Redpill me on consciousness, Veeky Forums

Neither is playing semantics just to win arguments.

When pressed on the issue, Dennett usually retreats into a view which sounds remarkably like panpsychism, yet refuses to call it such.

Considering the case on consciousness to be closed is just intellectual dishonesty.

>If you don't believe what I believe, then it is not science.

There are no "-isms" in science: only data. This thread is baseless speculation at best.

You're just inventing bullshit that's not backed up by anything. There is nothing here to believe.

>Redpill
Out of all /pol/ memes, this is the most innocuous along with the Bog Brothers, considering the context OP is using it. Why the fuck don't you get over yourself faggot?

>bringing a philosopher into a scientific discussion
What's next? Pseuds?

Sorry if discussing actual scientific mysteries is too intimidating for you.

I think I found a thread more suitable for you.

...

>There are no "-isms" in science: only data. This thread is baseless speculation at best.

lol do you realize how much of a faggot you sound like right now.

I'll bite. Look into electromagnetism. I recommend starting with a book called Life on the Edge: The Coming of Age of Quantum Biology
Book by Johnjoe McFadden

I've got a question for you smart guys. How did peahens sexually select this into existence with a brain that's supposedly the same size as one of its eyes? It seems to me like there is something with a very good sense of aesthetics in a peafowl's mind. The same mind that probably only has a handful of basic thoughts that ever go through it.

Fuck off queer

>seeing bright and flashy=advanced cognition
I'll take bad logic for 100, please.

>very good sense of aesthetics
>basic computation of contrast
>simple pattern
not much needed for that really

heres your redpill
consciousness is a computational shortcut. Why else would it evolve? Somehow, optimization for efficient computation creates consciousness. Naturally we've evolved such that our qualia gives us information useful for survive. However some people with 'glitches' like synesthesia reveal the computational nature of it. Some can do math like a calculator, by use of color or other virtual qualia. Once we figure out more about the brain and how to control this, we'll probably start utilizing qualia in much more mechanical ways. Currently its been optimized by evolution to make us highly aware of the current moment and any potential threats etc. Imagine if you could experience qualia through a USB port. Honestly I expect this to happen within the next 20 years minimum. Virtual reality industry will help progress quite a bit too.

That doesn't tell us anything about why it is like something to experience qualia, why it's something beyond the functions themselves.

>There are no "-isms" in science: only data.
Are you retarded? Data are what we use to make conjectures about the workings of nature. Have you even done any research in your life? The conclusions aren't always salient from the data, and there's a great deal of flair and imagination required to do science.

Well enjoy 20+ 'redpill me on X' threads a day. This meme is cancerous.

>consciousness is just matter interacting

*tips fedora*

M'lady, I daresay thou'st have thee most *exquisite* taste in beliefs.

But you *are* experiencing it from my perspective. It just so happens that I'm you.

The plot thickens.

Well it's true. You're experiencing my life just fine, which also happens to be your life, because I'm literally you.

...

>*tips fedora*

You're using that meme wrong dipshit.

This. P-zombies will never understand.

>There are no "-isms" in science: only data
Do you mean empiricism?

>our qualia gives us information useful for survive
Our qualia do not affect the decision process.

took it in soph year of hs and then calc 2 in junior yr and then stats in seniors (ap's) public school in cali

We are not greater than the sum of our parts. Consciousness does not exist, otherwise it would have been claimed by scientists long ago. Our brains have inputs and outputs flowing about, with an amazing amount of flexibility within the network for restructuring. Consider that a pulley system is also a network of inputs and outputs. If the brain is conscious then the pulley is conscious.If you want to read more into it check out IIT, and varying degrees of consciousness, like apes, dolphins and other animals. Chalmers is pretty good, heck, even Kurzweil talks about it a little bit in his book How to Create a Mind.

i just don't believe that a pulley is conscious. But then. I ain't god. so what do i know.

You're just working off a shitty definition of consciousness then.

Conscious; a system is conscious of a thing if the pattern of agent within the thing is projected onto the arrangement of the system.
Agent; a force that causes change; a force that is necessary for change to occur.
Consciousness; the capacity for a system to become conscious of things.

By that definition, is my operating system conscious?

No. Conscious is likely some kind of "harmonious" property where it exists at the very small scale and can be magnified to the macroscopic scale through the right arrangement. But it has to penetrate down to the small scale first.

Quite right. The 'color' could be defined in multiple ways depending on the problem one might be going after, but fundamentally it is an informational structure manifesting in a particular type of neural network that can be found in the Sol system.

is this supposed to be clear?
your "conscious" here is a binary relation which you defined as:
conscious(x,y) iff "the pattern of agent within y is projected onto the arrangement of x"
what is "the pattern of agent within y" and what does it mean for that to be "projected onto the arrangement of x?"

