A German invasion of the Soviet Union was doomed. No matter what...

Would Japan invading from the East instead of attacking America have helped?

They are doomed, Soviets would have continued building up and refining their military and would have invaded by 1944, and the Soviets would have won that war too.

He should've boosted fascism in the US at the start of the game

The southern strategy was by far the mist viable way to achieve a german victory
>Invade malta
> Convince Franco to invade gibraltar
>Transfer a good chunk of the luftwaffe to hunt the british navy and cover the italian one in the med. So they can better supply north africa
>Invade cyprus and provide support to iraq and the vichy french in syria
>Provide all the support Rommel needs to reach the suez
>Do all that in a few months and the morale blow to britain might just be enough to bring them to the peace table

If we're going to magically bullshit impossible actions, why not just

>Invade and conquer the UK.
>Overrun all of the USSR

there was info that stalin has planned the invasion of europe and hitler was aware of that

no. the Japanese were hopelessly outclassed by the Soviets, even in the event of a two-front war, and the geographical nature of the Far East means that Japan wouldn't have been able to leverage their numerical superiority anyways.

source? this seems like bullshit considering that Stalin killed people who believed in World Revolution, didn't annex Finland, and offered to hand over all of Germany to a neutral, democratic government after the war.

Keep Americans out, no Lend Lease, take over gorillion hectares of liebensraum, win war.

>Why couldn't the Germans produce ships and planes on the scale as a dinky little island?
They could, but they couldn't match the US.

>invading and attempting to hold North Africa in a general European war

JUST

Honestly this was a bigger mistake than Barbarossa.

This kind of ignores the fact that Germany started the war because of the whole living space idea. I mean they based that idea of becoming fortress europa as needing the Ukrainian breadbasket and the caucus oil fields.

That and they really have no way to properly deploy the majority of the resources used in Barbarossa. They can't cross the channel, they lack the port infrastructure to deploy in North Africa. They might have been able to deploy some forces in Syria and Iraq maybe but that wouldn't really have done much in the long run.

If the Soviets decided to stay out the entirety of the war I guess they could have made the allies bleed a lot more for Italy and France. Maybe bomb the British a bit more but nothing that would stop America from making Berlin glow in the dark in the end if need be.

I think war between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union would've been inevitable in the end. Or it would at least have ended in some form of cold war. If Germany had invaded Britain that would've definitely changed the war in the European theatre however there was no way of keeping the USA out of that.

Hard to tell if Germany ever stood a chance against almost the entire world

The literally couldn't even match the UK user.

Panzer Operations. Hoth. Soviets were sending supplies to the Germans for up to two days after capping a city because of a lack of communication. Uniform regulations were relaxed on the German side before that operation had begun. Read a fucking book before you post again.

Do this in 41. Invade UK in 42 when air dominance is able to be achieved. Use torpedoes to wipe RN. Use fighters in close and extending proximity. Prepare for an invasion of the USSR in 43.

>source?
>Icebreaker, Suvorov, he has the maps that have German translations and local maps to invade with
>Panzer Operations, Hoth, mentioned above, he says the USSR was preparing a massive and out of place motorized army on a likely offensive route but it was in the early stages of development
>Stalins speeches of 39 that allude to his geopolitical strategy of using Germany against the Allies, who instead reversed that strategy on the USSR
>Soviet military buildup since the early 30's

>Eliminate the RN with torpedoes
You serious mate?
>Cross the channel
With what river barges?

This board is really into speculative history for some reason. I don't understand the point of this kind of inquiry at all.

Surely you've heard of "butterfly effect" and what not. If you change one small detail in 1939 (an officer survives his wounds, is promoted) then 1945 happens quite differently. Change something major in 1939 (Hitler gets hit by a truck, or decides not to invade Russia) and you've flipped everything on its head.

There's no point in thinking about this since you can't possibly imagine the ramifications.There's no point arguing since nobody's conjecture is all that much better than anyone else's.

Don't forget that the UK outbuilt the Germans in airplanes in 41, so the air situation would get worse, not better, and you have the rather large problem that most of the German fighters don't have the range to get far over Britain, not if they want to get home anyway.

And of course, pretty much everything in is impossible. Franco didn't want to get into the war. The Luftwaffe doesn't have the range to sink the Royal Navy unless they stick them in the channel or off the coast of France for some reason. You can't land supplies in North Africa, nor do you have the naval/air dominance to invade or land supplies in Syria.

>There was no key decision or change of operation that could have made it succeed.
Fake news. A successful Operation Arctic Fox would've not only encircled two Soviet armies, but allowed for the cutting off of over a quarter of Allied aid. If Japan could be pushed into declaring on the USSR as well, the USSR could've been cut off from nearly all lend-lease for nearly a year before the Persian corridor was fully operational. Such a shortage of supplies, combined with pressure from two fronts, would push the Soviet Union to near-collapse, allowing a quicker and easier push to the East and for Germany to secure the A-A line, pushing Stalin to the negotiating table.

