>I'm scared of losing any ships, better not blow up the fuel dumps at Pearl Harbor >oh no I ran into a couple carriers in the Coral Sea, guess I better run away and not invade Port Moresby even though I defeated them >I didn't keep a reserve to immediately strike the US fleet at Midway even though destroying the US fleet was literally the whole point >man I'm really bad at sinking these outnumbered American fleets >finally sink the Hornet but lose all my planes int he process and fail to sink the Enterprise AGAIN so now I can't stop it from sinking the transports and we lose Guadalcanal >was only fired AFTER all that
Yamamoto would have been better off commanding these battles himself ffs.
>I'm scared of losing any ships, better not blow up the fuel dumps at Pearl Harbor Why exactly is destroying (assuming you get all of it, which is unlikely with tiny CVP) the stockpile that is worth about 1 and 2/3 of a day's worth of American oil production a worthwhile goal and worth sticking your neck out for? It's going to be replaced enormously quickly.
Jack Scott
Nagumo was pretty much the perfect example of a JUST commander in WW2. At least the IJN eventually fired him, but the damage was already done. He must have pissed off a lot of people for them to pretty much leave him to die on Saipan
Blake Ramirez
Nagumo pulled off the only major victory of the IJN in WW2 (not counting tiny skirmishes between cruisers).
Samuel Lewis
That's like saying blowing up their ships is pointless because they can so easily replace them.
Their entire strategy was supposed to hinge on taking immediate advantage of enemy setbacks. Sinking American ships isn't a permanent loss, for example, but gives you greater control of the sea for a period of time, during which you exploit it to capture more land.
Blowing up the fuel dump won't destroy the USN, but it will force them to sail out of San Diego rather than Pearl Harbor for a while until it can be replaced, thus restricting their ability to interfere with, say, the Midway or Port Morseby invasions.
Cooper Jenkins
They had like 100 single-engine level bombers with HE bombs. And Jap bombs were tiny. They wouldn't have destroyed shit.
>Blowing up the fuel dump won't destroy the USN, but it will force them to sail out of San Diego rather than Pearl Harbor for a while until it can be replaced, thus restricting their ability to interfere with, say Blowing up a couple of fuel tanks won't sideline the USN for 6 months.
Cameron Turner
Right, that was Inoue. Forgot about the Indian Ocean raid.
Elijah Cruz
If you mean Pearl Harbor, not only was the whole plan conceived by Yamamoto, but Nagumo actually fucked it up somewhat by refusing to send in a second attack because he was so terrified of his ships getting sunk. Not to mention he's responsible for the Midway disaster which cost Japan the war.
Jacob Cox
This is Tamon-maru, commander of the 2nd Carrier Division. Say something nice about him!
Jayden Evans
> Indian Ocean raid. Which was the other successful operation by the IJN. So Nagumo happened to lead the exactly two successful major operations in WW2. Wow he's so incompetent.
Jayden Martinez
It's going to take about 1-2 years to raise those bottomed battleships. It's going to take a week, tops, to replace the oil. If you want to maximize your short term benefit, the oil is a stupid target.
Hudson Baker
>a couple Those fuel dumps were designed to refuel the entire Pacific fleet, they were absolutely huge.
>If you mean Pearl Harbor, not only was the whole plan conceived by Yamamoto Pearl Harbor was conceived by Genda. Yamamoto had a plan but it was unimaginably retarded, basically involved using 2 carriers going on suicide missions.
>Nagumo actually fucked it up somewhat by refusing to send in a second attack because he was so terrified of his ships getting sunk. Nagumo didn't send in a second attack because it wasn't in the plan, which you claim was conceived by Yamamoto.
James Green
He literally couldn't even find Sommerville's fleet. It's almost like a little sneak peek into his terrible reconnaissance that would cost him at Midway.
Why did you kill yourself even though it was Nagumo's fault? You did your job properly, your country needed you!
Matthew Anderson
>Nagumo didn't send in a second attack because it wasn't in the plan It's called "adapting". When every single squadron leader says you need to launch a second attack in order for the operation to be complete, not listening is completely retarded.
Logan Price
Midway's planning was Yamamoto's work, including the shoddy recon.
Charles Myers
Intel =/= recon.
Nagumo wasn't in charge of locating the American fleet prior to the battle, true, but his recon work during the actual battle was S H I T.
