How do you decide how to act, Veeky Forums?

If we assume that we have free will, and because of the is-ought gap, then how is one supposed to act? To anyone, all basis, or reasons for actions, are ''is'', and are therefore invalid as basis for action. However, if we search for an ''ought'', there can be no justification for choosing one over another, and none can be shown to be true or valid. Therefore, there is no reason to morally condemn Stalin or Hitler.

Moreover, if we act on the basis of things others than ''ought'', like desires, than how can someone choose to act on the basis of one desire, but not another, seeing as both desires, are, for you, facts, they are ''is''?

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nigga i just do

But how? How can you decide to act on X desire. but not on Y, when both are simply facts, that do not, in themselves, compel action?

bump

It's a good question OP. My problem with Hume was that he wrote this great big system that was wonderful and all, but the answer he left as with was simply to act Prudently, which is desu lame as fuck. I really don't think there's an answer to this question, though. It has something to do with the fact that you tend to die if you mess up on the prudent front, though, and make the wrong oughts out of your is', though.

Well, that's still problematic, for two reasons. The first, is that you're positing living, or the continuation of your life as a moral goal (or as an acceptable goal), but there's no reason for that. And even if you accept that as a goal, then there are a multitude of ways to fulfill it - you could be kind to others, so they help you out, or you could dominate them to force them to help you.

basically like said. i was born with a personality that causes me to perceive emotions and information in a particular way and i act according to how emotions and information affect me. basically nigga, i just do.

Hume and most pre-critical and pre-hermeneutic philosophy operates on the flawed assumption that there is a judgmental subject, fully self-conscious and self-aware, that precedes and detachedly decides upon practical (moral, valuational, etc.) contents of the mind.

A lot of modern philosophy has been a move away from this radical subject-object dichotomy, toward a conception of the practical life of a subject that is immanent in an historically pre-given world of values and meanings that is "always already there." The subject's practical life is composed of, derived from, practical content whose critique and potential for judgment is only possible immanently, in and through the conceptual possibilities of the content itself. The subject is constituted over the course of his life through immanent interaction with that facticity.

Various things are involved in this move. The expressivist turn in early German romanticism, which Gadamer situates in Herder' emphasis on Bildung and which is incorporated by Hegel into his own historicising of Kant's practical philosophy, allows for a perspective of the subject as dialectically engaged with, and always rising out of and in relation to, its historical lifeworld and self-knowledge. The stuff of a moral life becomes not so much about propositions grounded in immutable moral laws, which only need discovery or clarification, but about taking a certain attitude or attunement (Stimmung) toward one's own existence and continuous development in the world. The finitude of life can then be confronted in various ways, whether nihilistically or transvaluationally or whatever, but the perspective shifts to a morphological view, where one has to decide on the rightness of "oughts" that are already there before one, in which one already finds oneself entangled.

As Hegel would say, this doesn't fundamentally resolve the issue of why the self-conscious subject should or shouldn't do anything. The fundamental right of the self-conscious subject is to do nothing, to resist the world, to be infinite in itself and reject entanglement in finitude. But it at least shifts the fundamental perspective of the inquiry a bit.

>implying there's some deep thought that goes into this

People act based primarily on how they were raised and secondarily on how society expects them to act. There you go.

First things first, I said assuming free will is a thing ; if it's not a thing, then your answers would be alright. But, if there is free will, then they are incomplete ; because no matter how you view emotions, or information, they are still just facts to you, they don't convey any moral meaning and don't demand any type of particular action. Maybe they are special facts, because they contain sense-data, like ''wants'' or ''desires'', but they are facts nonetheless. Why, for instance, do you act upon what society says or upon your desires, but you don't act on the fact that ''certain cats are black'' which you presumably also know to be true?

I mean, the things you want, don't imply that you must act upon what you want. Everyday, people choose not to act upon certain desires, but act on others. Desires, for you, are facts, just facts with sense-data, like ''the sky is blue'', except the sense data here is a feeling of desire or want. But since that feeling of want or desire is not enough to support an action, as it is only an is, then how it is that you can act on certain facts, but not others?

