He still unironically believes that matter exists

>it's impossible to be an idealist and believe in other minds!
kek

>How To Avoid Solipsism While Remaining An Idealist
philpapers.org/rec/HENHTA

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doesn't that argument justify all conspiracy theories?

Its a shitty argument that has so many presuppositions that are not supported.

First is existence of mind (most agree theres a mind/s) but not all. Second is the existence of independence. Third is the existence of the will.

how could it possibly justify a single conspiracy theory?

All the argument is showing is that since all that exists is perceivers and ideas, and there are ideas independent of my own will, then there are other minds causing those ideas. So idealism does not lead to solipsism.

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>the mind existing is a shitty presupposition
wtf I love contradictions now

At the end of the day the idealist is arguing for other minds the same way any non-idealist would. We experience other people behaving in certain ways and we rightfully infer that this is caused by a conscious agent.

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>conscious agent

yeah that's right. Got any rebuttals or...?

You would have to prove agency, let alone conscious.

imagine actually believing this

Believing is what you do when you believe there to be any sort of agency.

Science has shown otherwise. You're just clinging to old religious belief stemming from ignorance.

Agency and consciousness are proven by their impermanence.

?????

Not the other poster, but:
A belief is just a judgment that a proposition is true. You must be a conscious agent to judge that a proposition is true. You judged that
>You would have to prove agency, let alone conscious.
is true.
So you are a conscious agent.
So the other poster you were responding to is right and you are wrong.

These can be observed and described as distinct phenomenon when they are revealed by their departure.

You have to be able to say what matter is before claiming it doesn't exist.

Semantics at play

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>he STILL believes there is a meaningful difference between perception and object.

If perception is the object then say goodbye to materialism and welcome to idealism

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Materialism at its base is a claim that reality is fundamentally non-mental and this can be proven wrong by noting the reality, irreducibility, and causal efficacy of the mental. From here the materialist has to make sense of what non-mental is and describe it in a positive way. So far they've failed to do so.

From a thread I made a few days ago about Solipsism.

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kek

wow user, you're so good at posting images on Veeky Forums

What are you implying?

>dualism

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>to intelligent to solve the mind-body problem

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see:

Premise two seems doubtful. Even if the two substances do not rely on one another to exist, it does not follow from this that there can be no intersubstantial causation.

Take cognitive ability, which substance dualists take to be of the mental substance and the brain which would be the physical substance. If damaging parts of the brain eliminates various cognitive abilities then those abilities don't actually exist in another substance. Otherwise, it should exist independently, but it doesn't. So monism is true. However, the physicalist goes wrong in trying to claim this monism is non-mental given the irreducibility and causal efficacy of the mental. They can't accept this without slipping back into dualism.

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If matter can affect mind and vice versa then mind must share some properties in common as matter.

What properties define mstter? Matter is the stuff that can be effected and be used to cause affect.

If mind shares that property with matter then mind IS matter.

If i see material, it could as well be there. I don't care about if it's actually there as if it wasn't it won't change anything.

In this case, I believe the dualist would argue, not that some cognitive ability has been destroyed, but that its ability to manifest in the physical world has been hampered by the destruction or damaging of the brain, with which the mind interacts causally. Damaging the brain does not damage the mind or its capabilities, but it may impair the ability of the mind to manifest itself in the world through the brain. (e.g. a personality change because a railroad spike through the skull). Thus, on the basis of a change in behavior, we infer a damage in the cognitive powers of the mind, but this inference is not warranted based solely on observed behavior, since the dualist's response is a plausible explanation of the phenomena.

Let us assume that, for the purposes of argument, that God is an incorporeal being, and also that God is omnipotent, where omnipotent means "can do anything that it logically possible". In such a case, God could will that matter form a particular arrangement, and the matter would take that form, but God does not share any properties in common with matter. If this is at least coherent, then it seems as though matter can be affected by something that does not share any properties with it.

That is a very silly escape tactic. When you take a drug or you have brain damage it effects your phenomenal states. It's not like you have all your mental abilities intact, the patient's first-person subjective mental states are effected. You know like when your car isn't turning on or malfunctioning but you're still in it and operating just fine? That doesn't happen when the brain malfunctions.

Ok, but that requires god to exist and every idea you said there about god to be true.