Juan White
>it is a mememoto defense thread
Reminder that: >japan's whole war plan against america relied on crushing american public's spirit and convincing them that the war isn't worth of it >they had a perfect opportunity to make the war look like FDR is sending american soldiers to die for european colonies >yamamoto hears about taranto raid >yamamoto develops an autistic obsession to do the same with usn >yamamoto throws a shitfit when he hears that the actually halfway competent people in japanese command plan to move south, hopefully luring the usn into a decisive battle around philippines >gets his will through >fucks up everything >manages to sink 3 ships, 1 of them was nothing more than gunnery target >galvanizes the american public and makes sure that the US government has 100% public support for their war against japan >on top of that his little autistic pet project made it impossible to there be even a remote chance that usn would be around philippines anytime soon
Parker Richardson
>Midway's planning was Yamamoto's work Yes indeed, and Nagumo fucked it up by loading bombs onto his planes, thus needing to switch equipment while under air assault with the catastrophic results we all know about.
>including the shoddy recon Yamamoto handled the intel prior to the battle. Nagumo commanded the actual task force, and as such, he handled the recon during the battle, which just so happened to be ridiculously lousy.
Jeremiah Peterson
What the fuck are you talking about? I'm talking about Yamamoto planning how recon pattern was going to unfold.
Dylan Green
>which just so happened to be ridiculously lousy. Midway recon was done exactly as Yamamoto planned.
Sebastian Garcia
No, it wasn't. Nagumo was convinced that Yamamoto's plan was stupid and that no enemy carriers would show up, so he only launched a symbolic recon force and didn't pay much attention to it. It's literally what historians from both sides have always been saying ffs.
Ryan Lewis
Yeah, and Nagumo still fucked it up.
Nathaniel Evans
the raw amount of the oil is not what matters, it was the fact that the Pacific Fleet would have been significantly more constrained for the first several months of the war
Jason Gonzalez
Uh no, based on Yamamemecuck's plan, recon was curtailed to maximize stelath.
Austin White
>the raw amount of the oil is not what matters, it was the fact that the Pacific Fleet would have been significantly more constrained for the first week or so of the war
FTFY. The raw amount DOES matter, because that's going to determine how easy it is to replace. And it turns out that the amount of fuel stored at Pearl Harbor just isn't that big of a deal, and America can replace it quickly and easily.
John Allen
Which, in and of itself, made perfect sense, since the whole battle hinged on the carrier group not being spotted. Remember that the Japanese didn't know their communications had been deciphered. The thing is, even if you take this into account, Nagumo sent a significantly more anemic recon force than what Yamamoto had planned.
Samuel Brooks
>It's called "adapting". Are you suggesting that Japs went into Pearl Harbor without wargaming it to death and having multiple plans for every contingency? Fun fact: they did, and none of them involved sending a 3rd wave to hit some gas tanks.
Adrian Nguyen
>Nagumo sent a significantly more anemic recon force than what Yamamoto had planned. No he sent exactly the same recon force.
Jeremiah Gutierrez
>the amount of fuel stored at Pearl Harbor just isn't that big of a deal, and America can replace it quickly and easily To get oil to the Pacific Fleet if the fuel stored at Pearl Harbor had been blown up, the US would have needed to send convoys. And if the Pacific Fleet didn't have any fuel left, how exactly were they supposed to protect the convoys from Japanese subs and surface vessels ? Destroying this stockpile would have had a huge impact on the US's ability to counterattack for quite a long while.
See above. There was literally no reason not to attack the stockpile. Since the second wave didn't encounter any threatening resistance, any officer could have guessed a third one wouldn't either.
Easton Hall
>Since the second wave didn't encounter any threatening resistance Japan lost 10% of its aircraft and another 10% were shot up.
Jonathan Scott
What is the best book to learn about the Pacific War? I'm mildly intrigued to learn about all these nippon fuck ups >go attack Midway thinking it's going to be the decisive battle where you defeat Americans, the one you were planning for since the war started >send task force to capture useless Alaska islands in far north Pacific for some reason >Americans crack all your codes anyway and know where you attack and when you'll be there >lose all your 4 carriers that you sent for the attack >later get nuked for your troubles after your every city's been firebombed to ashes How can one nation be so JUSTed?
Jeremiah Nguyen
The goal of the battle was to break the back of the US Pacific Fleet and basically knock the US out of the war before it even started. Planes losses were regrettable but acceptable, and Japan actually launched the attack expecting to lose way, way more planes than they actually did lose.