Why would you say presumably that I'd be crazy if I decided to find a job because Latvia is a state?

Considering that you cannot derive an ''is'' from an ''ought'', and that desires, and wants, and all information or emotions you have are ''is'', then how is it that you can decide to act on certain information, or desires, but not on others? Presumably, you would act because you have a goal : but how did you get to that goal? You cannot deduce, from wanting something, that you ought to pursue that thing. And, if you simply choose a goal, regardless of morality, then why did you choose that specific goal, and not another one instead? By what process did you choose a goal? Was it just a random choice? It doesn't seem like we act randomly, or that we can act randomly, when you look at societies or singular behaviour.

Seeing as wanting something is just a fact, then how did you go from wanting something (fact) to acting upon that want?

trying to logically deduce human desire is a waste of time and quite spergy desu. you're going to drown in philosophical wordplay while the world keeps running.

>word soup
shut the fuck up kid. this reads like you just read your first ever book of philosophy and think youre smart because of it. look at all these assumptions you're making as if they're verifiable truths. bitch nigga i act how i want to act because I feel like it

What I'm saying is clear. I start from one single assumption, the other is a logical truth. The logical truth that you cannot derive an is from an ought, is not something I came up with, nor am I thinking I'm smart. I'm not. That's why I'm asking questions, to have an answer. I'm not just spewing forth a new theory. Nothing new here. I'm just showing Hume's problem. The assumption I'm making, is that free will exists, that's not word soup, it means something.

Now, the problem I'm positing, comes from the interaction between both of those things. Seeing as desires are facts, ''is'' propositions, then you cannot derive logically an ought from them (is-ought gap), Moreover, seeing as they are ''is'' propositions, with sense-data into them (a subjective feeling of need), then can you choose to act upon a desire or a need, or a want? Because, if you choose to act upon one of those, then you have chosen to act upon an ''is''. Then, why do you not choose to act on any other ''is''? Why not instead of acting upon your desires, act on the fact that Newtonian physics describe very accurately the physical world? How do you find a goal, or a purpose, even if it's not an ''ought'' or a moral goal or purpose, within a fact? It doesn't make sense. And I don't believe I'm playing with words here.

You say you act because you feel like it, but that feeling is itself a fact, so it isn't an answer.

Could you show me where I made a play on words? I think my reasoning is okay, but I could be wrong. And I'm not trying to deduce human desire logically, I just want to know how it is possible, if free will exists, to act in the world in a non-random fashion. If you act non-randomly, then you cannot act on facts, because facts don't compel actions. Therefore, it means you act on an ought - which cannot be shown to be true or valid - so you would be irrational, or that you act upon something else, a hypothetical imperative, a goal you set-up for yourself. But, then, how did you set-up that goal, how did it come to be that you chose a goal? You can't have chosen it from facts. So you chose it randomly? Then that's not any better. Perhaps, it's an innate goal. Then, it goes against free will, which is an assumption I made, so it doesn't work out either. Therefore, to me, it seems action is only possible irrationally, or randomly, or free will is not possible. None of those options seem satisfying, and both seem disheartening ; if you act irrationally, then no one can say Stalin or Hitler did anything wrong, and if free will is not possible, then everything is worthless.

The other part of my questioning, which I guess can be seen as a logical deduction, thought it's not, is how can we set-up goals or ''oughts'' from facts? How is it that we can ''see'' ''oughts'' and goals in facts, in things which are empty of them? How is it that we can get compelled to act?

You are really overestimating free will and consciousness.

Could you care to elaborate a bit on that, it sounds interesting?

I act as I would act if it were a hypothetical scenario. You never make decisions while daydreaming, as if there's a singular path to every fantasy.

Then how does those historical pre-given oughts come to be, and why couldn't we disregard them, if we posit free will exists? Also, why should we prefer the oughts of our society, as opposed to others societies, or other possible societies?

