>Yes.
Then what part of commitment to unconditional surrender to all three of them are you having trouble with?
>At least that was the rational of German leadership and such plan did have a slight, but still a chance of success.
Not really, the mere belief of something in Hitler's mind does not in fact make it so.
>And that inability came from diverging of resources to Sea Lion and then Barbarossa.
How does commitment of resources to Sealion (which never actually happened) or Barbarossa make railroads appear, or make the local harbors more spacious?
>Control over Suez, again,
Is a pipe dream and would never happen even with maximum commitment.
> not to mention that it would open way for even further advance into Allied colonies.
It actually wouldn't, unless you have some way of breaking out past Aden, which is not an easy obstacle to get past.
> Von Luck described the main reason for inability to provide adequate supplies to Afrika Korps due to allied air superiority, which could have been negated if Luftwaffe was concentrated in Mediterranean,
If the Luftwaffe is concentrated in the Med..... Nothing actually changes. Your planes don't have the operational range to stray any further than they already did (hell, it was Italian planes, Gabbianos and Sparvieros, which did the bulk of the far-ranging in the Med, they have longer flight ranges) You could bring them to North Africa and move them as you go, but then you have to supply entire Luftflottes, and you don't have enough ports even if you can get your transports through.
Read this. dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf
The problem wasn't ferrying shit over to North Africa. The problem was getting it out of Tripoli, where they had colossal stockpiles sitting useless.