Where does my consciousness come from?

Nice one shiva, stop joking around now

>Cartesian dualism
Way to unironically adopt a position that only gets mentioned in modern times as a way to insultingly refer to an opponent's argument.

>dude it's 2017 lmao

>We can't make more accurate observations and learn about things they have to be this mystical unexplainable /x/ shit

Lmaoing at your life.

Aside from your distaste for my argument, can you show it's actually wrong?

Try "it's any time from the mid-1700s forward," Hume killed that idea a very long time ago.

>If X then Y

kys brainlet

I will but not now, shitposting brings me too much joy.

NO. ONE. FUCKING. KNOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOWS.

>You can't know nuffin
Big mac hold the pickles please.

I've checked on that Hume guy and lmao
>argued against the existence of innate ideas, positing that all human knowledge is ultimately founded solely in experience

David Hume, more like David KEK.

But seriously, africa will never develop and it's because of black ppl.

You're not wrong, but that kind of came out of nowhere.

What can you do when leftypol shills shit up a thread with a libcuck (((((((philosopher)))))).

The Boltzmann Brain. You exist as a result of an ocean of sheer probability gaining sentience. You exist because at some point, at some time, you were going to emerge as a flesh construct, the ten zillionth extension of the Brain

You sound like a mental patient. I don't think this thread has any indication of being a leftist raid.

Atheist Logic.

Hey its the closest science has ever come to acknowledging the existence of a higher power, even if it acknowledged it as a theory thats probably bullshit. I actually just wanted to get some discussion on the theory going

So how do you explain self-awareness, which you know you have?

...

Programs can reference themselves as objects too. Do you consider programs "conscious?"

Consciousness comes from your brain.

Are you mentally handicapped by any chance?

A program does the same thing externally as it does internally. We see the entire process fleshed out.
Cognition is not this way, yet. Your argument will not be relevant until we improve neurology.

Its a curse, the curse of vulnerablity.

i know exactly who you are because of your refusal to use the word "neurology" in its proper context.

Being self-aware isn't "to refer to oneself as object", at least not in the same sense we say a program can refer to itself.

I don't get you people who try to "explain" consciousness but just end coming up with things way more abstract, vague and we could even say metaphysical.
What seems to motivate the opposition to the hard problem is the belief that by admitting it one admits a magic, spooky /x/ thing. But take a look at Spinoza: he admitted a strict determinism on the domain of thought, yet didn't think we could reduce it to extension. Also, to admit there are things in the world beyond the domain of explanation or reasoning isn't the same as being /x/, it's just not being autistic.

No, but there are outdated theories where "x is inexplicable therefore its existence is in a different plane than our own" of which all have turned out to be wrong.

An user posted this on the Veeky Forums thread:
theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/01/consciousness-color-brain/423522/

Here's my comment:
>The TL;DR is that the hard problem of consciousness is like the 17th century hard problem of white light. No color, particularly white, exists except in our brains.
Colours exist only in our consciousness, in our brains, understood only in a materialist sense, there are only neurons. So the comparison failed.

>Consciousness doesn’t happen. It’s a mistaken construct. The computer concludes that it has qualia because that serves as a useful, if simplified, self-model.
He missed the point, the problem isn't why we conclude the existence of qualia, the problem is the *experience* of qualia, and a concrete experience is a thing way different from an abstract conclusion.

>Graziano mentions that there is a strong sentiment that consciousness must be a thing, an energy field, or exotic state of matter, something other than information.
What is "information" but a pale abstraction before my immediate experience of consciousness?

>When some philosophers and scientists say that “consciousness is an illusion”, what they usually mean is that this idea of consciousness as separate thing is illusory, not internal experience itself.
That's better, and I think nobody denies internal experience. The problem is: how can internal experience be considered not something separated from physicality in some way or another? Parallelism of events isn't the same as a relation of cause and effect.

>You won’t find any evidence of something else, of an additional energy or separate state of matter, of anything like a ghost in the machine. Could something like that exist and just not yet be detected? Sure. But that can be said of any concept we’d like to be true.
That's a non sequitur, and it's a problem that doesn't really matter. You could say you are absolutely sure you have a squirrel on your head and that it's on a different plane, but that would make no sense to me and I would just dismiss it. However, to say that consciousness is by nature different from the things we know only mediately through the senses is a different matter: that makes sense to me and I admit it. And making such a concession has no dangers to science, which only occupies itself with what is measurable and predictable. It would only be a danger if we admitted it's in a different plane and interacts with matter, because then it would affect the system science occupies itself with.