>If mind shares that property with matter then mind IS matter.
You're right on target with your monism but you're going the wrong way. It's the other way around. Given that we for sure know mind exists (maybe we're in the matrix and the matter we see is just an illusion, either way we know for sure we're conscious) and that mind is irreducible and has causal powers, then what you're calling matter is actually mind. To go beyond this is to lapse into dualism.

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I'm more inclined to go with Kant on this and that there is a noumenal reality that we only interpret and the mechanism by which we interpret noumena into phenomena is composed of noumenal stuff.

The stimulation of my eyes affects my phenomenal states as well, but the dualist is perfectly happy to say that the brain is also responsible for this, even if no damage has occurred. Is it such a leap to say that abnormal brain states result in abnormal mental states?

I agree, but if you grant that the situation I described is at least possible, then you also grant that it is possible for something incorporeal to affect things that are corporeal. Since it is plausible that what I described is possible, it is also plausible to think that it is possible for an immaterial mind to interact with a material object, such as the brain.

And what is this noumenal stuff? The idealist can give a positive description of the mind and mental properties like experience and all that. Can we describe this noumenal stuff in any other way than via negativa? If we can't I'm not sure it's even possible to believe in noumenal stuff. It sounds like a concept with no content.

That's petito prinicipii.

I will not grant that is possible. That must be established.

That has nothing to do with my point. It's about an independent existence. If cognitive abilities cease to exist when the brain is effected then those cognitive abilities don't have an independent existence. This would be a direct contradiction of substance dualism.

It's the stuff in common that we all experience phenominally in our unique ways. We can only deduce noumena from concilliant phenomena.

If there's no noumenal world and only phenomena, then we fall into solipsism.

There is a presumption in favor of possibility; namely, something can rightly be held to be possible in the absence of [1] a prima facie contradiction, or [2] a demonstration its impossibility. I am not going to ask you to go back and demonstrate that mind is possible, or that matter is possible. If you want to quibble that hard, then I will respond to you only once you provide a demonstration that mind and matter are possible. Otherwise, you are being unreasonable not to grant that what I suggested is at least logically possible.

Mind is a priori.
Matter is an assumption we both share or else solipsism and there's no point in arguing with me because I'm you.

>solipsism
see: >It's the stuff in common that we all experience phenominally in our unique ways
That just sounds like an inter-subjective reality that is compatible with an ontological idealism. It seems unnecessary to posit any non-mental reality that can't even be described in any positive way.

I agree with you. I am simply suggesting that dualist denies that the cognitive abilities cease to exist when the brain is damaged. They will try and offer some other explanation for what is observed.

>Matter is an assumption we both share or else solipsism
Wrong See:

A two-sided triangle is a priori as well, but is impossible. Of course, its impossibility is readily apparent on its face. The notion of a largest natural number, or of a square and circle with equal areas are also a priori and impossible, but their contradictions are not as readily apparent or easy to demonstrate.
The /existence/ of matter is the assumption; matter can also be understood a priori as that which is extended in space.

They can try but their explanations will go against what is experienced by patients and that should be especially troubling given the experience of the mental is itself the knowledge of it.

SPECIES SPECIFIC USER INTERFACE

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The argument in assumes that ideas require conscious will; we experience dreams which we do not consciously will and assume are a result of the subconscious. Aspects of the mind are not always under control of your conscious will, you can control your breathing but don't have to, thus there is some aspect that controls your experience but it is not part of your active control and does not mean there is necessarily other minds.

I agree with you. Something I struggle with in entertaining dualism is the modifications to first-person experience that you bring up. If, for example, the intellect is purely a creature of the immaterial mind, with no dependence on anything material, then nothing that happens to my brain should impair my ability to contemplate mathematics, metaphysics, or other solely a priori matters. Yet, it seems quite obviously to be the case that even minor phenomena such as drowsiness affect this ability.

A two sided triangle is not a priori, it's a logical impossibility.

Cognito ergo sum. I think therefore I am. For there to be thought there must be a thinker.

Indeed ideas are not always under the control of your conscious will but they are still mental. There are no ideas without the mental, that's contradictory. However in a dream like a lucid dream, ideas are indeed under your will. You are conscious and lucid right now, yet you can't change things by thinking about them like as if it was your dream. This means this isn't your dream, and you're in an inter-subjective world of other minds. Read the paper I linked for more details on how one can be a solipsist and believe in other minds.

