How can electrophysiological activity of cells generate complex perceptions of universe?

You're aware it's well established our brains make us believe and behave around untrue ideas in many other contexts, right?
There are tons of psychology studies on this shit, what we think we're "experiencing" or remembering is frequently unreliable as fuck and more like a story about what must have happened than an accurate reproduction of what did happen.
That aside, it's not really "lying" if we aren't aware what we're saying and doing is based around untrue premises.

They don't

I believe in evolution but the amount of time required to evolve seems incredibly short.

>seems

>How can electrophysiological activity of cells generate
>How can electromagnetic activity generate the things on your screen?

>complex perceptions
As opposed to simple ones? How do you define the "complexity" of perception? Fundamentally deconstructed, "perception" is just quantum interactions objectively indistinguishable from everything else in the universe.

Interesting and related:

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_energy_principle

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory

It's the neural network and it's complexity that is responsible for the complex perceptions of universe. The electrophysiological activity is only the mean by which the signal is processed through the network.

You're a fucking idiot.

When the cells make chemical synapses with each others

then you don't truly grasp how long hundreds of millions of years is. Especially when mutations within generations are created within minutes instead of (as in humans) decades and in billions of the same species propogated a day instead of a few thousand.

Your brain is a computer except when something becomes corrupted (overwritten) your brain fills in the gaps rather than discarding the whole thing. It's kind of amazing when you think about it. It means that you can never make any definitive statements based on memory (which is why a computer could never operate like this) but it's great for a living being in the confines of a squishy body.

This is well known and consensus among evolutionary biologists. You really should just read The Selfish Gene, then you will understand the bigger picture.

To put it differently, you could say your brain integrates or differentiates along the information, depending on the (expected) importance of utilizing the information.

If you think about out known history, and how little we change, you wouldn't say hundreds of millions of years is that long. Especially if you consider what life should've looked like on Earth a few hundred million years ago.

This is the only counter-argument when faced with the question, "you don't comprehend how long it was". Actually, most people can.

Consider the fact that we do already understand how neurons and sensations work in simple systems.

E.g. there is a very simple neuronal loop in anemones whereby when you start stimulating their tentacles, the action potential from that sense organ goes into the ganglia/neural network and then triggers an action potential which is sent to the muscle to retract the tentacles, but if you keep stimulating what remains of their tentacles in the same way, the continued action potentials eventually triggers an inhibitory nerve which blocks thethe synapse from passing on the action potential from your stimulating of the tentacles to the ganglia so the anemone releases it's tentacles even though you are still stimulating its sense organ.

This is the same mechanism to how if you smell something continuously then you stop smelling it. So we know that no action potential, no sensation of that thing.

We will continue to uncover other things about how the brain and our senses and thoughts and memories work.

What is a perception?

But there's also electric synapses.

Behavior.

I don't think it is by chance that DNA works down at a molecular level. life is going to start at whatever the most fundamental level is. With that being said, neurons could just be another layer for manipulating gross matter and may not need extra depth.

someone explain how brain can possibly experience conscious precept please

It doesn't, it just uses the made up concept of "experience" as a tool to direct your behavior around the concept of stimuli referenced as though contact with them constitute some sort of actual non-physical thing that subjectively appears to you (e.g. vibrations from a radio hitting your ears is frames as the "experience of sound). You believe you're "experiencing" things but really you aren't. That's the trick, though some people are so convinced their belief in "experience" must be true because of how raw and immediate they believe it is (which incidentally I think is really evidence that the "qualia" business *isn't* real since raw, immediate, and irreducible is exactly how you'd expect a reference to something that didn't really happen to be interpretted what with there literally not being any detail available to reduce the alleged "experience" to, like a MacGuffin in a story that exists soley to forward the plot and has no real form of its own to analyze) that that they will never accept the explanation for how it works.

