Is hard problem of consciousness just philosophical circlejerk?

Is hard problem of consciousness just philosophical circlejerk?

please respond

Alan Watts, baby.

I think so, yes.

appearance qua appearance cannot be formalized, subjectivity as such is irreducible to its phenomenal ground

English please, doc

pleb

your actual experience of your "I" cannot in-itself be reduced to "just" neuronal activity, appearances are what they are, appearances, and while they have a material ground they cannot be accounted for in simply material terms precisely because they're appearances

There exists no hard problem if consciousness, the problem itself is rooted in ignorance of what consciousness actually is. It assumes consciousness can be explained beginning from the physical level up, but this is not possible. Consciousness is equated to Brahman, and it is out of Brahman that the mind, intellect, and senses manifest out of. Just as you cannot understand what the mind is by sense perception alone, you cannot understand consciousness, Brahman, by dry mental speculation alone. Brahman transcends thought. By trying to do so, you create a host of complexities and confusions such as this. If you come to understand Brahman by means of yoga, however, you can boil it down into a perfect philosophy just as you can take blue light out of the original white light.

The "I" is just self-awareness, nothing more. Threre are ways to test for self-awareness (mirror test), thus it is something physical.

You're not getting it. Self-awareness by definition cannot be physical, if we define the physical as inert. It is based in a physical system but not reducible back to it, just as the phenomenological experience of music are based on the notes on the page but can't be translated back to them

That sounds like saying the projection is something more than a product of the projector.

Its not the same as the projector but its never the less just a stream of particles produced by the projector and thus physical

Except when your idea of the physical involves the projection itself, then it's a meaningless term, unless you're prepared to commit to a panpsychism

>if we define the physical as inert
Why would we do that?

>just as the phenomenological experience of music are based on the notes on the page but can't be translated back to them
the guy who invents a piece of music does just that, translating the experience of music in his head into notes

What? In both cases whether it's the audience or the composer there's a clear distinction between the tones themselves and the notes which are just formalized short-hand

But it is clearly possible to translate between the musical experience and notes, just like it is possible to translate between meaning and words.

You're not getting it. The notes in-themselves can never convey the music.

notes must include same information as the music we experience, otherwise it wouldn't be able to translate experienced music to notes and back without loss of information

We know by convention what the notes mean, but they are only the ground for the experience of the music in its actuality, in a certain setting, time of day, mood, that can vary wildly according to subjective temperemants although objectively the same tones are being played. The qualia is only what it is, the experience of the music, and is not reducible to what makes it possible behind the curtain

Minor and Major scale generally feels sad and happy respectivly, regardless of other factors

>the guy who invents a piece of music does just that, translating the experience of music in his head into notes
>when materialists try to understand music but only listen to dreamtheater and have no notion of theory or praxis

Wrong actually.

Doesn't matter, the pertinent point here is that nevertheless there is a perception of objective frequencies according to a gradient of valuation we define as "sad, happy" etc. in the first place, since you can't point to me on a waveform where the sadness is, because it's pure appearance

because sadness is not a waveform, it is a chemical in our brain that is released under certain conditions, for example when hearing minor scale or seeing a sad face.

No, sadness the emotion is the phenomenological experience of these chemical changes in consciousness.

If you want to call it that way. I just don't see what exactly is unexplainable about it

I don't think you even understand the argument. Sadness the experience cannot be strictly accounted for the chemicals it is the phenomenological equivalent of, the hard problem is precisely that "it's just chemicals" cannot account for the subjectivity qualities of perception in a satisfactory way.

Are there any phenomens, any human behaviour that can't be theoretically explained with biology, bio-chemistry or neuroscience?

Like I'm talking to a fucking chatbot. Read more you fedora drone.

I think you just suck at explaining

I'm explaining it at the same level that I read it in, you literally don't understand words

yes

consciousness

is conciousness the same as self-awareness?

Being itself

Yes but it's a question of time when we can

how do you measure beeing-itself?

You don't. That's why it is irreducible.

is free market irreducible? evolution? love? the color green?

not really, I am saying the projection is something created by the projector from bits a pieces already in it.

if you scratch the lens the projection changes, if you pull the plug it goes away.

Furthermore both the projection and the projector are governed by the exact same set of laws.

I'm not sure I really think consciousness is anything more than a a suitably sophisticated system of organizing and processing information.

>speaking about hyperobjects and other nonphysical objects

no

you guys are simply unable to give clear answeres

I did give a clear answer, you just lack the means to understand.

But projecting is what the projector does, so telling me the projection is "just" the projector (consciousness is "just" chemicals) is a meaningless tautology with no real explanatory power besides locating consciousness in the brain, as if proponents of the hard problem are actually denying that

Its often used by people who deny that.

lets take your music comparison. The notes are not the same as the sounds, but they are an input that the musician and instrument use to create the output: sound.

the instrument isn't the music nor is the musician or the written notes but they are all part of an understanable process that creates the music

Agree?

Sure. Without making some claim to consciousness' ontological status, there's no doubt living systems produce their consciousness of themselves. Fedoras believe that's a sufficient explanation, hard problem proponents argue that we're only explaining the nuts and bolts.