> two decades prior a German Empire fighting the full might of the Anglo-Franco Empires in the west manages to knock out the ancient Russian Empire

> A German machine that blew out France and has secure(ish) flanks had zero 0 NO chance at taking out a young, brutal, experimental regime that seems to have little support among non ethnic russians

Hmmmm

Determinism is for brainlets.

>There's no point arguing since nobody's conjecture is all that much better than anyone else's.
Ahhhh, but you're in luck today, user. My conjecture is flawless. AMA.

>You serious mate?
Prince of Wales and Repulse. Two UK BB's. Wiped out by outdated Japanese torpedo bombers. Battle of Taranto Bay. Outdated UK Swordfish biplanes annihilate an Italian fleet composed of various ships ranging from cruiser to destroyer to battleships. Torpedo bombers were key in the US defeating Japan, and aircraft in general were part of that framework.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taranto

>With what river barges?
The French destroyed their military vessels. Not their civil vessels(which they had no right to do, since it was private property). Not to mention those held by the Belgians and the Dutch which were not transferred or destroyed. Also, augmented by the few gliders and transports needed for the initial attack.
>Don't forget that the UK outbuilt the Germans in airplanes in 41
Don't forget that half of RAF must defend Asia, and it still couldn't save the RN's precious battleships. Not to mention the outdated aircraft they were using in the beginning.

Excellent post.

>Don't forget that half of RAF must defend Asia
No it doesn't. RAF deployments outside of Europe were miniscule.

>Not to mention the outdated aircraft they were using in the beginning.
But we're talking about 1941 and 1942. By then they were using very modern aircraft.

>No it doesn't. RAF deployments outside of Europe were miniscule.
Then they would have continued sacrificing Asia.
>But we're talking about 1941 and 1942. By then they were using very modern aircraft.
Negative. The reserves were still deployed, and those were outdated. Had the Italians the forethought to wipe out Maltese airbasing or other peripheral sites, that would be true. The British would use their best for home defense, no doubt, but not enough if the Axis had combined their forces properly and had the Germans focused their air force in the perimeter. A reminder that the Battle of Britain is only a nominal success within a narrow timeframe, and a precise mapping of the combat. It's more of a propaganda tool than a realistic comparative of both air forces.

>Weak virgin German troops able to overcome STRONK CHAD Soviet border fortifications
>Japan being able to do anything except bayonet babies
This isn't even getting into the fact that there would be no negotiated peace because it was a total war for the Germans and the Soviets knew it.

>Logistics don't real

>Then they would have continued sacrificing Asia.
What sacrificing Asia? The Japanese stopped advancing against British positions by the end of 1942.

>Negative. The reserves were still deployed, and those were outdated.
Seriously, what the fuck are you talking about? What "reserve", "outdated" planes were still being operated in Europe?

>The British would use their best for home defense, no doubt, but not enough if the Axis had combined their forces properly and had the Germans focused their air force in the perimeter. A reminder that the Battle of Britain is only a nominal success within a narrow timeframe, and a precise mapping of the combat. It's more of a propaganda tool than a realistic comparative of both air forces.
A reminder that this has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that in 1941, the UK built more than 3 airplanes for every 2 that the Germans were able to turn out. A further reminder that airplanes do not have unlimited range, and while you could very well take Malta if you really want it, Malta's importance in North Africa is colossally overstated. You can't reach to places like Alexandria without deploying your Luftflottes into NA itself, and you don't have the port capacity nor the truck capacity to meaningfully increase your deployments there.

>German troops
>Not Finnish troops and the Luftwaffe

Russia is just a really shitty country to invade.

That being said, it was a stupid plan anyways; Hitler didn't like the USSR, decided invading them wasn't going to harm the war effort, but somehow help it. Russia was and still is a money suck, sure, Ukraine is cool and all, and Germany really needed the fucking oil, but considering that the USSR was something of an ally beforehand, they could've fucking waited.

I hope you don't legitimately think this. Nations don't have a battle rating like in Warthunder, you mong.

>What sacrificing Asia? The Japanese stopped advancing against British positions by the end of 1942.
Exactly why an invasion of the home realm would precipitate in the British withdrawing to it's defense or risk losing it's homeland. It can defend one or the other but not both, so long as the Axis coordinates and applies effort on Britain at once instead of the USSR or the USA simultaneously.
>What "reserve", "outdated" planes were still being operated in Europe?
Read above. Malta. Fairey Swordfish model biplanes. Biplanes in WW2. Do you know anything about this period?
>A reminder that this has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that in 1941, the UK built more than 3 airplanes for every 2 that the Germans were able to turn out
Except Germans won higher parity fighting when concentrating their air force or when fighting over it's territory, two advantages it turned over to Britain. Why? I'll never know why the Germans didn't focus Britain.
>A further reminder that airplanes do not have unlimited range, and while you could very well take Malta if you really want it, Malta's importance in North Africa is colossally overstated
Except when it allowed 19 severely outdated biplanes to wreck an Italian fleet of destroyers, cruisers, and battleships. Battle of Taranto. I've told you multiple times now and given you a link. Read please.
>You can't reach to places like Alexandria without deploying your Luftflottes into NA itself, and you don't have the port capacity nor the truck capacity to meaningfully increase your deployments there.
Firstly, Germany has Arabic allies. Secondly, it already has Italian airbases it uses in N. Africa and can ride the Mediterranean to reinforce in one go. Thirdly, the issue isn't establishing supremacy on Africa, the Axis has both a logistics advantage due to proximity of industrialized territories to colonial territories and the bonus of advancing through allied lands to the east. This was a 1941 operation drawn up by Goering.

