I know that I know pure ideology

Someone who prescribes to pure ideology knowingly would behave absurdly. In an example it would look like this: suppose someone told you after you purchased your lottery ticket that someone rigged the lottery and you have no chance of winning and your response was to say, 'Yes, I know, but how else will I win the lottery unless I buy a ticket?" This would amount to prescribing to pure ideology. Of course, the contention has to do with the fact that people do actually do this. You can test to see if they do I suppose.

what's zizeck's ideal

does anyone else have fun doing a zizek impression? or is it just me

Im sure he wants to articulate himself well, among other things.

How do you expect me to read this passage with its severe lack of sniffing and so on and so on?

Bumping so ı can source you tomorrow, ı'm too tired atm.

Ok, i'll look for it.

>not knowing about unknown knowns

>Zizeck
>ck

For what purpose?

It's a little bit like the Christianity part of human history in chapter 2, disengagement from the material world etc. but the problem is that was a willful disengagement (led by jesus) and did not make use of (using zizeks/anons language) remains of the positive emotions attached to old materialism but was a deliberate detachment from materialism.

Zizek/user says there is a removal of ideal mental content in pure ideology, Stirner makes no such claim about fixed ideas, quite the contrary, the afterlife, happiness, rationality and so on are always awaiting you with open arms but they behave in a self-serving manner and the spooked always get the short end of the stick in reality.

If you reduce that to say the promise is nothing but a farce in both instances then there is of course no difference but I think the motivations of the ideologized/spooked are substantially different so yeah. Yes and no.

>"testing" philosophy

Christ you positivist faggots are thick

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_philosophy

How else are we going to stop the demise of philosophy as relevant?
Logic alone won't save it.

>How else are we going to stop the demise of philosophy as relevant?
>Logic alone won't save it.

By dropping your juvenile analytic dead end

>juvenile
>analytic
>dead end
Explain? I think anthropology comes with much more interesting life philosophies and that the other things philosophy questions itself with can be explained by science.

Though I do think scientism is a pitfall but I see little philosophers warn against it but essayist Nassim Taleb who borrows a lot of his ideas from complexity science.

>Man, your head is haunted; you have wheels in your head! You imagine great things, and depict to yourself a whole world of gods that has an existence for you, a spirit-realm to which you suppose yourself to be called, an ideal that beckons to you. You have a fixed idea!
>Do not think that I am jesting or speaking figuratively when I regard those persons who cling to the Higher, and (because the vast majority belongs under this head) almost the whole world of men, as veritable fools, fools in a madhouse. What is it, then, that is called a "fixed idea"? An idea that has subjected the man to itself. When you recognize, with regard to such a fixed idea, that it is a folly, you shut its slave up in an asylum. And is the truth of the faith, say, which we are not to doubt; the majesty of (e. g.) the people, which we are not to strike at (he who does is guilty of – lese-majesty); virtue, against which the censor is not to let a word pass, that morality may be kept pure; – are these not "fixed ideas"? Is not all the stupid chatter of (e. g.) most of our newspapers the babble of fools who suffer from the fixed idea of morality, legality, Christianity, etc., and only seem to go about free because the madhouse in which they walk takes in so broad a space? Touch the fixed idea of such a fool, and you will at once have to guard your back against the lunatic’s stealthy malice. For these great lunatics are like the little so-called lunatics in this point too – that they assail by stealth him who touches their fixed idea. They first steal his weapon, steal free speech from him, and then they fall upon him with their nails. Every day now lays bare the cowardice and vindictiveness of these maniacs, and the stupid populace hurrahs for their crazy measures. One must read the journals of this period, and must hear the Philistines talk, to get the horrible conviction that one is shut up in a house with fools. "Thou shalt not call thy brother a fool; if thou dost – etc." But I do not fear the curse, and I say, my brothers are arch-fools. Whether a poor fool of the insane asylum is possessed by the fancy that he is God the Father, Emperor of Japan, the Holy Spirit, etc., or whether a citizen in comfortable circumstances conceives that it is his mission to be a good Christian, a faithful Protestant, a loyal citizen, a virtuous man – both these are one and the same "fixed idea." He who has never tried and dared not to be a good Christian, a faithful Protestant, a virtuous man, etc., is possessed and prepossessed 29 by faith, virtuousness, etc.
[cont.]

