I have yet to come across a valid criticism of the critiques

I have yet to come across a valid criticism of the critiques.

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impressive (autistic) system building but really we can't never not know nothing

>quadruple negation
HOLY.....

non euclidean geometry

Read Hegel

tl;dr Kant was the Jew all along

specifically, the application of non euclidean geometry in relativistic physics

Go on please?

I did, he misused Kant's terminology constantly.

>tl;dr Kant was the Jew all along
tl;dr "Wizzy" got caught with his hands in the cookie jar of transcendental dialectics.

His concept of space, as far as I can remember it, does not line up with what we know about space from modern physics.

How is this a critique of Kant?

>His concept of space
What concept of space of his

I read Critique of Pure Reason, but didn't buy his criticisms of it. With Trump in office, I think we need reason now more than ever.

Nothing has ever needed to be said more. Tearing up rn :'(

You won't find any.

Alright, this does not fit our pure intuition of space. But the very fact that we cannot naturally form a proper representation of non euclidean geometry or relativistic physics, or that we can only form an approximate euclidean representation of it, kinda confirms Kant's views, wouldn't it ?

So. Much. This.

Kill all whites.

>he hasn't read the critique of the critiques.

...

>Alright, this does not fit our pure intuition of space
Kant never makes the claim that we intuit euclidean space. He actively argues against it.

Eucluckcluckdean/non euKEKlidean space is an a posteriori model of space nothing more

formulate an argument or yield you rancid swine.

Haven't spent much time with the 2nd and 3rd, but as for the 1st, some are:

>The schematism is totally superfluous given his definition of concept in the 1st transcendental deduction. Not that this compromises the integrity of the critique, however
>The definition in 1st deduction he offers of concepts as signifiers of rules imposed on the imaginative synthesis of the manifold of intuition leads to a problematic genealogy of empirical concepts, since the rules pertaining to a given concept presuppose for their derivation a certain abstraction of a certain synthesis of intuition (which is how kant throughout seems to account for the origin of empirical concepts), a synthesis which is what the rule is meant to dictate.
>Neglected alternative, i.e. space/time may be properties of noumena as well as a priori intuitions.

There is none my dude

Uhh, you don't get to bring categories.

Pic related

He posits the noumeon as unknowable so how does he justify its existence in the first place

Actually, Trump is the greatest Kantian thinker and will complete the system of German idealism.

good thing scientists are morons who are taken seriously only by morons

Here's one:
Soviet show trials in which the accused is forced to participate in the process of practical reason despite the fact that they are reading a script full of lies about things they never did, resulting in their execution as a consequence of their own confession.

Reason is wrong.

They're required for the intuition of time, read the Critique.

can someone explain this meme? I keep seeing it posted everywhere

I think it's referring to this.
youtube.com/watch?v=iOk6HB609po

Einstein proved Kant wrong and I don't think he even meant to do it.

>Kant never makes the claim that we intuit euclidean space. He actively argues against it.
Do you mean that we intuit non euclidean geometry ? Because I only said we don't.

Doesn't Kant give a different definition of concept when talking about schematism ? That would be a flaw (using different definitions of the same concept in the same work), but maybe not an essential one. After all, the 2d Critique provides for liberty some kind of proof that was deemed inacceptable in the 1st Critique. (not saying they're the same work, but still - if you admit that, you can also admit some slight change within the 1st Critique regarding some terms)

Interesting stuff. Circle here ?

Like the rancid swine said, >formulate an argument or yield you rancid swine.

His concept of space is the concept of our intuition of space, not the conception of "real" space, which is something we can only understand a posteriori. On the other hand, I think we could say that there's still the possibility we can manipulate our intuition, that its nature is not so fixed and immutable as we think.

Could you care to explain?

that quadruple negation is quite retarded my friend

>HAHA LET'S MAKE A SYSTEM BASED ON TERNARY STRUCTURES INSTEAD OF DUALISMS SO THAT WE'LL OVERCOME KANT BECAUSE 3 > 2 HAHA
No. That's not what you call criticism.

>What did they do, I say, to help their old friend, the sorely distressed Cosmological Proof, now at its last gasp? Oh, they hit upon a shrewd device. "Friend," they said, "you are in sorry plight since your fatal encounter with that stubborn old man in Königsberg, and indeed your brethren, the Ontological and Physico-theological Proofs are in no better condition. Never mind, you shall not be abandoned by us (that is what we are paid for, you know); only you must alter your dress and your name—there is no help for it—for if we call you by your right name, everyone will take to his heels. Now incognito, on the contrary, we can take you by the arm, and once more lead you into society; only, as we have just said, it must be incognito! That is sure to answer! First of all, your argument must henceforth be called The Absolute. This has a foreign, dignified, aristocratic ring; and no one knows better than we do all that can be done with Germans by assuming airs of importance. [...] Exclaim (and we will chime in), 'The Absolute, confound it! that must exist, or there would be nothing at all!' Here, strike the table with your fist. Whence does the Absolute come? 'What a silly question! Did not I tell you it was the Absolute?'—That will do, forsooth! That will do! Germans are accustomed to content themselves with words instead of thoughts. [...] So that carping old faultfinder, Kant, has been criticizing Reason, and clipping her wings, has he? Well, then, we will invent a new sort of Reason, such as has never been heard of—a Reason that does not think, but which has direct intuition—a Reason which sees Ideas (a high-flown word, made to mystify), sees them bodily; or which apprehends directly that which you and others seek to prove; or, again, a Reason which has forebodings of all this—this last for the benefit of those [45] who do not care to make large concessions, but also are satisfied with very little. Let us thus pass off early inculcated, popular conceptions for direct revelations of this new kind of Reason, i.e. for inspirations from above. As for that old-fashioned Reason, which criticism has criticized away, let us degrade it, call it Understanding, and send it about its business. [...] We may then philosophise in a lofty tone, making the Universe proceed from the Absolute by means of the most heterogeneous deductions, one more tiresome than the other—this, by the way, being their only point of resemblance. We can call the world the Finite, and the Absolute the Infinite—thus giving an agreeable variety to our nonsense—and talk of nothing but God, explaining how, why, wherefore, by what voluntary or involuntary [46] process he created or brought forth the world, showing whether he be within or without it, and so forth, as if Philosophy were Theology, and as if it sought for enlightenment concerning God, not concerning the Universe!"

