How do Buddhists reconcile the concept of No-Self with reeincarnation...

There's no reincarnation in buddhism.

There's rebirth (reincarnation implies "something that incarnates again"), and it's that of the mindstream, or parts of it (which are not the self) that identify with a body and situation and rebirth, keeping the "error" of self identification going

stop assuming Buddhism is coherent

It's not really "you" that is reincarnated, it's more that the "stuff" that makes up your mind is recycled into another mind. The goal is to free yourself from the endless recycling by achieving enlightenment and NOT reincarnating.

That's why Hindu philosophy is closer to the truth.

>implying it isn't the most coherent philosophy of all time

Eastern religions are garbage and filled with gaping holes in their worldviews.

hurr just live in balance cuz I said so even though I admit the universe is infinite and chaotic and there probably isn't a creator t. buddah

They are according to Chogyam Trungpa. Mental states that we live each day and at the moment of death, with such imagery being dependant upon our concepts of bliss and suffering

There's no actual reason nor evidence to believe the lokas are actual defined and structures places in some dimension.

Even some indian sadhus consider that the charnel ground can be a concept, with the modern depressive life in a soulless industrial metropoli being a smashan of our times

>implying the same can't be said about western religions

>Religions are garbage and filled with gaping holes in their worldviews.

FTFY

quick rundown on that guy? heaps of people seem to like him and his teachings seem appealing, but wasn't he a drunk and a sex pest??

it's been huge issue throughout the history of buddhism

buddha basically just said 'don't concern yourself with these things'

worlds most shit fucking religion

It is not just classical Indian self-theorists who have found this objection persuasive. Some Buddhists have as well. Among these Buddhists, however, this has led to the rejection not of non-self but of rebirth. (Historically this response was not unknown among East Asian Buddhists, and it is not rare among Western Buddhists today.) The evidence that the Buddha himself accepted rebirth and karma seems quite strong, however.

The later tradition would distinguish between two types of discourse in the body of the Buddha's teachings: those intended for an audience of householders seeking instruction from a sage, and those intended for an audience of monastic renunciates already versed in his teachings. And it would be one thing if his use of the concepts of karma and rebirth were limited to the former. For then such appeals could be explained away as another instance of the Buddha's pedagogical skill (commonly referred to as upāya). The idea would be that householders who fail to comply with the most basic demands of morality are not likely (for reasons to be discussed shortly) to make significant progress toward the cessation of suffering, and the teaching of karma and rebirth, even if not strictly speaking true, does give those who accept it a (prudential) reason to be moral. But this sort of ‘noble lie’ justification for the Buddha teaching a doctrine he does not accept fails in the face of the evidence that he also taught it to quite advanced monastics (e.g., A III.33). And what he taught is not the version of karma popular in certain circles today, according to which, for instance, an act done out of hatred makes the agent somewhat more disposed to perform similar actions out of similar motives in the future, which in turn makes negative experiences more likely for the agent. What the Buddha teaches is instead the far stricter view that each action has its own specific consequence for the agent, the hedonic nature of which is determined in accordance with causal laws and in such a way as to require rebirth as long as action continues. So if there is a conflict between the doctrine of non-self and the teaching of karma and rebirth, it is not to be resolved by weakening the Buddha's commitment to the latter.

The Sanskrit term karma literally means ‘action’. What is nowadays referred to somewhat loosely as the theory of karma is, speaking more strictly, the view that there is a causal relationship between action (karma) and ‘fruit’ (phala), the latter being an experience of pleasure, pain or indifference for the agent of the action. This is the view that the Buddha appears to have accepted in its most straightforward form. Actions are said to be of three types: bodily, verbal and mental. The Buddha insists, however, that by action is meant not the movement or change involved, but rather the volition or intention that brought about the change. As Gombrich (2009) points out, the Buddha's insistence on this point reflects the transition from an earlier ritualistic view of action to a view that brings action within the purview of ethics. For it is when actions are seen as subject to moral assessment that intention becomes relevant. One does not, for instance, perform the morally blameworthy action of speaking insultingly to an elder just by making sounds that approximate to the pronunciation of profanities in the presence of an elder; parrots and prelinguistic children can do as much. What matters for moral assessment is the mental state (if any) that produced the bodily, verbal or mental change. And it is the occurrence of these mental states that is said to cause the subsequent occurrence of hedonically good, bad and neutral experiences. More specifically, it is the occurrence of the three ‘defiled’ mental states that brings about karmic fruit. The three defilements (kleśas) are desire, aversion and ignorance. And we are told quite specifically (A III.33) that actions performed by an agent in whom these three defilements have been destroyed do not have karmic consequences; such an agent is experiencing their last birth.