Don't greentext those huge chunks of text, it's painful to read.

>Just as the schoolmen philosophized only inside the belief of the church; as Pope Benedict XIV wrote fat books inside the papist superstition, without ever throwing a doubt upon this belief; as authors fill whole folios on the State without calling in question the fixed idea of the State itself; as our newspapers are crammed with politics because they are conjured into the fancy that man was created to be a zoon politicon – so also subjects vegetate in subjection, virtuous people in virtue, liberals in humanity, without ever putting to these fixed ideas of theirs the searching knife of criticism. Undislodgeable, like a madman’s delusion, those thoughts stand on a firm footing, and he who doubts them – lays hands on the sacred! Yes, the "fixed idea," that is the truly sacred!
>Is it perchance only people possessed by the devil that meet us, or do we as often come upon people possessed in the contrary way – possessed by "the good," by virtue, morality, the law, or some "principle" or other? Possessions of the devil are not the only ones. God works on us, and the devil does; the former "workings of grace," the latter "workings of the devil." Possessed people are set in their opinions.
>If the word "possession" displeases you, then call it prepossession; yes, since the spirit possesses you, and all "inspirations" come from it, call it – inspiration and enthusiasm. I add that complete enthusiasm – for we cannot stop with the sluggish, half- way kind – is called fanaticism.
>It is precisely among cultured people that fanaticism is at home; for man is cultured so far as he takes an interest in spiritual things, and interest in spiritual things, when it is alive, is and must be fanaticism; it is a fanatical interest in the sacred (fanum). Observe our liberals, look into the Sächsischen Vaterlandsblätter, hear what Schlosser says: "Holbach’s company constituted a regular plot against the traditional doctrine and the existing system, and its members were as fanatical on behalf of their unbelief as monks and priests, Jesuits and Pietists, Methodists, missionary and Bible societies, commonly are for mechanical worship and orthodoxy."
>Take notice how a "moral man" behaves, who today often thinks he is through with God and throws off Christianity as a bygone thing. If you ask him whether he has ever doubted that the copulation of brother and sister is incest, that monogamy is the truth of marriage, that filial piety is a sacred duty, then a moral shudder will come over him at the conception of one’s being allowed to touch his sister as wife also, etc. And whence this shudder? Because he believes in those moral commandments. This moral faith is deeply rooted in his breast. Much as he rages against the pious Christians, he himself has nevertheless as thoroughly remained a Christian – to wit, a moral Christian. In the form of morality Christianity holds him a prisoner, and a prisoner under faith.
[cont.]

Monogamy is to be something sacred, and he who may live in bigamy is punished as a criminal; he who commits incest suffers as a criminal. Those who are always crying that religion is not to be regarded in the State, and the Jew is to be a citizen equally with the Christian, show themselves in accord with this. Is not this of incest and monogamy a dogma of faith? Touch it, and you will learn by experience how this moral man is a hero of faith too, not less than Krummacher, not less than Philip II. These fight for the faith of the Church, he for the faith of the State, or the moral laws of the State; for articles of faith, both condemn him who acts otherwise than their faith will allow. The brand of "crime" is stamped upon him, and he may languish in reformatories, in jails. Moral faith is as fanatical as religious faith! They call that "liberty of faith" then, when brother and sister, on account of a relation that they should have settled with their "conscience," are thrown into prison. "But they set a pernicious example." Yes, indeed: others might have taken the notion that the State had no business to meddle with their relation, and thereupon "purity of morals" would go to ruin. So then the religious heroes of faith are zealous for the "sacred God," the moral ones for the "sacred good."

