Multiculturalism

Has there been any multicultural civilization?
Why does it work so well in USA?

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> let people in
> They're all weird and different
> unsurprisingly, they group up with others like them in this (to them) strange, weird place
>remain strange and weird
> children grow up in this new land
> to them it's the only home they've ever known (except that old place parents talk about or grandparents live)
> wear local clothes, eat local foods
> disproportionately criminal because they're disproportionately poor relative to new country
>(this is exacerbated by racism and hostility of the natives to these weird newcomers and their weird criminal ways)
> another generation two removed from the homeland
>Kids identify as natives, are self conscious about the weird and embarrassing ways their parents behave
> believe they are native more than that other place parents and grandparents came from; aside from some cultural music and dietary predilection, integrate until they're basically like everyone else

And that's the story of the Germans, Irish, Italians, Russians, Hungarians, and Poles who immigrated and now pay taxes to the USG. Yes, people raised Cain about them in their day too.

How many Good Boy Points do you receive for making this thread every week?

How many tendies does your mom give you to make you stop being so paranoid?

>Why does it work so well in USA?

Multiculturalism doesn't work.

If migrants don't integrate/assimilate, there will naturally be conflict. Just look at Europe and how disastrous multiculturalism has been.

Pilgrims and immigrants that came to America assimilated and identified as Americans, they did not cling to their old culture. This is why America became so successful.

Forced multiculturalism is a good way to kill your own nation and cultural heritage.

This.
Americans with ancestors before 1965 HATE new immigrants.
Have you seen the elections? All identity politics.
"The white vote, the black vote, the Hispanic vote." They acted as if everyone was some foreigner.

> Has there been any multicultural civilization?
Many, they were called empires

>Americans with ancestors before 1965 HATE new immigrants.
No?

They literally did, you revisionist monkey.
Perhaps you've heard of things like the Jewish ghettos, Irish mob, or Italian slums?

They don't integrate instantly, but even the "niggers of Europe" wound up "American" after a few generations. And that's completely ignoring things like imported Czechs or Hungarians that were brought and settled in single race company towns specifically because they came from a separate language group and wouldn't be able to integrate, walk off, or unionize with local workers.

Italian immigrant wave, Irish immigrant wave and the Cuban immigrant wave - they all eventually integrated and became Americans.

Ever heard of the typical migrant story looking for hope? He comes to America for work and starts a successful life. Where do you think the "American dream" comes from?

There is no such thing in Europe. Muslims are let in with wide open gates, they stick to themselves and hate the local infidel culture. Plenty of rapes and attacks take place. There are neighborhoods that resemble Pakistan, the native inhabitants of Europe are terrorized and live constantly in fear, that is why there is a resurgence of right-wing nationalism in places such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Sweden (the most cucked of all). People are tired of the liberal agenda.

You don't see Chinese-Americans forcing their culture on anyone in the U.S. Even Muslims that come there are more nice and assimilated than the ones in Eurabia.

>Why does it work so well in USA?


youtube.com/watch?v=iB5lirVJtwE
youtube.com/watch?v=lrNiPf4Kyxs


HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAhahAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA

>Ifunny

You can thank the liberals for that. It used to be that blacks were decently civilized (see 60's and before that).

>Grow up without father
>Live off welfare state
>Be told all my problems are because of da evil white people
>Ghetto slum culture
>Get a free pass for doing crime (dindu nuffin)

Instead of addressing and fixing these issues, the Left only cares about getting their votes for Democratic candidates and brainwashing them to believe that Republicans/Conservatives are literally Hitler.

When did the immigration start?

For most of the West the 60', for the Nordic country the 90'

Define multiculturalism.

the muslim caliphate before it was rekt

Austria-Hungary.

Why does it feel like African-Americans are becoming the new ''nazis''

because >60% land has never had a homogeneous society

>why does it work so well in USA

kek, it isn't 1904 anymore. The multiple cultures of the US were thrown into a blender long ago and are now a single weird tasting liquid.
The same thing is now happening to race.

>the Jew is centrally placed as an almost pater familias figure
What did he mean by this?

these types of threads ruin Veeky Forums

>why does it work so well in the USA

But this is a history thread.

This

why is nearly everyone in this picture cock-eyed?

CHI

>USA
>multi-cultural
top kek
Burgers just let in immigrants at a pace which allowed constant assimilation into American (((culture)))

Melting Pot versus Salad Bowl

That is a really good description.

>burgers

>

>It used to be that blacks were decently civilized (see 60's and before that)
Yeah the blacks were way better off before they had any civil rights
And with them being so decently civilized, it's not like any white people had any issues with them, especially not leading droves of them to be lynched in the streets!

much less blacks were killed by lynch mobs then in drive-by's now, even taken proportion into account

blacks before the civil rights movement were far more deserving of equal rights compared to now

You're not going back far enough
blacks before the emancipation proclamation were the most deserving of equal rights
at least those niggers knew how to pick cotton and shut the fuck up

Literally all these things were once claimed of Chinese immigrants.

The USA was kind of founded by outsiders in the first place. Almost every other modern nation-state can trace their origins to a tribe or group, that where the first to settle that particular area. Sure, there was migration of culture groups, but the roots of European civilization where laid thousands of years ago at the end of the Migration Period, it was even further back for East Asia and the Middle East.

The USA didn't really have that kind of historical attachment to any kind of "American" culture early on, so they naturally adopted the practices of those present, and coming in at the time. The result is a kind of hybrid culture that appropriates practices of all of its immigrants. This means that there was no concrete definition of who was a real American, and who wasn't.

This is not really true for the modern US. With each new wave of immigration, the previous immigrants began to think of themselves as "American," and the new immigrants as outsiders. These older groups would develop a defined culture, so its the same claim to the land that happened everywhere else became common thought. Settling in an area will make attachment to the land inevitable, and one will look upon those who arrive later on with suspicion. Also coupled with the fact that it is nearly impossible for first generation immigrants to assimilate to the native culture, it creates a problem for multiculturalism that will develop and compound over time with subsequent generations, almost without exception.

>tl;dr
It worked for the USA early on, but became less applicable as time went on.

Multiculturalism only really works in a society that is just beginning its development, and is purely composed of a diverse group of cultures that are are equally unestablished in the region in question. As time goes on, multiculturalism will become a problem due to a development of a more defined culture among its populace, and their growing suspicion of outsiders.

Singapore has been more or less successfully pursuing a form of multiculturalism where everyone more or less manages to run a coherent meritocratic state in spite of the races not really integrating with each other and all speaking their own language + English.

fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/how-to-overcome-racial-tensions-55645/

The trick is to have an iron-fisted authoritarian but benevolent dictatorship that forces everyone to live next to each other and prevents the formation of racial ghettos, and severe punishment for doing anything to threaten racial harmony.

Except it does? Are /pol/ memes all your little mind can comprehend?

