Do you think the French would have stood a chance against the Germans in 1940 if they didn't have such a low birth rate...

Do you think that the French would have stood a chance if they had Achilles fighting on their side during WWII?
Keep in mind that he has the armour forged for him by Hephaestus, a direct hotline to the Olympian Gods thanks to his mother Thetis, a squad of Myrmidons to back him up and he's been promised everlasting glory for defeating the Germans.

Fuck no
This thread is already full of retards so this post is pointless anyway

France had more devisions than Germany more aircraft more tanks etc

France had morel issues not man power issues

Nearly all wrong lol
>force them into germany
Yeah kind of, the Maginot Line gave them no other alternative. The French just assumed a forest was an impenetrable wall
>Paris
was declared an open city and everything valuable evacuated. Germans would have had no steamrolling the city if they had to. Think of the morale hit to the French if they saw that
>wasn’t worth the fight
No, the French simply had no will for an aggressive war strategy
>no malicious intent to the French
what

What does the birth rate have to do with anything? Are you daft?

>At a meeting in Germany the following day, Hitler instructed him to be prepared to leave no Parisian religious building or historical monument standing. After Choltitz's arrival in Paris on 9 August, Hitler confirmed the order by cable: "The city must not fall into the enemy's hand except lying in complete rubble."A popular account holds that Hitler telephoned Choltitz a week later at his headquarters in the Hôtel Meurice, in a rage, screaming, "Brennt Paris?" ("Is Paris burning?") By another account, the question was addressed to Hitler's Chief of Staff, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, on 25 August at the Wolf's Lair: "Jodl, is Paris burning?"

London?

Really, it's all a matter of whether the demographic boom is substantive enough to offset the rampant paranoia imbedded in the French enemy, who were terrified of having to meet the Germans again on their own land (10% of the French land had been ravaged in WWI, sometimes even the most productive in France accounting for all the plants and mines there).

This made the sum of France's strategy to set their army in Belgium, in easily defensable positions, and wait for the Germans to tire themselves out there or against the Maginot line. Something too easily thwarted when the Germans with Manstein's plan feinted an attack into Belgium, but then had von Kluck's panzergroup take the French army in the rear via Sedan.

Now you could also say however that a more demographically-strong France might've had meant more reserves in France, so it's hard to say if a million or so young men could've changed the game. It's not exactly like the Germans had it easy after Dunkirk. Most report their hardest time fighting in France as being against the reserves, who had adapted to the German tactics.

>The Germans renewed their offensive on 5 June on the Somme. During the next three weeks, far from the easy advance the Wehrmacht expected, they encountered strong resistance from a rejuvenated French Army.[183] It had fallen back on its interior lines of supply and communications, and had closer access to repair shops, supply dumps and stores. Morale rose and was very high by the end of May 1940. Most French soldiers that knew about the defeats, and were now joining the line, only knew of German success by hearsay.[184]
>Surviving French officers had increased tactical experience against German mobile units; increased confidence in their weapons after seeing their artillery, which the Wehrmacht post-battle analysis recognised as technically very good, and their tanks perform better in combat than the German armour. The French tanks were now known to have heavier armour and armamen

any Frenchman with a set of balls died in the trenches 20 years before, so the nation was filled with cowards and pussies. Led by them, too.

>the Germans with Manstein's plan feinted an attack into Belgium, but then had von Kluck's panzergroup take the French army in the rear via Sedan.
literally what the fuck is going on in this post

He would get literally BTFO on the first minefield.

True, but same goes for Britain
Yet, a mere tiny sea saved them

the British lost a fraction of the amount of men France did. To have survived not dying in the trenches as a French male, you had to have faked an injury, hid, or be wealthy enough to avoid combat. The vast majority of Frenchman worth their salt died or were maimed, so a generation of losers ran the show instead.

I don't see what you're having a hard time grappling with.

>Germans send divisions into Belgium
>Belgium finally sides with France, and France using this, sends its best divisions into Wallonia as per its strategy
>one more army is also dispatched to the Netherlands to hold off the German advance there, the Seventh army
>Britain also sends its troops into Belgium
>von Kluck, with a panzergruppen or whatever they're called contained divisions headed by Guderian and Rommel, swing through the Ardennes and make a breakthrough into France at Sedan
>the French and British are now trapped between the German army in Belgium, and the "panzer corridor" stretching from Sedan to Boulogne-sur-Mer
>only reserves on the Somme bar the road tp Paris

French defeat in 1940 was mainly political and it's seeds were already planted in 1925 (Rif war), 1929 (Great depression) and 1934 (6 February crisis).
Military the French could very easily drag out the battle of France into July and then move the main of the troops, equipment, gold and government apparatus to Algeria, giving the Allies a considerable early boost.
This isn't some scifi scenario either, such a manoeuvre was already proposed back in the middle of the 1918 Spring offensive, when the French HQ and government overestimated the German's ability to not run out of steam.

>I don't see what you're having a hard time grappling with.
Let's see, how about the fact that von Kluck died in 1934.

>The Germans may take Paris, but that will not prevent me from going on with the war. We will fight on the Loire, we will fight on the Garronne, we will fight even in the Pyrenees. And if at last we are driven off the Pyrenees, we will continue the war at sea.
Clémenceau, oh Clémenceau why did ypu have to die before WWII?

von Kleist*
My bad, I don't know how they even sounded similar to me.

Retard.

That could have been done, but at a tremendous cost for the French population.

>Implying a low birth rate doesn’t factor into Manpower reserves and the ability to wage another war of attrition only 20 years later.

The state of Europoors’ understanding of warfare today. A damn shame.

Yes if the French state evacuated to Algeria and thus legitimized resistance to the German invasion, the occupation of France would probably be way more brutal with a puppet government completely subservient to Germany and German troops posted all over the country.
In the long run though I believe it would be beneficial to the French, specially if they used their evacuated and colonial troops to quickly shut down Axis presence in Africa.
The French would get more concessions at the peace conference and could completely unambiguously claim that France never lost and that collaboration with the enemy really was a fringe phenomenon.
Not to mention France would get back on its feet sooner since they'd still have all their gold stashed in Algeria during the war instead of being stolen by the krauts.

The lack of manpower had nothing to do with the French defeat. The French mobilised almost 5 million men. Their problem was logistics, not manpower

No. The ratio of populations in 1914 was about 1.7:1 in favor of Germany. By 1939, it had shifted to about 1.9:1 in favor of Germany.

What lost the battle of France was extremely outdated and simply wrongheaded French doctrine which led to bad tactical and operational decisions. At least on paper, the strength of the armies struggling in Fall Gelb was pretty similar, but one of them had no coherent vision as to how to use mobility in large-scale warfare, or how to react to sudden breaches of the line.

This is a good read on the subject. spectrum.library.concordia.ca/977623/1/Parker_MA_F2013.pdf

France had tactical issues. Morale didn't cause the bulk of France to be overrun.

The bulk of the French army had already been obliterated by June 25th, and most of their equipment had been seized. Sure, you might be able to evacuate the government and some gold to Algeria, or even further away, but you're not saving those millions of troops. Trying to disengage the roughly million or so you have left (that aren't pocketed) while the Germans are chasing them to shove them onto sealift across the Western Med while the Italians have their fleet and naval bombers in the area is going to get very messy, very fast.