Can you refute this argument?

Here's a few ready-made refutations of Berkeley:

>"according to Berkeley and Hume, I do not have such a thing as an "abstract idea" or a "general idea" of green. When a particular token, be it a green color-patch or a token of the word "green", occurs in my mind, and is used as a symbol for the whole class of green sense-data, all that happens is that the token is associated with a certain class of other tokens to which it is similar or which are similar to one another. Ayer and Russell depart from Berkeley and Hume on this point--and with good reason. For they see that if I can think of a particular relation of "similarity," then I am able to recognize at least one universal. Thus universals cannot really be avoided in the way Berkeley and Hume wanted to do." - Hilary Putnam

>"the alleged impossibility of having trees-without-the-mind in mind, or of having (in plain English) trees in mind, does not need, though it has received, the labours of earnest logicians to refute it. The feat is so far from being impossible, that every bird that alights on a tree manages it easily." - David Stove

>"it does not normally occur to us that there is any need for us to justify our belief in the existence of material things. At the present moment, for example, I have no doubt whatsoever that I really am perceiving the familiar objects, the chairs and table, the pictures and books and flowers with which my room is furnished; and I am therefore satisfied that they exist. I recognize indeed that people are sometimes deceived by their senses, but this does not lead me to suspect that my own sense-perception cannot in general be trusted, or even that they may be deceiving me now. And this is not, I believe, an exceptional attitude. I believe that, in practice, most people agree with John Locke that the certainty of things existing in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs." - J.L. Austin

>Can you refute this argument?
No and I've never seen it done.

>Thus your argument is circular.
I think your gall is hilarious, but you really need to fuck off

>P2.) Mind is not reducible to non-mind.

Aha, but here is your mistake! You see that while the mind is certainly not reducible to non-mind, substance itself is not reducible to mind either. The reality is a neutral monism, a single substance that has both mental and physical poles. Mental activity is everywhere but things are not reducible to it.

>Mind is not reducible to non-mind
Stream your suicide to prove that. Since your mind is irreducible, you should be fine

>Substance is mind
Prove it. You can't. This vein of thought is unfalsifiable.

>Substance is neutral
Prove it. You can't. This vein of thought is unfalsifiable.

The funny thing is that Berkeley himself provides the best basis for an actual realism. We have to say the world is made up of experience, but the real strange thing is that we have to start admitting that rocks, birds, bacterium, are all having experience.

You can actually, just going off of pure experience. It's radical empiricism baby.

P2 is not reducible to non-P2

>If all is mind, we must conclude that all is dependent on a much larger mind. That mind is what we call God

Why a monad-mind? Why not many powerful minds generating their own multi-faceted world? A circuit forms a singular object, but it's still composed of nodes, transistors, etc. Which alter the properties of the current. Similarly, we can call a mind a single thing, but that doesn't refute the fact that the brain is composed of an incomprehensibly large number of synapses or neurons, which likewise alters the movement of impulses across neurotransmitters.

>You can actually, just going off of pure experience. It's radical empiricism baby.
Do you really believe that in the 21st century or are you just trolling

Sorry for being more empirical than empiricism I guess.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_empiricism

Berkeley's basic argument is valid, but there is no necessary assumption that reality exists in some primordial Mind.

If you really believe those, I'm guessing you're one of those nerds who has to compensate for a lack of personality with a hoard of (stupid) opinions. I pity you.

1.How do you know that I don't know? Or: How do you know better than me? We have an idea of what happens when the body dies: all neurological activity stops, thus the mind ceases to exist. Everything is circular because everything has an opposite. Everything that exists will cease to exist. Your logic only subsists if you believe in the idea of souls which would beg the question of what a soul is, and the need of a proof that souls exist.

2. "Being and Not-being is an argument against dualism"

I just realized this is bait, kek. Bye

This is not how it works. None of the point you're making is obvious, therefore you should justify them, one by one.

>P2.) Mind is not reducible to non-mind.
therefore,
>C1.) Irreducible mental substance exists.
This conclusion is only true if "mind is (a mental) substance"

But "mind" is not necessarily a "substance".
In fact mind = substance is a typical assumption of a metaphysical realist. "Mind" can also be seen as a quality/characteristic/attribute (whatever you want to call it), which is a more nominalistic point of view. (It's the way Aristotle sees it btw, although I wouldn't call Aristotle a nominalist.)

If mind is not a substance
>C1.) Irreducible mental substance exists.
doesn't follow from
>P2.) Mind is not reducible to non-mind.
and the whole argument collapses.

Thank me later for doing your homework.