>Am I, or Graziano, missing objective evidence of consciousness being more than information processing?
Maybe, maybe not, "information processing" could mean anything in a wide range of meanings.

Anyway, we can see in the text the old confusion between finding external physical events correlated to internal mental events with finding what those internal mental events "really" are.

But I dismiss the hard problem of consciousness because I don't think consciousness, insofar as we consider its "internal subjective nature", could have an explanation or even need one.

>my immediate experience of consciousness?
The belief you're having an 'experience' and the details you report it having aren't actually immediate at all. We discussed this a few days back in a thread about optical illusions. The brain actually needs to come up with how to interpret a given stimulus before you get any awareness of it. You can look up blindsight for examples of people with functioning eyes who will respond to visual stimuli e.g. walking around obstacles you put in front of them, but who report not being able to see anything. Is this a disease of 'qualia'? I think the better explanation is there was never any 'qualia' to begin with and that this is instead a matter of behavior. We behave around and believe as though these 'qualia' are there because if we didn't we'd be like blindsighted patients, able to respond to visual stimuli at a low level but not able to reference it as an object to do more sophisticated things with it like talk to someone else about it or come up with a deliberate plan on how to respond to it.

>The belief you're having an 'experience'
The FACT

It doesn't matter how intensely you insist you're compelled to believe that, your brain is 100% capable of making you believe in things that aren't literally true.

i already proved to you that blindsight is a shit example.

And consciousness-denialists are living proof of that.

In order to be able to believe anything I must be conscious, so saying that my brain makes me believe that I'm conscious implies that I AM conscious.

I think you have to define what this illusion is before you make claims of the brain making you believe things that arent literally true. Your brain is making inferences on hidden states. It can be treated as a bayesian engine and in this sense, truth statements don't actually apply to the brain. Just like in science, the brain isn't looking for objective truth, it's looking for predictive efficacy.

Treat the brain as a scientist. Verification is impossible.

So define your illusion.

It's a perfect example. They have sight without reporting 'qualia'. And that's exactly what you'd want to look at to identify what's going on with that reporting behavior. Medical conditions where processes break down are usually your best source of information in trying to figure out how those processes work.

>In order to be able to believe anything I must be conscious
Not true. You can have beliefs you aren't even aware of.

So what? I never said you have to be conscious of all your beliefs, I said that having beliefs is something that only conscious things can do.

I never used the word "illusion," specifically because you always get the "but you need experience to have an illusion" complaint when you do. A less loaded term is "false belief." A machine can be programmed to operate as though something that isn't true, is. No "experience" required.

Well, just replace my word illusion with false belief. What is the false belief? The belief that we have experiences?

The point is if you can have beliefs you aren't even aware exist, then you definitely don't need to have "conscious experience" to have beliefs. A machine can be programmed to behave as though X is true, and that's a belief.

>A machine can be programmed to operate as though something that isn't true, is.
Again: so what? That doesn't actually mean that the computer believes anything to be true. How can non-conscious things have beliefs?

>The belief you're having an 'experience' and the details you report it having aren't actually immediate at all.
That's right in a sense. But then it would turn to be more a discussion about what "immediate" means than if we do or don't have immediate experience.

>The brain actually needs to come up with how to interpret a given stimulus before you get any awareness of it.
Here we enter in a pretty confusing territory. But it seems that one moment we talk about the brain as if it were only one object, and in another moment we talk about it as if it was the knowing subject. I can only admit it if we say that the brain-as-subject and the brain-as-object are the same thing under two different aspects, one no less valid than the other.
But I think you missed what I meant by immediate: indeed we don't know physical things immediately, but the senses and feelings through which we know things have to be "immediate"; there has to be something immediately experienced through which everything that is mediately experienced is mediated.

>You can look up blindsight for examples of people with functioning eyes who will respond to visual stimuli e.g. walking around obstacles you put in front of them, but who report not being able to see anything.
I think you're talking about this:
scienceblogs.com/notrocketscience/2008/12/22/blind-man-navigates-obstacle-course-perfectly-with-no-visual/
The problem is: either those visual stimuli are being interpreted somewhere in his brain and probably with correlate phenomenical processes in his consciousness, or we have to admit some kind of magical or supernatural faculty that makes that man deal with those obstacles without dealing with their stimuli, or he can work with such stimuli unconsciously.

A chemical reaction, basically. Biological matter occurred as a result of certain reactants coming together due to the characteristics of the universe.
I would argue that its a blessing to be able to perceive information, despite the somewhat difficult aspects, its better than nothing.

(cont.)

