Do you believe the world around you is real?

This is the kind of stupidity you can only learn in college, t b h

t. brainlet

If it is not the I who is thinking then how do our thoughts come to being

If my reality is a construct I'd expect it to be more enjoyable or at the very least interesting.

How can you make an irrefutable claim that your thoughts are the product of "You" in the first place?

That is precisely the point I am making. In a supposed scenario where it is not yourself who does the thinking, there would still exist an entity, a phenomenon who is an acting force behind it.

Yes, because we have no external/outside vantage point from which to determine if the world is real or not. Our senses/cognition are entirely limited to this experience. That is to say, we must take our sensory experience/perception at their word.

Nietzsche blew out metaphysics over a century again.

If those thoughts are not mine, there still must be a "me" to contain them

At some given point in time if I am experiencing awareness there must be some sort of self to be capable of this

To acknowledge the existence of thoughts without an "I" is illogical since thoughts can't exist without a conscience

>What does "real" mean?
Based on the etymology, something like "belonging to the thing i1tself."
Based on your post, you actually believe in this reality. But why1 would you? I'm curious.
>Something obviously exists as is perceived by our sensory inputs, though the picture we form is by all means not nearly objective enough to know the reality of these objects in themselves.
Here you're just presupposing the common sense intuitions. How do you deduce these objects in themselves?
The real question is indeed: what on earth is that - existence.

How do the first three sentences and the last one relate?

Exactly the point I am making. The only thing you can affirm is the existence itself. When it comes down to the autonomous capacity of held thoughts of such an entity, in this case "Me" or "Self", that is what may be subjected to scrutiny.

I suppose it boils down to how one interprets Descartes' "I think" part of the statement.

>Based on your post, you actually believe in this reality. But why1 would you? I'm curious.

I merely regard it as a curious thought experiment, nothing further than that.

>How do you deduce these objects in themselves?

Could you please elaborate further on this question?

>Could you please elaborate further on this question?
I would love to. In order to this, let me go back to your first post.
>Something obviously exists as is perceived by our sensory inputs
You're already unnecessarily opposing 'something' with our sensory input. On what basis do you assert that there's something beyond the, for lack of a better word, sensory inputs. Something that, perhaps, underlies your input. Is this whole distintion between 'something that's out there' and your representation of that thing that's beyond you, not in itself nothing more than something inside of yourself? You're distinguishing an object from a subject and describe a relation of medation, but at no point have you presented a genuine clue, let alone a good reason, to think that this object exist in itself (as a reality). That is, without the mediation of a subject. (This ofcourse works both ways. The subject need the mediation with the object, too.)
>though the picture we form is by all means not nearly objective enough to know the reality of these objects in themselves.
Now here I have a hard time making sense of what you're getting at. "the reality of these objects in themselves." Could you, keeping the first part of this post in mind, justify the conceptual possibility of the existence of that reality?
I hope I also made more clear why I 'accused' you of believe in a reality - being the existence of a world independent of thought. My point is that the concept of a reality is unintelligible.

Thank you for clarifying, I will try to offer a simplest and most concise explanation of my stance.

For that, I will firstly have to adhere to empirical principles to elaborate on the limitations of our sensory inputs. Modern scientific method I believe, is a best used example to present this.

In the phenomenal world surrounding us, we've these waves, particles, forces and what have you, and their respective behaviors. Most of these behaviors, including the very existence of the mentioned subjects utterly eludes our basic sensory inputs in terms of recognition and conscious interaction with the same. Now, one could argue that the methods we've devised to ascertain the existence of these subjects is an extension of the capacity of our sensory inputs and cognition, but at the fundamental, most basic levels of our being, these subjects are impervious to our direct attempts at observation and interaction.

Another very crude example I'll offer, which is evident within the nature itself, is how different species of animals perceive their surroundings in differing ways, in large part due to the variety in visual perception.

I may offer a small myriad of examples to present the obvious limitations of our sensory inputs, but in a summary, I use this very fact to assert the distinction of the phenomena and noumenon (Object and its assigned attributes as they are independently of the observer).

At the end of the day, the obvious and most crucial question being asked here is, I believe: "How close do our human sensory inputs describe the attributes of the objects found in existence?"

When Descartes says "I think" he doesn't necessarily mean the thoughts are original

Their origins aren't important, what matters is that you have thoughts (hence you think) therefore you must exist

The cogito ergo sum is irrefutable

Read buddha my dude

It does boil down to semantics. Cogito ergo sum presupposes that it is the "I" performing the thinking.

Were you to define the capacity for thoughts and thinking as requiring a certain degree of autonomy of "I", it would be refutable for it is not necessarily the "I" that does the thinking, but merely contains them, as you've pointed earlier.