And if morality is stance towards the world, then you could derive the set of rules which would optimize (generate the most moral) that stance you take. And those rules are oughts.

I'll admit, though, I'm not sure my answer has any value, if at all, because I'm not sure I get your point.

I don't get what you're trying to say, sorry.

>How is it that we can ''see'' ''oughts'' and goals in facts, in things which are empty of them?
1. Hypothetical imperatives. If I want to post this post, I ought to click 'post'. I want to post this post, therefore I ought to click 'post'. I use my 'wants' here as primitive givens, which you could object to, though. I just want to give examples of oughts legitimatly derived from a is.
2. Function definitions. We can derive from the definition of for example a watch objective value judgements about how it ought to work. (Informal and inaccurate) function definition of a watch: a object that indicates the time accurately. Therefore, a watch ought to indicates the time accurately. If a watch runs too slow, it's objectively a bad watch. Prima facie objection: but function definition are arbitrairy conventions. True, but I believe this idea comes close to what was talking about with "historically pre-given world of values and meanings that is always already there."

Not an explanation. Go back to /pol/

1. I understand your point, and agree with it to an extent, but it doesn't explain how your ''wants'' are oughts, and, even if they are oughts, ''primitive givens'', how they are valid oughts. When you look at your desire, what you have is a feeling, but a feeling is not an ought. When I feel sadness, it is a matter of fact ; when I see something as blue, it is also a matter of fact - nowhere is there an ought. The same goes when I want food, for me. What is different between those two sense-data, between wants and other kinds? Wanting something doesn't imply you should act upon that want, or even that you would wish to act upon it, as it could go against your other goals.

2. Well, I think by using function definitions you're surreptitiously changing the definition of ''ought'' and ''bad'' and ''good''. You're using these terms as if they had moral value, but they don't in that case ; they are qualitative and quantitative indicators of how much a certain item has watch-like properties, they do not indicate if a certain watch is moral or not, which wouldn't make much sense. In other words, function definitions talk about performance or efficiency, but not morality. When you say ''a watch ought to indicate time accurately'', what is meant is not that a watch would be immoral if it did not, but rather that a watch ought to indicate time accurately, to be a watch, or to be a functioning or reliable watch. A good watch in this scenario means one who can keep track of time. That's one objection. Another would be, following what you said about the arbitrariness of definitions. A watch doesn't ought to be anything. A watch is a thing with x properties. That's it. It doesn't tell us of it's usage, or it's purpose, because, inherently, it carries none. A watch can be used to lift the paw of a chair, or as a weapon, or as a baseball ball. It can be used in an infinite number of ways. How it is used doesn't come from the watch, but from us. We put on the watch how we want to use it.

Let me start of by saying that I'm not in the position to have a discussion with you. That's because I'm on your side, in the sense that I too am having a hard time rendering intelligble on what basis to act. The following is best read as an attempt to dialectically (in the platonic/socratic sense) investigate this matter - together.
1. If you reject the idea that desires are primitive givens than this argument will fall flat. I am btw inclined to agree with the rejections of such givens, but let me nevertheless clarify it a bit more. The implication is that to ask "ought I to desire this" is to make a category mistake, because the desires are immediate givens in the sense we basically are these desires. (An alternative route from the starting point of hypothetical imperative would ofcourse be the Kantian move which looks at the form of the possible moral laws and imperatives and voila: the categorical imperative.)