Those who are zealous for something sacred often look very little like each other. How the strictly orthodox or old-style believers differ from the fighters for "truth, light, and justice," from the Philalethes, the Friends of Light, the Rationalists, and others. And yet, how utterly unessential is this difference! If one buffets single traditional truths (i.e. miracles, unlimited power of princes), then the Rationalists buffet them too, and only the old-style believers wail. But, if one buffets truth itself, he immediately has both, as believers, for opponents. So with moralities; the strict believers are relentless, the clearer heads are more tolerant. But he who attacks morality itself gets both to deal with. "Truth, morality, justice, light, etc.," are to be and remain "sacred." What any one finds to censure in Christianity is simply supposed to be "unchristian" according to the view of these rationalists, but Christianity must remain a "fixture," to buffet it is outrageous, "an outrage." To be sure, the heretic against pure faith no longer exposes himself to the earlier fury of persecution, but so much the more does it now fall upon the heretic against pure morals.

[He goes on about it in the rest of the chapter, pages 37-46]

Okay.

Way better, thanks.

In response to the similarity between 'the fixed idea' and 'pure ideology', I would say they both serve the same general function; that of addressing unreasoned prejudice. The tradition of accusing people of unreasoned prejudice goes at least as far back as Socrates. It seems like Zizeck has more of a concern with economic prejudices than does Stirner who seems primarily focused on moral prejudices stemming from religious faith, but both share in this 'having made up a term to identify how it occurs that people have unreasoned perspectives'. I wouldn't make the mistake of reducing one perspective to the other though. Each articulation can tell us something principally different about how to approach what I've decided to call 'unreasoned prejudices'. Each differs slightly. For instance, in the Socratic method the philosopher takes the burden on himself of disavowing prejudice by 'not knowing' which forces a logic investigation of the subject in question. This perspective differs from that of Zizeck and Stirner in that it suggests a pedagogy even though it serves the same function. I would say that the use of the phrase 'pure ideology' highlights an interesting use of our natural language whereas 'fixed idea' shines in terms of allowing Stirner explicate prejudice in a psycho-mechanical fashion. Although I could invest in a deeper analysis of Stirner's 'fixed idea' here (as my interpretation may come off a bit vague), my original point merely aims to distinguish that philosophers identify prejudice in different ways not only owing to their own differences but also owing the the unique differences in the subjects that they address.

Interesting take on it. I'd say that the most crucial difference here, and indeed *the* difference between Stirner's position and Marx's (and therefore Marxist's), is that of the presupposed world: for Stirner there's no truth of the world and spooks serve themselves, for Marx ideology is false conciousness, and therefore obfuscates in service of capitalism, and once rid the real, class consciousness would be realized. Marx presupposes that the world exists outside of our perception and there are therefore perceptions that aren't aligned with it, while Stirner thinks of people (even those possessed by fixed ideas) as perfect in and of themselves and only capable of overcoming spooks according to their particular mights.

I am not even a STEMlord, but I still have odd feelings about philosophy.

Using difficult language and fancy words might give one the imagination that what is described here is really profound.

I am wondering, if philosophy was done in more simpler language, would it still be as profound?

I'll try to put it very succinctly, considering that's what you want: philosophy is not a transmission of already completed ideas, but construction of the same through different methods over time, so it's a given there will be lots of experimentation, which must (this is present already in Plato/Socrates, dialogues being the rudimentary manifestation of this 'dialectic') include the reader and force him to work out his own ideas as well, and not just spoon feed him.

That is actually a good argument as it does engage the reader to think clearly of what has been written.

It suppose that is why philosophy doesn't work for me, I have learned to speed read since I usually go for anthropology, ecology, history, evolutionary biology and so on and so on.

I scan for new information. But a few philosophy works actually did engage me. Just not many.

nice pasta

he knows that he himself is pure ideology.
he became what he hated the most, now he just reproduces his own words in a static way which by definition is ideology.

when you look into the abyss, the abyss also looks into you

>I am wondering, if philosophy was done in more simpler language, would it still be as profound?
It would actually be harder and more "profound". See the traditions in East Asia, things like Taoism and Zen are really more difficult to approach because you need a specific frame of thinking to understand what they are talking about, and a ton of repetition on the same questions to understand all the far reaching implications of what's being expressed, despite the language used being "simple"; some Zen koans are designed so as to be nearly impossible to solve without very specific keys. Of course this isn't to say western philosophy doesn't require reflection, but the way the arguments are constucted is such that they already bring some sort of reflection upon their subjects already, subjects which to begin with aren't easy to put into words without sounding sort of stupid.

