What is the best theory of consciousness?

No it doesn't. If there is no one around to see it, not only is it not making a sound, there's also nothing there at all.

Everyone knows consciousness don't real.

Look at it this way, there is no real reason for physical objects to even exist, all that needs to happen is that it needs to appear as if they exist as separate things from us. There isn't any real reason to think this is impossible except that your intuition would tell you otherwise. Consciousness is different, it is something that MUST exist (if you don't believe so try convincing yourself you don't exist).

I agree that consciousness exists (as an unavoidable empirical fact), but there must also be some kind of structuring process to reality. How else would the tree know to come back into existence once you look at it again?

I agree, there has to be something bringing it into existence. What many idealists would argue is that the "something" is a mind that encompasses everything, so essentially God.

I don't see how this is distinct from a physical process, though. What science does is figure out how the "mind" of this "God" functions. And I put the word "mind" in quotes here because I think using it to refer to anything outside one's own conscious experience is too broad a definition of it to be useful.

Well you have a very different definition of physical from most people.

>And I put the word "mind" in quotes here because I think using it to refer to anything outside one's own conscious experience is too broad a definition of it to be useful.
Fair enough, I'm not even sure it is really one mind and not a collection of minds or what but the point is that it is essentially a mind or the same "thing" that your mind is made of, otherwise how could it causally interact?.

Idealism is just irrational, reality must be interpreted from what can be pragmatically understood. There is no raisin to believe in anything that don't exists in evidence and what not

SPBP
Spread mind makes the most sense

Right, and ordinarily I would agree but I have come to the realization that consciousness can't emerge from physical interactions alone so it must be innate in the universe. That leads to all sorts of issues and idealism, in my opinion, has the least amount of issues even if it is somewhat dissatisfying.

>conscious can't emerge from physical interactions
You need to read the literature on biosemiosis

Nah mate, it won't help. It's a flaw with the materialist paradigm not just a lack of information. At the very least some form of dual-aspect or neutral monism would be true.

>Well you have a very different definition of physical from most people.
I don't think that's exactly true. Physics is the governing process behind what you perceive. How is that unusual?

>otherwise how could it causally interact?.
How do charged particles causally interact with the electromagnetic field? Are they not two different things? I see no obvious reason mind and matter couldn't interact.

I never understood how double-aspect is different from dualism

>How do charged particles causally interact with the electromagnetic field?
They are both "physical."

>I see no obvious reason mind and matter couldn't interact.
Well what I am saying is that if they causally interact they are essentially the same "stuff" aren't they?

It's basically dualism except that it argues that the "stuff" has both a mental and physical aspect. Where as traditional dualism argues that mental stuff is separate from physical stuff.

Well, if we want to get specific, I'm actually a pluralist. Each individual object you can identify is different "stuff", and necessarily so. That doesn't stop this "stuff" from interacting with other "stuff", and it must necessarily be able to, or else we couldn't observe it.

Interesting, my only problem with that is how does all this different stuff make consciousness?

Consciousness is just another kind of stuff (more specifically an aggregate of stuff, see bundle theory). It probably attaches itself to certain kinds of physical processes, but I don't know why or how it does this.

Alright. I guess I do still have a problem with it which is that I'm not convinced they are really completely different stuff then. For them to interact there has to be some part of them that is the same stuff.

Well, everything is similar in the sense that there are other things it can interact with. Is that not good enough?

Another thought: How are the color red and the sound of a cat meowing the same "stuff"? They seem like entirely different things to me, thus pluralism.

Isn't that arguing for dual-aspect or neutral monism?

They are both ultimately mental "images" they have to interact with your mind somehow so they have to have something in common with your mind.

>Isn't that arguing for dual-aspect or neutral monism?
Like I said, I wasn't really sure of the difference. But the ability to interact seems to be the only thing that everything has in common with everything else.

>They are both ultimately mental "images" they have to interact with your mind somehow so they have to have something in common with your mind.
As far as I'm concerned, they and the aggregate of all other sense experiences (plus possibly free will) /are/ the mind.

Ah okay, I see what you mean. Maybe that could work, my main thing is that consciousness/mind are a fundamental part of the universe somehow.

I agree with that completely.

I haven't either. Dual aspect-theory seems like it's dualism, but with some neat semantics wrapped around it to make it seem like monism.

>There's just one kind of stuff guys, b-but it has two sides OK?
>So, it's really two different kind of stuff merged together?
>N-no it's the same stuff but the two sides are completely different

Sure seems like you're taking an apple and an orange, taping them together, and then saying that because they sit together, it's one kind of stuff.

I think neutral monism is a more viable option. It holds that there are no sides, everything is made out of neutral stuff, and depending on how you group it together, it exhibits emergent properties that we interpret as either mental or physical.

whata paradox, i should make a thread about this

I don't know anything about "idealism" or theories of consciousness, but then how would you explain leaving when the tree is up, then returning when it has now fallen? Or does reality only exist in the strictly observable radius of your perception? Like a sort of collective sillopsism?

hyperdeterminism, and I won't be convinced otherwise.

Dialectical materialism.

Solipsism is understandable, but collective solipsism makes no goddamn sense whatsoever.

>sense external signs
>signs memorized symbolically
>signs are perceived
>perceived signs are ran through memory(evaluation)
>value of signs interpreted from memory networks (what is going on)
>meaning interpreted from value(what it means)
Signs from memorization and cognition are also remembered, and the mind is experienced. This is what consciousness is, the experience of cognition, it is made possible by the symbolic experiential memory of the animal neurosystem. All life is minded but most minds are simple physio-chemical memories, experience needs to be symbolized so it can be remembered. Consciousness is just a by-product of symbolic semiosis. Consciousness isn't in the body, it is perceived and remembered by the body.
I don't see a hard problem anywhere

WE ARE PUPPETED BY 5-D SUPERBEINGS

ALEX "RELIABLE SOURCES" JONES TOLD ME SO

Hello Ricardo Manzotti

This is just physicalism

Is consciousness not just the collective memories of an individual that lead to schematic interpretations producing functional perspectives?

OK maybe this is inaccurate. I should read more about this.

Is any opinion on the internet not just a word salad?

The best theory is no theory.

Science is not philosophy to the point you people make it appears to be. It is, as a matter of fact, an application of pragmatism, but it is totally detached of all this mental mumbo jumbo.

Say all you want but if your preferred """theory""" can't be experimented on or doesn't have predictive capability it is not science, and is also useless.

Do you know what Ph.d stands for?
>scientism
Wew lad
>philsophy can't be experimented on
Yes it can. And just like in science, logic in philsophy is only as fallible as the practitioner

>Do you know what Ph.d stands for?
I sure hope you're not trying to prove your point by bringing up a made-up term and pretending as if a dictionary or anything of the sort had any kind of persuasive power or authority.

>philsophy can't be experimented on
Why are you misquoting me?