>Reason, to which all this wisdom is falsely and audaciously imputed, is pronounced to be a "supersensuous faculty," or a faculty "for ideas;" in short, an oracular power lying within us, designed directly for Metaphysics. During the last half-century, however, there has been considerable discrepancy of opinion among the adepts as to the way in which all these supersensuous wonders are perceived. According to the most audacious, Reason has a direct intuition of the Absolute, or even ad libitum of the Infinite and of its evolutions towards the Finite. Others, somewhat less bold, opine that its mode of receiving this information partakes rather of audition than of vision; since it does not exactly see, but merely hears (vernimmt), what is going on in "cloud-cuckoo-land" (νεφελοkοkkυγία), and then honestly transmits what it has thus received to the Understanding, to be worked up into text-books.
Schopenhauer could've been a great satyr writer.

Jacobi blew him the fuck out, like, two days or so after CoPR was published.

>‘Without the presupposition [of the "thing in itself,"] I was unable to enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I was unable to stay within it’

>So um, like, the thing-in-itself is what causes the erscheinung that we perceive, but also, causality doesn't inhere in the objects-in-them-selves, and indeed, if they did, my entire moral philosophy would fall apart, um, HURR DURR, so the thing-in-itself both causes the things-for-us and cannot in any way be associated with causality

And keep in mind Jacobi was a giant hack.

You're playing on the word "causality", I don't even know if Kant actually uses the same verb in German. No big deal. Jacobi should have known better, though.

There's an obvious difference between "the thing in itself causes the Erscheinung" and "there could be no Erscheinung without a thing in itself".

>No big deal. Jacobi should have known better, though.

You do realize Jacobi's critique was what inspired literally all of the post-Kantian German Idealism, right? It wasn't misguided. It was absolutely catastrophic for Kant.

>There's an obvious difference between "the thing in itself causes the Erscheinung" and "there could be no Erscheinung without a thing in itself".

Indeed there is a big difference. Kant held the former, fallaciously on the terms of his own system, and the latter is indefensible and could be countered by just postulating that there is nothing but schein - which is exactly what inspired the idealists.

>Kant held the former, fallaciously on the terms of his own system
No. Again, you're playing with words.
It's like saying that Kant contradicts himself because he sometimes mixes desinteressment and "superior interest of reason".

Just checked the Kant-Lexikon btw, apparently he rather uses the verb/idea of grounding, when relating the thing in itself and the phenomenon. Maybe he *also* uses the verb "to cause" from time to time, but you can't honestly claim it's a contradiction since the meaning does not consist in relating two phenomenons together (which is the only thing that the category of "cause" can legitimately do).

>Just checked the Kant-Lexikon btw, apparently he rather uses the verb/idea of grounding

Like Spinoza, he continually conflates the empirical term cause with the logical term grounding, but OK, riddle me this then.

If grounding is a logical term, and logical terms are put upon the world by the subject, how does the thing-in-itself ground (logically) the thing-for-us? How can Kant reasonably make this claim about a thing that is, according to his own admission, beyond our scope of comprehension?

>the meaning does not consist in relating two phenomenons together (which is the only thing that the category of "cause" can legitimately do).

Yeah, I don't get this. If Kant doesn't want to relate the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, why does he postulate the thing-in-itself at all, and how does his philosophy differ from the post-Kantian idealists?

As Hegel pointed out, the distinction between analytic/synthetic and prioi/posteriori is needlessly complicated, they are logically equivalent distinctions if you think a little.

Also his reliance on math as being inherently a priori is debatable, I agree with Hume/Wittgenstein in that it's just another language we thought up.
And that's a pretty big mistake because it's the main concept he gives as proof that a priori thinking is a valid concept.

Would you say that the issue you're pointing out is, after all, the same one as the relationship between ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi ? I think it's more or less the same. And yeah, I admit that it's annoying.

I wouldn't say "grounding" has a strictly logical meaning in Kant. Then again, I'm thinking of "ratio cognoscendi". Transcendantal conditioning, something like that, dunno exactly what the usual english translation is.

- Anyway, I remember a Descartes scholar explaining how a phenomenological reading/understanding of Descartes is legit and full of interest today. What you say about the idea/notion of "grounding" could lead to some interesting phenomenological understanding of the "transcendantal condition" or ratio cognoscendi.

Btw, I'm not accurate here, since transcendantal condition is within the subject, whereas the thing in itself is not - it's true, though, that the thing in itself is only required in order to understand how the experience of phenomena can happen. The reason why we're lead to think there are things in themselves is the same as why we assume we have distinct faculties, no ? Sorry if not clear.
(faculties) - experience of a phenomenon - (thing in itself)

>the difference between a triangle and a line is merely quantitative

apriori doesnt real