>Finnish troops
You mean the same Finnish troops who wouldn't continue forward without German reinforcements. Reinforcements which the Germans were unwilling to give which is in part why the operation failed in the first place? Those Finns?

>Exactly why an invasion of the home realm would precipitate in the British withdrawing to it's defense or risk losing it's homeland. It can defend one or the other but not both, so long as the Axis coordinates and applies effort on Britain at once instead of the USSR or the USA simultaneously.
Maybe I wasn't being clear. The defenses that the British historically left in Asia were tiny leavenings of troops from Commonwealth countries, and largely left up to locals. This was sufficient to hhalt Japanese advances after they took Malaya and souterhn Burma. I have no idea how a more anti-UK policy would stop that, unless you're asserting that the British would be pulling Burmese and Indian and whatever troops to England.

>Read above. Malta. Fairey Swordfish model biplanes. Biplanes in WW2.
Which did quite well at things like Taranto and against the Bismarck. Furthermore, they were hardly that uncommon. Not that they ever finished the carrier that they were supposed to be on, but the Germans were planning on using the FI 167, a biplane, as the bomber for it.

>Except Germans won higher parity fighting when concentrating their air force
But you can't concentrate to an unlimited extent, especially in the Med where your ability to deliver supplies is so limited.

> or when fighting over it's territory,
Because the range limitations now work in reverse. British bombing raids in 1941-42 were generally unescorted.

>Why? I'll never know why the Germans didn't focus Britain.
Because the Luftwaffe had terrible carrying capacity and was designed to serve as an adjucnt to another arm, usually the Heer. If you don't have an invasion ready, just sending out bombing raids is going to cost more than you're going to get.

>Except when it allowed 19 severely outdated biplanes to wreck an Italian fleet of destroyers, cruisers, and battleships.
The Illustrious set out from Alexandria, not Malta.
1/2

>Firstly, Germany has Arabic allies
So? They're few, unarmed, and poorly organized.

>Secondly, it already has Italian airbases it uses in N. Africa and can ride the Mediterranean to reinforce in one go.
So you're planning on flying to North Africa from Italy, and then doing what? Those planes need things like spare parts, fuel, munitions. So do your other forces in North Africa, and you can only land about 45,000 tons of supplies per month in a perfect situation. This needs to be divided among your land troops, your motorized logistical arm bringing supplies up to the front, and these new luftflottes you want to bring down. What are you cutting to increase your air capacity, and why do you think that sacrificing it for more fliers is a good idea?

> Thirdly, the issue isn't establishing supremacy on Africa, the Axis has both a logistics advantage due to proximity of industrialized territories to colonial territories and the bonus of advancing through allied lands to the east.
Except it won't work, because your real logistical limits are in the factors of port capacity and railroad capacity, neither of which you have much of. And if you want to "Advance from the east" you need to secure the waters of the eastern Med, which means you need planes to protect your slow, vulnerable convoys. Which in turn means you need air bases further east so that you can actually protect them, which you don't have unless you advance into Egypt proper. But you can't advance into Egypt without somehow getting more supplies to DAK, which is impossible.

Lend Lease saved the Soviet Union.

All the memes around Barbarossa are terrible.

>winter coats
>listen to the generals
>Stalingrad
>impossible to win
>Sealion instead

It was impossible to win.

What if the Germans had spent more resources on military tech?

>ICBMs by 1945, courtesy of Werner von Braun and Heisenberg

all they had to do was not be abominations. but alas germans are more fish, than man

>Suvorov

They needed to have some pretty massively expropriative food policies to keep the Wehrmacht going, as well as deal with a food deficit in Germany itself and most of their conquered territory. And if you take all their food, they're probably going to hate you.

>Use torpedoes to wipe RN
WHY DIDN'T ANYONE THINK OF THISSSSSS B4 A FUCKING GENIUS MOVE

Barbarossa was doomed to failure, but it was the best option they had. Sealion was a pipe dream, North Africa was a backwater of a theater with a very constrictive supply situation, and just sitting around depending on Soviet imports of raw materials while they grow stronger by the day would be a catastrophic blunder. If the Germans were to carry out a naval and air war against the Anglo-American powers, they needed resources the Soviets had, namely food, oil, and nonferrous metals. And they needed it now instead of waiting on the tough bargaining of the Soviets who could take their business elsewhere. They also needed to make sure there wasn't any possibility in the future of a massive front opening up in the east at an inconvenient time. When viewed through a more broad economic and political lens, Barbarossa makes perfect sense.