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I meant to say be an idealist and believe in other minds

Precisely. It's this intuition that has led many away from dualism and rightfully so. But they take this to physicalism and that's just not the way to go given irreducibility of the mental. Idealism appears to be the last man standing.

Again that argument presumes that you can't create that experience subconsciously alone. Of which I can only assume can be the case. Both arguments cannot be proven so are of equal validity.

Or there's a noumenal reality

If it was, like in your dreams, then we would still have control. If you were just in my head and only existed as an idea in my head then you would be subject to control like the dream characters I experience in dreams. But that's not happening.

At the end of the day, the idealist is coming to believe in other minds the same way any dualist or materialist would. It's a very commonsense approach that hey these people seem conscious like me so they're conscious. This question about other minds isn't unique to idealism. If physicalism and dualism can rationally affirm other minds then so can the idealist.

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Which apparently you can't even describe so it's no different than saying there's a "oriejwgoiha reality". I'm not seeing any reason to affirm a non-mental reality.

meant to post pic related
tired

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Not all dreams are lucid. Presumably. Maybe you have only lucid dreams.

The materialist sees a creature made of the same material as himself, understands that the noumenal world, he assumes exists, operates on fundamental axiomatic principles, thus if he is conscious, so must this other creature similar to himself.

The idealist must assume the world is a product of the mind and assume that this mind that he perceives is similar to himself but not himself, and assumes that together they formulate the world.

The materialist has less assumptions

Not all dreams are lucid but you're lucid right now. You're aware that you're aware. You can do a reality check right now just as lucid dreamers do. Lucid dreamers determine what is a dream and not by doing reality checks, seeing if they can change things with their mind and seeing if reality is consistent and all that. If this was a dream, and you were just an idea in my head I'd be able to control you by now but I can't. So just like any lucid dreamer would rightfully infer, whether they were idealist or materialists, you're not just an idea in my head but another mind.

>The materialist has less assumptions
Absolutely false. You admitted the materialist assumes the noumenal world exists (which you have yet again failed to actually describe). The idealist need believe experience exists, which they don't have to assume at all. We know experience exists. It's the materialist that is positing there is more than experience. The idealist believes there's the mental and that's that. The materialist either believes there is the material and tries to cram the mental in there, which just lapses into dualism, or they deny the mental which is impossible (I think, therefore I am).

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You're assuming your lucidity check is trustworthy. It seemingly has been previously, but that presumes that the past is similar to the future. More assumptions. The materialist knows the future will operate on the same rules as the past because the fundamental axioms do not change by definition.

The idealist needs experience to be trustworthy. The materialist knows it's not. The mental existing doesn't result in duslism if the mental has the same properties as noumenal stuff. There is a dualism of noumena and phenomena, of which phenomena is untrustworthy.

There is no assuming. Stephen LaBerge (Ph.D. Stanford University) developed techniques to enable himself and other researchers to enter a lucid dream state at will, most notably the MILD technique (mnemonic induction of lucid dreams), which was necessary for many forms of dream experimentation. In 1987, he founded The Lucidity Institute, an organization that promotes research into lucid dreaming, as well as running courses for the general public on how to achieve a lucid dream. This is the primary way scientists will research dreams and do these reality checks in a reliable and quantitative manner.

>The materialist knows the future will operate on the same rules as the past because the fundamental axioms do not change by definition.
Why is this closed off to the idealist? Idealists can believe in fundamental laws as well without the extra assumptions of a material world outside of experience.

Experience is reliable, it's what science is based off of. Science is not trustworthy?

>The mental existing doesn't result in duslism if the mental has the same properties as noumenal stuff.
1. you've still failed to actually describe what noumenal stuff actually is
2. we know mental properties are irreducible. check out the hard problem of consciousness.

your only way out is to either deny the mental, which is impossible, or go to dualism which we know is wrong given the mind-body problem. you should just stick with monistic idealism to remain consistent.

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In what form are fundamental laws insantiated? Is it something agreed upon by all minds? If so why are physicists having so much trouble figuring out the unified field theorum, shouldn't they know it already?