Some caution is required in understanding this claim about the defilements. The Buddha seems to be saying that it is possible to act not only without ignorance, but also in the absence of desire or aversion, yet it is difficult to see how there could be intentional action without some positive or negative motivation. To see one's way around this difficulty, one must realize that by ‘desire’ and ‘aversion’ are meant those positive and negative motives respectively that are colored by ignorance, viz. ignorance concerning suffering, impermanence and non-self. Presumably the enlightened person, while knowing the truth about these matters, can still engage in motivated action. Their actions are not based on the presupposition that there is an ‘I’ for which those actions can have significance. Ignorance concerning these matters perpetuates rebirth, and thus further occasions for existential suffering, by facilitating a motivational structure that reinforces one's ignorance. We can now see how compliance with common-sense morality could be seen as an initial step on the path to the cessation of suffering. While the presence of ignorance makes all action—even that deemed morally good—karmically potent, those actions commonly considered morally evil are especially powerful reinforcers of ignorance, in that they stem from the assumption that the agent's welfare is of paramount importance. While recognition of the moral value of others may still involve the conceit that there is an ‘I’, it can nonetheless constitute progress toward dissolution of the sense of self.

This excursus into what the Buddha meant by karma may help us see how his middle path strategy could be used to reply to the objection to non-self from rebirth. That objection was that the reward and punishment generated by karma across lives could never be deserved in the absence of a transmigrating self. The middle path strategy generally involves locating and rejecting an assumption shared by a pair of extreme views. In this case the views will be (1) that the person in the later life deserves the fruit generated by the action in the earlier life, and (2) that this person does not deserve the fruit. One assumption shared by (1) and (2) is that persons deserve reward and punishment depending on the moral character of their actions, and one might deny this assumption. But that would be tantamount to moral nihilism, and a middle path is said to avoid nihilisms (such as annihilationism). A more promising alternative might be to deny that there are ultimately such things as persons that could bear moral properties like desert. This is what the Buddha seems to mean when he asserts that the earlier and the later person are neither the same nor different (S II.62; S II.76; S II.113). Since any two existing things must be either identical or distinct, to say of the two persons that they are neither is to say that strictly speaking they do not exist.

This alternative is more promising because it avoids moral nihilism. For it allows one to assert that persons and their moral properties are conventionally real. To say this is to say that given our interests and cognitive limitations, we do better at achieving our aim—minimizing overall pain and suffering—by acting as though there are persons with morally significant properties. Ultimately there are just impersonal entities and events in causal sequence: ignorance, the sorts of desires that ignorance facilitates, an intention formed on the basis of such a desire, a bodily, verbal or mental action, a feeling of pleasure, pain or indifference, and an occasion of suffering. The claim is that this situation is usefully thought of as, for instance, a person who performs an evil deed due to their ignorance of the true nature of things, receives the unpleasant fruit they deserve in the next life, and suffers through their continuing on the wheel of saṃsāra. It is useful to think of the situation in this way because it helps us locate the appropriate places to intervene to prevent future pain (the evil deed) and future suffering (ignorance).

It is no doubt quite difficult to believe that karma and rebirth exist in the form that the Buddha claims. It is said that their existence can be confirmed by those who have developed the power of retrocognition through advanced yogic technique. But this is of little help to those not already convinced that meditation is a reliable means of knowledge. What can be said with some assurance is that karma and rebirth are not inconsistent with non-self. Rebirth without transmigration is logically possible.

NOSELF IS NOT A CONCEPT OF BUDDHISM; NOTION OF SELFLESSNESS/EGOLESSNESS ASSOCIATED WITH BUDDHISM DERIVES FROM "NEW AGE" PSEUDOHINDUISTIC FALSITY.

>The evidence that the Buddha himself accepted rebirth and karma seems quite strong, however.
He was born in indian culture with an indian cosmovision, so of course he probably kept those beliefs. Like Jesus keeps so many jewish beliefs (gehenna, etc).

Say, if he was born today he'd be an heliocentrist.

Because that's a Indusubhuman infiltration... the original Buddhism didn't have reincarnation baby

Why are people so obsessed over the reincarnation thing? They seem even more obsessed over this than the dharmic teaching themselves

>Anattā is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions. For example, the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (~200 CE), extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity called attā or ātman (self, soul), asserting in chapter 18 of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that there is no such substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self". The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of the Yogachara school similarly discuss Anatta as a fundamental premise of the Buddha.

What did he man by this?

One interpretation is that the buddha was using skillful pedagogical means by not explicitly disavowing reincarnation at the time. He knew people were so attatched to it and that they would be less receptive to the dharma of he rejected it outright, so he remains silent on it and worked around it. When a practitioner got up to higher levels of understanding they would naturally ditch it because it's inconsistent with dependant arising and noself/emptiness, which are the true nature of reality.

