Why couldn't Rommel take Tobruk even though he had a massive numerical edge against an isolated garrison?

it is easier to defend if you control the surrounding sea and can resupply and reinforce it almost at will
Brits lacked that luxury in Far East with IJN and IJA controlling sea and skies.

Well that'll be a question for alt-history speculators since Yamashita took Singapore too quickly for any reinforcement/ resupply to matter.
Too bad Rommel wasn't as competent.

well, Brits in Singapore had shit training, equipment and morale and thought that the Japanese they faced were invincible just how mobile they were (they thought that the sound of their bicycles was the sound of their tanks)
Also they lost Prince of Wales and Repulse (which was the pride of their navy) to Japanese air attacks and they lacked complete air cover.
It's incredible luck for the Japanese that they were so incompetent and surrendered.

Hitler said make do

Yamashita >>>>>> shit >>>>> Rommel
face it, wehrboos.

Percival?
I'm IJA

Perceval would've been known as a hero if he was in charge of Tobruk.

For the western front not to turn into a shitshow for the Axis, they had to capture Malta (which was totally feasible but they didn't do it because "lol reasons"). Tobruk was important but by no means a decisive factor in the african front, more importantly the Axis lost precious time during which the Allies were easily able to resuply and reinforce . Rommel should have just kept going and hammering them no matter the casualties. By the time of El Alamein and shortly after Operation Torch rolled around it was too late to change anything.

>For the western front not to turn into a shitshow for the Axis, they had to capture Malta (which was totally feasible but they didn't do it because "lol reasons")
It wouldn't have mattered.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf (specifically on pages 18-20) and dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf (page 12)

The amount of interdicted shipping from all bases (of which Malta was only one, albeit the single most important one) is less of an impact to Rommel's supply problems than the lack of port capacity or the difficulties in moving supplies overland from his ports to his front in absence of a rail system.

> . Rommel should have just kept going and hammering them no matter the casualties.
But taking Tobruk is necessary to do that. Precisely because you have this long coastal road over which all your stuff that's being unloaded in Tripoli is coming from, you can't afford to leave behind an enemy stronghold while you go and pursue, they'll simply block the road and suddenly you have no food, gas, or ammo.

It sure would've been nice to have a port from which you can resupply nice and close to Egypt.
You know, like Tobruk.

Not him, but given the abject state of the Italian navy, especially with its fuel shortages, shipping from Sicily or Italy to Tobruk would be insanely dangerous, as it's too far to cover with land based air from Sicily the way the route to Tripoli was.

Italians used Tobruk to supply the DAK once it actually fell you moron.

It would also be nice if Tobruk had the port capacity necessary to do that.

It would be nice if Rommel could take it in less time than a fucking year.

You forget that ultimate wargoal in the African campaign was Alexandria and the Suez canal not some literally "who?" town in the middle of the desert. As I said Tobruk was important because it was a port town and would have greatly eased the supply lines from Tripoli, but it was by no means vital.

Rommel's grand strategy was sound and clear headed if one understands that denial of enemy supplies is just as important as receiving them. Because Rommel knew that he had make due with what he had (no new supplies or divisions by the time of winter Barbarossa). Essentially what he was trying to replicate was the Wehrmacht drive to Paris in 1939. Rommel no matter how overextended in Libya or Egypt had he managed to deny to the British the crucial resupplying station in Malta and then drove to Alexandria by by-passing fortifications like Tobruk. And before you say it is infeasible, this was what the Allies did with Torch and Overlord in France, by-passing well defended positions and capturing crucial supply stations like Sicily and the coast of Normandy through which they could supply far greater number of troops than those that were already engaged. Without Malta and Crete , the British have just one island left from which to resupply and station their ships which is Cyprus, but Cyprus is too far away to change anything in Libya.

A piddling amount; the primary supply route was always to Tripoli and over Via Balba.

Second of the two pdfs, page 13.

>Rommel's grand strategy was sound and clear headed

Malta was not a resupply station for anything. Are you retarded? holy fuck.

Fortified positions are notoriously hard to roll over, even with a massive amount of soldiers.

Especially if you're a one-trick pony like Rommel.

