The Right to Travel, pt 2

He needs to include them, so he can play word games.

my post was meant for

I love it when people do this without realizing that the AoC haven't been the law of the land in over 200 years

The amount of butthurt this guy is generating is golden.

>word games
Not really playing "word games" just being legally accurate, in the legal sense every almost word has a definition. You can look these up yourself. If you ever use the words motor vehicle, drive, driver, driving, you are using words that indicate you are operating commercially.

There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle. An automobile has been defined as:

"The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways."

American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200

While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts have stated:

"A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received."

International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120

The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the word `automobile.'"

City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232

The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:

"Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and property.

"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

Huh. Good thread op.

"The Motor Vehicle Act is not unconstitutional as making an arbitrary and unwarranted classification, in that it requires professional chauffeurs, or drivers of motor vehicles for hire, to pay an annual license, but exempts all others operators of such vehicles from tax and regulation." - [In the Matter of Application of Stork (1914), 167 Cal, 294,295]

"... (The Motor Vehicle Act classifies) drivers of automobiles into two classes, one professional chauffeurs, and requiring them to obtain a license, and pay an annual license fee of $2.00, the other embracing all others, who are not required to secure a license or pay license fee, is sound classification, and not arbitrary, so as to constitute special legislation." - Ex Parte Stork, 167 Cal 294. The Supreme Court of California Feb 24, 1914 - footnote inparamateria. Further confirmed in Beamon v. DMV (1960), 180. App.2d 200,4 Cal. Rpter396.

"A carriage is peculiarly a family or household article. It contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort, and welfare of the householder or of the family." Arthur v Morgan, 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243 S.D. NY 1884).

"The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of." Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907).

This topic is fucking stupid

Now in order to further separate them, we find that during some probate hearings deciding on what goods to classify as personal and what goods to classify as business goods, we find that what use they are put to is a deciding factor.

"The use to which an item is put, rather than its physical characteristics,
determine whether it should be classified as ``consumer goods'' under UCC 9-109(1) or ``equipment'' under UCC 9-109(2)." Grimes v Massey Ferguson,
Inc., 23 UCC Rep Serv 655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).

"Under UCC 9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for
personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually
exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be
considered as determinative." James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv
1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).

"The classification of goods in UCC 9-109 are mutually exclusive." McFadden
v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273
A.2d 198 (1971).

"The classification of ``goods'' under [UCC] 9-109 is a question of fact."
Morgan County Feeders, Inc. v McCormick, 18 UCC Rep Serv 2d 632; 836 P.2d
1051 (Colo. App., 1992).

"The definition of ``goods'' includes an automobile." Henson v Government
Employees Finance & Industrial Loan Corp., 15 UCC Rep Serv 1137; 257 Ark 273,
516 S.W.2d 1 (1974).
Household goods

"The term ``household goods'' ... includes everything about the house that is
usually held and enjoyed therewith and that tends to the comfort and
accommodation of the household. Lawwill v. Lawwill, 515 P.2d 900, 903, 21
Ariz.App. 75" 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part
94. Cites Mitchell's Will below.

"Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his
place of
employment was ``consumer goods'' as defined in UCC 9-109." Mallicoat v
Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn.
App., 1966).

"The provisions of UCC 2-316 of the Maryland UCC do not apply to sales of
consumer goods (a term which includes automobiles, whether new or used, that
are bought primarily for personal, family, or household use)." Maryland
Independent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v Administrator, Motor Vehicle
Admin., 25 UCC Rep Serv 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978).

"An automobile was part of testatrix' ``household goods'' within codicil. In
re Mitchell's Will, 38 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674, 675 [1942]." 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) 512. Cites Arthur v Morgan, supra.

"[T]he expression ``personal effects'' clearly includes an automobile[.]" In
re Burnside's Will, 59 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (1945). Cites Hillhouse, Arthur,
and Mitchell's Will, supra.

"[A] yacht and six automobiles were ``personal belongings'' and ``household
effects[.]''" In re Bloomingdale's Estate, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (1955).