>behaviorism
>not objectively superior structuralism

they are unnecessary for what OP is asking for

>I believe in evolution

>You believe you're "experiencing" things but really you aren't.
Why aren't we just a clockwork then? Why do we -experience- experience? I don't disagree that it could be physical based, but I reject strict materialism. Sounds like you could agree to emergence at least.

>Why aren't we just a clockwork then?
We are. Our behavior is the product of old fashioned Newtonian physics explicable nervous systems operating with deterministic cause and effect events.
>Why do we -experience- experience?
The real question is why are we compelled to report and behave *as though* these alleged "experiences" are happenening. And my explanation is above, these are useful fictions for us to behave in terms of. It's like if you programmed a bunch of robots to communicate with each other in terms of objects they identify from their cameras' visual stimuli instead of in terms of the raw visual stimui data as is. If the robots only worked with the visual stimuli data as is, it might not be as quick or easy for them to get to where they're behaving how you want e.g. if you want them to throw out garbage it might help to have behavioral expectations based around the idea of the "experience" of seeing garbage instead of just having them reinvent the wheel with all the raw visual data every time (recent improvements on image recognition neural networks do something similar to this in real life where instead of reinventing everything from the ground up some common helpful known patterns will be introduced in addition to normal training from scratch).
>emergence
It makes way more sense to me to accept our brains make us believe in perceptual MacGuffins to further our behavior without literal qualia existing than does the idea that after X amount of complexity literal qualia somehow appear despite having no interaction with or influence on physical phenomena beyond us "experiencing" it. Seems like the legitimacy of our compelled beliefs is the problem, not everything else about the physical world.

Everything you have said is pure conjecture. If you cannot trust your experience to be anything more than machinations of atoms, then how can you trust that that is true? Essentially how can you trust or know anything?

It's the most bizarre belief to think non-conscious matter could create illusory consciousness, it's logically absurd, because the non-conscious matter would have to be conscious in order to "know" how to create the illusion of it in the first place. It's a conspiracy of the deepest level.

It just seems more of a way to push any responsibility of yourself onto mechanical processes. Only conscious beings could trick themselves into thinking they're not actually conscious. Being conscious of not actually being conscious, see the contradiction?

yes it is

the chemical synapse is THE hallmark of a neurosystem

The money things a false analogy. Experience is self evident. We might be able to explain it completely through abstract processes but it still exists.

Define visual experience and why it is a fiction.

Also you dont have to believe in qualia to believe we have experience.

>anything more than machinations of atoms
Why are you acting like the machinations of atoms is somehow a bad or inadequate thing? There's nothing particularly "untrustworthy" about atoms.
>Essentially how can you trust or know anything?
That was the whole point of having a notion of "science." People test things out and compare answers. You don't have guarantees about anything, but if lots of different parties and mathematical modeling and non-human diagnostic approaches all agree with a given answer then we tentatively accept that answer as the way things are.
>the non-conscious matter would have to be conscious in order to "know" how to create the illusion of it in the first place
"Illusion" is a bad word for this concept because it has connotations of "qualia" actually appearing to you, and we're not talking about some illusory vision appearing to you, we're talking about nothing actually appearing to you.
That said no matter would need to be "conscious" in order to "know how to create" the beliefs and behavior we operate with. Consider a robot with a mounted camera operating reporting and behaving in terms of what it "sees." Most of us probably wouldn't assume the robot in this case is having "qualia" appear to it. It would just be taking in stimuli to its camera and behaving in response to it. I'm saying suppose we're like that hypothetical robot.
>Experience is self evident
Your *belief* in "experience" is one where you're compelled to interpret the notion it's referencing as a literal, self-evident phenomenon. There's not much reason to overrate the literal reality of what we're compelled to believe just because it's a product of our own personal cognitive processes. Just the opposite, these are the sorts of things we should be very skeptical of because it's a proposition no other parties can corroborate for you. What other parties can corroborate is your behavior and your reported beliefs.