>Is this a disease of 'qualia'? I think the better explanation is there was never any 'qualia' to begin with and that this is instead a matter of behavior.
I can't see your reasoning. What would be a disease of qualia? Something like synesthesia? We only know his visual cortex is inactive, we know nothing of his inner experience.

>We behave around and believe as though these 'qualia' are there
I don't "believe" I have qualia: beliefs are only propositions, qualia are sensations, feelings. I can ground my beliefs on sensations and feelings, but these can't themselves be "beliefs".

>A machine can be programmed to behave as though X is true, and that's a belief.
Define "belief", give an example of a belief held by computers.

Yes. Or to clarify a little, the belief the abatrct fictions we behave in reference to are really there as anything more than a reference point for behaving around. In this way, the behavior we exhibit in reference to "seeing blue" would be the real thing (along with the stimuli and phisiology processing) while the idea of our "experience" of blue would be the false but useful thing we're compelled to believe in and behave around, like how the eye of a storm has no substance of its own beyond being the focal point of the things of substance revolving around it.

>A machine can be programmed to behave as though X is true, and that's a belief.
That's not belief. And we're talking about a machine, it's like saying a book has beliefs.

A belief in the sense I'm talking about is a proposition something behaves around as though it were true.

Are machines and books the same?
No?
Then what the fuck are you even talking about?

Ok, now give an example.

Well feel free to not call that a belief then, but it's what I'm arguing our beliefs are. RE: Books, they don't have beliefs because they don't behave in response to their contents. You need behavior like robots, animals, or people have for beliefs.

Maybe his visual ability is habit based?

The same way I can interpret a machine as having purposes and beliefs through its behaviour, I can interpret a book has having the same thing through what it "says".
Anyway, I could ask, like you:
Are machines and people the same thing? No? Then what the fuck are you even talking about?

>You need behavior like robots, animals, or people have for beliefs.
Well, that can be satisfactory only if you want to reduce everything to its external aspect. That's more a matter of how to use the word belief than what constitutes belief (as that word is particularly understood by someone). Your definition of belief can be a scientifically useful way of calling measurable things, but isn't philosophically satisfactory.

You are not aware of most of your beliefs.
Most of your beliefs are stored in the non conscious part of you.
Most of your beliefs you have not yet verbalized or thought about, but merely presupposed.
Why do you assume that you have to have to be conscious to have beliefs?

> but isn't philosophically satisfactory.
Why not?

Because philosophy, in the sense I pursue it, isn't only an ancilla scientiae.

> isn't only an ancilla scientiae.
What is it then?
Youve merely denied one sense but you havent affirmed any.
For all we know you may be denying all senses that we are aware of.

But the blindsight information isn't without interpretation at all. It still gets processed if it goes through the midbrain and thalamus. And again, the important thing maybe in how it lacks functional connections to other parts of the brain - this is maybe why the information is non-conscious. Not because it is "unprocessed" (which it is). If we manufactured new connections to the rest of the cortex, the people may be able to see. Its not a perfect example especially as you have other conditions with intact visual cortices which differentially process the information - you need to be able to manipulate the factor of interest without confounds. Blindsight doesn't do this. Furthermore, the "seeing" ability is probably created through older subcortical routes not meant for identifying objects etc and not the cortex. It really is a bad example. His lack of sight is not necessarily directly related to qualia, more the preservation of certain pathways.

>Most of your beliefs are stored in the non conscious part of you.
They're not real beliefs until there is a consciousness to believe them.

I also wonder when they became blind. their ability to evade objects might be a product of developmental learning before the injury rather than an intrinsic ability.

We have experiences though don't we? I'm experiencing this right now.

Define "real belief".

we are subjects in the brains model of the external world.

Im not concerned with whats true or false. Like i said before, the brain isnt either. Our experiences may not be directly representing the outside world (which is impossible considering Berkley's idea of a mind-independent object) but we have experiences nonetheless.

No, you just need perception...

why?

No True Scotsman up in this bitch.

Well, what are you waiting for? If computers can have beliefs then you should be able to give an example of a belief that computers have, or are you just too stupid to think of one?

I think the better formulation I can give is: the practice of shaping one's own understanding freely, that is, without ethical, technological or scientifical compromises. I know that is still negative, but positively we can say it's some kind of aesthetical or purely contemplative refinement of understanding.
Obviously that's not any usual definition of philosophy, but that's because I find the usual ones unsatisfactory. If that's not philosophy then I'm not a philosopher, whatever; at this point it has only become a word; and if to be a philosopher is to content oneself with ready-made concepts and definitions, then fucking hell I'm not a philosopher.
About the question of defining belief, I don't think I could give a definition that would be any more clear than the common sense and instinctive use of the word. Definitions are pretty useless when given to such things, still more definitions that try to be "pure" or "scientific", that is, without resorting to some other thing with which we're familiar or of which we have some instinctive understanding. Either the definition will give a new sense to the word or it will not clarify anything.
Definitions are only of value when we're introducing a new or unusual concept.