Russia didn't need to pre-emptively strike. They merely needed to threaten to cut their oil exports to Germany and bring the Reich to its knees within months. The Axis didn't produce nearly enough petroleum to supply mechanized operations in its wars of maneuver; the reason why Barbarossa was set for October months is because after that, they would be scrounging for energy resources to run any large scale blitzkrieg operations. Hitler was entirely dependent on resources imported from his sworn enemy, and that situation could not stand. In truth, Hitler had already lost the war by 1940 when Britain refused to peace out; Barbarossa was a desperate gamble for the only remaining possibility for keeping Germany in the war. The failure at Stalingrad sealed the deal.

Well, since Hitler lost, the logical thing do would would, at a certain point, try to do the opposite of what Hitler did.

For example, instead of starting Operation Barbarossa, bringing both the USSR, and eventually the United States, into outright war with Germany; they could simply have used their military hegemony, in continental Europe to build a consolidated state in Europe; and industrialize/develop areas of Eastern Europe; though I'm not sure what undeveloped resources were in those regions; and whether the agricultural areas of Eastern Europe would have significantly increased output if modernized. (Not really a war strategy; nor likely a strategy consistent with Nazi/Hitlerarian ideology however).

Fundamentally though, the Nazis only started Barbarossa because they believed that they had a good chance of winning; what political/military strategy they would have chose, if they knew they would lose the attempt is interesting speculation if something occurred to change their premises/knowledge (example: a time traveler dropping off a book saying that they lost.... Im actually surprised no one made that movie ).

>More more detailed and controversial than "Nimitz carrier has opportunity to prevent Pearl Harbor".

NAzi economy was fundamentally parasitic due to the overheating armaments industry and how they funded it. If they stopped conquering they stagnate and collapse.

See Tooze’s wages of destruction

We go over this every week. Debt means nothing if a nation is in debt to itself.
Yes, and he has hard copies of the proof he claims. I've noticed only the irl communists I know have a kneejerk reaction to him. Stop being a zealot for five seconds to pay attention to evidence.

The whole economic objective of Operation Barbarossa was to seize the Ukrainian breadbasket and the Baku/Grozny oilfields. They couldn't possibly compete with Britain on the seas or maintain their mechanized blitzkrieg tactic without being self-sufficient in energy; on the home front, the a grain surplus is needed to avoid the collapse on the home front as in the first world war. None of these resources were present in Axis Europe, aside from small amounts in Romania. Worldwide oil production in 1940 was:

USA 182.657 Mt
USSR 29.700 Mt
Venezuela 27.443 Mt
Iran 10.426 Mt
Indonesia 7.939 Mt
Mexico 6.721 Mt
Romania 5.764 Mt
Columbia 3.636 Mt
Iraq 3.438 Mt
Argentina 2.871 Mt
Trinidad 2.844 Mt
Peru 1.776 Mt
Burma 1.088 Mt
Canada 1.082 Mt
Egypt 0.929 Mt

The only energy sources available to Germany were the Soviets and Romanians, the rest was barred by the Allies.

Its not debt. Nazi germany needed a ton of petroleum for tanks, marble for monuments, tungsten for shells, and eventually uranium for nukes.

To afford to trade for most of that, they needed money, which they got by sacking Europe’s reserves and selling them to Switzerland. This funding source was no infinite.

You have no scholarly reference for your counter factual.

Every year the nazis stalled, their dependence on the soviets would grow, and America would be more likely to join the war with their bar unlimited industrial capacity

He also freely admits that he ignores all countervailing evidence. You'll note that the Soviets took none of the steps that they took when they did invade other countries in the time period (Finland, Baltic States, Bessarabian Romania). You didn't see any recon overflights, no massing of reserves near railheads. Hell, they didn't even pair the artillery with their organic transport elements. Suvarov is an idiotic meme.

>citing marble for monuments as a war need
I can't even finish your post since you have to reach to the moon to grab your straws.
>He also freely admits that he ignores all countervailing evidence. You'll note that the Soviets took none of the steps that they took when they did invade other countries in the time period (Finland, Baltic States, Bessarabian Romania). You didn't see any recon overflights, no massing of reserves near railheads. Hell, they didn't even pair the artillery with their organic transport elements. Suvarov is an idiotic meme.
You're a fucking retard mate. Evidence is linked to you above. We know they had massive reserves of offensive units because of the memoirs written about the eastern front to being with. Hoth mentions this presence in the central sector specifically and it was his opinion hat the USSR was going to invade. When does Suvorov say he declines evidence, because I've not seen that but I see you doing that. Also, Soviets had spies in Germany, so they didn't need aerial recon.
youtube.com/watch?v=Ppnj0rZKfqQ
Some interesting claims, but he mentions the spyring in Germany. They knew which Gauleiter would be in charge of which Gau and the invasion plan as a whole. Secondly, the artillery pairing meme is just something you made up on the spot.

