1) It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak...

That's not the definition of Omelette though.

Don't talk shit about my perfect omelette, heretic.

...

He said perfect omelette, we'll now call the Perflette.

The Perflette is the most perfect omelette.

renamed, not redefined

1. The best girlfriend ever is a concept of what the greatest girlfriend would be
2. This concept exists in my mind
3. A girlfriend which exists in reality is greater than a girlfriend which only exists in the mind
4. Therefore the best girlfriend ever must exist in reality
5. A girlfriend which is mine is greater than one which is not mine
6. Therefore the best girlfriend ever exists in reality and is my girlfriend

>tfw no gf even though my impecable logic necessitates I have one

Does God contain the set of all sets that don't contain God?

At least try to understand the argument, for God's sake.

Where is my proof wrong?

There's nothing to understand. The argument is bad, and from a primitive age where people didn't really know what a thought is and believed matter was made of fire, water, earth and wind.

Kant destroyed it thoroughly with impeccable logic.

Let me break it down very easily for you. Just because you can imagine a concept that contains in its definition that it exists, doesn't mean that it exists. I can define a certain kind of unicorn as existent, but that doesn't mean it does. Imagination does not necessitate anything within reality.

The argument is either analytic or synthetic.

If it is analytic, then it is a tautology; God exists because he is defined as being existent.

If it is synthetic, then it is invalid as the existence of God is not contained within the definition of God and as such evidence would need to be found to support it.

t. Kant

1,2 and 3 are fine. You have no basis for 4. 5 is a non-sequitur. 6 is a restating of 4 and 5.

The right conclusion to make from 1,2 and 3 is "therefore any real girlfriend is better than "the best girlfriend" ever existing strictly as a concept."

It's an interesting argument. You must be able to explain, very clearly and with strong confidence, why you disagree with it if you don't.

You may not select its final conclusion as incorrect according to your broader perspective and toss the entire argument out without consideration.

This is the most obvious retort to the argument, but it's a tangential aside as you have it here. Can you find away to apply it to the argument?

>You have no basis for 4.
How so. The best girlfriend ever must exist or it would not be the best. The best girlfriend ever not being the best is a contradiction. This is exactly how the ontological proof works.

>5 is a non-sequitur. 6 is a restating of 4 and 5.
Then you don't understand what I'm proving.

>The right conclusion to make from 1,2 and 3 is "therefore any real girlfriend is better than "the best girlfriend" ever existing strictly as a concept."
This is true but a non-sequitur. Another conclusion that can be drawn and that is relevant to the conclusion trying to be reached is that the best girlfriend ever cannot exist simply as a concept if it is defined as the greatest girlfriend.

I'm not going to camp in the thread and greentext war, sorry. Have a nice day.

How is 2 fine? "God" is neither well-defined, nor has it been actually shown that we can imagine such a being. We can hold a symbol such as the letter construct "God" in our heads, and the ideas it evokes, which differ from person to person, but it is devoid of meaning by itself. As for the attributes of such a deity, they are also mere symbols assigned to it.
In addition, a clear understanding of the act of imagining is fundamental to making an assessment of what that does and does not allow in terms of conclusions drawn from said act, and we lack this clear understanding, both scientifically and conceptually.

I could find a few more points about 2, never mind the rest. This is not a sound argument, just a silly trick of language.

come up with a good theodicy and justify how a nonphysical mind would exist.

then tell me why a god would create a physical universe

How does it not apply to the argument? The flaw is in step 6. Proving that the concept of God includes existence does not mean that the concept itself exists. There is a bubble if you will around the concept that cannot reach outside into reality, no matter what you put in it. I think the ontological proof is putting a kind of recurrence inside that bubble, another conceptual bubble, and then pretending that the outer bubble is now reality and the new bubble is the original concept. That's the only way I can explain it intuitively.

Follow the replies more carefully user.

The argument in OP (a parody of which I was responding to) definitely forces us to ask questions about the relationship between real things and concepts, you're quite right.

Most people seem to miss the argument though. It's doing something very neat (I'm not convinced it's correct, but it's very interesting, definitely not "silly").

I will try to rewrite it as I've understood it.

1. There is an upper bound on conceptualization. There is a concept which denotes this upper bound. Call it G.

2. Suppose we can imagine something greater than x. Then x is not G.

3. For any concept x, let R(x) mean that x corresponds to a real thing. Let C(x) mean that x is purely conceptual. Note that for any x, C(x)

The trick here that's deployed is getting from conceptual existence to real existence by using an idea of conceptual "greatness."

The sentence that allows for this argument is "ideas corresponding to real things are greater than ideas not corresponding to real things" which would seem to imply a partial ordering of concepts based on the extent to which they correlate to reality.

That's fascinating. Actually that's a much more convincing premise too than the one OP has.