>its discussion is found in the later texts
What does that means? That earlier texts do not discuss it at all, or that the idea of anatta can be a later development?

It appears in the earliest ones too

>The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutta of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts. It appears, for example, as a noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya, II.37–45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga, III.406 of Dhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya.

Anatta is definitely an essential concept to the Buddhist conceptual framework from the time of the buddha himself. It's later reaffirmed and also extended into the concept of 'emptiness' (shunyata).

There is no self as in, reincarnation disputes it. You cannot call your present body a self because through reincarnation, you will be in a different vessel. You cannot say your past or future lives are self because that simply isn't true, even from a non-Buddhist perspective. Because of reincarnation, the self you identify with now is only temporary, thus not the objective truth to atman.

If anything, reincarnation reinforces the idea of no self. I don't see how you thought they would contradict one another.

> If anything, reincarnation reinforces the idea of no self. I don't see how you thought they would contradict one another.
Reincarnation implies that there is something that incarnates, so it had more sense in hinduism where a "soul" or atman exists. The persona is not real but there is "something" existent that moves from one body to other.

See this post What reincarnation would inforce in those lines is the idea that the true self is not the same as the identity or the body. For hinduism the true self is the atman which is neither of those, it is a particle of the divine, of Brahman. For buddhism there's nothing at all. You can say that in the end Sunya and Brahman are nothing but the same thing, just with a different perspective/terminology which in fact is the center of several debates.

Not him, but that's a great summary.

Thich Nhat Hanh has said this about it:

>Reincarnation means there is a soul that goes out of your body and enters another body. That is a very popular, very wrong notion of continuation in Buddhism. If you think that there is a soul, a self, that inhabits a body, and that goes out when the body disintegrates and takes another form, that is not Buddhism.

When you look into a person, you see five skandhas, or elements: form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness. There is no soul, no self, outside of these five, so when the five elements go to dissolution, the karma, the actions, that you have performed in your lifetime is your continuation. What you have done and thought is still there as energy. You don’t need a soul, or a self, in order to continue

>It’s like a cloud. Even when the cloud is not there, it continues always as snow or rain. The cloud does not need to have a soul in order to continue. There’s no beginning and no end. You don’t need to wait until the total dissolution of this body to continue—you continue in every moment. Suppose I transmit my energy to hundreds of people; then they continue me. If you look at them and you see me, well, you have seen me. If you think that I am only this [points to himself], then you have not seen me. But when you see me in my speech and my actions, you see that they continue me. When you look at my disciples, my students, my books, and my friends, you see my continuation. I will never die. There is a dissolution of this body, but that does not mean my death. I continue, always.

>you are really just a manifestation of a supreme source of everything

-t hindu

He was a practioner of esoteric buddhism. He was a monk when he was a child but was forced to give up monkhood when he was found to be in sexual relations. He then taught as a lay guru (yes you can be a guru without being a monk).

THE CONCEPT OF NOSELF, IN RELATION TO BUDDHISM, IS PRESENT ONLY IN THERAVADA TRADITION, AND IN THERAVADA TEXTS.

THERAVADA IS NOT BUDDHISM; THERAVADA IS PSEUDOBUDDHISM, BEING A HYPERFORMALISTIC PRIESTLY INSTITUTION THAT RESULTED FROM HYBRIDIZATION OF VEDIC TRADITION, AND NAGA IDOLATRY, UNDER A BUDDHISTIC FACADE.

Please provide 1 single credible source to support this claim. Otherwise please refrain from spreading misinformation.

It's present in every single buddhist tradition bar none. This is objectively false.

Thank you

>>>lol

coping THIS hard

>what are skillful means
>what is the 2 truths doctrine

At least the west tries to plug its own plot holes, even if the plugging is with bullshit. eastern religions just handwave all their contradictions off.

>dude absolutely everything that the old testament says is cancelled by the new testament
>"I didn't came here to eliminate the law, I came to enforce it"

>filoque
>REEEE

>I'm going to impregnate a woman to born as my own son to offer myself to myself as sacrifice to clean you from the original sin you have from birth because I gave it to you

>thou shall not kill
>Moses, kill all the canaanites including women and children lol

>create man with foreskin
>command him to chop it off
>allow circumcision to be discarded just because the greeks won't convert

>bible makes no sense
>use Plato's doctrine to redraw and accomodate it

>creates everything good and perfect
>sin exists

>you'll see the coming of the kingdom in the days of the apostles
>I mean, you'll see them when the Lord comes
>I mean on his second coming
>that will be someday, trust me

>etc

You're confusing sunyata with nothingness. They are not the same.