>Also you dont have to believe in qualia to believe we have experience.
Yes you do, they're the same thing.
>Define visual experience and why it is a fiction.
Visual "experience" doesn't really exist except as a reference point for beliefs and behavior. There's light stimuli contacting our eyes and prompting different sorts of brain activity, and the notion of "experience" abstracts this process out into a make believe thing that "appears" to you so we can talk about "it" and behave around "it" as a shortcut to avoid having to deal with all the little details of what actually happens with light, our eyes, and our brains.
We believe this abstract concept is literally appearing to us. The question is whether this belief needs to map to an actual real world phenomenon. I'm arguing that no, it doesn't have to map to an actual real world phenomenon. That we're compelled to believe something's there is all that's required, nothing literally needs to be there for us to have that belief and the behavior around it.

A false experience is still an experience.

What do you mean a real world phenomenon? No our everyday definitions of experience will not map exactly to the brain.

And for me the raw thing that appears as you say is experience even if its not what it seems to be. The self is illusory too but it appears to us and that is experience.

Its fallacious to say that a specific functional property makes it redundant and non existent and desu i dont think it has the function you desrcibe anyway but is emergent. Easier explanation fot me.

Feel like you are convoluting hard and soft definitions of consciousness. Your deconstruction if soft definitions doesnt negate the vaidity of self-evident experience.

It's not a false experience. Nothing appears to you. What you have is belief and behavior, not some "illusion." That's why I've been making a point not to call this concept an illusion.
>raw
"Raw" / irreducible / pure / immediate / etc. is exactly what you'd expect from a belief you're fed where the concept referenced by that belief isn't really there.
>No our everyday definitions of experience will not map exactly to the brain.
That's not what I mean. I mean "experience" doesn't exist. At all. Full stop. Not there. Not some illusion or hallucination, just not there. You have a belief it's there, but it isn't. That's my argument here: Can the brain create a belief and behavior based around a notion that doesn't correspond to an actual thing in reality because it's useful to do so? I'm arguing that yes, it can, there's nothing preventing a brain from working in terms of belief and behavior that reference a notion ("experience") which isn't literally a thing at all.
>emergent
>Easier explanation
How is that an explanation of any sort? Enough complexity in a pattern matching system and eventually you magically get "experiences" which we're supposed to believe exist and are the product of physical phenomena yet have absolutely no verifiable impact in even the slightest way on anything physical?
>self-evident
There's that phrase again.

Define belief?

Are beliefs self-evident?

What is your actual argument for experience not existing? Your argument suggests that you view experience in a dualism. I dont agree. For me experience is identical to the physical phenomena.

And to me its not just pattern matching. Its inference from a perspective and necessitates inference of a self or we. Experience i think is just a product of when inference is contextualised in this me and is significantly complex and based on global information.

>Define belief?
It's a premise for behavior e.g. If you believe you're having a heart attack, it might result in the behavior of you calling an ambulance.
>Are beliefs self-evident?
I don't think it's a good idea to call anything "self-evident." It's basically a decision to stop examining an idea when you invoke that term.
>Your argument suggests that you view experience in a dualism.
No it doesn't. Dualism is a belief that there exist both physical and non-physical phenomena. I'm saying there's just physical phenomena and the alleged non-physical phenomena don't really exist.
>experience is identical to the physical phenomena
Do all physical phenomena exist as "experience?" If there were no organisms on this planet, would your version of "experience" still exist here?
>And to me its not just pattern matching. Its inference from a perspective and necessitates inference of a self or we.
I don't think the concept of "self" has anything to do with the concept of "experience."
>Experience i think is just a product of when inference is contextualised in this me and is significantly complex and based on global information.
>significantly complex
Why should complexity make an "experience" happen? You said "experience" is identical with physical phenomena, but if complexity makes it happen then they're not identical because something physical needs to happen to make the "experience" begin. And this leads back to the interaction problem of dualism if something physical is supposed to cause the "experience" to begin since we have no evidence of any such interaction taking place in reality. If complexity made "experience" happen then that's something we should be able to identify in terms of the impact this interaction has on the physical side of things.

that picture is retarded because the 'outside world' is itself based on our conscious perceptions, and so to is the persons head and the brain

all we exist as is those very conscious perceptions on the right, with everything to the left of the dogs face also just being ideas in our minds of what the world beyond our conscious perceptions are like

the diagram wants it both ways - we have access to the external world (with the man and the dog), and conscious percpetion is internally generated within a physical brain.