>2017
>being racist

I serious hope you don't seriously believe in this

>Singapore

Multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore:
Contesting models

Noraini M. Noor (a), Chan-Hoong Leong (b)
a.International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia
b National University of Singapore, Singapore

>sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176713001119

Malaysia and Singapore are good examples of multicultural societies albeit with different acculturation ideologies. Both countries comprise
three main ethnic groups but in diametrically opposite proportion. In Malaysia, 50.4% of the population is Malay, 23.7% Chinese, 11%
indigenous peoples, 7.1% Indian, and 7.8% other races. In Singapore, the ratio is 74.1% Chinese, 13.4% Malay, 9.2% Indian and 3.3% other
races.

Due to its colonial past, “ethnicity” has been the central policy issue in Malaysia and remains so up to this day. The dominance
of communal politics can be understood in Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) model of integrated threat theory. In Singapore, the city-state
does not believe in affirmative action and it prefers to manage cultural identities on the basis of a multicultural ideology (Berry & Kalin,
1995; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977).

In this article, multiculturalism is used to refer to public policies carried out by the two countries to
manage their plural societies. We will discuss the development of the multicultural models that have evolved in the two countries. While
Malaysia’s model of multiculturalism is based on policies that have been instituted to manage inter-group tensions, prevent violence,
and pursue social justice between the ethnic groups as a result of its past, Singapore’s model is guided by pragmatic realism and market
fundamentals associated with the needs of a global city. Both models will face challenges in the coming years as they each adapt to the
seismic shifts in the geo-economic landscapes.

1. Introduction
The term “multiculturalism” was introduced by the Canadian Royal Commission in 1965, to show its progressive political
system in accepting immigrants from diverse cultural, ethnic, racial, religious, and language backgrounds into the country
(Ang, 2005). In subsequent years, other Western countries have also witnessed large-scale immigration across its borders
and it is in this context that the term has been used—to manage the unintended social and cultural consequences of this
immigration into a relatively homogeneous host country. This response was taken on the premise that by acknowledging and
celebrating ethnic differences (Berry, 1984; Takaki, 1993), harmony and equality between groups can be increased (Fowers
& Richardson, 1996). This assumption was supported by studies in social psychology that have found positive implications
of multiculturalism for intergroup relations (e.g., Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007;
Verkuyten, 2005). However,the reverse has also been reported in some studies where immigration has a destabilizing impact
on social relations (e.g., Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Thomas & Plaut, 2008).


The concept of “multiculturalism” has been used in several different ways. It has been employed to refer to the demographic
description of a society, an ideology that accepts and recognizes diversity (race, culture, or religion), and programmes
or policies that have been carried out by the state or a specific theory that underlies how diverse societies should be governed
(Berry, 2013; Berry et al., 1977; Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Vasu, 2012). In this paper, we have used it to refer
to policies that have been carried out by the state to manage its plural society.

According to Berry (2001, 2005), the quality of intercultural relations is underscored by three fundament principles.

First, mutual respect and acceptance towards increased cultural pluralism is predicated by the degree of confidence in one’s
socio-economic security. When individuals and groups lack confidence in their identities, whether in terms of cultural or
economic status, they would be more likely to view intercultural relations as competitive rather than complementary. Berry
coins this condition as the Multicultural Hypothesis

Second, both dominant and non-dominant groups face similar
issues associated with cultural maintenance and intercultural contact. The first dimension focuses on heritage continuity
whilst the latter on engagement with members of other ethnocultural groups. Several intercultural strategies
are possible depending on the socio-cultural and political orientation of the individuals or communities.

Studies have shown that minority group members do well in terms of psychological well-being when they are able
to combine their respective ethnic identities with a new national identity (integration strategy) as opposed to either
assimilation (where minority group members abandon their respective ethnic identities to adopt a new national identity),
or separation strategies (where minority group members renounce the new national identity to maintain their
respective ethnic identities). In a similar vein, dominant host members are shown to be more inclusive and accepting
of cultural plurality if they embrace both dimensions, i.e., multiculturalism. Berry labels this as the Integration Hypothesis.

Lastly, Contact Hypothesis postulates that intergroup contact will engender a more favourable outgroup attitude in an
environment where all groups are treated fairly and with sincere, mutual respect. The three hypotheses constitute the
foundation pillars of a harmonious and cohesive society, and they form the hallmarks of the multicultural ideology.
I

It works pretty fucking good actually.

In Malaysia and Singapore, the social construct of “culture” or “many cultures” is primarily defined in the realm of racial
identity or “ethnic pluralism.” It is a legacy that the two countries had inherited from the British colonial masters of the
time. This variant of pluralism was created by the British based on a secular capitalist system of the West that “. . .recognized
priorities (for example, entrepreneurial and technical over farming skills) and emphasizes new hierarchies that could be
systematically manipulated (for example, religious and ethnic differences, new status and wealth differences, and ultimately
class differences). . . to respond actively to the open world economy of the 20th century” (Wang Gungwu, 2001, p. 26). From
a demographic point of view, both countries are multicultural by default, consisting of a heterogeneous mix of ethnic groups,
with the three main groups of Malay, Chinese and Indian, but the composition of the groups is diametrically opposite in
the two countries (50.4% Malay, 23.7% Chinese, 7.1% Indian in Malaysia versus 74.1% Chinese, 13.0% Malay, 9.2% Indian in
Singapore).

The British structurally segregated the groups by dividing labour by ethnicity making them unable to unite across ethnic
lines, i.e., segregation (Lim, 1980), leading to prejudice and stereotypes which later formed the basis of interethnic conflict.
In both countries, the British essentialized the concept of “ethnicity” and formally accepted only these three groups. Any
individuals who do not fit these three categories were pushed into the “Others” group.

1.1. The shared history of Malaysia and Singapore: British rule, independence and separation
Though Singapore and Malaysia shared a common colonial past, the former joined the Federation of Malaya together
with Sabah and Sarawak only in 1963. But, the union was short-lived due to racial tensions from the economic and political
fronts. After separation in 1965, both countries have taken very different approaches in the management of interethnic
relations. At present, there is also the added concern of a significant influx of migrants into the countries, especially for the
small city-state of Singapore.

Both Malaysia and Singapore are demographically multicultural societies due to the make-up of their people. To understand
how each has evolved with respect to the management of ethnic relations, some historical information is pertinent.
Before the arrival of colonial powers in the region,the MalayArchipelago was a trading route spanning India,Arabia and China
(Andaya & Andaya, 2001). There was a mix of indigenous (Malay and Orang Asli—indigenous tribes) and non-indigenous
(Chinese, Indian, Arab) people creating a form of cultural pluralism which was an integral part of the local reality at the time.

The British created a plural society based on a capitalist system that emphasized ethnicity. By dividing labour by ethnicity,
Malay in the unwaged peasant sector and non-Malay (term used collectively for Chinese and Indian in Malaya) in the waged
capitalist sector, the British ensured that the groups did not have much contact with one another. Thus, the plural society
advocated under British rule was the “. . .construction of essentialized ethnic categories” (Shamsul, 1999, p. 52).