Kevin Rivera
Since they're going to lose int he long term anyway, you might as well gamble in the short term. It's the only way. Unfortunately, Nagumo was the exact WRONG person to give that kind of assignment, because that wasn't his nature. But it did gel with what the brass thought, yet again proving only Yamamoto and Ozawa really knew WTF they were doing.
Mason Clark
Sending another 100 bombers with tiny payloads wouldn't have broken the back of the PacFleet. That's why Japs didn't bother. Why you can't understand this simple concept is really incomprehensible to me.
Easton Thomas
>To get oil to the Pacific Fleet if the fuel stored at Pearl Harbor had been blown up, the US would have needed to send convoys Okay.
>And if the Pacific Fleet didn't have any fuel left, how exactly were they supposed to protect the convoys from Japanese subs and surface vessels ? What surface vessels and submarines? The Japanese don't have the range to go patrolling behind Pearl Harbor, hell, they could barely get there and back. And if you want to do a close blockade, what do you do when the Americans fly in a bunch of Catalinas (which can make the trip from the west coast) to interdict your subs and raiders?
>Destroying this stockpile would have had a huge impact on the US's ability to counterattack for quite a long while. You yourself have just moved the goalposts, you now not only need to destroy the stockpile, but you need to keep the U.S. from replacing it. That's insanely difficult. You mentioned submarines. You know how many subs the Japanese had on December 8th? 68.
About 2/3 of them can't even make it to the area you'd need to patrol and back. And I would point out that if you look at the Battle of the Atlantic, the much larger, more doctrinally sound, German submarine fleet operating in a smaller patrol area still couldn't find (let alone sink) most of the British shipping, which was way more voluminous than supplying a military base.
The idea that you can stop the shipments is not grounded in reality.
Chase Anderson
Absolutely full of themselves to the point of denying reality.
>We beat Russia >We beat Korea >We beat China >Therefore we should be able to beat anyone
That doesn't actually make sense of course, but that's what they thought.
Robert Adams
>Since they're going to lose int he long term anyway, you might as well gamble in the short term. It's a gamble without any payoff. If they were truly putting everything on Pearl Harbor attack, they should've attempted an invasion. There was nothing of value they could've achieved by attacking installations with Kates.
Jaxson Edwards
What Japan did was rational when you consider it from the perspective of the ruling classes, not from the perspective of the nation. A military class has to justify its existence by doing military things.
Joshua Baker
Oh, so now instead of only having to drag enough extra fuel to support 6 aircraft carriers and a couple of battleships, you'll need to have the supplies to invade a set of islands with almost 20,000 troops defending them. [sarcasm]That's feasible [/sarcasm] I'm sure that you won't have any trouble with your almost 4,000 km long supply line back to the Marshalls, which aren't exactly the most developed ports in the world. And it's not like you won't need those same marines to attack other places like the NEI or the Philippines.
Zachary Ward
The chances of success is practically nil but an invasion was the only gamble that would've paid out, so why not try it?
James Russell
Of course you cannot stop the shipments. However, you can slow them down significantly. Not to mention spotting the convoys would actually be significantly easier than in the Atlantic, since the Japanese could implement air superiority around Hawaii thanks to their carriers and send their subs to wait at the entrance of Pearl Harbor and just sink whaveter comes along.
>send bombers with tiny payloads to attack the fuel stockpile >tiny payloads explode >tiny payloads set fuel on fire >no more fuel Or do you actually believe the local garrison could have stopped a fuel fire ?
Jaxon Roberts
Because actually attempting it is completely impossible and at odds with the other things you need to invade and are even more vital than Pearl Harbor, like the oil sources that you're going to war to secure in the first fucking place.
And you are colossally underestimating how impossible this invasion would be. The chances of success are some mathematical abstraction that isn't quite zero but can be treated as such. Projecting an invasion fleet 4,000 kilometers from tiny bases to land somewhere heavily defended is completely insane.
Jacob Torres
Life isn't like the movies where a gas station explodes when you drive a car into it. It would've taken a lot of bombs of the incendiary type to set bunker fuel on fire.
Nathan Baker
Invading Pearl Harbor on Dec 7, Showa 16 was a lot more feasible than winning WW2 against the US without taking Pearl Harbor first.