1/2

2. You make good points here. Let me alter my argument a bit. To cash in on the function definition strategy we should indeed not look at objects like watches. Let's change two things. 1. let's focus on the person in its many manifestations. What is the function definition of the nurse, the college student, the male, the human? 2. Let's consider them (both the persons and the function definitions) in the right (linguistic) tradition.
So my claim is that the way the other person - and I myself - appear to me is mediated by the tradition; mediated by the concepts, categories and definitions of my tradition which I apply to the world. I'm being very unspecific, because this is not yet the right time, but with these categories I mean the ways in which we interpet behaviour. The dialectic between me and the other is relatively straight forward. I apply the categories and it is clear for me what obligations, expectiations etc come with the specific manifestation of the other person. When I turn to myself however we get ourselves a Gordian knot. These questions get the form of dialectics that I haven't resolved yet (maybe you could give some insight): "how ought I act" is know understood as a question that is already being judged from a certain tradition, with its conceptual and categorical baggage. Not only jugded, but the question is even posed from a determined linguistic tradition that in this case includes concepts such as 'ought'! Yet it seems that we want to get to the ethical-question-in-it-self to be satisfied. Here might be a way out: the encounter between me and the other goes two ways. He appears to me mediated by my categories, but I also appear to him through his categories. In the complex interaction between us two things may happen. 1. our traditions are incommensurable and we don't understand each other because our behaviour is unintelligible to each other. 2. We share a tradition or we can bridge the gap. In the last case, our own behaviour becomes intelligble within the tradition throught these interactions. It is through the other that I come to understand myself. That I learn what I ought to do and how to judge my actions. The gestahlt that I'm presenting is thus one that is wrought with oughts.
So the question "what ought I to do" changes to "what am I" which in turn can be formulated in two ways: "how do I understand my I that is understanding" or "how do I understand myself throught my relation with the revealed other."
Note: I hold that the categories of thought are highly historically contingent in nature. I will not elaborate on this point too much, because that in it self is a discussion point we could go over for years.
What do you think of this way of thinking about it?
Maybe you've already read it, but here Anscombe argues that we for now should stop focussing on 'ought' in ethics. I think you'll like the article. pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/mmp.pdf

2/2

these are the correct answers
>because no matter how you view emotions, or information, they are still just facts to you
you go wrong here
emotions are what you're looking for. you could reason back-and-forth forever based on the facts available to you but the thing which drives you to act is emotion/passion, by definition. you can reason til 'X is the best action to take' but there's no reason to act on it unless you give a shit about doing what is best. the act of 'giving a shit' and how it actualities your reason to an action is passion/emotion.

The common rejoinder to this is to say that you feel emotions, in a sense, to everything and must still decide which emotions to follow.

1. Considering I'm stipulating free will, then I believe it necessarily falls flat, because it would imply determinism. But, even if we accept determinism to be true, I still don't believe that desires can be primitive sources of action. When you look at a desire, it is a sense-data. You feel something, like hunger. But a feeling, in it of itself, doesn't tell you what to do. It can be strong, or weak, but it doesn't imply that you should act upon it, or how to act upon it. I mean, we constantly go against our desires, and there are plenty of ways to satisfy them, and for a singular desire - like hunger - plenty of people have different methods - types of food - to fulfill it. I don't see how desires can be primitive givens, at all. Now, you might say I'm making a category mistake in considering them as ''oughts'', but even if we toss morality to the side, then why is it that you can act on a certain desire, but not on another? It seems mysterious to me that you can even act ; because you cannot derive any action from a simple state of fact, unless you already have a hypothetical imperative in mind.

OP I don't think you understand Hume properly. Human beings are valuers. We can't help but want and desire things. These wants and desires are "oughts" in the sense that they compel us to want the world to be one way instead of another. You can't derive an ought from an is, but you can derive an ought from an ought. Which means that starting with values, as all humans do, we can say that we ought to do what gets us the things we value.

2. I'm not fully certain I understand your point, but I'm assuming that by categories you refer to something close to what Kant elaborates in CPR, although you take those categories to have historical origins? If that is so, then I'll simply use Robert Paul Wolff's critique of Kant's ethics, using Kant's epistemology. The way we perceive the world - through our categories - gives us access, not to the noumenal world, but the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world being subject to physic's laws, and being only composed of things as you perceive them, you can never, in there, find persons or freedom. However, when you now consider ethics, you must interact with persons to have an ethical relationship, to encounter, as you put it, the other, and to understand them. However, because you can only interact with the phenomenal world, you can never interact with another person, and therefore, you cannot have any ethical relationship with them, simply on the basis of encountering them, because what you encounter is not their person in themselves, which would be the depository of their free will and moral action, but their person as you perceive them, in the phenomenal world, without freedom and subject to the laws of physics.