The same
approach was used in education (Hirschman, 1979), with the English system overlaying the other three—Malay, Chinese, and
Tamil. Each differed in the medium of instruction and course contents, further separating the groups. The different “races”
lived in different places, rural versus urban areas in Malaya, and different parts of the island in Singapore (Turnbull, 1977).
Drawing on Berry’s acculturation framework, the communities were highly segregated—with little or no intergroup contact,
with unequal economic status, and each maintaining separate cultures.

The Japanese occupationduringWorldWar II drew inter-ethnic relations further apart.Malay policemen were deployed to
fightthe Chinese-dominated Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, pitching one ethnic community againstthe other (Zainal
Abidin, 1970). In post World War II, political parties were formed along ethnic lines. In Malaya, the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) collectively formed
an alliance known as the National Front to bargain for independence from the British. Independence in 1957 was granted
based on a power-sharing working relationship of the Alliance, based on a politics of difference—the political supremacy of
Malays and the economic dominance of non-Malays (especially Chinese)—which has continued till the present day.

The new Malayan government aimed to create a multicultural nation, assimilating the groups with a common ingroup
identity via a common language and a shared educational system. Malay was chosen over English as the national language,
because of the latter’s association with colonial rule and also as “a patriotic nationalist sentiment that was instrumental in
resisting the imperial hegemony and restoring the consciousness of the ‘disadvantaged people”’ (Quayum, 2003, p. 184).

In
addition, it was proposed to be the common medium of instruction in all schools, moving away from a fragmented colonial
system to one which was seemingly more integrated along national lines (Razak Report, 1956).
The implementation of the policy, however, failed because of the resistance by non-Malays who felt symbolically threatened
by the dominant group. Non-Malays feared that they would be assimilated into the Malay ethnic national identity,
losing their cultural identities and even their economic dominance (Abdullah Hassan, 2004).

Singapore, on the other hand, was developed as a trading post since the early 19th century. Many Chinese from southern
China flocked to the island to escape economic hardships in China and by 1827 they were the largest ethnic group, followed
by Malay and Indian. Due to its strategic geographic location,the island state was a key outpostfor British Empire in Southeast
Asia. Like Malaya, Singapore was briefly occupied by the Japanese during WWII, but its sovereignty was quickly reverted
back to the British by the end of the war. In 1963, it was part of the short-lived Federation of Malaya that broke apart after
only two years due to racial tensions from the economic (Singapore was perceived as an economic rival to Kuala Lumpur)
and political fronts (Singapore was advocating equal treatment of all races as opposed to the pro-Malay policy in Malaysia).
This different political ideology (Malay special rights vs equal treatment of all races) was believed to be the cause of the
1964 race riots in Singapore between Chinese and Malays.

Under the authoritarian leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, the city-state opted for a
pragmatic, market-driven approach because entrepreneurship was what they do best. This policy of equal treatment was
aggressively pursued with respect to Singapore’s modernization programme. The small size of the city-state and the lack
of natural resources meant that Singapore had to focus on harnessing human capital and traditional work ethics associated
with self-reliance and hard work are promulgated as the only accepted ethos to enhancing one’s standard of living (Goh,
2002). But, as in Malaysia, the distinctions between the three groups remained clear, in part, due to the colonial legacy of
racial politics inherited from the British. Indeed, as argued by Vasu (2012), in trying to achieve harmonious relationships
between the groups, the state has advocated for a “governance by difference,” with the elite managing “. . .a fractious racial
and religious mass that makes up the Singaporean polity” (p. 736). In this case, the government’s pro-market policies are
superimposed within a politics of difference, similar to that of Malaysia.

1.2. Policies in managing inter-ethnic relations post-1965
In Malaysia, the 1969 inter-ethnic violence between Malays and Chinese was a result of multiple factors, but economic
inequality was singled out as being the most important (Tarling, 1999). Thus, the state came up with a radical solution of
implementing affirmative action programmes (New Economic Policy, NEP) that positively favour the Malay ethnic group
in many aspects of society, including politics and civil service, economics and business, education and language, as well as
religion and culture (Haque, 2003). Religion and culture, under the National Culture Policy, introduced in 1971 entrenched
the primacy of Malay culture, making it non-negotiable with anyone raising questions against it prosecutable under the
Sedition Act (Lee H.G., 2000).

Why did the Malay-dominated Alliance introduce this pro-Malay policy? Because it diagnosed the cause of the violence
as economic, though it was equally political; i.e., Malays feared their political power was being threatened by
Chinese’s economic might. However, at that point in time, it could be argued that affirmative actions were needed to
correct for past structural inequalities—to lessen the sense of “relative deprivation” among Malays. In peace psychology,
this is referred to as peace building or “. . .the pursuit of social justice”.

Without that aid, the economically disadvantaged Malays would never stand a chance against the more urbanized and
entrepreneurial Chinese. The two goals of the NEP were clear—to eradicate poverty regardless of race, and to restructure
society to eliminate the identification of race with economic function. The NEP was meant to run for 20 years (1971–1990)
but has since continued under different names (National Development Policy, 1991–2000 and National Vision Policy,
2001–2010).

The implementation of these policies has not only intensified interethnic tensions but also highlighted intra-ethnic
inequities (Singh & Mukherjee, 1993). Under the modernization programmes in the 80s and 90s, a select few well-connected
Malays emerged as elites overseeing state-owned businesses (intimately intertwined with politics). These new elites, however,
lacked the business acumen and entrepreneurial experience of the Chinese, so they formed partnership with the
latter (known popularly as the ‘Ali-Baba’ arrangement)—resulting in the political economy of “elite bargaining” (Lee, 2011).
The materialism and immorality of these Malay elites, seen to be against the teachings of Islam (Malays are constitutionally
defined also as Muslims), prompted many Malays to move their support to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), a religious
party, in recent years. To regain lost ground, UMNO became increasingly even more “Islamic” in its approach

The 90s also saw some softening of the authoritarian structures and preferential policies where the cultural practices of
the other ethnic groups were accorded more public space (Ting, 2009), providing more opportunities for cultural maintenance,
and consequently inspire greater sense of status security among minority group members. In essence, it recognizes
the importance of socio-cultural confidence in nurturing positive intercultural relations, i.e., multicultural hypothesis, and
acculturation orientation tilted towards multiculturalism as opposed to forced assimilation. The Education Act of 1995 liberated
the education system by allowing the establishment of private institutions using English as the medium of instruction.
More scholarships were allocated to non-Malays in public universities (Syed Husin Ali, 2008). In reality, these liberalizations
were part ofthe ‘back-door’ elite bargaining between different ethnic political leaders within the National Front(Ting, 2009).
The non-Malays were able to do so because of their economic power and sizable number (Fenton, 2003).