Jordan Powell
>Of course you cannot stop the shipments. However, you can slow them down significantly. No, you can't.
>Not to mention spotting the convoys would actually be significantly easier than in the Atlantic, since the Japanese could implement air superiority around Hawaii thanks to their carriers and send their subs to wait at the entrance of Pearl Harbor and just sink whaveter comes along. Except you need those carriers elsewhere, to support the invasions of places like the Phillipenes and the NEI. Except it's dangerous as hell to leave your carriers within striking distance of the unsinkable aircraft carriers in the form of islands. Except you don't have the fucking fuel to stay out there all that long. Except leaving submarines in shallow water is a great way to get them all killed by the artillery emplacements or the battleships still in the harbor.
The "plan" is retarded.
Andrew Thompson
>No, you can't. That's an great argument there lad.
>it's dangerous as hell to leave your carriers within striking distance of the unsinkable aircraft carriers in the form of islands It would have been dangerous if there actually had been a significant amount of planes on the islands at the time. Which wasn't the case.
Which leads to >you need those carriers elsewhere True, but it isn't inconceivable to leave a pair of them behind to secure air supremacy, while the rest goes on to take over the actual war goals.
>you don't have the fucking fuel to stay out there Japan secured some oil pretty goddamn quick. Wouldn't be that far-fetched to supply such a task force, especially since a carrier that isn't threatened by any actual enemy fleet isn't going to move a whole lot.
>leaving submarines in shallow water is a great way to get them all killed by the artillery emplacements or the battleships >implying you need to leave your subs literally right next to the fucking harbour in order to effectively blockade it You don't seem very bright.
Now, a better question would be : would this plan be worth it just to immobilize the US Pacific Fleet for a few more months ? I'm not sure, but then again, Japan went to war because they were kinda desperate, so...
Oliver Martin
>It would have been dangerous if there actually had been a significant amount of planes on the islands at the time. Which wasn't the case. There were 200+ army aircraft and 100+ navy aircraft stationed in Hawaii at the time. USMC had 19 fighters and 25 SBDs.
Isaac Morales
>Japan secured some oil pretty goddamn quick. It wasn't until late in the war when the Dutch oil fields were operational.
Isaac Bennett
>That's an great argument there lad. I've made the argument. You've ignored every bit of it. You don't have the range, you don't have the numbers, and you have pressing commitments elsewhere. Even if you did, it's really hard to stop these shipments, because you have to patrol a fuckhuge area to make sure the convoys don't slip through your fingers, and OH YEAH, the Americans have 7 fucking carriers that they can base out of San Diego or anywhere on the Western Coast to complicate things that I'm completely pretending don't exist just to humor your idiotic autism.
>It would have been dangerous if there actually had been a significant amount of planes on the islands at the time. Which wasn't the case. Planes, which might come as a shock to you, can FLY. You can take a PBY Catalina, load it up, and fly it straight from California to Pearl Harbor. Ta-da!
>True, but it isn't inconceivable to leave a pair of them behind to secure air supremacy, while the rest goes on to take over the actual war goals. Oh, so now you ARE abandoning air superiority since the carriers only carry 72 planes at most, and most of those will be bombers. I'm sure your 36 A6Ms if you leave behind say, Shokaku and Zuikaku will be able to stop the American air garrison.
>Japan secured some oil pretty goddamn quick You know what's rich? You are making this entire argument about how hard it would be to get fuel from the mainland U.S. to Pearl Harbor. But apparently the Japanese just show up in the NEI, and all the oil wells MAGICALLY start pumping for them immediately, and then that fuel MAGICALLY appears in the bins of a bunch of ships that are almost 4,000 km from their nearest (tiny) bases.
1/2
Asher Barnes
>especially since a carrier that isn't threatened by any actual enemy fleet isn't going to move a whole lot I see you LIKE having your carriers spotted and destroyed by land based planes.
>>implying you need to leave your subs literally right next to the fucking harbour in order to effectively blockade it Retard. You might forget what you wrote ten minutes ago, but I can assure you that other people don't.
>and send their subs to wait at the entrance of Pearl Harbor and just sink whaveter comes along.
>Now, a better question would be : would this plan be worth it just to immobilize the US Pacific Fleet for a few more months No, taht is again the wrong question. The better question is "would this be plan be worth it to immobilize 4 battleships for a few weeks tops". the answer is obviously no, but I'm sure your weeb brain will somehow manage to alter that.