Related, and something that's always bothered me:

Why did Germany insist on assaulting cities instead of besieging and bypassing them? It worked with Leningrad, so why the costly urban warfare of places like Stalingrad? Hell even the Soviet victory in Stalingrad came from saying "fuck it, go around'' and cutting off the Germans inside from supplies.

>Why did Germany insist on assaulting cities instead of besieging and bypassing them?
The ultimate plan was argued over(Manstein disagrees with both Jodl and Brauchitsch, the chief of operations and co in chief, but he just blamed Hitler anyways in his memoirs so it's not self incriminating). The plan of the superiors was to trap the Soviet forces in Moscow, Leningrad, and later Archangel to pocket them and kill the troops in one go rather than simply win territory. Manstein's opinion seems to be whatever the other German generals are against doing, so he's perfect for amateurs to look at for something "different".

They needed to hold onto Stalingrad to exploit the Baku oilfields as long as possible. If they managed to hold onto Stalingrad, they would be able to starve out the oil/resource shipments moving up the Volga while simultaneously exploiting those same oil resources for themselves and maintain strategic initiative. It's a matter of logistics. Leningrad could be completely bypassed without affecting the strategic situation. Of course the general staff, who were narrowly focused on tactics and were the ones who set the narrative of "stupid insane Hitler" after the war, didn't fully grasp this logic.

Leningrad was in a very favorable position for encirclement, with a sea to its west and a lake to its east, and Finnish troops to the north. The Germans only had to focus on the south. Meanwhile, cities like Stalingrad and Moscow were either situated on the bank of a river or very large with millions of inhabitants.

*Sorry, the Germans managed to capture Maikop, and not Baku.

>Evidence is linked to you above.
Where?

> We know they had massive reserves of offensive units because of the memoirs written about the eastern front to being with.
What the hell are you talking about?

>Hoth mentions this presence in the central sector specifically and it was his opinion hat the USSR was going to invade
Hoth is a German general both justifying his own actions and operating on the enormously crappy intelligence the Germans had on the USSR. history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-21/cmhPub_104-21.pdf (Page 42 for German estimates of Soviet strength on the eve of Barbarossa. For instance, they believed the Soviets had 118 divisions on the border region. They ran into 164 in the first few days.[page 46] Oops.)

>When does Suvorov say he declines evidence,
In "The Grand Design to Start WW2". He justifies it based on his former intelligence work, that the one guy out of a hundred who is saying something different from the rest is the one to really focus on.

>because I've not seen that but I see you doing that.
You haven't provided any evidence to deny.

>Also, Soviets had spies in Germany, so they didn't need aerial recon.
Are you saying they didn't have spies in the Baltic States, Finland, and Romania? Why did they feel a need to do aerial recon there?

>Secondly, the artillery pairing meme is just something you made up on the spot.
No, I didn't. It's in Stumbling Colossus by David Glantz. And it's not a meme, unless you're even dumber than a baboon. If you want to attack, you need to be able to move your artillery. They don't go very far if you have to pick them up and carry them by hand.

>Why did Germany insist on assaulting cities instead of besieging and bypassing them
Every time you blockade off an enemy force, you're committing yourself to leaving a certain amount of troops behind, to both seal off the guys in the city or fortress, and to seal off any sort of relief effort that's trying to break through to them. That takes up manpower, which is a very limited resource.

Leningrad was the exception, not the rule. It's blocked off on one side by Finland, another by Lake Ladoga, a third by the Baltic, and to the south it's kind of swampy. Furthermore, you don't have to advance any further in that direction, you can seal that bit off and turn east.

If you tried to do it somewhere like Stalingrad, you now have much bigger problems. You're hoping to advance on that axis, so instead of just blocking off 1/4th of the city, give or take, you need to seal all of it off. That in turn requires you to get around behind it, which means a forced river crossing over the Volga, and then extending your lines even further, as the Soviets counterattack over your bridgehead, hoping to get behind the city, seal it off, and then advance onward.

>Where?
Holy shit user. Look at the post for five links. CTRL+F = "pdf". Or look at that post right above the one you just responded to. You've got three ways to figure this out.
>What the hell are you talking about?
Hoth said there were Soviet motorized divisions place on an offensive path to invade Germany. We know there are hard copies of German maps with Russian to German translations, and they did not always have those for each invasion but they would *only* have them for an invasion.
>or instance, they believed the Soviets had 118 divisions on the border region. They ran into 164 in the first few days.[page 46] Oops.)
So you're proving Hoth's point? Thanks I guess.
>You haven't provided any evidence to deny.
You just ignored Hoth out of turn. So if you're going to ignore first hand evidence, explain what evidence is good enough for your intellectual majesty.
>Are you saying they didn't have spies in the Baltic States, Finland, and Romania?
How did you get that out of what I said? I said they had exceedingly good spyrings in Germany.
>David Glantz
Oh, its you. The 80 iq retard who has remained ignorant of all the sauce and videos I've given him over the past half year. I fucking love it. Wherever a good ww2 thread is, there you are, shitting in it, demanding sauce, failing to give sauce, and failing to make any personal advances in the field. Why do you out yourself as an inept retard Glantzfag? And by the way, I don't see it. [citation needed]? I see where the Soviets failed to mobilize their artillery later in the campaign,but not in the first 6 months when they were losing artillery on the forward line in the first few weeks anyways. It's pretty obvious that you just made that up and threw the Glantz name on another deceitful claim. How sad.