Science is only trustworthy because it cinstantly checks itself over and over again. It is the pinacle of consillient phenomena, and when it's wrong it must fundamentally restructure it's paradigm to accommodate new knowledge. (like the shift from newtonian physics to quantum physics, quantum equations fit the newtonian model but not vice versa)

It's the stuff we experience phenominally. We're still trying to figure it out, some people think it's vibrating dimensions.

Where did I deny the mental? Where did I posit a separation of mind and body? Where was my inconsistency?

>what is monadic dualism

>In what form are fundamental laws insantiated?
In what form could they be instantiated if physicalism were true?? If everything is just a physical object then how could any fundamental laws exist, unless you're saying fundamental laws are themselves physical objects which just sounds silly. With Idealism, this could be explained by a cosmic mind, a universal lucid dreamer that holds all things together in a consistent manner. We macro minds would exist within this cosmic mind the same way physicalist see macro objects within a cosmic object (universe).

>Science is only trustworthy because it cinstantly checks itself over and over again.
And this is done with... experience! It's an ongoing empirical investigation. This is something idealism is right at home with. Materialism is saying there is more beyond the empirical world, that beyond experience there is this stuff called "matter" or "the physical". Idealism doesn't assume that. Idealism just sticks to what we know: experience.

>It's the stuff we experience phenominally.
If noumenal stuff is just that then you're saying it's just a bunch of phenomenal properties which is right at home with idealism.

>Where did I deny the mental? Where did I posit a separation of mind and body? Where was my inconsistency?
Please read more carefully. I said from the irreducibility of mental properties your only way would would be to either deny the mental or go to dualism. You can't be a materialist and keep irreducible mental properties as I explained awhile ago.

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that won't work given the irreducibility of mental properties. If the mental and physical are just two different expressions of a single monad then we wouldn't have irreducible mental properties.

So you also assume there is a cosmic lucid dreamer? Where? Could this cosmic lucid dreamer not be a mind and just be noumenal reality of which we are composed of?

If experience was fundamentally trustworthy, then the initial test would be enough to guarantee success, rather than constant retesting, which is an admission to the fallibility of us all.

Just because we don't understand fully something does not invalidate the theory thereupon the current understanding is built.

>idealism thread devolves into spiritualist nonsense
Is bashing materialism one of these christian reverse fedoras things?

This wouldn't be an assumption, this would be a conclusion derived by reason. There is no such thing as experience without a mind. This world of experience would have to be grounded in a mind.

If experience was untrustworthy you wouldn't be able to make any predictions based on it, but alas here you are making all sorts of predictions based on experience. The fact that your own experience is not infallible is only further proof that solipsism is false and that reality is ultimately grounded in a mind other than your own.

We have to first understand what a theory is in order to believe it. So far this noumenal stuff is indistinguishable from phenomenal stuff.

For now I'm going to bed, I can continue this discussion tomorrow.

>spiritualist nonsense
proof you haven't read this thread at all

If there's no way to test the derivation to conclude upon it's veracity thenit is an assumption.

Experience seems trustworthy most of the time. But it's not always so we gotta test it. This only proves solipsism false if you think your subconscious mind which could be the cause of evertything wants you not to suffer.

The absolute level of noumenal stuff hasn't been figured out yet, we thought it was atoms, then subatomic particles, now we sort of think it's strings but that seems to be wrong. The nature of this stuff is that we cannot perceive it. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle ensures it, so we can only derive upon the nature of this noumenal stuff.

Gnight! Nice talking to you.

>unconscious thought
Damn really BTFO my own mind there

>believing existance exists
user, no...

Perception is subjective.
Truth is eternal and inmaterial.

There are more colors than those we can see. More flavors than what we can taste. More sounds than what we can hear.

Just the fact that we know these exist, proves the OP correct. Our entire world, as shown by our perception is nothing more than a veil.

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Not him, and also not trying to sound like a cunt. My point being don't talk about things you only know in a surface level: Heinserberg's uncertainty principle is an observable and determinable mathematical phenomenom which states the more precise you measure (interact) with certain variable (momentum or position) the more imprecise the other will be read. It's not an universal law per se, but an observable event, most probably due to the wave-particle paradigm.

p1 and p3 are assumptions

>not seeing existence is the simple oneness of being and nothing
user, you...