2/2
Nathaniel Ward
There were about 390 planes in Hawaii when the Japanese attacked, true. They shot down 188 and damaged 128. 74 planes aren't a significant threat. Especially if they have no fuel.
Liam Clark
74 planes aren't a threat, that's why a couple of carriers won't do shit.
Ethan Johnson
>you have to patrol a fuckhuge area to make sure the convoys don't slip through your fingers >there is one significant harbour in Hawaii >fuckhuge area If you literally know where the convoys are going, you know you can just wait for them there, right ?
>You can take a PBY Catalina, load it up, and fly it straight from California to Pearl Harbor >pitting PBY Catalinas against Japanese fighter aircraft Oh boy, that would have been fun indeed.
>I'm sure your 36 A6Ms if you leave behind say, Shokaku and Zuikaku will be able to stop the American air garrison Well, given the fact that US pilots were notoriously bad at the start of WW2, I wouldn't bet on them. They took horrendous losses during the actual battle of Pearl Harbor, despite not even being the primary targets of the attack.
>that fuel MAGICALLY appears in the bins of a bunch of ships that are almost 4,000 km from their nearest (tiny) bases. Again, with no fuel left for the Pacific Fleet to use, which fleet is going to stop Japan from refueling their task force ?
>the Japanese just show up in the NEI, and all the oil wells MAGICALLY start pumping for them immediately That's pretty much the only part of your rant that actually makes some sense.
>I see you LIKE having your carriers spotted and destroyed by land based planes. Land based planes with no fuel. Yeah, that sounds threatening as hell.
>You might forget what you wrote ten minutes ago, but I can assure you that other people don't Let's say you have 30 operational subs to commit to the blockade of 1 (one) port, full of ships that have no fuel to actually get out of it. Do you leave your subs literally next to it, or do you spread them out just out of the range of any coastal defenses ?
Julian Edwards
Yamamoto never believed in the war, he counselled that they'd have to dictate terms in the white house to get the USA to agree to a ceasefire, meaning there was no realistic propability of a ceasefire.
A bunch of deluded militarists took over the government and he saw the outcome years ahead of time. His generation dragged Japan out of decrepity into the modern world then watched a bunch of high school kids fuck it up.
Jordan Phillips
>Well, given the fact that US pilots were notoriously bad at the start of WW2, USMC pilots were bad. USN pilots not so much. In every one of their engagements against IJN carriers, USN lost fewer aircrafts, sometimes by hilarious margins.
Xavier Evans
>If you literally know where the convoys are going, you know you can just wait for them there, right ? No, you can't, because the immediate area is facing resistance, especially stuff that will fuck up your submarines.
>Ignoring the context. The Catalinas can fuck the shit out of your submarines, and if you're leaving 2 carriers, that's 36 zeroes, assuming you leave them with full complements. That does not give you much recon or CAP, and yes, you are vulnerable even to those flying boats.
>They took horrendous losses during the actual battle of Pearl Harbor, despite not even being the primary targets of the attack. Surprised planes being shot at on airfields do badly. News at 11.
>Again, with no fuel left for the Pacific Fleet to use, which fleet is going to stop Japan from refueling their task force ? The fact that it needs to be refined, stored, shipped out to Kwajalein or somewhere in the Marhsalls, loaded up into tankers, whcih you don't have enough of, and then have those tankers continually going to and fro between wherever your blockade is basing itself from and the Marshalls, vulnerable at any point to an opportunistic U.S. submarine or cruiser?
>Land based planes with no fuel. Yeah, that sounds threatening as hell. Oh great, more bullshit. Remember how you probably won't destroy the entire stockpile? Or how you could take those Catalinas and instead of loading them with their armament, load them with fuel for the other planes and touch down? Or that you even admit in the best situation, you can't stop the shipments, only slow them down, and that planes take a lot less than capital ships? Or that there are 7 carriers unaccounted for, any one of whom could stop this nonsense?
Dominic Flores
>Do you leave your subs literally next to it, or do you spread them out just out of the range of any coastal defenses ? Oh goody, so you are abandoning your former statements
>to wait at the entrance of Pearl Harbor and just sink whaveter comes along.
AND the ability to interdict those convoys right at the point of the harbor, where you're sure to find them. That's why the Gemrans did that when trying to besiege places like Liverpool, and cought ALL the incoming convoys.