According to Christof Koch, yes. If everything is conscious, then so is your computer. The difference is that machines don't have willings, like we do, so they appear to be dead. Their willings are our willings (for now)

The pattern is the future of the thing, because agent + thing = future of thing. Projected here is just a technical way of saying "knowing". So it means knowing the future of thing.

>otherwise it would have been claimed by scientists long ago
appeal to authority. user, scientist have tried for years and failed. They simply cannot find consciousness with empirical evidence (especially with the Geneva convention in place).

>Our brains have inputs and outputs flowing about, with an amazing amount of flexibility within the network for restructuring.
did you know that the brain can be rewired simply by worldview and thought? Now if thought is a part of the program itself, then thought should change as structure does, and yet thought does not. Why might that be?

No.
I think that consciousness is not an emergent property.

Although alternatively consciousness could be some sternal agent interacting at the interface between mind (the emergent property of brain activity) and soul (whatever the fuck it is that consciousness comes from).

is this standard terminology? I feel like I'm missing something because it still doesn't make sense

I think its very possible that hard problem deniers are P-zombies. There is no way you can simultaneously experience qualia and deny its existence.

I swear, I apparently live within distance to Dennett but I have never seen him around once.

Oh, and since we are on the subject of him, watch Season 11 Episode 3:

chedd-angier.com/frontiers/season11.html

guy you are replying to makes no sense whatsoever, but you are arguing from lack of information, twice

first part: "haven't found a perfect explanation yet" doesn't mean "obviously can't ever be found in principle"; lack of information doesn't allow any certain conclusions either way here, just speculation

second: some parts that are meant to change do indeed change, but noone has yet disabled conciousness in a functioning brain to see what such a state looks like, you again go from lack of information to some conclusion

noone knows yet how conciousness arises exactly, anyone who claims certainty here is just speculating out loud

They're the purely empirical properties of consciousness, as opposed to the properties that have been mutated to fit with assumptions.

There's no way it isn't derived from a physical phenomenon. For all of humanity's self aware existence, dumb cunts trying to explain otherwise have always eventually been one-upped by physicality. Always. As in, every single time. Explanation of disease, chaos, stars, memories, cognition, weather, libido, you name it. Physicality so far has a 100% win record. I don't know how to iterate this more nor why people keep ignoring this.

That being said, more should be done to study it to know exactly what "it" is and how qualia manifests. What is "cyan"? I don't know. I'm not about to jump aboard the "it can't be chemicals :DDDD" train because I don't know the answer though. I'd like it to be something more, because it would defy the above single most important, ubiquitous, and constant principle to date. It's good to be skeptical and test against fundamental principles like physicality too. It's arguably the most tested though, so good luck otherwise.

Qualia is a concept derived from humans' lack of imagination. People only say a mental image is not equivalent to certain brain activity because they lack the ability to parse a map of brain activity into the mental image it represents. Then they go on to say machines can never be conscious because machines are too flexible to have this limit.

>guy you are replying to makes no sense whatsoever, but you are arguing from lack of information, twice
that shitty grammar is making it hard to understand wtf you are saying user.

>just speculation
And that is exactly what it is. But speculation can be supported with present evidence. The fact that in all of 200+ years of psychological research, that consciousness has not been found as a part of the brain's structure does not mean that it cannot happen.

>you again go from lack of information to some conclusion
no conclusion made. I was asking what it means. If the brain can change itself by itself from its own thoughts, then it seems like an external agent must be acting on it. I propose that is consciousness.

>noone knows yet how conciousness arises exactly, anyone who claims certainty here is just speculating out loud
never said i know for certain, just saying my current hypothesis with conviction.

>Redpill me on consciousness, Veeky Forums.

Nobody knows the answer yet except. We only have speculations based on very poor evidence on what consciousnesses actually is. Scientist think consciousness can be understood through math. We'll get an answer soon once we uncover more information of the brain, technology gets better, or better understanding of physics. A physics major thought consciousness cannot be broken in half like a vase. We don't actually know yet.

Wrong. I would argue anyone who believes computers can be conscious does not know what a computer does in principle and only understand that their computer appears to perform magic. Same can be said about any machine, even a biological machine.

> Physicality so far has a 100% win record
So? That is merely inductive reasoning, qualia can be deduced meaning it is knowable and not just probable.

I believe consciousness arises out of the "physical" world however, the way we understand the physical world is incomplete. We believe it is constructed of mere particles and interactions and nothing more, however we do not understand truly what a particle or an interaction IS. We don't know the intrinsic nature of the objects of our observations. That's why I am saying the intrinsic nature is mental, or at least part mental. It can explain consciousness without forcing anyone to sacrifice science, in fact it will only bring us closer to uncovering the truth about consciousness.

Good post. Sums it up nicely.

Shit's a myth lol

It's a "Veeky Forums has yet another discussion on philosophy while thinking philosophy is for retards" episode

>We believe it is constructed of mere particles
I don't think modern science uses the particle model anymore except for calculating approximations. Modern physics is all about fields.

