Does science yet understand what separates a self aware being that can "feel" it's own existence vs something that...

Does science yet understand what separates a self aware being that can "feel" it's own existence vs something that cannot but can imitate it? Is this a strictly philosophical question that cannot be known scientifically?

There is no difference between an "actual" consciousness and a "simulated" one.

Except me as a human can feel being alive.
A group of 10000 humans all doing computations on a piece of paper that over time that can mimic a conscious being probably doesn't actually feel anything.

>Except me as a human can feel being alive.
you might as well be a computer program

There is no evidence to believe that a computer program can feel anything user. Simulated feelings (and I don't mean just emotion) are not the same as actual feeling.

You have incredibly naive ideas on what "feel"ing is, and the nature of consciousness. Self-awareness is a binary thing, and just because something is conscious in a way that's different from people, doesn't mean it isn't self-aware.

Your "feeling" being alive isn't the decisive factor in self-awareness.

Whatever you want to define self awareness as doesn't change what the term normally means. There is no evidence at all that an advanced artificial intelligence can actually feel rather than just imitate it. Pretending that all imitations are self aware just because they imitate what a human can do is wrong.

How, then, are you sure that everyone else that you interact with feels, rather than them just imitating it?

I don't. It's an assumption I make based on the similarity of our biology but even that could be false. I think so far I am only proves that me myself am a feeling being.

your "actual" feelings can go suck a cock
you have no goddamn clue how subjective your perception of the world around you is compared to what it actually looks like
hulking majority of what you look at and touch is sheer colorless emptiness bumping off photons into your retinas and pushing away your fingers through electron movement and your brain thinks it's vivid colorful solid objects you can touch
sound is just molecular vibration
feelings might as well be fucking bullshit someone gave you to think highly of yourself

I hope by this point, you realize it's a retarded question to ask, akin to "but how can I be sure that, like, ANYTHING is real, man!?"

Feeling is something that literally exists and something I can experience even if the world around my senses are false.
Sort of but even if the world was fake I would still be able to feel that fakeness. I want to know if it is scientifically possible to even tell if something is self aware or not because despite the definition being vague I can still experience the world around me and that is a known fact to me and possibly a known fact to you but probably not true for a computer.

Your problem is one of incompleteness.

It's impossible to prove that you feel things using your feelings (i.e. the only way you can perceive the world), and therefore, it is impossible to prove that anything else is also feeling the things you feel.

Apart from that, you're also placing your ability to feel things (and, by extension, humanity's ability to feel things) as THE way to feel things, which is a spook.

Furthermore, if somethings acts as if it is self-aware and feeling, then you have as much evidence of it being self-aware and feeling as you do with any human you interact with (again, making your problem here a spooky, arbitrary one).

>feel things using your feelings
Yes it is. I think therefore I know I exist in some form. Even if I am some brain in a computer I am still something in some form that can think.

But you cannot prove that.

Define "feel".

Can't? Then you're just spouting nonsense. Any word without a definition is equivalent to every other word without a definition.

Proof is irrelevant.

It is extremely relevant if we are to answer OP's question.

No, OP. The problem of consciousness stands as it is, you are absolutely right when pointing out that perfect imitation of extraneous behavior doesn't indicate the presence of true consciousness - see Searle's work on AI and strong AI in particular.

>this reddit tier babby ontological reductionism
*tips*

>that
>ontological reductionism
fuck outta here