And again, let's assume that unlike you, the Americans aren't colossally retarded and send in a big convoy escorted by 4 carriers and half a dozen battleships? You know, the ones in the U.S. west coast that you can't touch?
Carson Thompson
>the Americans aren't colossally retarded and send in a big convoy escorted by 4 carriers and half a dozen battleships Congratulations, you just did exactly what the IJN was hoping you'd do, commit to a decisive battle right at the start of the war with a fleet that is vastly inferior to what the IJN can throw your way. Ironically, doing that is probably the most retarded thing you could do.
Zachary Foster
>Committing to a decisive battle >With their carriers outnumbering you two to one >And having more support ships besides >Closer to their bases of support >While you're still triyng to keep Pearl Harbor and its adjoining facilities suppressed.
Do you think about these things at all before you write?
Lincoln Evans
>what are spies >what is intel >what is recon Do you actually think such a huge fleet leaving the west coast would do so unnoticed ? The IJN would just have to pull back their task force, link up with the rest of the fleet, let the convoy reach Pearl Harbor and just attack it again with 6 carriers and 10 battleships. The US would lose their entire fleet besides the ships in the Atlantic and basically would be forced to sue for peace. Literally the worst case scenario.
Jace Baker
>what are spies Tell me which spies the Japanese had that informed them of U.S. naval maneuvers from within the U.S. itself.
>what is intel/Recon Again, show me what recon elements the Japanese had off the West Coast?
Let's say we have a magic submarine off the west coast that finds this out. They don't actually have the radios to get this kind of information back to Japan in one transmission, but let's ignore that too. They talk about it the SECOND the fleet leaves. Now, all the IJN needs to do is teleport all their carriers away from the other theaters they're fighting in, supporting those critical landings to secure the resources they need. They need to sail at top speed to Kwajalein, where of course you just HAPPEN to have a bunch of tankers laying around with full fuel to get them there, and they'll just nip on over to Pearl Harbor, and get there while they're unloading the convoy with your magic perfect timing.
Then of course, while their ships are all in harbor even though it's only the cargo vessels that need to do that at all, you will launch your aerial assault, this won't be a surprise attack again, and the air garrison will be reinforced, because the Americans will bring planes as well as fuel on this convoy, so you can have all the fun of engaging in a port attack at long odds. BUT MAGGIKO NIIPIRITU WEEABOO FIGHTIN POWER WILL WIN! AMERRICA WILL HAVE ENTIRE FLEET DESTROYED AND FRANKRIN DERANO ROOSEVERT WILL KOMMIT HONORABU SEPPUKU OVER GREAT SHAME OF DEFEAT!
I cannot believe how stupid you are. Your entire thought process hinges around everything always working perfectly for Japan. Real life doesn't work that way.
William Cruz
>getting this mad over a theoretical scenario The goal was only to remind you that the US sending their entire fleet to a location that actually is within the operational range of the IJN was the IJN's wet dream and literally their only actual hope of victory, no matter how tiny. Of course it would be a long shot, and of course for this scenario to work you have to assume that everything goes well for the Japanese, because otherwise there's no way they'd ever have a chance. In my opinion, they never did have a chance, period.
Camden Brooks
>The goal was only to remind you that the US sending their entire fleet to a location that actually is within the operational range of the IJN was the IJN's wet dream and literally their only actual hope of victory, no matter how tiny. First off, learn to count. bluejacket.com/ww2_12-07-41_carriers.html
Secondly no, that was NOT the IJN's wet dream. The IJN's wet dream was that the U.S. would send their fleet to the aid of the Philippines, where they could pulverize it with their entire fleet, on interior lines of communication, and considerable support from land based aerial forces on the various islands they controlled between Hawaii and the Philippines. None of those exist east of Hawaii, and the location does in fact hugely fucking matter.
Thirdly, you have not shown that 2 carriers and a handful of submarines can actually interdict Hawaii, you've just retardedly asserted that they would. Go on, show me some losses from actual IJN submarines in early 1942 and see how much of a terror they were. It wasn't much.
Fourthly, you assume that the IJN is omniscient and can apparently teleport their ships around. That's bullshit, even in a best case scenario from their point of view.