Remeber that you only know about your body and the physical brain it supposedly contains *through* conscious perception itself. So what, there's like a little body and world made of conscious perceptions, within a physical brain of a physical man in an external world, and from the position of the little man in his private internal world (you), you can somehow even know an external world and others exist?

this question is philosophy btw, not science

thomas metzinger has a great book essentially biting the bullet on this position in the op image btw, called "being no-one"

this is some of the dumbest shit I've ever read

how about I just shoot you in the fucking thigh and then you'll see just how "alleged" qualia is you fucking literal braindead moron

Thats why i said emergence happens. Experience is a physical emergent condition. Like how states of matter e.g. gas liquid solid, and pretty much every macro thing is emergent.

Experience is built on perception as in all experiences are perceptions? I think conscious experience is just highly contextualised perceptions.

I think a confusion is that we seem to think physical existence is
Obvious when in fact it is just an inference through mental perception or qualia. Physical existence itself is a mental concept. We seem to intuitively think of ourselves as situated in the world when everything we perceive is situated in the brain. We dont have an objective view of the physical. No way never. I think in a sense it is a presumption to assume that experience cannot be created by the physical as an emergent effect. We have never even and cannot have a a perception if the objective physical world and by physical i just mean outside mental experience. I dont see a problem. The objectivity of physical experience is created through our own abstraction.

Also your ideas of premise as belief doesnt exist either. Its emergent from neuronal networks isnt it. Same as behaviour.

Physiology and behavior exist, so that's a stupid argument. If you shoot anyone they'll report having a bad time. The "qualia" not actually being there doesn't have any sort of relevance to that.
States of matter can be identified as a physical phenomenon with impact on the physical world by multiple different parties, so that's not really a fair comparison to "experience" as an alleged emergent phenomenon.
>We dont have an objective view of the physical. No way never.
>Remeber that you only know about your body and the physical brain it supposedly contains *through* conscious perception itself.
This is an overrated concept. Yes, you need sensory organs to take in sensory data to behave in response to it. No, this doesn't mean the details of your sensory organs doing this have some sort of elevated importance to reality, it's just a means to an end of gathering information which we then wisely compare against other parties, mechanical systems, mathematical models, etc. any time we want to come up with a rigorous idea of what's going on that we can use for developing the sorts of systems where accuracy matters. The notions of any one person taken on their own are not known to be particularly reliable.
>premise as belief doesnt exist either
Belief exists.
>Its emergent from neuronal networks isnt it.
Belief in the context of human belief is generated by brains. I don't think that's the same as your stance for "qualia" being real / emergent phenomena since nobody claims belief is some sort of non-physical "experience" thing that needs explaining.
>Same as behaviour
Behavior is *caused* by brains. That's not the same thing as saying behavior is some sort of emergent property of brains. Behavior is just what organisms physically do with their bodies.

>they'll report having a bad time.

how do you know? you'll hear them saying it? you'll see that they wrote it down?

We are beginning to study consciousness in the brain through e.g. fmri so i think it is actually becoming a reality.

>you'll hear them saying it?
Yeah, if you shoot someone in the thigh I'm pretty sure they'll make some statements to the effect of "I'm having a bad time."

I agree that brains exist and fMRI exists.

but that's a sound, which is a type of qualia/experience

so really, you'd only believe you hear them reporting it

I dont claim that experience is a non physical thing that needs explaining so im in the same boat as you.

I think it is similar coz if the brain is simply modelling sensory inputs then you can say that the behaviour we cause is mirrored in the brain and atleast the goal-directedness of that is emergent.the idea of specific action etc. Emergent of neural interactions.