The problem arises from the fact that language as we know it isn't at all an innocent or clear tool to describe the world around us, and all of it is ladden in implications and relations. The "difficult language and fancy words" exist as a response to this, as an attempt to be consistent, concise and well-defined; the issue arises because language is not a static thing and so, as time goes by, the terms stay but the rest of the structure changes, so words that were completely obvious, derivative things to a Greek philosopher become things on their own on modern tongues--but to try to translate them would be yet another task, because of all the associations they have gathered and the inherent change of meaning between one language and another.

If we take the word "intelligent" for example, what does it mean? One can think of someone that is smart, witty, even wise, someone who has big thoughts. What does it derive from? From Latin "intellego", derized from the prefix inter-, meaning between, and the verb -lego, having a constellation of meanings based around the idea of collection (notice the same root -lect-), which includes gathering through reading (therefore lect-ure, leg-ible).

Therefore we can see how words like intelligible and intellectual can be related; however, in Latin the original verb (intellego), has a wider range of meanings:
>I understand, comprehend, realize, come to know.
>I perceive, discern, see, observe, recognise; feel, notice.
So how similar are these to our concepts of "intelligent" or "intellectual"? Surely abstracted thought isn't as close to a basic meaning of "reading each other", "being able to understand (each other)".

Notice though, that this kind of processes aren't exclusive of this type words, but are a constant among all of language, and we're capable of (and interested in) better discerning the changes of these words because they are used in disciplines which aim towards discernment and discourse; but in fact, the more obvious a word is, the harder it is to define.

Thats interesting. I didn't realize Marx was beholden to a 'world outside of our perception'. But then, Marx is a weak point for me. The intersection of Stirner and Marx here makes me think of Nietzsche's 'history of an error'. Nice distinction user.

Analytic language philosophers are notorious for holding the belief that philosophy should be conducted with as much clarity and precision as possible. To this end they encourage that people employ the simplest language possible, always define their terms, and generally make sense by supporting their well exposited arguments succinctly. They like to acuse people of obscurantism when they fail to meet rigorous standards of exposition.

The continental attitude differs slightly. It recognizes that difficult subjects may require difficult language. A difficult idea proves difficult precisely because we dont have the language yet to describe the thing in question. In some cases we need to create that language and that proves to be no easy task. It encourages greater charity be given to the author in my opinion. I'm reminded of the quote by Nietzsche that they put in my intro to philosophy text book, "Those that know they are profound strive for clarity. Those who try to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity." Although this may seem to say the same thing as what the analytic philosophers proclaim, I have always read it to imply that when you strive to express a new thing clearly it occurs that you appear, but merely appear, like an obscurantist by dint of the fact that no one has a familiarity with the concept in your mind.

Profundity, and 'the difficulty of language' amounts to a mater of perspective. To speculate somewhat harshly, analytics find their satisfaction in the display of concepts and take pleasure in this display choosing to analyse the display itself more so than the concept which no longer seems profound to them. (The concept remains nevertheless indispensable because you cannot display a display non-trivially.) In contradistinction continentals have a subject which seems profound to them precisely because they do not fully understand it in simple language. To the end of making the profound concept part of simple language they make up language which seems complex.

Interesting take on simplicity. I hadn't conceptualized it like that. I had assumed that meant only that when given the opportunity one should use simple words rather than obtuse outdated ones. Consider the difference between the words 'masticate' and, simply, 'chew'. In this sense I always try to make myself clear by using 'simple' words.

It's important to have in mind Marx and Stirner from and against Hegel, which was a response to Kant, who was one to Descartes and sho on, and that Stirner was important to Marx's development as he made a fool out of Feuerbach, on whose work Marx was working from at the time.

I wonder if there's a philosophical genealogical tree or one of those connect-the-dots-like relations charts out there, because it would come in real handy for times like these.

>In this sense I always try to make myself clear by using 'simple' words.
Precisely that is why they are harder to deal with. As "less specific" words, by virtue of their common interchange, cause less friction to the ears, they expand in their range of meaning. You can say "chew on that!", but "masticate on that!" is quite jarring; so it's a misunderstanding to think words can ever be completely synonymous and can be made simpler mithout some loss, because by the very attempt one is basing their choice on this word and that word having a different effect on the reader.