>Of course it would be a long shot, and of course for this scenario to work you have to assume that everything goes well for the Japanese, because otherwise there's no way they'd ever have a chance. Or, you could understand that not all wars are total wars, and that Japan's only real hope is to make it a non-total war where superior commitment on their part can counterbalance superior material resources on the Americans part and not attack Pearl Harbor in the first place.
Nolan Baker
The Army Hawaii garrison in 1941 consisted of 2 "triangle" infantry divisions with their supporting equipment.
That's some 20-25,000 fighting men, equivalent to the garrison of Iwo Jima. Then there's the civilian population of Hawaii itself, which amounted to about half a million. In times of pressing need, these civilians could be armed as well.
Then consider that at this time, Japan only had the transport capability to carry less than a brigade from the Marianas to Hawaii, and only enough tankers to keep the supporting fleet on station for less than a week.
Your "realistic" chance, is an amphibious assault carried out by ~3000 men, against a garrison of 25,000, securing an island with an area of 1,450 km2 and a native population of half a million, and doing it in under a week.
Joshua Richardson
Sigh.
First, I don't really get what your link is supposed to prove. Unlike the IJN, the ISN was in no position to group all of these carriers together. And any new carriers wouldn't be effective either until they could be grouped up.
Second, of course the optimal situation would have been for the USN to be retarded enough to sail to the Philippines, but even the most optimistic officers in the IJN weren't stupid enough to expect this, which is why they attacked Pearl Harbor in the first place instead of trying to lure the USN further to the west. Settling for the next best thing is just logical.
Thirdly, this is a theoretical scenario, so we could debate of the feasibility of this plan endlessly. I do think that since we're talking about one port, full of either destroyed, damaged or out-of-fuel ships, with few operational planes remaining and sub-optimal pilots, it isn't outside of the realm of possibility for two carriers and a few dozen submarines to severely disrupt supply lines.
Fourth, I never assumed the IJN had to get there at the exact same time the convoy did. Or are you assuming that the convoy would literally leave on the very next day ? They'd need to stay in port for quite a while.
And finally, you very well know Japan had no choice but to go to war since the US were literally choking them with a ridiculously harsh embargo that no nation on Earth could have withstood.
Ryder Hughes
>First, I don't really get what your link is supposed to prove. Color me surprised. Look at the number of carriers I suggested for the relief convoy; and compare it to the number of pre-war carriers. Then remember that after the battle of the Santa Cruz Island, the U.S. had one active CV in the Pacific, the Enterprise. But clearly, that forced the U.S. to come to terms, right? [spoiler]7-4=3. 3>1[/spoiler]
>this is a theoretical scenario, so we could debate of the feasibility of this plan endlessly. No, we could actually prove our points. I know that's crazy talk, but it really can be done.
> I do think that since we're talking about one port, full of either destroyed, damaged or out-of-fuel ships, with few operational planes remaining and sub-optimal pilots, it isn't outside of the realm of possibility for two carriers and a few dozen submarines to severely disrupt supply lines. Those "few operational planes" actually are pretty much even up with 2 carriers worth of planes and a hell of a lot less vulnerable. Furthermore, you have nothing to demonstrate their pilots are "sub-optimal". You have yet to reply to the patent inability of existing IJN submarines to intercept convoys, except to assert that it would magically work here. They are somehow magically close enough to intercept every convoy, but also far enough out to be completely immune from any reprisal from the islands. Nor have you answered the fuel problem, how to keep those ships out their in blockading positions indefinitely.
Camden Wilson
>Fourth, I never assumed the IJN had to get there at the exact same time the convoy did. Yes you did, because you claim, and I quote
>let the convoy reach Pearl Harbor and just attack it again with 6 carriers and 10 battleships. The merchant ships might be there a while, but the carriers never need to enter the port at all. And once you unload the planes and the supplies for them, (first priority) they can leave and never need to return again to defend the island. This is of course, ignored. As are all of the other problems I outlined above even finding out in time to do anything about it, which is going to be tough as shit when your carriers are literally engaged in combat operations elsewhere.
Why not just assume that the Japanese will just magically win all the battles every time they lock horns with the USN? It requires about the same amount of bullshit.