When Najib Razak became Prime Minister in 2009 after the UMNO-led National Front lost its two-thirds majority in
the 2008 election, he put forward his New Economic Model. He attributed that loss to the long-standing affirmative action
policies that are threatening the country’s economic future and called for a revision of those policies by promoting the
1Malaysia concept, a more plural and inclusive approach to national economic unity and racial blindness. This concept aimed
to combine both a common ingroup identity while at the same time maintaining cultural diversity. While this 1Malaysia
framework is the closest to Berry’s (2001, 2005) multiculturalism model, it has remained as mere rhetoric because the
necessary conditions for such a model are yet to be in place (such as doing away with pro-Malay policies).

These seemingly endless contestations between the ethnic groups as well as within the Malay ethnic group were precisely
the reasons Singapore opted to choose a different path. It advocated equal treatment for all and it was able to move forward
with its pragmatic, market-driven ideologies because of its majority Chinese population, and the strong realization that
economic survival was undoubtedly the key priority for the two million people living on an island with no natural resources. For the small and vulnerable nation to survive, the citizenry must stay united, adopt a common
ethos on mutual respect and self-reliance, and embrace market-driven, pro-business economic policies. It was the firm belief that a tolerant and inclusive society can be fostered without incurring the racial rhetoric seen
in its northern neighbour.

Singapore manages its cultural diversity by recognizing and championing heritage maintenance within the different
ethnic and religious groups even as it embraces principles of secularism and meritocracy. It
believes that a cohesive and harmonious society is predicated on having a strong cultural identity embedded in a pluralistic
and non-threatening social climate, and at the same time partakes in the larger society, or what Berry claimed to be the
multicultural hypothesis.

Singapore’s national language policy exemplifies this emphasis on cultural continuation. The educational system requires
every child to master two languages—the first in English and a second, native language used by the community that he/she
belongs, otherwise known as the ‘mother tongue’ (Gopithan, 1991; Lee, 2008). The native language carries with it the values
associated to one’s racial identity and this facilitates the retention of the ethnic heritage (Lee K.Y., 2000). This dual language
policy on one hand creates a common linguistic platform for intercultural contact(using English), and on the other, reassures
the cultural identity of each “race”

The bicultural language policy forms the cornerstone of Singapore’s integration policy by fostering a policy environment
that emphasizes equality and mutual respect. It is the building block of a truly multicultural society. Beyond linguistic
policies, Singapore’s multicultural landscape is supported by three other pillars.

First, there is a strong emphasis on a hyphenated identity in the public discourse, e.g., Chinese-Singaporean, Malay-Singaporean
(Lee, 2008). Ethnic and national identities are not regarded as mutually exclusive but complementary (Chew,
1987; Hill & Lian, 1995; Lee, 2008). This hyphenated label reaffirms equal status and atthe same time aims to forge a common
ingroup identity everyone could relate to (Brown, 2000; Chew, 1987; Clammer, 1998). In line with the contact hypothesis
(Allport, 1954), equal status and recognition of ethnic heritage creates the optimal condition for meaningful intergroup
contact to take place. Studies have shown that Singaporeans hold a strong sense of national pride and citizenship among the
developed economies (Tan & Koh, 2010).

The second defining feature of multiculturalism in Singapore involves the concept of “Collective Ownership”, or self-help
organizations differentiated by racial identities. These are created to address issues that are known to be prevalent within the
different ethnic communities. The Chinese Development Association Council, Mendaki, and Singapore Indian Development
Association offer socio-economic assistance to the Chinese, Malay, and Indian constituents, respectively. The State provides
funding to the various groups but the latter decide how the resources are to be spent. The distribution of resources is not
viewed as a zero-sum allocation and it serves as a critical framework to meet the social security needs for the different ethnic
communities.

These institutions are managed by distinguished members of the ethnic community and they tackle ethnic-linked
socio-economic problems through job retraining, education subsidies, and career, marriage and family counselling. Most
importantly,they address issues that are unique to each racial group in a non-threatening and empathetic manner. It reduces
perceptions of intergroup bias since the respective institutions look after their own ethnic communities.

Third, there is a strong political resolve to foster multicultural participation deriving from ingenious policies targeted
at promoting inter-racial interaction. Examples include the imposition of a strict ethnic quota in public residential
estates and the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) electoral system (Elections Department Singapore, 2012; Housing
Development Board Singapore, 2012). The former requires the racial background of tenants in every apartment block to be
proportionate to the national ethnic distribution (i.e., ratio between Chinese, Malay, and Indian) so as to safeguard against
the formation of residential enclaves and stereotypes.

In national elections,the Constitution mandates selected electoral seats to be contested as a group constituency consisting
of four to six candidates and of which at least one member must be an ethnic minority (Attorney-Chambers Singapore,
2012). This process ensures there is political representation for Malay and Indian Parliamentarians regardless of political
affiliation.

>DUDE WE'RE ALL THE SAME LMAO
Go jump into a no-go zone and tell me how well that idea holds up

Thus, both Malaysia and Singapore adopted the policies that they do to manage their multicultural society. Both countries
essentialized ethnicity and recognize that racial identity is a deeply entrenched aspect of life in this part of the world due to
the historical colonial legacy.

But while Malaysia used the groups’ differences against one another (by pitting each other’s
fear of one another—Malay fear Chinese economic power and Chinese fear Malay’s political might), Singapore used these
differences to manage the groups to embrace market-driven, pro-business economic policies.


1.3. Policy implications on multiculturalism
Singapore’s principles of governance—enshrined in the defining hallmarks of multiculturalism (i.e., superordinate and
hyphenated identities, collective ownership, and multicultural participation)—have mitigated intergroup symbolic threats
commonly observed in plural societies. These social values and practices have overtime inspired confidence and acceptance
between the racial communities (Chua, 2005; Koh, 2004). The collegial inter-ethnic landscape today is a marked improvement
considering the acrimonious and arduous racial climate which existed for more than half of the last century (Chan,
2002; Chin & Vasu, 2012; Lee, 2009). The transformation also reflects the political ideology, policies, and consequences in
bridging the multicultural divides.

Chin and Vasu’s (2007, 2012) studies on ethnic relations provide a strong testament to the successful management of
racial diversity. The respondents in their surveys were asked if they would interact with someone from their own and
other racial backgrounds, at both public and private levels. In particular, whether the respondent would accept a person
from another racial background as a friend, spouse, and sibling-in-law, whether he/she would voluntarily speak to a doctor,
neighbour, or co-worker from a dissimilar ethnic status, and whether they would support them as a Member of Parliament,
Prime Minister, and President of Singapore. Respondents were also probed if they would trust a policeman or soldier from
another racial group to defend and protect them.

Among the Chinese sample, 31%said they would marry a non-Chinese, 91%indicated they would support someone outside
their race for political office, and well over 95% were confident that a security officer from another ethnic background will
protect them in times of need. Interestingly, Malays articulated a more inclusive perspective. Forty-six percent said they
would marry a non-Malay, 97% were comfortable with non-Malays as Parliamentarians, Prime Minister or President, and
nearly all of them (98%) indicated they have faith in law enforcement officers from other races.