Same boat in regards to you and beliefs*

And isnt it the real world that needs explaining not the qualia which we experience. Do you smell things? Do you hear? If you day yes to that. If you know what its like to hear or smell something. That is qualia. Regardless of whether it is true or false hearing.

You'd only believe there's such a thing as "the experience of hearing sound." That's not the same as your ears or the sound waves not existing. It's just the "qualia" part that isn't real. You're just obsessing over the literal reality of how this stimuli contact and response situation is referenced by the brain. The situation isn't non-existent, just the notion of "experience" happening to you like some magic non-physical ghost bullshit. You still take in stimuli and get useful information out of it just like a camera can take in stimuli and get useful information out of it.

dude stfu you're a complete fucking idiot

>And isnt it the real world that needs explaining not the qualia which we experience.
No. This is that same overrating everyone seems to want to do with the mechanism for taking in stimuli and producing behavior. Just because we're limited organisms who can only get information about the world through sensory organs doesn't mean we have greater quality or reliability of knowledge for our sensory mechanisms than we do for the objects we're detecting with these sensory mechanisms.
Which does a CT scan have more information on, the body it's scanned or the nature of its own scanners?

I'm sorry I hurt your feelings, maybe try clearing your head and getting some sleep so you can approach this topic with an actual argument in the morning.

Its not non-physical. Would you say your first person perspective is non existent?

And yes i agree with the camera analogy but maybe if the camera was as complex as you it would have experience.

Im not talking about that at all. Im trying to get you to see we live in a mental world. The physical world is hidden. Our notions of it are mental. Because of that im saying that we dont have any epistemological basis to presume that qualia cannot relate to a physical world thats hidden. The mental is all we ever know right?

The ct scan is the wrong analogy. A better one is an insect sitting on a pool and senses predators through waves flowing on the water. It knows a man is there but only through the vibrations. Never the man itself. This is what i mean by hidden physical world. Ours is mental.

>maybe if the camera was as complex as you it would have experience
Reminds me of this:
consc.net/notes/lloyd-comments.html
>The mental is all we ever know right?
I disagree. Unless you suspect the Matrix scenario or something where everything being fed to us is a lie, you have the option of comparing your own information with the information everyone else has, or the information machines gather, or the information inferred from mathematical models that don't even have anything to do with sensory input. The agreement of all these sources is something that isn't limited to your own sensory data or your own brain processes. You need some sort of sensory stimuli taking mechanism as a starting point to getting at knowledge, but that's not the same as saying all knowledge is just "mental." We have evidence pointing towards objects and processes which are very much independent of any one person's brain activity. It's possible this evidence is just an elaborate ruse, but I don't think we have much reason to suspect that's the case. We operate on the notion agreement across multiple parties, mechanical systems, and mathematical models is good reason to consider what everything's in agreement on an objective real world thing, and we build up information about how these real world things function so we can do neat things like build the computer you're reading this on, or the elaborate international telecommunications network that allows for this conversation to happen between our computers.

My point isnt agreement. My point is that one cannot imagine a mind-independent tree. Every piece of knowledge everything we see no matter what it is, is mind dependent regardless of whether it has an objective outside cause. People for instance distinguish the perceptual image of a piece of art and its interpretation as external vs. Internal. This is not strictly true. Both parts of mental experience.

Everything being known through brain processes is something I'd consider only technically true in a way that doesn't really matter despite the extreme weight this fact is given by epistemology enthusiasts.
This incidentally is why...:
... I brought up the CT scan example.
To show that just because a machine needs a scanner to take in data about its object of focus doesn't mean it has better, more reliable, or even more immediate access to the nature of its own scanner vs. the object it's scanned.
We know what it's like to only get data from internal sources without influence from the outside world, this is what dreams are. And dreams are radically different from the waking knowledge we have of the world independent of any one observing party. Our personal sensory processes matter very little to the knowledge we have of the world provided they're working normally. You technically use visual stimuli to learn about physics by reading a physics book for example, but the read in words and equations are just delivery mechanisms for ideas that exist independent to any one subject's "mind." Having much better visual faculties than another person reading that book won't matter because the things you're learning really are much better conceptualized as independent of your sensory processes rather than dependent on them. Even if you were blind you could still get the same idea through a number of alternative delivery mechanisms (braille, audiobook), and you're able to do this because the idea exists independent of your eyes.