>The opening of a new front in North Africa in June 1940 increased Malta's already considerable value. British air and sea forces based on the island could attack Axis ships transporting vital supplies and reinforcements from Europe; Churchill called the island an "unsinkable aircraft carrier".[10] General Erwin Rommel, in de facto field command of Axis forces in North Africa, recognised its importance quickly. In May 1941, he warned that "Without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa".[1]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)

It was absolutely a resupply station and a station for allied aircrafts. The axis resolved to bomb it and cause damage because they were afraid of a second Crete, its importance became apparent only after all that wasted time in 41-42.

>You forget that ultimate wargoal in the African campaign was Alexandria and the Suez canal not some literally "who?" town in the middle of the desert
Please, show me where in my posts you can draw that ridiculous conclusion.

> As I said Tobruk was important because it was a port town and would have greatly eased the supply lines from Tripoli, but it was by no means vital.
No it wouldn't have. It had tiny capacity and the route to send supplies through it was far more difficult to defend than the one to Tripoli, which is why Tripoli remained the primary supply debarkation point even after Tobruk fell post Gazala.

>Rommel's grand strategy was sound and clear headed if one understands that denial of enemy supplies is just as important as receiving them
No, it's not sound or clearheaded at all. Ignoring your strategic situation as to which fronts are primary and which ones aren't, and go for a pie in the sky offensive that is neither feasible nor necessary is just stupid. You want to deny the enemy supplies? Make them the ones who have to cross over eastern Libya and its no infrastructure whatsoever and engage the British in Cyrenica rather than chasing them all across the desert and face those same problems yourself.

>Rommel no matter how overextended in Libya or Egypt had he managed to deny to the British the crucial resupplying station in Malta
You are retarded. Show me ONE shipment that went from Malta to the British forces in Egypt and Libya. Malta was not a resupply point for the Commonwealth forces, it was a point to stage raids on the Axis SLOCs.

Your quote has literally nothing to do with Malta being a resupply station.

>and then drove to Alexandria by by-passing fortifications like Tobruk.
So, were you planning on splitting your forces into impotence to keep Tobruk bottled up, or just letting the British sitting there cut behind you while you run over to Alexandria?

>and before you say it is infeasible, this was what the Allies did with Torch and Overlord in France, by-passing well defended positions and capturing crucial supply stations like Sicily and the coast of Normandy through which they could supply far greater number of troops than those that were already engaged.
The two are nothing alike, because in neither case were the Allies constrained to an over 1,000 km long land road that could be cut off at any point by said bypassed forces you fucktard. Rommel didn't have a Transport Plan backing him up paralyzing British forces into immobility, or facing forces of a captured nation that would defect en masse.

> Without Malta and Crete , the British have just one island left from which to resupply and station their ships which is Cyprus, but Cyprus is too far away to change anything in Libya.
Or, you know, you could READ SOME FUCKING SHCOLARSHIP ON THE SUBJECT. (Link, heredtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf)

>The main British communcations with Alexandria and Suez had to go by way of the Cape of Good Hope, a voyage of 12,000-13,000 miles. Thus the Eight Army had the longest lines of supply that history has ever known.

And know that the overwhelming majority of the supplies that went to Egpyt came through Suez, whcih you can't take prior to total British defeat in North Africa anyway.

None of that claims that Malta was being used to supply British forces in North Africa. And of course, wikipedia, but that problem is secondary to the fact that it doesn't say what you're claiming it says.

British supply line was through the Suez canal. Why would the Brits send the supplies all the way to Malta, then ship them back to Alexandria? Please explain, Mr. history-expert.

I think we can all agree that Rommel was defeated by musolinis failure to seize malta

Yet Yamashita was able to take a heavily fortified island facing 1:2 disadvantage? What did the Nip Warrior figure out that Rommel didnt?

>No it wouldn't have.

So we are in agreement here, I said the same thing, Tobruk would have eased the supply question but was by no means crucial.

>No, it's not sound or clearheaded at all

The British were fighting in their home front and were the defenders, I don't see what you say as feasible unless you expand on it.

>You are retarded. Show me ONE shipment that went from Malta to the British forces in Egypt and Libya

Troops and planes absolutely flew from Malta to Libya and Egypt, which is the fastest way from Britain to N.Africa? From Britain to Malta, or from Britain through the Indian ocean to Suez?

>So, were you planning on splitting your forces into impotence to keep Tobruk bottled up

Ignore the Tobruk, make plans for one single push for Alexandria.