The outcome for Indian Singaporeans was marginally better than their Chinese counterparts, though a slightly lower than
the Malays; 35% said they would marry someone outside their race, and at least 96% have no objection to having people
from another ethnic background taking up political leadership. Nearly all (99%) believed that non-Indian law-enforcement
officers will protect them in times of needs.

Singapore’s evolving multicultural landscape is also reflected in its inter-racial marriages. In 2010, an average of one in
every five newly married couple involve a cross ethnic partner. This figure has steadily increased in the 40 years, particularly among the Malay community, where one in every three marriages is outside of the race. In Singapore, there is no legal
compulsion for the non-Muslims to convert to Islam when they marry a Muslim (see Table 1).

In all, Singapore’s commitment and respect for multicultural orientation forms the bedrock for a harmonious, stable,
and prosperous city-state (Chua, 2003). It has served the country well and earned itself international admiration for its
management of socio-cultural diversity. However, there are others who have argued that this is only possible so long as the
government ‘delivers the goods’—achieves impressive economic development and employment, effective educational and
health provision (Nichol & Sim, 2007).

Table 1
Percentages of inter-racial marriages.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
% of marriages under Muslim Law 12.1% 14.8% 16.5% 24% 33.3%
% of marriages under Civil Law 3.06% 3.26% 5.73% 9.5% 17.5%
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics.

>Literally full of revolts every other day
No, AH was a shithole

Yes it does
no it does't

at least try to make an arguement

Compared to Singapore, Malaysia’s policies and their implementations have deepened the division between the ethnic
groups. Over the years, with the growing institutionalization ofthese policies within the state, non-Malay resentment against
Malays has intensified. They feel marginalized by these policies that keep on being continued, resulting in a sense of injustice
and collective resentment among them towards the Malay ethnic group.

Drawing on Stephan and colleagues’ intergroup threattheory (Stephan & Mealy, 2012; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan,
Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2009), intergroup threats—realistic or symbolic—contribute to conflict and violence by influencing
perceptions, emotions, and behaviours of the group members. In this case, both Malays and Chinese feel threatened by each
other, not only by realistic threats (i.e., economic) but also symbolic ones (i.e., socio-cultural). For the Chinese, the monopoly
of the public and government sectors, the set ownership target (30%) for Malay participation in the economic sector, and the
preferential policies in higher education are examples of realistic competition, whilst symbolic threats include the mandatory
Malay National Language Act that requires all schools to use Malay as the primary medium of instruction. In addition, the
culture and religion of the Malays are given prominence over other cultures and religions.

In contrast, for Malays while the main threat is realistic threat—the dominance of the Chinese in the economic sector and
their success in education—increasingly symbolic threat is gaining prominence. As argued by Muzaffar (2002), each group is
determined to retain its cultural and religious identities. Malays fear that “. . .if they opened up too much to the non-Malay,
non-Muslim communities, especially in matters pertaining to Islam—its most potent identity symbol—‘the others’ would
gain control over their land, given their perceived economic superiority” (p. 5).

Malays have always regarded Malaya as their
home,that they were the “original” people, while atthe same time perceiving non-Malays as immigrant. The fear exemplifies
the anxiety over their economic security and it is assumed that by having a right to the land, via political control, the threat
could be counterbalanced.

Non-Malays, on the other hand, “. . .are afraid that if they do not protect their identity, expressed through language more
than religion, the Malay majority, which enjoys political pre-eminence, will emasculate them totally” (Muzaffar, 2002, p.
5). Compared to the Malays, the angst is largely symbolic threats. This analysis may be correct to some extent because
the affirmative action policies have, in general, decreased the economic disparity between the groups. And, this is currently
happening, as indicated by several recent inter-religious clashes.

The pressure towards greater Islamization and assimilation
by the state is perceived by many non-Malay to curtail their religious liberties. These include the propagation of Islamic values
within state institutions and schools (Ting, 2009), and upholding the decisions of Islamic religious courts in sensitive issues
such as when one spouse in an existing marriage converts to Islam and makes the other members of the family subject to
Islamic law on matters such as child custody (Heim, 2004).

Though these policies were meant to promote and strengthen interethnic relations between the groups, they have not
resulted in bringing the groups closer together, though some would argue otherwise. While the 1Malaysia’s framework of
“Unity in diversity and inclusiveness” seemed to advocate Berry’s multiculturalism model, so far, the results have not been
encouraging.

In fact, both Malays and non-Malays view the 1Malaysia concept with wariness; the Malay right-wing group,
Perkasa, sees the concept as undermining Malay rights while non-Malays view it as another ploy by the state to win their
votes, not as a genuine effort to unite the ethnic groups in Malaysia (Merdeka Center Survey, 2010). Caught between the
groups, the state hesitated from making drastic reforms to affirmative action policies.

Interestingly, when the groups were
queried on their understanding of the concept, 64% of Chinese think 1Malaysia should be about treating all races as equal
citizens compared to only 39% Malays. Though 1Malaysia outlines several areas to be tackled to achieve its aims, change
would not be forthcoming based on mere enunciations by the governing elites because practices favouring Malays have
become entrenched within state institutions (Lee, 2011; Ting, 2009). Institutional reforms are what would be required but
because of the political costs that these would incur, even the current Prime Minister Najib is backing away from his initial
1Malaysia recommendations.

Another Merdeka survey on perception towards ethnic relations among 1013 registered voters (using random stratified
sampling by state, ethnic group, gender and age) showed that 64% of Malays identify with religion first, compared to 11%
Indians and 6% Chinese (Merdeka Center Survey, 2011a). On the other hand, 71% of Indians identified as Malaysians first
followed by 55% Chinese and 26% Malays. In contrast, a study on inter-ethnic relations using a student sample (Verkuyten & Khan, 2012), found that members of all three ethnic groups already endorsed a strong feeling of being one national community,
providing some support for the 1Malaysia concept. Members of all three ethnic groups did not consider national and
ethnic identifications as incompatible.

. For Malays and Indians, national identification was stronger than ethnic identification
and for Chinese the two group identifications were equally positive. While all groups had some sense of national identity,
Malays, due to their more politically dominant position showed higher national and ethnic identification, saw their own
group as more indispensable for the national category, more strongly endorsed an inclusive national representation, and
had higher in-group bias, consistent with past studies (Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002; Noor, 2007).

These results, nevertheless, may be different if religious identity is considered; as shown by the Merdeka survey where Malays tend to
identify more with religious than national identity. It would be interesting to include these three differentidentities in future
research and see the groups’ endorsement.

Comparing the 2011 Merdeka survey findings with the one conducted in 2006, results on perceptions of ethnic relations
are not encouraging. The survey showed a 12% points decline from 2006 to 2011 in respondents who reported that ethnic
relations are getting better. Only one in three think ethnic unity is sincere and friendly, down by a 19% point from 2006, with
a higher percentage reporting it to be superficial (44% from the previous 29% in 2006).

