What should I read if I want to learn about the meta-epistemology of logic, particularly modal logic?

What should I read if I want to learn about the meta-epistemology of logic, particularly modal logic?

My ultimate interest is in the phenomenology of logical "necessity" (e.g., the phenomenology of a mathematical proof).

I find analytic philosophy really hard to understand. I can never tell when its seeming sterility (to me, compared to continental traditions) is self-conscious, intentional, and aimed at clarity, and when it reflects actual naivete with regard to the phenomenological complexity of some conscious act. Sometimes when they speak about truth, reference, concepts, etc., it seems to me that they are being almost bewilderingly naive about how ambiguous their statements are, despite the stolid presentation. So I really want to understand what the hell analytics think they're doing when they do logic.

Someone told me to check out Kripke. But I'm worried I'm going to have the experience I just described, yet again, where I can't tell whether he's bizarrely naive compared to continentals, or so non-naive that he sidesteps all their errors too subtly for me to understand and without explaining it.

I asked the same question some time ago, and a nice user brought Quine. Haven't read it yet, but what the user said gave me the impression that Quine is less ignorant than most american analytic fags.

Analytic grad student reporting in, which is to say a grad student in an analytic department who is nevertheless very critical of contemporary analytic methodology.

There is no epistemology involved in formal logic, including modal logic. I'm not sure what you mean by "meta-epistemology" or "the phenomenology of logical 'necessity,'" but those systems are purely formal and are best treated in purely formal ways. Their application to concrete phenomena in substantial argumentation is where epistemology enters the scene, and I will admit that your standard contemporary analytic will invoke modal notions and possible worlds without any hesitation or epistemological scruples or examination of their own methodology. The bulk of them are tinkerers, who want to apply their self-fashioned tools to their hyper-specific problems without worrying about the rigor, efficacy, and legitimacy of the broader practices.

>Sometimes when they speak about truth, reference, concepts, etc., it seems to me that they are being almost bewilderingly naive about how ambiguous their statements are, despite the stolid presentation.
This seems right to me. The interesting and meaty stuff is the stuff they presuppose in going about their technical business. They largely presuppose a formalized correspondence theory of truth, a monolithic relation of reference, and a Platonism about concepts (or, more usually, "propositions"). The interesting work is in those who try to critique, resist, or at least investigate the widespread adoption of these presuppositions (e.g., later Wittgenstein).

>Someone told me to check out Kripke.
Try out his Naming and Necessity, or David Lewis, who is a bit more thoughtful and self-aware (and I would recommend his work if you're dying to read a defense of using formal modal notions in metaphysics, e.g.). Leaning modal logic and possible worlds semantics will not help you figure out what analytics are up to when they make use of modal logic and possible worlds in their philosophizing. Generally speaking, they don't know what they are up to. The giants like Lewis knew what they were up to but constructed whole systems to ground it. The others -- the academic laborers -- just follow suit methodologically because that is how it is done.

Better yet, read Quine's criticisms of modal logic and the use of modal notions in analytic philosophy. Quine is a champ.

Heidegger's "the metaphysical foundations of logic" and "logic"

Hegel

modal logic don't real

>phenomenology of logical necessity
What? Do you even know what's phenomenology?

Thank God, so it's not just me.

>They largely presuppose a formalized correspondence theory of truth, a monolithic relation of reference, and a Platonism about concepts (or, more usually, "propositions"). The interesting work is in those who try to critique, resist, or at least investigate the widespread adoption of these presuppositions (e.g., later Wittgenstein).

That is exactly what it feels like. Thank you for giving me the insider perspective, and making me feel a little less like I'm crazy. It's easy enough to formulate my stance positively, from Heidegger or from late Wittgenstein like you said. But the feeling of craziness comes from not knowing the extent to these critiques are already known and bypassed.

I've interacted with Quine a bit so I'll pick him back up, and check out Lewis and Kripke. Thanks to everybody else as well for the responses.

What do you mean? Phenomenology of math, logic, proof, etc., isn't that uncommon. Husserl and Heidegger both wrote on the phenomenology of logic. Wittgenstein's "hardness of the logical must" is similar. A logical inference being somehow "necessary" is obviously phenomenal in content, so I'm interested in its constitution is all.

Modal logic is first of all a set of formal tools. I would not recommend trying to 'critique' it, internally or externally, until you actually do the work of learning how to use those formal tools. I know a few continental-leaning people who critique analytic logic this way and that, but I don't take them seriously for the simple reason that they don't know what they;re talking about. I mean this literally, not as some sort of insult – just know the basics of what you're talking about first.

Read Ted Sider's Logic for Philosophy if you want an introduction. Kripke's N&N is full of baseless appeals to intuition and will, if you have continental sympathies, probably just piss you off anyway. Learn the ropes instead.

can you explain why people should bother with modal logic?

the possible worlds thing puts me off