We are subjects in the subject's model of the external world. This isn't going anywhere.

it is going somewhere because we clearly aren't our brains. we, as conscious agents don't take up the whole brain. most of it is unconscious. we are just a small part. The brain models the world. We are part of that model. We clearly aren't the aspects of the brain that generate the model and all the unconscious aspects.

Since you're still not giving an example I guess I'll just have to give you one.

A robot which has been programed to stop walking when its sensory data returns information which corresponds to it bumping into something "believes" that when it receives that data it means taht it has in fact bumped into something.

There, can we agree that this is an example of a computer believing something according to your own definition of belief and move on to the part of the argument where you get BTFO?

Anyway, that's only one definition of philosophy I have; actually, I think a better definition would be: the practice of shaping one's own understanding of the world without being content with ready-made ideas and ends. The one I've given was a more special one.

I was thinking about the subject in a more Kantian sense instead of the "I". But then we can reformulate it thus: We're I's in the subject's model of the external world.

But I think I will be leaving for now. Discussing philosophical themes on Veeky Forums always makes me frustrated. Maybe I will be back tonight.

is there a difference between self-awareness and consciousness?

In my humble opinion, there are three possibilities:

1) There is no god. For unknown reasons humans survive and thrive on this planet. The fundamental problem with this, as every literate scientist should know, is: where do ideas come from, and how are we often able to come up with working principles "out of the blue", that is, by default? It seems not like electronics, air planes etc. are an inate part of nature. So either we must aknowledge, and therefore need to look at, some kind of extraterrestrial/extradimensional influence on our brain or our species. So far (SETI etc.) none was found.

2) There is an abrahamic god. This is actually very reasonable considering both historic documentation and the opinion of many accomplished individuals. Which means we should stop looking for wisedom and start looking for righteousness and living according to His will. I am discarding holy cows, buddhas and shrines etc. as these are just silly, at least in my opinion.

3) There is nothing but my brain and everything else is warped around for my survival. Seems plausible to me.

Yes, self-awareness is the intellectual ability to be aware of your own existence or even reflect upon it. Consciousness is a fundamental property of "having an experience". You can have either without the other.

For anyone genuinely interested in the fundamental mechanics of consciousness (and holding the assumptions that consciousness exists and may be explained), I recommend checking out work by Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi. Koch takes a more neurobiological approach, while Tononi attempts to define consciousness more mathematically. If you are interested in the neurobiological approach, I can really recommend looking into experiments on blindsight and visual cortex TMS - there is definitely a lot to be explored and understood at frontiers.

wind cry for no one saw his work

t. Daniel Dennett

What creeps me out the most is the fact that up to this date, no memory storage has been found in our brain. Our brain might very well just be a neuronal net for the decomposition of our sensory input coupled with some control mechanisms for our vegetative system. Which makes you wonder, who are we really and who is in control?

Not true, the brain has an intricate memory storage system, although it is not well understood. It is well known that the hippocampus is crucial for the storage and retrieval of memories, although it seems that memories are not stored at a single specific location in the brain - however, damage to a specific location in the brain can cause the loss of specific memories.

origin of consciousness = 1

we are emergent of the whole system. what control mechanisms?

and what is vegetative?

is shit
realize consciousness is to consume it

I assume 'vegetative' refers to unconsciousness "base survival" mechanisms, such as those in the brainstem that facilitate breathing. While it is possible that our conscious experience controls aspects of our nervous system, most of aspects are controlled by unconscious processes.

I believe that consciousness is the "experience" of informational integration when the brain explicitely contextualises sensory input.

Sensible position, in agreement with empirical evidence and the same position held by (imo) the most respectable scientists studying neural correlates of consciousness. However, large aspects of our minds are unconscious and likely not directly affected by our conscious experience.

yes, and i believe that, unconscious stuff happens when the brain is able to perform tasks at a certain confidence to the point of it being context-free or bayes-optimal. This entails a form of model-reduction where a situation no longer has to be considered in terms of a high-dimensional space so the parameters of the model are cut down. the task no longer requires the same informational integration or an exploration of potential conflicting solutions. This, i believe underlies the conversion of rich episodic memories into the sparse gists of semantic memory, and also the conversion of goal-directed behaviour into habits. I believe it also applies to perception at least to some extent.