In addition, the results indicated a
decrease in the percentage reporting “that they are happy to live in a multi-ethnic society,” “Malaysian society was mature
enough to discuss race and religious issues openly,” and “that government policies were improving ethnic integration.” This
last point is particularly revealing because it stands to indicate that 1Malaysia may not really be getting the results it desires.
Almost all respondents (96%) mentioned that inter-ethnic interaction remains an important factor in Malaysian life.

On a positive note, however, the younger generation living in urban areas are more likely to report having friends from
other races. This intergroup friendship normally occurs within the school or workplace
settings. While there is increasing evidence that shows individual members of the Malay or Chinese groups have friends
from the other group, somehow these friendships have not progressed to the group level.

For example, Mohd Noor (1999) describes five studies with Chinese and Malay participants by asking them to respond to a number of hypothetical situations
in which a Malay or Chinese must decide whether to interact with someone of the same or different ethnicity. His results
suggest that while individual Malaysians welcome friendly relations with those from the other groups, at the group level
distrust is still common. The results were obtained by comparing Malay and Chinese responses to hypothetical individual
personal interactionsto their actual pattern of interethnic contact at the group level (where results showed that about
50% of Malay and Chinese had frequent interethnic contact at the workplace, 22% in their residential area and 5% at the
shopping place). Therefore, increasing contact at the interpersonal level may not necessarily reduce distrust, anxiety or
prejudice at the group level as proposed by intergroup contact theory, because relationships among the groups are still not
equal.

Noor’s (2007) study on polarization and inequality between Malay and Chinese students found both groups to show
ingroup bias but the Chinese to be more tolerant and accepting of the Malays than vice versa. The author explained the
findings in terms of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) where ingroup favouritism is to be expected as well as the
context of the country where Chinese favour the outgroup because they see themselves as a threatened group and given the
political climate, may feel that it is in their best interest to be politically correct.

1.4. Emerging issues

1.4.1. Intra-ethnic differences

Though interethnic conflictis perceived as centralto Malaysian politics, in recent years intra-Malay politics is increasingly
becoming to be just as important, triggered by the weaknesses of the political system, with its “money politics”, cronyism,
nepotism and corruption. In fact, a portion within the Malay group has become very politically powerful and economically
well-off at the expense of the masses, turning many Malay middle-class professionals and grassroots to Islam as a solution
to these imperfections and injustices (Martinez, 2001). This is creating a rift between Malay support for UMNO and the
Opposition (PAS—an Islamic party, and PKR—People’s Justice Party).

The Opposition Party (also made up of several parties)
are brought together by their concerns for social justice, eradication of poverty and gross inequalities, and the restraints
on political debate. Their agenda is in line with a recent survey (Merdeka Center Survey, 2011b) that shows the majority
of voters, 38%, indicated that the most important issue that needs to be solved in the country is economic-related (like the
rising cost of living, low wages and high unemployment, and poverty), rather than politics and race-related issues which
was endorsed by only 9% of voters. This finding is reinforced by an earlier survey carried out by the Merdeka Center Survey
(2010) that found 72% of youth aged between 19 and 24 years are more concerned with real issues that affect them such
as quality education, employment and the increasing intra-ethnic income disparity, rather than interethnic differences or
defending “Malay rights.”

A survey carried atthe end of last year (Merdeka Center Survey, 2012) again reinforces the finding that economic concerns
and crime/social problems are of higher priority than racial issues. Fig. 2b shows a time series data on people’s main concerns
from 2009 to 2012.

The Merdeka Center Survey (2010) indicated that even among Malays, they are divided as to whether affirmative action
programmes have benefited them and whether these should be continued. While 40% of Malays said that all Malaysians
should receive equal treatment regardless of ethnicity or religion, 45% indicated that the policies only benefited the rich and politically connected. The results of the 2008 general election also highlighted many cases of younger voters voting for cross
ethnic candidates.

In Singapore, George (2000) argues thatthe development of citizens’ appreciation of cultural diversity is top-down. While
before Singaporeans were assured that public schools and HDB estates would provide opportunities for mixing and thus
promote multiculturalism, many are now getting more affluent with a greater number of resident households living in gated
communities (16.9% in 2010 and 11.4% in 2000)

Singapore’s social fabric has come under
tremendous pressure over the last 10 years as the level of income has widened (see Fig. 3). With a Gini coefficient of 0.465
(2010), the city-state has one of the highest income disparities in the world. There is a concern that the affluent segment will
not have adequate contact with the less privileged communities and consequently, there is a danger that social cohesion
will be eroded if the successful elites could not empathise with their less fortunate fellow countrymen.

The impact of a widening income gap is evident across all races but Malays are seemingly more affected. According to the
2010 population census, the national median household income was reported as S$5000/month. The median incomes for
Chinese, Malay, and Indian households per month were S$5100, S$3844, and S$5370, respectively. The average real annual
income growth rate for the past decade was said to be 1.1%, 1.9%, and 2.9%, respectively. Thus, the issue of intra-group
difference is also observed in Singapore, though it is not as salient as in Malaysia.

1.4.2. The immigration quagmire

Singapore has always maintained a liberal open-door policy for immigrants and sojourners long before it became a
sovereign state. From the 1960s to the late 1990s, there was a steady though sustainable influx of foreigners, including new
permanent residents and citizens, averaging 30,000 new permanent residents a year (see Fig. 4). Since the turn of the last
century, the rate of inbound migration accelerated exponentially. Within a 10-year period between 2000 and 2010, the total
number of permanent residents and migrant labour, or non-residents, had doubled.

The influx of immigrants and migrant labour is underpinned by several social and economic imperatives. Firstly, it is
a means to complement the domestic workforce and to augment Singapore’s economic competitiveness. Immigrants are
needed in professions that require specialized skills which Singaporeans lack, or to fill in jobs that Singaporeans shun.
Secondly, due to the anaemic birth rate and the rapid ageing demography, the city-state needs to replenish its resident
population to stem the decline in old-age support ratio. Without immigration, it is estimated that by 2030, there would be
fewer than three working-age adults available to support one Singaporean who is aged 65 or older; there will be severe
economic (e.g., higher taxes to fund social expenditure) and social repercussions if the problem is not resolved before the
tsunami of aged citizens takes its toll (Saw, 2007).

Similar to Singapore, Malaysia has been, and continues to be, a major destination country for immigrants, notably since the
1970s, when the industrialization programmes accompanying the NEP again made Malaysia dependent on migrant labour
to work in the labour-intensive manufacturing production, land settlement schemes, construction, and in the running of
households. By the 90s, it was the biggest labour-importing country in Southeast Asia.

According to Huguet (2008), Malaysia is home to 2–3 million documented and 1–2 million undocumented immigrants (labelled as
“illegal immigrants” or “aliens”). Malaysia is attractive to these immigrants because of its high employment rate, low birth
rate, ageing population, and apathy among the locals to do jobs categorized as 3D (Dirty, Difficult and Dangerous). In 2010,
the majority of these migrant workers are from Indonesia (50.9%) followed by Bangladesh (17.2%, cited in Ahmad, 2012).

