outfought the Brits in actual battles.

This is you.
>Because on paper, the British forces in North Africa were enormously stronger than the DAK and the Italian forces. On the ground, however, things were different.
Now apparently you were saying something completely different, that you meant to say British were outnumbered but they probably were stronger?

>Everyone knew this, and calculated accordingly.
Except for you in your earlier dumb fucking post.

>Your entire argument was that British had an enormous advantage on paper compared to Germany AND Italians, but the Axis outfought the Brits in actual battles.
Yes.

>Now apparently you were saying something completely different, that you meant to say British were outnumbered but they probably were stronger?
No, I'm not. You apparently think "paper strength" means "Numbers", and that if you compared the forces of say, at Jellabad, (First Anglo-Afghan war), the Afghanis have a greater paper strength, since there were about 5,000 of them to 1,500 under the EIC flag.

That's wrong, and not what I'm saying. When I say "paper strength", I mean perceived strength according to people sitting in the capitals of their countries making long term plans. And they were not equating Italian to British formations they way they were equating British to German formations.

"Hey Britain let's have a war"
"What war Germany"
"A TANK WAR"
"Ok I'm in. Where?"
"Well umm..."
"Let's see..."
"I know, Africa!"
"Will do"

>What's the big deal about Rommel taking some desert clay (from well armored and trained British forces) then losing it right away? Italians did the exact same thing (with Ethiopians with ancient guns and spears) before he came.

Pretty sure OP is talking about that rather anemic Italian offensive into British Egypt in the autumn of 1940, not the Abyssinian (sp?) campaign.

he didn't gas the kikes so he's an honorary good guy

Wasn't he in command of Einsatzgruppe Egypt though?