Furthermore, regardless of this problem, I think seeing people through function definitions, lead to the same problem as before. If someone acts as a nurse, and behaves like one, such that you might call them a nurse, you might form the idea that they are likely to act like a nurse in the future, but that doesn't mean that they should act like a nurse in the future, or at all. Now, it might be possible that we have innate moral categories with which we judge other's behaviour, but simply because we have them is not a rational justification for using them, it's not a proof that they are correct, or valid. At this point, you might claim, that I'd be making a category mistake, and that I shouldn't describe the categories (moral) through which we see the world as being correct or valid, but, following the Frege-Geach problem, we can see that moral propositions do possess a truth-value.

Also, if you learn what you ought to do through other people, or more precisely through their judgment of you, then how can you show or know that their judgment is valid? And I'm not certain that I understand the last part about ''what am I''. It seems this would lead to the is-ought gap, again. It's like you're abandoning the initial problem - saying it's unsolvable - and you've moved on to a new problem, or that you're changing the meaning of the initial problem from ''how ought I act'' to ''how ought I act such that I can function in X society with Y tradition and culture''.

Even if you take on this new problem, you're still faced with the problem of how action is possible, and what compels it.

I was only taking from Hume the is-ought gap ; I am aware that Hume thinks we act based on passion, and that reason helps us to fulfill our passions in the most efficient way possible, but I was challenging that assumption, assuming free will exists, because I don't see how desires or passions can compel us to act, seeing as they are also simply facts, and from facts one cannot derive an action.

I would have answered that Also, I would say that if one acts on the basis of emotions, then no free will is possible, which would be a coherent explanation, but I was starting on the assumption that free will is possible. Because if you act only on the basis of emotions, then the process by which you determine what to do, when you rationalize your situation, is itself an action, which must therefore be compelled by an emotion. There is no free will in such a scenario, at all. All intentional actions must be driven by emotions.

Furthermore, how do you come to care about certain emotions or desires, but not others? Sometimes you are sad, or hungry, but you realize that you must not act upon those feelings because they may be erroneous. Feelings are simply the result of an interaction between you and there world. They are a situation of fact, that gives you sense-data. I don't see how you can think of hunger or sadness as being reason for action, but not seeing the colour blue or red. What is the difference between those two? All that I see are factual situations that represent themselves to you via sense-data.

If there's no reason to act besides emotions, then all emotions carry the same persuasive force, so you'd be in a Burridan's ass situation.

But you can derive an ought from an is

How?

1. X is

2. X is bad.

3. (implies bad is bad and good is good etc...)

4. We ought to act upon X to make it good.

3 seems to be the hard part. Can things actually be ''bad'', and if so, how?

Various answers depending on your school of moral realism.

Then, you don't derive an ought from an is, you simply find an ought in nature, somewhere, which opens up the question how do you find an ought in nature, by which means does one do so. There's also the question if it's even possible to find oughts like that.

To add to that, because oughts would be naturally given, it seems as though they would be arbitrary, because no reason would support their existence - they would just be. Which, although it is a different problem, opens up the idea that there'd be no real reason to follow these oughts.

>I just want to know how it is possible, if free will exists, to act in the world in a non-random fashion
Depends on if by "free will" you mean "freedom of the will" or "freedom to will"

By free will, I mean the definition most people have of it. The freedom to act however you want, such that, given a clearly defined situation, you could choose to do A over B, or B over A. I don't know exactly what difference you're implying between freedom of the will and freedom to will, though.

Every human being is capable of committing great acts of cruelty.

By "freedom of the will" I mean that the will and the decision-making process is unaffected by any external factors. It's the "free will" of incompatibilists.
By "freedom to will" I mean that our choices are made by our will. The "free will" of compatibilists.