As in Singapore, the Malaysian government differentiates between two categories of migrant workers—skilled professional
and technical and semi-skilled or unskilled. The former group is small, regulated and usually without much problems.
It is the latter group that poses socio-economic threat to the host. They make up the majority of immigrant workers in
the country, and among them is a large pool of undocumented workers who either enter the country in an unauthorized
manner or turn into “illegal” workers due to a number of reasons.

The Roman Empire

Compared to Singapore, the Malaysian
government is not fully in control of the inflow of these workers as indicated by the large number of undocumented migrant
workers. Policies have been perceived to be ad-hoc (Piper & Iredale, 2003), but since the 1970s, there has been more regulation,
especially after the 1997 economic crisis (Kaur, 2008). That crisis resulted in more illegal workers being in the country
despite reduced legal inflows because of deteriorating economic conditions in the workers’ home countries. The huge number
of illegal workers can also be attributed to the government’s attitude—in the past they were needed to fill the 3D jobs
and the state’s apathy has encouraged their numbers to multiply (Abubakar, 2002).

1.4.3. Imperatives and repercussions

From Singapore’s pro-business standpoint, the open door policies make perfect sense. It is a pragmatic solution to both
the economic needs and the low fertility rate. Within policymaking circle it was further assumed that Singaporeans should
have little difficulty accepting in-bound migrants as Singapore and Singaporeans are after all, an immigrant society with a
rich and diverse, multicultural background (The Straits Times, August 23, 2006).

But this assumption has not been supported. The sizeable increase in immigrants and non-residents has triggered intense
debates over a broad range of issues pertinent to immigration, integration, and the meaning of citizenship. The groundswell
of resentment can be heard from a wide spectrum of sources, including research surveys, media reports, and online forums.
The resentment against immigrants and migrant labour incur both economic and symbolic threats—the relentless influx has
resulted in more intense resource competition and the cultural encroachment to social norms and values.

On the economic front, many Singaporeans feel that their job security has been compromised and they now have to
compete harder with immigrants. The competition for resources is not confined to employment alone; foreigners are viewed
as the root cause of escalating housing prices and congestion in public infrastructure. Parents with school-going children
feel displaced by the scholarships awarded to international students.

On the symbolic end,the significant presence of foreigners is seen to have affected social cohesion and devalued the status
of citizenship. Although the majority of new immigrants and migrant workers are of ethnic Chinese and Indian origins, their
cultural values and behaviours are dissimilar to the ones practiced by the local Chinese or Indian communities. Moreover,
some are not familiar with the multiracial make-up of Singapore’s society and are not cognizant of the cultural taboos in
the multicultural environment. The lack of English language proficiency is a major impediment for interaction between
immigrants from non-English speaking background, e.g. from China, and native Singaporeans who are well-versed in the
language.

For many Singaporeans, their antagonism reflects a deeper sense of insecurity, and the enduring perception that the
government favours immigrants over native-born for political gains (Lai, 2012). In recent years, increasing number of Singaporeans
have called for a tighter regulation on the immigration number and a more inward looking, exclusionary approach
to managing cultural diversity from immigration. This is a stark contrast to the collegial
inter-racial climate that Singapore is known for. Drawing from the multicultural hypothesis (Berry & Kalin, 1995), it appears
there are two distinct dimensions of intercultural confidence in Singapore, one between the established “races” which is
relatively firm and unwavering, and the other, between immigrant and native communities which has shown to be fragile
and unstable.

In essence, multiculturalism as a racial discourse has given way to one rooted in nationality. Globalization,
the uncertain economic outlook, and the diluting of the Singapore identity have all but overshadowed racial identity as
the stumbling block in intercultural confidence. The fluidity of multiculturalism is a theoretical facet that deserves more
attention in empirical research.

Similarly in Malaysia, where prior to the 1997 economic crisis, locals’ perceptions towards immigrant labour were generally
favourable with the majority of respondents (80%) indicating that they were not bothered by their presence because of
the country’s labour shortage (Zehadul Karim, Abdullah, & Mohd, 1999). However, after the economic crisis, locals increasingly
became more hostile towards these workers due mostly to economic insecurity (competing for scarce jobs), more so
when these immigrants started to penetrate into other economic sectors like petty-traders or taxi drivers due to a slowdown
in their designated economic sectors. These activities bring them into direct competition with the low-income locals leading
to negative perceptions and hostility against immigrants as locals feel that they have to strive harder to survive.

Thus, in addition to the existing divide between the ethnic groups, these low-skilled (including illegal) immigrants have added
another dimension to the picture—the question of citizenship including legal status, rights, participation, and belonging. At
the moment, they are basically excluded by the locals.

There are, however, differences between Singapore and Malaysia on the issue of immigration.

First, being a small citystate,
Singapore has better regularization policies on the inflow and outflow of immigrant compared to Malaysia with its
extensive and porous borders.

Second, the Singapore government takes proactive steps to improve multicultural relations
between the native-born and the naturalized residents compared to Malaysia that has been repeatedly criticized for abusing
migrant labour (see for example, Huling, 2012).

Third, the impact of immigration has affected Singapore more than Malaysia
as the effect was more pronounced in the small city-state.

Multiculturalism works when there's enough money involved. The US are a poor shithole so they're doomed to regular riots.

1.5. Management of cultural diversity in Malaysia and Singapore: a work-in-progress

In this paper, we have delineated how two countries have dealt with the perennial issue of managing their cultural
diversity.

Cultural plurality in Malaysia and Singapore is not a matter of choice; both countries are bounded by a common
historical past and the legacy of the British colonial masters. “Demographic multiculturalism” therefore, reflects only
a superficial facet of the landscape. Public policies and social attitudes play a much crucial role in defining and shaping
the state of multiculturalism. Though Malaysia and Singapore have a similar eclectic mix of ethnic or racial groups, the
management of cultural diversity in each country reflects the core issues that matter to each, despite having a shared past.

The policies that Malaysia has taken are related to ethnic politics based on ethnic identity, which is intimately entwined
with a politics of difference (e.g., Yuval-Davis, 1997). In positioning ethnicity within such a framework, the state-imposed
ethnic labelling of Malay, Chinese, and Indian, and the political categories of native and non-native carries with it different
forms of political, economic, and social powers.

Intergroup relations are mooted in a zero-sum belief where finite
resources are distributed in way that will favour the dominant Malay at the expense of the non-dominant ethnic communities. There are special privileges available through affirmative action programmes for the indigenous native group
and there is a symbiotic relationship between the ethnic collectives of Malays and Chinese within the political and economic
spheres.

In addition, the Malay ethnic identity has always been tied with Islam, which brings in another angle
to the politics of ethnic identity based on power differences. In analysing the acculturation models of Malaysia, they
are basically based on ethnic differences and are in reality, not much different from the “divide and rule” policies of
the British—the elites of the main ethnic parties control the politics of differences based on ethnicity to maintain their
position.