Still waiting for you to get back on that sauce genius. Did you figure out how to find mine?

They could produce aircraft, but they would have to massively outproduce Britain to win a battle over British soil, and they could not do that. They simply didn't have the drydocks to build to build a fleet, and building a surface fleet is a decade long process in the best of cases.

Honestly the blitz is the better turning point. It unified the British people around a conflict that might otherwise have ended in a negotiated peace, as they grew tired of sacrifice in the name of yet another European war. From the moment the first bomb fell on London, Germany could not exert power anywhere in Europe without the knife of Great Britain aimed at it's throat

>Holy shit user. Look at the post for five links. CTRL+F = "pdf". You've got three ways to figure this out.
There is one and only one >pdf link cited in this thread at the time of writing. It is in this post, one of mine. >Or look at that post right above the one you just responded to.
You mean, the one with the rambling youtube link? THat's not a source retard.

>Hoth said there were Soviet motorized divisions place on an offensive path to invade Germany.
Hoth is working from worthless German intelligence assessments

>We know there are hard copies of German maps with Russian to German translations, and they did not always have those for each invasion but they would *only* have them for an invasion.
No, really, how do we know they would "only" have them for an invasion? And if they were clearly planning them for an invasion, where are the rest of the steps?

>So you're proving Hoth's point? Thanks I guess.
No, I"m proving that German intelligence of pre-war Soviet deployments was worthless, and that Hoth is not magically omniscient. How can his statments mean anything when they're based on guesses that are wrong most of the time?

>You just ignored Hoth out of turn. So if you're going to ignore first hand evidence,
What firsthand evidence? We have Hoth's speculation based on an intelligence apparatus that is demonstrably bad.

>explain what evidence is good enough for your intellectual majesty.
Let's see. Some Soviet plans of attack would be good. Actual archived plans of attack, not just "I spoke to a guy and he said we were planning an attack, maybe"
1/2

>How did you get that out of what I said?
Because you say here,>Also, Soviets had spies in Germany, so they didn't need aerial recon.
Clealry, if they have spies somewhere, they don't need aerial recon. But since they did do aerial recon in Finland, Baltic States, etc, we can infer they didn't have spies. Of course, we also know that they DID have spies, so you're caught in a bit of a cleft stick here, neighbor.

>Wherever a good ww2 thread is, there you are, shitting in it, demanding sauce, failing to give sauce
I have been the only person in this exchange actually citing to scholarly articles. Here's another one, by the way. sci-hub.la/10.1080/13518040590914136

>Why do you out yourself as an inept retard Glantzfag?
Gee, why would someone bring up one of the most pre-eminent scholars on the Eastern Front in a discussion about the Eastern Front?

>And by the way, I don't see it.
Stumbling Colossus, It's a book. You can get it on Amazon. amazon.com/Stumbling-Colossus-World-Modern-Studies/dp/0700617892

>I see where the Soviets failed to mobilize their artillery later in the campaign,but not in the first 6 months when they were losing artillery on the forward line in the first few weeks anyways.
That has nothing to do with what I'm saying. I'm saying that if the Soviets were planning to attack, they'd need to be able to move their guns around. That implies they need transport, transport which was not stationed with their guns when they were supposedly getting ready to attack. That's a really stupid attack plan if they weren't' able to move their artillery to keep pace with their advance.

>icebreaker meme shit again
here's a good overview of the literature on the subject:
sci-hub.la/10.2307/2697571
>Suvorov's evidentiary base (or lack thereof), his dubious assertions of fact, and the illogic of his argument have been critiqued devastatingly by Gabriel Gorodetsky in Mif "Ledokola." Using archival as well as published Soviet, German, and British documents, Gorodetsky refutes Suvorov's picture of a campaign of aggression carefully plotted in the Kremlin and reestablishes the widely accepted view of Stalin desperately seeking to avoid a German attack, while scrambling to prepare for it. Gorodetsky also attacks the details of Suvorov's "evidence" drawn from Soviet procurements and deployments. In contrast to Suvorov's picture of vast Soviet numerical
superiority (with hundreds of elite armored and paratroop units at the height of preparedness), Gorodetsky shows the reader a large Soviet force to be sure, but one in precarious transition (training a horde of raw recruits, struggling to replace the purge-slaughtered majority of the officer corps, trying to develop and integrate new weapons systems and stretching to protect dramatically expanded borders), and very much unprepared to fight the Wehrmacht. Apparently Suvorov was so stung by these criticisms that his latest book contains a not so thinly veiled incitement
to violence against Gorodetsky.
>Such distinguished students of Nazi foreign policy as Gerhard Weinberg and Norman Rich have demonstrated convincingly that neither Hitler nor his generals feared a Soviet strike. To cite one example of their evidence, Joseph Goebbels's diaries show that Hitler and his henchmen believed that the USSR would attempt to maintain its neutrality for as long as possible and that they did not fear a Soviet attack in 1941. It is clear that, contrary to Suvorov and his disciples, Hitler's motives
in launching Operation Barbarossa were aggressive, not defensive.