Alright, thanks for the arguments I guess? I'm just trying to contribute to the discussion?

Woah! C'mon man, he wasn't thinking that far ahead that's not fair to do question him like that.

Mental and physical are two aspects of the same reality, of which we are only a modus.

Sorry Spinoza, as much as I love you (and I love you more than Berkeley) your definition of modality is so stretched as to be almost entirely incomprehensible

>agreeing with a Portuguese Jew
oy vey

OP is a troll and this is a bait thread. That he hasn't taken time to even elaborate on the validity of his basic premises should be apparent, even to people not grounded in philosophical education.

Spinoza appears.
>now we mean business.

He was Dutch and was also excomungated.

I bet you're the dumbass that was just praising olavo de carvalho in the other thread.

The mind is reducible to non mind. It's a biological computer.
Consciousness is a byproduct of our increased ability to simulate hazards and rewards.

There are technologies which allow one to physically manipulate the brain to change affect and action.

>Portuguese parents
>Spoke Portuguese
>Didn't know Dutch
Very Dutch indeed. I bet these refugees Germany have been getting are also Germans

We don't know for sure what the subjective mind experiences during death for sure but we have done studies to look for "Spirits" and telekinesis or evidence of mind operating separate from the body and there is no systemic evidence of such a thing. Additionally we have done studies that indicate that elements of the mind can be destroyed by destroying parts of the brain. As a result the best evidence available indicates that the mind can be reduced to non mind elements.

>The mind is reducible to non mind. It's a biological computer.
That's a common misconception. Brain =/= mind.

>falisifiability is a useful standard of truth in philosophy

get bent stemcuck

The conscious mind is a byproduct of the circuitry of the mind, a subset.

>There are technologies which allow one to physically manipulate

Yeah, they're called drugs.

>bifurcating nature
baka desu senpai.

Go to China.
Take your dumbass wife.
Have a child.
Teach him english and christian tradition.

Your son will be a english speaking dumbass chinese. And if he does shit that makes the pope go "wow, fuck this guy" no one - except dumbasses like you - will call him a christian.

(he also did speak dutch)

>The mind exists.
[citation needed]
>Mind is not reducible to non-mind.
Death, for one.
>Substance dualism is false.
[citation needed]
Fuck off back to ribbit and do your calculus homework, STEMfuck.
Neuroscience is for children, fuck off.

>comparing religion to ethnicity
dumb

So my son that will have nothing to do with the chinese culture and chinese ethnicity will be chinese just because the law nowadays prefers ius soli over ius sanguinis? Glad to see that legalists are still alive and well.

>reducing a philosophers work to hes ethnicity
smart

>implying I support the other user's point
dumb yet again

"I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. Thus also God understands Himself and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His nature, that He should understand all things. You see I do not place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner. In order that this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing.
For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause, a certain quantity of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The permanence of the stone's motion is constrained, not necessary, because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause. What is true of the stone is true of any individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its functions, inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner.

Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavouring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and
which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined."

My favourite thing in the whole wide world is misusing standard form around analytic autists just to see them sperg out

>The mind exists

The brain surely does, but the mind, which is an idea, does not.

OOGA BOOGA

To elaborate.

>P1
I accept the standard Cartesian argument for the existence of the mind. The very act of doubting one's own existence serves proof of the reality of one's own mind.

>P2
The neural binding problem (NBP) is evidence of P2. In other words, the brain stores information about the colour of an object and information about the shape of an object but there’s nowhere in the brain where the information is combined.

To quote this paper from 2013 on the NBP "There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, highresolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al., 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins, 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry.”

This to me seems to be real world evidence of the "Mary the color scientist" argument. Which goes: Mary, a prodigious color scientist has obtained a complete physical understanding of color, including brain physiology, cones and rods in the eye, nerve impulses, chemical pigments, light waves, etc. Thus on a material basis she should know what color is. However there is a catch. She has been locked into a black and white environment since birth, and has never seen color. One day she leaves the black and white room and learns something new in addition to her complete material knowledge of color: what color looks like. Thus the mental perception of red is immaterial.

These two arguments are related to Levine's explanatory gap argument, which shows that there is a conceptual gap between mental and material knowledge. Matter is supposed to be objective and third person, whereas the mind is subjective and first person. To reduce subjective to objective would be a contradiction in terms. If something subjective reduces to something objective, it is no longer subjective.

>P3
P3 is proved through the interaction problem: My immaterial mind can move my material body, but my material body moves via a material force. Thus if my mind can interact with my body, it must produce material forces. However if it produces material forces, it can not really be immaterial at all.