I don't think philosophers choose difficult language because they think they have a choice however. Rather in their field of work requires from them a specific lect, and it's much easier for them to keep using it than to try to come with completely new terminology on their own, "dumb it down" (as patronizing as that is) or having to explain themselves every time they talk.

Being less "obscure" could also bring about some very real problems, like opening the gates to people who aren't that versed in the field, or rattling people up when attacking their ideologies--and believe me, first hand info, people can get very angry, very fast when you try to talk about some fact without tact or in a way they can't discern beyond the reptile brain, just see whenever people try to explain some drug induced eureka moments, or a lot of Max Stirner's career.

GOOD anthropology is just as obscure and abstract as philosophy, familiar.

Out of curiosity, have you ever read Roy Wagner or Levi-Strauss?

bump

Again, what's with the Zizeck? Is it just suble trolling or can you not write his name?

The term 'simpler' invites a lot of criticism. I think some people fashion more relatable texts, which have their virtues, and others fashion professional texts complete with all the complicated language which identifies the nuances you would expect. No one says to a dentist not to use the word masticate any more than anyone has the right to tell a professional philosopher not to use complex language, but if aspiring, not yet professionals, don't grasp the more complicated language, indoctrination can sometimes prove difficult. If chew works just as well as masticate for a technical paper in dentistry, why confuse people with a weird word. (As often the case may be, however, the word in question does have a technical nuance that only a professional would note, and so does in fact bear inclusion.) I only mean to express that people by nature learn simple words first and complex ones thereafter. No one sets a four year old down with Hegel.

Red pill me on Stirner's career. What makes it offensive?

I dont know what you mean; I'm not trolling you. Right now I have to work out some of my difficulties with Hegel before I move on to Zizeck's appropriation of Hegel. I have only devoted time to 'The Phenomenology of Spirit'. I have never read Lacan so I cant weigh in there either although I have started to gather some of the pieces of the Lacan puzzel from his satellites. I dont have a background in Marx beyond the communist manifesto and some of his stuff with Engels. Zizeck basically embodies the intersection of Marx, Hegel, and Lacan so that doesn't make me the best analyst, but it doesn't disqualify me either. Having some experience with the history of philosophy helps. Frankly, I just wanted to test my mettle and give the best interpretation of some one of his concepts I could. I choose 'pure ideology'.

Thanks.

People who have read Stirner have historically
1) Tried to pretend as if he didn't exist
2) Mocked him or become enraged (Marx)
3) Ended up as terrorists (Renzo Novatore) or vagabonds (Tsuji Jun)

>What makes it offensive?
He's extremely radical, very short, great at arguing both emotionally and intellectually, and his work deals mostly in the sphere of action, rather than thought; the first part of his book is concerned with letting go of ideals and mental contructions as the center of life and embrace all that being a human can be. His philosophy allows for everything, but at the same time demands nothing in terms of behavior.

«I see how men are fretted in dark superstition by a swarm of ghosts. If to the extent of my powers I let a bit of daylight fall in on the nocturnal spookery, is it perchance because love to you inspires this in me? Do I write out of love to men? No, I write because I want to procure for *my* thoughts an existence in the world; and, even if I foresaw that these thoughts would deprive you of your rest and your peace, even if I saw the bloodiest wars and the fall of many generations springing up from this seed of thought – I would nevertheless scatter it. Do with it what you will and can, that is your affair and does not trouble me. You will perhaps have only trouble, combat, and death from it, very few will draw joy from it. If your weal lay at my heart, I should act as the church did in withholding the Bible from the laity, or Christian governments, which make it a sacred duty for themselves to "protect the common people from bad books."
»But not only not for your sake, not even for truth’s sake either do I speak out what I think. No – I sing as the bird sings / That on the bough alights; / The song that from me springs / Is pay that well requites.
»I sing because – I am a singer. But I *use* [gebrauche] you for it because I – need [brauche] ears.»

good stuff

good thread

this is the important question