Qualia

How does anyone argue that qualia are reducible to what we conventionally think of as physical brain states? It just doesn't follow.

Do you think that cranes are incapable of explaining the origin of qualia and that a skyhook is necessary?

Do you think that qualia are changeable over time due to evolution?

why not? I haven't seen any good arguments for qualia not being reducible to the physical brain

How about the argument that it doesn't follow? You can't describe the color red in terms of conventional bio-chemistry you can only describe corollary elements like wave lengths of light and optical nerves and neurons. How does the phenomenonal experience we call 'red' just magically pop-out of such a system regardless of how compact and complex you make it?

How can colour-blindness influence qualia if it's separate from genetics?

It's clear that colour-blindness occurs due to your genes.

No one is denying that there is correlation, the question is whether or not it is reducible (if not then we would have to concede that qualia are another type of fundamental physical property that we haven't formally intentified or classified yet, for instance)

It seems stronger than just a correlation (obviously just my opinion), why would it be assumed that qualia aren't emergent properties or the brain interacting with the external world, is this because the previous starting assumption is historically descendent from Plato?

And if light is not always required to 'see' colour, when on psychedelics for example, then wouldn't it seem to suggest that the consumption of a particular chemical (seretonin analogue in the case of psychedelics) induces changes to how you regularly perceive, would this suggest that qualia it is an emergent property of physical systems, even if we are unable to identify or classify it?

their's a difference between subjectivity and objectivity for a reason, you can't explain subjectivity with objective empirical evidence it just doesn't work, you can explain some objective traits but not the subjective characteristic itself they exist on a different dimension,but you can explain subjectivity accurately and beneficiary with the subjective experience itself like the classic philosophers did.

Also I know I'm not properly addressing the problem of qualia, but what other plausible mechanism is there besides evolution, which explains the change in what would be the average 'type' of qualia experienced by a population over time, which would undergo considerable change due to speciation events for example?

(I'm aware of some of the unverifiable assumptions I'm making)

>why would it be assumed that qualia aren't emergent properties

I've seen 'emergent property' used in two senses: ontological (a new type of property emerges from interaction between primer properties that isn't merely 'the conceptual sum of its parts') and mechanical (like how a hurricane forms from air particles and atmospheric conditions, even through ontologically a hurricane is reducible to those things) I'm assuming you mean the former.

There is two problems to this. First, that ontological emergentism proposes this relational gap that's just sort of filled in ad hoc. The leap from 'Y property emerges from X property' doesn't have any justification at all. 'Z property' could just as well emerge from 'X property' and there isn't anything to justify why it wouldn't.

Second, is that your basically conceding my point. Your argument would disagree with mine that qualia may be fundamental, but you aren't seeming to disagree that qualia aren't reducible to it's corollary components. In other words, you're saying exactly what I'm saying except that you are saying that qualia 'emerge' as distinct phenomenon as opposed to just being perhaps independant fundamental properties in their own right, no?