Accuracy doesnt matter. We still view the world in a subjective way

It does matter alot givrn how the brain works and how we think and learn. You dont seem to understand why we have a brain at all.
Your ct scan example is also irrelevant coz i dont claim we know anything about our sensory processing. And i emphasise cognitive not just sensory processes. They do matter because everyone thinks about and perceives the world differently.

All our complex perception/interaction with the universe don't belong to this universe.

Physics (as in the way physical objects behave) doesn't change based on whatever subjective factors you personally introduce.
The various phenomena of the physical world that can be observed by multiple parties is notable in its extreme consistency i.e. the exact opposite of the purely subjective environment that is dreams.
You realistically have to call this physical world objective rather than subjective unless you go full solipsist and assert it's all just your mind making things up.
The fact you need sensory processes to take in this objective physical world is again not all that important.

Doesnt your brains use of beliefs create the same problem of non physical vs physocal in that even though you say there is a physical description of the world these descriptions are insufficient to describe our beliefs about what soemething is like

>Behavior is *caused* by brains.
by brains yes, but even more so by environments

Sensory process is important given theres lots of things in the universe are not perceptible by us.

Ive told you the cobsistency thing is irrelevant. Im thinking in lines of the duheme quin hypothesis. Im telling you to imagine a tree that hasnt been seen. Im telling you ontology is mental and the physical world is an unseen generative process. Im telling you that the world is partly fictive because the way we carve it at its joints is fictive. A good analogy is how scientific models dont make metaphysical claims just good predictions and multiple models can coexist.

If you dont see he importance of this then youre pretty much missing out on theoretical and computational neuroscience.

What makes you say that?

well, without environment, there would be no need for the brain to cause behavior in the first place

also the brain has to modulate the behavior it'S causing so that it fits the environment

it's only logics that make me say that

You know it really drives home how science has basically become a cult when you have people arguing that they're literal zombies because they believe in materialism more than their own subjective conscious experience. Like, your consciousness is literally the ONLY thing you can reliably say is 100% real and true within reality and you retards are arguing that actually it's all just a delusion and you're actually automatons because you read a pop-sci book on neurobiology

Literally brainwashed morons.

Because if you take a brain (a human being in fact) and you place it in twe differents environments, your behavior changes.

right. if behaviour was the same in two different environments, it wouldn't be behaviour, but property

That's the point, the property doesn't change, your brain is a brain, independently of your environnement. The only factor that changes is the environment.

not completely. the brain changes, too. that's its big advantage: learning and memory.

>Our behavior is the product of old fashioned Newtonian physics explicable nervous systems operating with deterministic cause and effect events.
Self defeating argument. If true then you never had the agency to determine if the evidence supports your idea in the first place and are pushing it because you're a slave to your biological processes. The scientific method presumes the existence of free will and if you posit that it doesn't exist then you can't rely on any scientific evidence to support your hypothesis since it all ceases to be reliable.

>Just the opposite, these are the sorts of things we should be very skeptical of because it's a proposition no other parties can corroborate for you. What other parties can corroborate is your behavior and your reported beliefs.
Wait. If I'm not even a reliable observer for my own thoughts and actions how is anyone else one? If you're arguing that people should be skeptical of their own though processes that includes their judgements of other people. If I can't even rely on my own subjective conscious experience to make reliable judgements for my own behavior I sure as fuck can't be considered a reliable source for anyone elses behavior.

You've taken a big swig of the pseudoscience glass and gotten drunk off it.