Freedom of the will then.

Sure thing, buddy.

emotions (immediate)/passions (long-term tendencies) are something you have control over (at least to an extent in the former case)
>Feelings are simply the result of an interaction between you and there world. They are a situation of fact, that gives you sense-data
are you working on some humean basis for that thought?
think of them as just the name of your freedom of will to bring (what would be endless) reasoning to a close
hunger is quite base and you've no control over it, sadness you can definitely ignore or wallow in.
but seeing red/blue isn't an emotion/passion, don't conflate them with all feelings/sensings, that's just empirical data which feeds reason, it doesn't "override" it as emotion does

>is ought
This is your brain on empiricism.

You have flawed premises so you'll never get an answer.

I approach a situation and have a certain "feeling" about it and then I do the complete opposite of that "feeling". I don't trust myself.

>are you working on some humean basis for that thought?
Not really, unless, unknowingly, Hume also asserts this point, though I don't think he does. I'm more or less using basic science, where an event in the world (either internal to your body or external) would modify it, mostly your neurochemistry, to bring forth emotions. Admittedly, this lies on the premise that the exterior world exists, and if you don't admit that, then emotions are simply a thing that comes and goes, following a pattern. Though I don't believe it affects my point that emotions are only ''is'' statements. And just to clarify things, I'm not a Humean, I just start from part of what he says and try to ask something else.

>emotions (immediate)/passions (long-term tendencies) are something you have control over (at least to an extent in the former case)
You say this is compatible with freedom to will, but freedom to will is just another name for determinism, because our will is determined by several conditions.

>to bring (what would be endless) reasoning to a close
How do emotions bring reasoning to a close? Emotions, according to you, would be the sole basis for action ; reasoning is an action, and is therefore fueled by emotions. It's not as if reasoning was it's own independent thing.

As for hunger or sadness, why do you have no control over hunger, but some over sadness? I mean, people let themselves starve to death. I still don't get why those emotions would compel action, and, if they do, how would you choose between different emotions, on which to act. To me, it seems that hunger is just a feeling, same with sadness. But feeling something doesn't imply that we should act on anything. How is stating I feel X different from stating that 2 + 2 = 4? Both are situations of facts, and, as such, shouldn't compel any action whatsoever. Can you pinpoint to me the specific thing, within an emotion, that compels action, and which is absent in other feelings, like the sight of red or blue?

The is ought gap is grounded in logic, not in any empirical data.

>You say this is compatible with freedom to will, but freedom to will is just another name for determinism
nah, I said 'freedom of will', it just seemed to work better than 'free will' when I wrote it but like you, I wasn't making a distinction. going by I mean 'freedom of the will'
>As for hunger or sadness, why do you have no control over hunger, but some over sadness? I mean, people let themselves starve to death
okay I used the wrong words [ignore/wallow]
'no control over' I mean this: you feel hungry. if you sit doing nothing, you can't really (maybe you can a bit) choose to feel otherwise (to not feel hungry) -- you can't will yourself not hungry without action

cont. i wrote out some bs but actually I realize it comes down to this:
>if we act on the basis of things others than ''ought'', like desires, than how can someone choose to act on the basis of one desire, but not another, seeing as both desires, are, for you, facts, they are ''is''?
you mean "I am X" and "I want Y" are facts because they can be true/false and used as 'inputs' to reason (as a sort of 'calculation')
this may be true
however

to have passion/desire/emotion/whatever is not just this. i contest that "I want Y" (a passion) is equivalent to "I am X" where "X"="in the state of wanting Y" (a proposition).
you are human, no? how are you feeling right now? I don't mean for you to answer this with a statement which may be conflated with a proposition (e.g. I want to be happy), but just to reflect -- actually _feel_ it. this is what it is to have passion. your choice in this is how your 'freedom of will' manifests itself (assume that reason is determined, i.e. given the same memories and sense-input you'd always follow the same line of reason, independent of your will). this passion is what brings your potentially endless reasoning to stop at some point and take action

[for some reason Veeky Forums will only let me post v short posts]

>Blah blah history blah blah romanticism blah blah

How is history of an idea relevant to the idea itself? Checkmate atheists.