Singapore was equally ethnically divided at independence. But because former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued for
equal treatment for all races when in Malaysia (Chang, 1968), its model of multiculturalism was designed with a multiracial
ideology in mind.

Here, individuals are recognized to have only one racial identity (Chinese, Malay, Indian or Others) that
depends on the state to both protect and preserve their differences. Implicitly the city-state subscribes to the concept
of Multicultural Hypothesis, as it believes that socio-economic security is a necessity prerequisite in forging inter-racial
confidence regardless of group status.

In contrast to the Malaysian model, social policies are not formulated with a zero-sum
belief or with the intention to suppress the development of other ethnic communities. Each group is also essentialized, with each associated with “unique” cultural traits—language, religion, way of life—as differences to be preserved to maintain
inter-group harmony

As argued by Vasu (2012), this form of governance is dependent on these racial differences being entrenched, with the
state elite responsible for ensuring thatinter-group relationships areharmonious. Using this foundation, Singapore promoted
a structured form of multiculturalism but emphasises self-reliance, justice and equality to produce an inclusive, superordinate
Singaporean identity.

This form of governance has enabled multicultural ties to flourish but the relentless influx of
immigrants and migrant workers in recent years has threatened social cohesion in the city-state. Perceived resource competition
and cultural encroachment from the non-native have redrawn intergroup boundaries. In Singapore, the discourse
surrounding cultural diversity is no longer centred in the realm of racial identity but as a component of immigration—how
the influx of immigrants changes the cultural fabric of the nation.

Thus, the understanding of multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore is somewhat different. As the foregoing analysis
has demonstrated, ethnicity will remain to be part and parcel of Malaysian political discourse.

In this case, what would be
the most viable way of managing cultural diversity in Malaysia? “Multiculturalism,” as generally understood where equal
regard is granted to the many cultures extended into politics and the constitution, would be difficult for two main reasons;
the perception of symbolic threats among the Malays, and the erosion of the competitive economic advantage among nonMalays,
i.e., realistic threat. Therefore,the feasible option is to continue with the series of compromises and accommodations
that have been the hallmark of Malaysian politics since independence

Multicultural policies work in Singapore partly because the dominant race already enjoy an advantage, but the values
that underpin acceptance of diversity has eroded as people feel threatened, in Singapore’s case, because of immigration.

The rapid influx of immigrants and the widening income gap has called for a new social compact that places greater emphasis on
fostering social cohesion than the pursuit of economic growth. The public discourse on the foreign-local schism has redefined
the meaning of multiculturalism and there are signs that a culturally conscious, inward-looking and assertive Republic is
emerging, one that makes a strong distinction on native versus non-native status. Singapore’s past success formula in the
management of ethnic diversity will be tested yet again in the context of immigrant acculturation.

tl;dr Singaporean multiculturalism works because they accept a degree of government infringement on personal liberty that Americans would never accept, and the ethnicities are made to be together but not the same. However immigration is putting a strain on the social cohesion as native-born Singaporeans regardless of race feel threatened by the foreign-born regardless of race.

Meanwhile in Malaysia it's a shitshow of everybody pretending not to hate each other as the majority race keep voting in favor of affirmative action that puts them on top of the minority and the minority feel threatened by muslims.

>Why does it work so well in USA?
it doesn't

that's because Singapore has a extreme stance on drug usage and possession which can get you executed, which I support btw

Most of East and Southeast Asia does. Opium wars and being next to the golden triangle will do that to you.

>which I support btw

Death penalty for a nonviolent crime? How edgy can you be?

Austria-Hungary comes to mind

>Just look at Europe and how disastrous multiculturalism has been.

Lol EU is fine stop inhaling right wing propaganda.

Sounds like Singapore worked because all the races were already there from the beginning thanks to the British so they had to craft it from the ground up to make it work. As opposed to the demographics changing rapidly in an established country due to immigration.

It's worked extremely well, though. Singapore is actually ludicrously drug free especially in comparison to America.

I think it's a basic values difference, in America taking drugs is associated with freedom and liberty (it's my right to decide what I put in my body) while in East Asia it's associated with mental dependence and loss of control and social breakdown (the Opium Wars).

You know that lynching means killing someone who is guilty of a crime in an unceremonial way?
Most of lynchings happened to (suspected) murderers and rapists. Its not like random well behaving blacks were generally hanged on a street corner.

Extremist islam has nothing to do with race.

Living and security standards are ever so decreasing. Stop inhaling Mutti-propaganda, fellow kraut.

>There are neighborhoods that resemble Pakistan, the native inhabitants of Europe are terrorized and live constantly in fear
This is how I know you're an American

t. never went outside of his basement

Yeah right, it's a cultural doctrine not a race. Thus you can't be racist against Islam, since Muslims can be from any race and background.
Good thing we agree.

Makes it even absurder though...the leftist's claim that a group, whose dogmas are explicitely and clearly in opposition to modern, western life are 'just like us' and we shouldn't generalize.

Dude, that's like saying you can interpret Mein Kampf in different ways and not all Nazis are the same. Most Reichsbürger are just people trying to get by blablablabla...maybe not even 100% wrong, but a complete distraction from the fact that there's a serious problem with that ideology

>There have been several international comparisons made, placing Sweden at the top end of the number of reported rapes. However, police procedures and legal definitions vary widely across countries, which makes it difficult to compare rape statistics.

>For example, Sweden reformed its sex crime legislation and made the legal definition of rape much wider in 2005,[3][4][8][12] which largely explains a significant increase in the number of reported rapes in the ten-year period of 2004-2013.

>The Swedish police also record each instance of sexual violence in every case separately, leading to an inflated number of cases compared to other countries.

>Additionally, the Swedish police have improved the handling of rape cases, in an effort to increase the number of crimes reported.

>Raised awareness and a shifting attitude of sexual crimes in Sweden, which has been ranked as the number one country in gender equality, may also explain the relatively high rates of reported rape.

One fucking Google search.

Sweden has also taken a lot of steps to make it easier for people to report rape in the last decade. Those numbers do not in any way correlate to actual rapes committed.

>Sweden has also taken a lot of steps to make it easier for people to report rape in the last decade. Those numbers do not in any way correlate to actual rapes committed.

You have no proof of this and just assume it because it is the explanation that is more convenient to you.

Sounds completely unbiased and not like damage control at all, senpai. Even if the number was inflated by these procedures (rape definitions are pretty strict in some other countries as well i.e. Germany), does it completely account for this FUCKING UGLY, TERRIBLY HUMONGOUS number?

Must be from the same mind who decided to stop/alter ethnic profiling for rape cases, because they were to racist to the new Swedes.

>Most of lynchings happened to (suspected) murderers and rapists. Its not like random well behaving blacks were generally hanged on a street corner.

literally justifying lynchings