>And finally, you very well know Japan had no choice but to go to war since the US were literally choking them with a ridiculously harsh embargo that no nation on Earth could have withstood. And you claim this is an intellectually honest discussion and not weebery? Wow. What obligates the U.S. to sell oil to the Japanese? Why couldn't they buy it from Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela, or the Soviets, or the British and any of their constituent colonies/occupied zones? Burma produced oil. So did Iraq and Iran, both under British occupation at the time the Pearl Harbor strike was being planned. But no, they *had* to attack the Americans! They couldn't just say, attack the DEI and call Roosevelt's bluff as to whether or not he would get involved, and who the hell cares about the perception of a first strike (and surprise attack) when your main goal is to attack the enemy's morale, right? That surely won't be important.
John Gonzalez
Ah yes, the famous Japanese intel.
Asher Allen
>Then there's the civilian population of Hawaii itself, which amounted to about half a million. In times of pressing need, these civilians could be armed as well. You do realize that half of those civilians are Japanese, right?
Gabriel Mitchell
The minutiae of the conflict doesn't really affect its outcome. Yes, it's interesting for military historians to argue about what went right or wrong for both sides at various battles, but from a top-down economic perspective, the war's outcome was determined before a single shot was fired. Take a look at this chart. It should be very enlightening.
Brody Baker
>The Army Hawaii garrison in 1941 consisted of 2 "triangle" infantry divisions with their supporting equipment. >That's some 20-25,000 fighting men, That's some 6000 riflemen and 1000 or so on heavy weapons. The rest are pogs.
Lincoln Anderson
>Why couldn't they buy it from Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela, or the Soviets, or the British and any of their constituent colonies/occupied zones? Because the US froze Japanese assets and pressured other countries to do the same.
Alexander Rivera
Are you trying to suggest that support personnel are somehow irrelevant? An army needs logistics to fight.
Leo Rogers
>Are you trying to suggest that support personnel are somehow irrelevant? I'm trying to tell you that your understanding of how an army division is composed is wrong.
Jace Nelson
>Then consider that at this time, Japan only had the transport capability to carry less than a brigade from the Marianas to Hawaii, Yet they somehow managed to transport 4 corps-sized armies to Malaya and Philippines simultaneously. I guess they really packed them in like in a Tokyo subway.
Nathaniel Bailey
That's really interesting.
The public reaction wouldn't have been the same if Japan left alone America and went for Indonesia and Malaysia instead, but still USA would have intervened, whether popular or not, and the posession of the Philippines along with an intact naval operational network in Guam and Hawaii would have pretty much cut off communications between Japan and Indonesia-Malaysia.
Wrecking Pearl Harbor was the right move. The retardation came later, being operationally fucking stupid in Coral Sea and especially in Midway.
Samuel Clark
>still USA would have intervened USA had no choice but to intervene. The only reason the Dutch and the Brits had embargoed Japan and froze Japanese assets was because the US pressured them to do it, while forming a not-so-secret defense pact against Japan.
Leo Sullivan
How much fuel did the 7th Fleet use while it was at sea per month? Certainly would be in the millions of tons, depending on speed and weather.
Angel Morgan
7th Fleet didn't exist in 1941.
Jace Walker
They believed Doolittle's raid originated there at first. The occupation tied up 500,000 American personnel trying to deal with app. 15,000 occupiers, not a bad trade-off.
Nathaniel Brown
So what was the Pearl harbor Fleet called? And how much fuel per month at sea?
Carter Ramirez
Post referred to Aleutians.
Levi Morris
yeah caught it
Adrian Adams
They did not believe B-25s flew 2000 miles from Attu to Tokyo, then kept flying to China.
Asher Rodriguez
Japanese records say otherwise. Admittedly they were not convinced, but it was considered a possibility. They had to explain where Doolittle's planes came from, and this was a factor in the decision to invade Attu etc.
Gavin Jackson
>Japanese records say otherwise No they don't.
Dylan Ross
>Yamamoto had a plan but it was unimaginably retarded Deets?
Jonathan Anderson
The limitation on transporting a force to Hawaii isn't the number of transports themselves, but the auxiliaries. For example, fast fuelers, because the transports used in the Malaya operations don't have the range to sail from the Marianas to Hawaii without refueling.
The IJN was chronically short of fleet oilers, having only 8 oilers before Pearl Harbor, and brought all 8 of them with the Pearl Harbor attack force.
Adrian Morgan
Basically he wanted to use Kaga and Akagi to launch about 40 Kates far enough away that they had no chance to get back. The pilots flying the Kates were supposed to shoot some torps then ditch in the water on the way back, hoping to be picked up by a sub or something.