Barbarossa did not have an economic objective. The main goal of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army. It sought to achieve this by reaching the Leningrad - Moscow - Stalingrad axis and destroying everything in the way. The diversion into the Caucasus was not an attempt to obtain oil either, but to deny oil to the Soviets. Not even Hitler could have been so stupid as to think that putting a couple divisions on Baku would suddenly make refined oil flow back in Germany.

>Other Russian scholars, including Iurii Gor'kov, the late Dmitrii Volkogonov, A. S. Orlov, and Lu. A. Poliakov, have mobilized much of this newly available evidence to demonstrate that Stalin was not preparinga revolutionary crusade and that Soviet forces were certainly not ready to attack the Germans in the summer of 1941. Gor'kov argues vehemently that the May 15 "Considerations . . ." document was never official Soviet policy and that references to attacks in various planning documents concerned the projected defeat of threatening German troop concentrations, not the conquest of new territories. V. N. Kiselev uses logistical evidence to criticize the theory that Soviet forces were preparing for aggressive war in the summer of 1941. He shows, by comparing railway shipping capacities, that the Red Army did not have the necessary transporto sustain an attack across its 1941 borders, while the Wehrmacht enjoyed better than a two-to-one advantage in that capability. This inadequacy of rail transport, coupled with the inadequate stockpiling of food, fuel, and munitions, means that the Red Army did not have the capability to conduct a campaign of the scale envisioned by Suvorov.
a link to Gor'kov's paper:
sci-hub.la/10.2753/rsh1061-1983360322

>Hey Ukraine
>Know how you're the breadbasket for Europe?
>The Wehrmacht needs food to keep its foot kicking Stalin's balls.
>Think you can help us out here?
>WE SHALL REDOUBLE OUR HARVEST, MEIN FUHRER

You utterly underestimate how much Ukraine hated the Soviets for what they had done. All Hitler had to do was not try to immediately start exterminating them and they would have put *themselves* under rationing just so they could help the German war effort that much more.

Germany could have won the war if she wasn't run by the Nazis, but if she wasn't run by the Nazis, there wouldn't have been a war in the first place.

Is it truly your belief that if Hitler asked for it Ukraine would have doubled its agricultural output, and that would have won the war for Germany? Please state yes or no.

Hitler's express reasoning for diverting the drive to Moscow to Kiev, and later the objectives of Fall Blau, were to seize the economically valuable areas of the Soviet Union and thereby knock the Russians out of the war. He prioritized first the Ukrainian breadbasket and the Caucasian oilfields over the obvious political objective of Moscow.

>Not even Hitler could have been so stupid as to think that putting a couple divisions on Baku would suddenly make refined oil flow back in Germany.
Of course not, but seizing the oilfields had the dual purposes of interdicting the flow of energy resources to the Russians and opening up the possibility of exploitation, delaying de-mechanization.

It's a turn of phrase, you moron. I'm saying that if the Germans didn't immediately start purging them and treating them worse than the Soviets had, they would have had a huge agricultural heartland completely on their side, full of soldiers willing to take up arms and join the war for the Reich. Having German-run farms would have probably gone better than the collective farms as well.

If they don't turn the areas of the Soviet Union they captured against them, and use them against the Soviets, they could have possibly won that war through the sheer snowball effect. For fuck's sake, how many Soviet defectors did they have, crossing the lines to join the Russian Liberation Army, eager to fight against Stalin? How long did it take them to actually MAKE that army of defectors instead of just throwing the defectors into concentration camps?

The Germans themselves did a study before Barbarossa which was pessimistic in the value of Ukrainian agriculture in the first few years due to its deficits and inevitable disruption during wartime. Simple force of will can't overcome massive losses in capital and labor as a necessary result of war.
>However, the investigations and calculations made at the beginning of 1941 within the Wehrmacht High Command and in the staff of the Reich Peasant Leader about the potential gain arising from an occupation of European Russia gave little ground for optimistic expectations. According to that study ‘the world’s greatest contiguous economic region’ scarcely produced any agricultural surpluses. Even the Ukraine recorded a surplus only in its southern part, while its central and northern areas, because of their high population density and their industrialization, had to be regarded as areas dependent on imports. It was necessary, moreover, to remember that, because of the high level of mechanization of Soviet agriculture, wartime effects and internal upheavals must instantly result in substantial losses of yield.
>These losses can only be made good over several years and are likely to reach their peak
in the second year, when cultivation can no longer be adequately performed. For that reason no surpluses should be expected under the given circumstances for several years to come; even immediate requirements for human and animal consumption will probably scarcely be met for some time.