>The two are nothing alike

Excuse me but are you forgetting the Atlantic Wall? Operation Torch was a one off gambit with no prior position to fall back to because they had the fucking sea on their backs. Also, forgetting the how the Battle of France ended ignoring fortifications and divisions behind you because at the same time you are encircling them? Forgetting how the whole airborne doctrine changed the rules of war by dropping soldiers behind enemy lines, which won the Allies Sicily? The British waged WWII in the old and outdated style, Rommel wa heralding the new way of full on mechanised warfare, with lightning fast attacks, encirclement, denial of enemy positions and fortified fall back positions etc. Rommel just didn't have enough to succeed, it wasn't that his overall strategy was completely flawed like some Anglo historians say and pat themselves in the back. Without Malta and Afrika Korps in front of Alexandria the brits would be sweating bullets.

>Excuse me but are you forgetting the Atlantic Wall? Operation Torch was a one off gambit with no prior position to fall back to because they had the fucking sea on their backs
Operation Torch was a landing in North Africa. Atlantic Wall had nothing to with it.

>Forgetting how the whole airborne doctrine changed the rules of war by dropping soldiers behind enemy lines, which won the Allies Sicily?
Are you literally arguing that Operation Husky wouldn't have succeeded if it wasn't for the airborne landings?

I meant to say Overlord. but Torch was the same situation.

>So we are in agreement here, I said the same thing, Tobruk would have eased the supply question but was by no means crucial.
And if you pour an eyedropper of water onto a bonfire, you'll cool it, but not by any noticeable amount.

>The British were fighting in their home front and were the defenders, I don't see what you say as feasible unless you expand on it.
Considering I was talking about GERMANY's offensive and defensive postures and what their ultimate war aims are, you might want to give this a second, or first thought.

>Troops and planes absolutely flew from Malta to Libya and Egypt, which is the fastest way from Britain to N.Africa?
Then cite it.

>From Britain to Malta, or from Britain through the Indian ocean to Suez?
Literally this, because that way they weren't dodging enemy warships all the while. I've even literally cited it in this thread. >Ignore the Tobruk, make plans for one single push for Alexandria.
And when the troops in Tobruk slip behind you, cut you off from supply, and your troops die of thirst or run out of ammo?

>Excuse me but are you forgetting the Atlantic Wall?
The Atlantic wall was not even a factor in Torch, which was in fucking Morocco, and didn't pose an ability to interdict supplies, as it was a series of coastal fortifications. The troops manning them were pinned down by the wholesale destruction of the rail network in northern France prior to Overlord.

>Also, forgetting the how the Battle of France ended ignoring fortifications and divisions behind you because at the same time you are encircling them?
And again, there's a difference in that THOSE FORMATIONS WERE PINNED DOWN. They were themselves out of supply, and could not mount counteroffensives. That is not the case for the troops in Tobruk, as their actions in Crusader amply demonstrate.
1/2

> Forgetting how the whole airborne doctrine changed the rules of war by dropping soldiers behind enemy lines, which won the Allies Sicily?
If the Germans had paratroopers in North Africa, or the means of projecting them far enough given the fluid nature of the battlefields there, that might actually mean something.

>The British waged WWII in the old and outdated style, Rommel wa heralding the new way of full on mechanised warfare, with lightning fast attacks, encirclement, denial of enemy positions and fortified fall back positions etc
Yes, Compass and Crusader were WW1 stytle, unmechanized attacks full of stodgy old men with massed artillery. Were you dropped as a baby? Or perhaps thrown?

> Rommel just didn't have enough to succeed, it wasn't that his overall strategy was completely flawed like some Anglo historians say and pat themselves in the back.
No, his overall strategy was flawed, because it literally required him to have more supplies than could be delivered to him under perfect conditions, to which his response when informed of this problem is "I don't care, that's someone else's problem"

>Without Malta and Afrika Korps in front of Alexandria the brits would be sweating bullets.
No, because Malta was literally irrelevant. At most it would tamp down on SLOC interdiction for the Axis, but those losses never overshadowed the attrition losses from simply moving stuff acrtoss the Via Balba. Why should it be so decisive?

The only reason he's so popular is because he supported the plan to overthrow Hitler.

And even for this [citation needed].

Attack where the guns aren't pointing.
Old mate probably skimmed through Sun Tzu's book before planning the attack