These dont really follow
Youre using a very simple way of lookig at brain and behaviour and ive never heard of "property".
Also nothing youve said suggests why environment is a bigger cause than brain.

Scientific method doesnt talk about free will in a very specific sense.

Put two different brains (i.e. people) in the same environment and the behaviour changes too.

underlying, not bigger

Both are underlying. You cant have behaviour without a brain and cant have it without an environment.

Regardless though, behaviour is goal-directed and agent centred. Thats why i give the brain primacy. Because brains control the agent. Define the synergies and parameters which initiate one behaviour and not another

>how can you trust anything to be true

A calculator's sapience has little to do with how it computes numbers.

The calculator doesn't have sapience, it was made by people with sapience, and it is used by people with sapience. The calculator has nothing to do with it.

Our behavior having actual physical causes doesn't invalidate anything. The scientific method doesn't "presume free will," that's ridiculous.
>If I can't even rely on my own subjective conscious experience to make reliable judgements for my own behavior I sure as fuck can't be considered a reliable source for anyone elses behavior.
That's why nobody bases important findings like those made in the scientific disciplines or in criminal court cases on one person's "subjective experience."
If you don't think there's a difference between one person's anecdotal opinion vs. multiple independent sources, mechanical verification, and mathematical modeling, I don't think I can even begin arguing with you. The more independent sources you introduce and use to check ideas against the more you control for the very well established unreliability of any one person's "subjective experience."
>You've taken a big swig of the pseudoscience glass and gotten drunk off it.
I don't think you know what pseudoscience is and also it sounds like you were just really impressed by that anti-atheist Werner Heisenberg quote brainlets keep posting and decided to try to force a bad paraphrasing of it in a context where it didn't belong.

>theres lots of things in the universe are not perceptible by us
This seems like more of an argument in favor of subjectivity not mattering as much as people believe. We don't need to personally perceive things in order to learn about them because our perception isn't the world, it's just one way of getting at information about the world. Other ways exist that don't involve direct perception because the world is more than just our own sensory functions.
>your consciousness is literally the ONLY thing you can reliably say is 100% real
You can't even begin to explain what that "consciousness" is let alone demand we take it as 100% real. You have a belief. It's a very strong belief. Which says nothing about that belief being correct. Your brain isn't incapable of operating in terms of very strong false beliefs. You're very certain this thing you 100% believe in is some "self-evident" variety of "experience," but that itself is a belief.
Suppose "experience" is literally real for everyone alive right now. If it's real, does that mean it's something that can be changed? Or removed? Or prevented from ever happening in a person as part of some future technological tampering done before they're born? All while keeping the physical stuff (e.g. the way they appear and behave outwardly) about the person the same? And if so, how would you ever know whether you had "real experience" vs. just being one of these new modified philosophical zombies who had the belief and behavior of possessing "real experience" but didn't really possess it? You can't go by how certain you believe you're really "experiencing" things because these philosophical zombies would be very certain about that belief in the same way non-zombies are very certain about it.

Its not an argument for that. Its saying that are information about the world is defined by specific assumptions embedded in our own subjectivity. All its saying is theres no metaphysical truth to our perception (and probably even science) perception and science is pragmatic. Models that work. Similar to what is said about perception as a means of organisms surviving as opposed to a true view of the world whatever true even means.

Id say experience can be profoundly changed e.g. via drugs sleep anaesthesia psychosis.
I think even if experiences are not true the very fact youre having a belief is still qualic. Something difficult todescribe as we would physical things. If they were describably physically we wouldnt have the qualia problem in the first place. Otherwise how could we falsely believe we were having a qualia and still not be able to describe it. I also think you get into a dangerous regress of having false beliefs about beliefs. I think the essence of the "you" having the forst person belief which is deceivable is infact one of the crucial aspects of experience which doesnt seem to be communicable in objective tools.

Depends of the environment where the two brains were before. It it was the same environment, the behavior will be the same