Thus substance dualism is found to be self-contradictory at close inspection and must be rejected. But if immaterial mind already exists, then no other substance can. Thus matter can not exist, and idealism is true necessarily.

>The mind exists
>How do you know that
>I accept the Cartesian argument

So now being Descartes' spiritual (intellectual, mental) catamite is somehow "knowing" something?

>This to me seems to be real world evidence of the "Mary the color scientist" argument.
That has already been refuted. The scenario occurs the way it does because humans are imperfect at imagining things.

A hyper-intelligent alien could imagine what red looks like even if it has been in a pitch black room its entire life, if it was given braille description of its wavelength. Then being exposed to red would not give it access to any new information.

How? It doesn't matter how smart you are if you have no frame of reference to ascribe the value to.

>the mind exists
[citation needed]

Because the braillian psychically perceives everything down to the atomic level in a 1 mile radius around itself. Even if it has never encountered a photon in its life, describing all the properties of a photon with the red wavelength to it will give it the full information of something it has never actually encountered.

So black and white Mary is just an issue of lacking imagining; being unable to imagine a being who is better at internally modelling things and has access to better communication than humans.

A "red wavelength" is only "red" because that's the name we've given it. Without having experienced the color "red", (x) wavelength light is just (x) wavelength light. But even if the alien is able to imagine or recognize colors, it would also necessarily gain factual knowledge about the colors it now sees, such as the fact of how the experience of seeing red relates to the physical brain states underlying it.

>the fact of how the experience of seeing red relates to the physical brain states underlying it.
What is this even suppose to mean?

The subjective experience of the color will be associated with a physical brain state (assuming the alien has a brain). Before it experiences the color, it won't know how the two relate. Thus, by seeing color for the first time, the alien still acquires new information.

But it doesn't. The alien perceives things to much finer degree than humans. Encountering a photon allows the alien to know all the physical properties of that photon. If it acquires information about all the physical properties of a photon without never having encountered one, then using that information to imagine a photon will be an experience identical to actually having encountered one.

1st person vs 3rd person =/= mind vs matter

read Searle

>Mind is not reducible to non-mind.
Are you sure?

Also the correct answer is neutral monism.

millenials are spastics

>But if immaterial mind already exists, then no other substance can. Thus matter can not exist, and idealism is true necessarily.
Why does the mind have to be immaterial?

Sorry Bish, I don't recognize the validity of ideas or word or whatever you mean by "mind." Back to the drawing board cunt.

>We assume consciousness and the mind cease to exist because we assume mind is reducible to non-mind. But this assumption is what I'm arguing against.
You can manipulate somebody's personality by jamming a lead pipe into his forehead. Ergo the mind is dependent on the brain.

Searle's Chinese room argument literally supports P3, or rather, refutes the "mind is just a process" argument by illustrating that mind can never just be a process.

I don't believe that statement has any legitimacy in this discussion. I didn't directly experience spasticity myself. And what is spastic really? It just doesn't add up, you see? If you ask me, derailing productive thought on the matter is the only spastic thing here.

Read the actual paper the Chinese room argument is from. He argues that intelligence isn't functional, that a Turing machine that can get along in a conversation isn't ipso facto conscious. That does not mean that machines can't be conscious.
>hint: he thinks we are biological machines that are.

And, for the love of God, read literally anything by Searle in the philosophy of mind before talking out of your ass again.

>If you can't refute the premises, you must accept the conclusion.
P1) I am god.
P2) I know everything you are going to do and say before you do, and there is no way to discover that this is untrue in any objective or provable sense.
C1) Anything you could come up with to refute this is covered in P2, and therefore the premise is irrefutable.
C2) Thanks for making me god, bruh! In return, you are also god according to this logic. It's a pretty sweet deal.

Why look at it this way? It is possible to view the matter of the mind as having no difference between the matter of so-called "ordinary reality" --- but why assume this means the mind is non-mind? You could also assume that the world itself is mind/consciousness.

Can you really reduce your own experiencing and subjectivities to mechanism?

Using the term "mind" in this context means you've lost sight of the real question.

The real question being, what exactly is the force that we perceive as a part of some motions; the force whose presence defines conscious motions, as opposed to non-conscious motions where the presence of that force is not perceived.

>If you can't refute the premises, you must accept the conclusion
This is itself an unprovable premise.

That's not how logic works. If I ACCEPT the premises, then I must accept the conclusion. But just because I'm unable to refute them doesn't mean the conclusion must be accepted.

But in this case, shitty premises like "mind exists" hardly need to be given the time of day.