I don't understand how the ''I am X'' goes against what I have said. As for your other (perhaps the same?) point, if passion is what stops reasoning, and makes you take action, then where does free will intervene? Surely, it would seem to me that free will would allow me to disregard my emotion, and continue reasoning. Moreover, you seem to think that reasoning is not itself an action, but it seems to be. It is an intentional process (though determined), like any other action one might do. In that sense, because reason is an action, then, following our idea (or Hume), the process of reasoning must be caused by an emotion and maintained by it. Therefore, emotions don't end reasoning, but begin it. Moreover, even if you disregard this point, then how is it that we can apply our reasoning to our emotions? Wouldn't that be contradictory, following your view, because we would have an emotion that pushes us towards action, and yet we reason?

> I don't mean for you to answer this with a statement which may be conflated with a proposition (e.g. I want to be happy), but just to reflect -- actually _feel_ it
Feeling emotions constantly, I still don't understand what compels me to act upon them. Certainly, it seems I disregard certain emotions, over others, irrespectively of their strength. I might be the set of my passions and emotions, but it doesn't cross the is ought gap, it remains in the realm of the is. I might want something, but in it of itself, it doesn't motivate action. I might be sad, but that isn't a reason to act, at all.

I don't think I quite understand your point, would you care to give me an example?

Just be yourself

thought-provoking

>try to find an objective answer to a question
>Just be yourself

Literally : what.

What?

BTW, I haven't read this paper completely, but I started it and it might seem promising, thanks.

Autism.

bump

assuming system of free will actions will only make sense within particular systems existing in particular sub-systems. Contradictions exist insofar as you contain them to the system in which they are in, and do not allow them to contradict entities of another system. Free will really is just pragmatism, and the influx of systems exists if you want pragmatism with structure.

How are you able to consider "wants" and "desires" as sense-data? Are you saying some inwards perception accounts for the biological inclinations ("wants desires") and this counts as sense-data?

Anyway your question seems to imply the answer "to satisfy".
>Everyday, people choose not to act upon certain desires, but act on others. Desires, for you, are facts, just facts with sense-data, like ''the sky is blue'', except the sense data here is a feeling of desire or want. But since that feeling of want or desire is not enough to support an action, as it is only an is, then how it is that you can act on certain facts, but not others?
and
>Why, for instance, do you act upon what society says or upon your desires, but you don't act on the fact that ''certain cats are black'' which you presumably also know to be true?
Seem to imply a criterion for satisfaction including truth.
Given a network of beliefs, you, if you have free will, will choose to act on particular desires which are true in accordance with your established network of beliefs.
For example.
>if I decided to find a job because Latvia is a state?
Can be restated as "if Latvia is a state, then I will decide to find a job." The conditional is true in every sense except when the antecedent is true, while the consequence is false. So, if we are to make decisions upon a criterion of truth, we could render that conditional meaningful (and true) by saying you will satisfy it in any case but {if p(T), then q(F)} where p is Latvia being a state, and q is your desire to find a job.

When I mean sense-data, I mean that feelings cannot be reduced to anything else, but the subjective impression you have of them.

About the criterion question, the question was less how the network of beliefs allow you to act, given it, but rather how is it that it comes to be?

Also, if you act only on the basis of conditionals, then there is no free will possible, because all you actions are determined by conditionals, such that if a situation q arises, then you will always do p.

Also, more on the sense-data, since I realized it's not the correct term for what I meant, but our biological inclinations (like hunger, or emotions) only make sense insofar as you can subjectively feel them, which is why I described them as sense-data, because you feel them, maybe not through what is normally defined either by a sense, but I wouldn't know the correct words to describe my exact thought on this.