Nice little fantasy you are building up there but sadly Hitler and gang had to deal with real world issues and that meant you can't just take a bunch of people who have contrary loyalties, do not speak your language, and have not had any training, and start using them as soldiers. Germans couldn't make effective use of the few "defectors" they had, and that means Ost-legions were mostly used for garrison or antipartisan duty, and had practically zero combat value. Let's not forget either that in the real world which is sadly very different from your goosestepping fantasy Germany didn't have the weapons and vehicles to equip its own citizenry properly. They would also be short of officers and good luck finding officers and NCOs who can speak Russian.
TLDR; you are a dumb faggot and handing out some bolt guns to a bunch of random people will not turn them into an army.

It's like you've never played Hearts of Iron or Europa Universalis or Crusader Kings or the Victoria Series.

Holocaust is fake

Because it's fun

This is bullshit.

>they had a smaller economy than Britain and her empire.
Irrelevant, since the Soviets would de facto ally with Germany to take out Britain. It would be USSR + Germany's industry vs. Britain's industry.

>>Stalins speeches of 39 that allude to his geopolitical strategy of using Germany against the Allies, who instead reversed that strategy on the USSR
That speech is a proven forgery, made up by the right-wing French media.

Nope.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf (Harborage in Libya)

jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/236/251 (U-boat ineffectiveness)

>this map

I seriously hope the black is labelled as "Axis" and not as "Germany"

Where do you get that idea from? The MR pact trade agreements were in no way even close to putting the full industry of the USSR at the disposal of Germany. They were trading some raw material, most importantly oil products and food, for certain manufactured goods from Germany.

Furthermore, they had been doing so at more or less the same scale from before the war right up until Barbarossa. Britain outproduced that. Why would you think it would increase?

I agree that Germany couldn't win with Barbarossa in 1941, there are only two things that I think could have made the operation more successful
1st concentrating the force towards Moscow (not diverting towards other fronts) and charge it. Imo it could have been the only way for 1941 Barbarossa to have a higher chance in suceeding, why? Not because of the city, or it's political meaning (the Soviets would have continued fighting even if Moscow fell) but it's railway. Moscow was the central railway hub of the USSR and it was a huge reason why STAVKA didn't allow it to fall. If the Germans took the hub, all the other fronts would have been vastly exposed. Even if Soviets blew it up, Germans would have repaired it fast as it was shown during partisan sabotage events.
2nd Attacking earlier (not wasting resources and time on Yugo and Greece), but that's a point that only someone from the future can bring up.

Nevertheless even IF Germany would have somehow conquered USSR, it's very questionable if they could maintain that territory while being still at war (would depend if USA is in the war or not, as UK's only hopes were USA and USSR). But also the war between Germany and USSR was inevitable, so this whole situation was rather tricky.

Best possible outcome for Europe would be if Hitler didn't came to power in the first place as many European countries were already anti-communist.

>1st concentrating the force towards Moscow (not diverting towards other fronts) and charge it.
And when the Soviets curl around your flanks and cut off your supplies?

>2nd Attacking earlier (not wasting resources and time on Yugo and Greece), but that's a point that only someone from the future can bring up.
No, it's a really bad idea as someone who was contemporaneous could point out. You need to beat the Soviet armies quickly and close to the border before your logistical limitations become crippling. To do that, you need a lot of burst speed to be able to breakthrough, rapidly move your more mobile formations, surround and then swallow up those big Soviet formations at the border. It's still muddy in May and early June, and that makes such rapid breakthroughs and exploitations difficult. There's a reason why the other two German summer offensives on the Eastern Front were both planned for late June, even if Citadel was delayed.

>and it didn't stop their vehicles and horses from getting stuck in the mud
so
>build roads
>win war

>Convince Franco to invade gibraltar

This is retarded because then Portugal would have invaded Spain immediately. Portugal actually honored the Anglo-Portuguese treaty and offered assistance but Britain said no because then Spain would have likely joined Hitler and made the whole thing an even bigger mess in Europe.

Spain joins Germany's side = Portugal enters the war on Britain's side

Portugal joins Britain's side = Spain enters the war on Germany's side

That's why they both remained neutral.

I'd say one should also take into account Spain just got ravaged by a fucking civil war, fairly certain the Spanish population would want Franco's head if they heard they were gonna go in ANOTHER devastating war.

>Invade UK in 42 when air dominance is able to be achieved.

Never would have happened. Not only were the British building planes faster than the Germans, they would have just moved their airbases further up north and defended from there. it would have increased the reponse time but the German's wouldn't have been able to maintain superiority at all.

Britain had no shortage of pilots from the Commonwealth and allies.