To present a fitting analogy to elaborate further: Let us imagine a robot or a computing machine that is processing certain information that is being input by a user. You would not say that this machine performs the action we commonly define as "Thinking", nor would you classify the information contained within it as "thoughts".

Sorry for my late response. I was busy fighting of Petersonfags while taking a shit.
A Kantian and an empiricist methodology? That's a curious combo. The problem, very briefly, is that empirically, there's no noumenal. Wouldn't you agree?

>I will firstly have to adhere to empirical principles
We can have an interesting discussion if we focus on this first, because I was talking about the nature of our cognition in my previous post. Instead of laying out the consequences of this principle, please explain why you think this is a correct model.
>In the phenomenal world surrounding us, we've these waves, particles, forces and what have you, and their respective behaviors. Most of these behaviors, including the very existence of the mentioned subjects utterly eludes our basic sensory inputs in terms of recognition and conscious interaction with the same. Now, one could argue that the methods we've devised to ascertain the existence of these subjects is an extension of the capacity of our sensory inputs and cognition, but at the fundamental, most basic levels of our being, these subjects are impervious to our direct attempts at observation and interaction.
Well, you're asserting all kind of things without first justifying your principles of cognition. I'm afraid you misinterpreted my point about subject vs object and the problems that it presents. This is already evident from the plural use in "the mentioned subjects". You can't just say that the subject (of the kind I was talking about) is in phenomenal world. You're then making a category mistake. I would like to invite you to reread my previous post. I remember having a hard time grasping the consequences of that problem when I was more inclined to the Kantian ontology.
>Another very crude example I'll offer, which is evident within the nature itself, is how different species of animals perceive their surroundings in differing ways, in large part due to the variety in visual perception.
>I use this very fact to assert the distinction of the phenomena and noumenon
I don't think that follows. I can go into detail, but it's beter for us to grapple the roots of the problem: the problematic nature of 'something in itself'

I know you might find my response a bit lame, because I didn't adress all things you said, but I really think we need at least a consensus on the problems I raised on the noumenon/reality in my previous post, in order for us to discuss fruitfully the consequences of the nature of our cognition.

No, , read Parfit or Perry instead if you want to learn about the impersonal theory of personality.

Creating certainty from a position of doubt presupposes the self-evident nature of reality as embodiment of truth with being in itself.

In context, belief is implied to be translatable into conceivable, conceptual grounds for truth.

As a consequence, that same truth is therefore sourced in the essence of the determined and perceived world through perspective and experience. How does this framework of deduction determine universal reality? By being beyond reasonable doubt.

In the same vein, does the spectrum of existence and factual deduction allow to be defined as sufficiently existent to be certainly real, while encompassing an inextricable distinction towards the unreal? Belief through self-definition may vary on a scale of subjectivity as sample within the same context of existence. The same existence as components of a universe universally defined may constitute an affront towards the conception of another perspective which doesn't naturally or necessarily find grounds to share or be defined by unilateral grounds which aren't into reality until the very moment his reality was defined through another being.

And does existence truly preclude reality?

As one whole, the authors mentioned are components or contributors to the question, since their thought or influence can define their reality since they exist sufficiently to be mentioned within this context.

The origin of righteousness, for truth.
The limits of my language.

>Plato, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley

Are those the only options?

The answer is Aristotle, btw.

Hume

The self doesn't exist dummy. It's just a persistent thought.

It's a real old joke, it is.

Who is the dummy in this context?

(You)

well memed

I have no option but to operate under the assumption that it is real. So yes I think reality is real.

>this thread

I don't really know but sometimes I kind of hope it's not

>I create my own reality
>I am a living god
>my realm consists of crying and masturbating in front of a computer 12 hours a day

Underrated post.

Step into an oven and tell me the fire's not real

That's a retarted samuel johnson-tier excuse for an argument

Is this bait?
Are you trying to say that one has to believe in reality because intense pain feels very real?
Why would it be real just because you are in pain?
You might say the pain or at least the sensation of pain is real. But this is at least in no way an argument for the existence of an outside world independent of the subject.
Is the world in my dreams real? Not? Well, I could swear that I would start to panic if I was put in an oven there. Because I would imagine that I would sense pain. Or I could probably say that I would indeed sense pain. I don't see the difference between the imagination of pain and the sensation of pain.

You could argue that you never felt pain in your dreams. In that case I would need you to believe me that it's possible. Or you could google it.

>He thinks descartes was right about anything.
Go back to the greeks

i can only answer if you prove that you are real first

But Descartes cogito directly addresses and refutes the sceptics

Anything can be doubted if you get radical enough, even cogito ergo sum. For all you know, your consciousness is a simulation.

Being in a simulation is irrelevant. It doesn't change the fact the fact that there is consciousness.