Some scientists argue that viruses are alive, because of their ability to replicate and other such criteria. Others disagree, as a virus is not much more than a small string of nucleotides. The line between the living and the non-living becomes blurry at this level, with the definitions becoming arbitrary. Living and non-living share the same component parts. Death is just the result of inevitable physical forces acting on you, the same forces that act on the inanimate. The only difference being that the less "complex" something is, the easier it is to predict its composition and behavior.

Things that are predictable are pleasing to us. We like patterns. This is why music is appealing. And why symmetrical faces are attractive. Why certain mathematical formulae appear elegant. Why scientists are applauded for providing new insights, insights that make sense of the world. We like patterns so much that we look for them all the time. Sometimes we see patterns where there are none. It's a nasty habit.

We exhibit fear when something challenges our notions of a particular pattern. It's the basis of cheap horror movies. Loud, unexpected noises. Images appearing with no warning. Things floating for no reason. Dead people coming back to life. It shouldn't happen. It doesn't make sense. It's terrifying. And if the terror is prolonged, it can lead to death or the onset of insanity. Going insane is a coping mechanism.

Just like how trying to find order among chaos is a coping mechanism. Because we can't handle the truth. Because we can't handle the notion of the absurd. That there is no order. That we can't know anything and anything we think we know is just a fabrication. Much like how a child fabricates an imaginary friend to cope with loneliness.

We like it in here. Form is nice. Causality is nice. We even have treats like pain to keep us distracted. Anything besides the alternative. So let us sleep a little bit longer. It gets tiring out there.

>We exhibit fear when something challenges our notions of a particular pattern. It's the basis of cheap horror movies. Loud, unexpected noises. Images appearing with no warning. Things floating for no reason. Dead people coming back to life. It shouldn't happen. It doesn't make sense. It's terrifying. And if the terror is prolonged, it can lead to death or the onset of insanity. Going insane is a coping mechanism.

this is where you went from agreeable to outright bizarre user.

Firstly: jump-scares make us feel no horror but play on our startle reflex (which we are all born with), and a lack of patterns or symmetry does not induce terror (except for autistics maybe). Thing's not making sense does not scare people either, it only makes them more curious. Lastly insanity is not a coping mechanism and cannot be induced in the way you think it can.
True horror lies in atmosphere of mystery and the unknown. the Cthulhu mythos works upon the principles of the unknown and the horror of cosmicism.

>Because we can't handle the notion of the absurd.
i live the absurd user.

>Form is nice. Causality is nice.
and then there is correlation, and such-froth. user your argument is very poor.

>We even have treats like pain to keep us distracted.
found the edgelord.

user, what bubble have you been living in to have formed such absurd and unrealistic notions?

to anyone denying that consciousness exists, you are misinterpreting what the word refers to. if you are reading this right now, you are having a first-person subjective experience of reading this. and that's the concept in question. unless you deny that you are having an experience, then you accept the existence of consciousness. as you are reading this, some sort of physical process is occurring in your brain, and that process can probably be correlated to the act of reading. but you can't say that that physical process IS your experience of reading. your experience of reading is likely to be causally related to your brain processes in some way, but that doesn't equate them as being the same thing. so neuroscience can only has so much explanatory power, because it hasn't yet explained phenomena like qualia, subjectivity, and intentionality. though I tend to agree that a complete neuroscience will explain consciousness in purely physical terms.

>what is the interaction problem

What's supposed to be hard about intentionality?

>though I tend to agree that a complete neuroscience will explain consciousness in purely physical terms
How do you reconcile your ideas that qualia poses a real problem, and that explaining subjective experience in purely physical terms is conceivable?

is that a response to my suggestion that neuroscience will be able to explain consciousness? you are right that if we assume mental and physical properties can causally interact then we have problems. one of the primary reasons we don't just buy into descartes. and i think mental causation has the same problem, it's unintelligible unless you assume that mental properties can be reduced to physical properties in some way. but that's what I'm assuming when I guess that neuroscience will be able to explain consciousness. it's definitely up for debate.

basically I think qualia etc poses a problem but I'm also optimistic about the problem being solved as we learn more about neuroscience. and I lump intentionality in there too because for thoughts or experiences to be referential to other thoughts or experiences is just another layer of complexity in somehow showing how that would work physically

It's a response to things like
>first-person subjective experience
The interaction problem means that anyone who talks about the problem in terms of some kind of "private experience" has misunderstood their own perception. Humans cannot speak of anything non-physical because to speak is a physical action, and physical actions must come from physical actions. Anything anybody refers to must be something that can be physically interacted with, or else there is no way to physically refer to it.

But the core problem about qualia and subjective experience is not about functions and behavior, which science has given us so much progress from so far. It's not a question of how something functions, but a question of why it feels like something. Even if you map out the entire brain and all the physical mechanisms, there still doesn't seem to be a conceivable solution that will explain why it is that there can feel like something from the inside to be a system of particles reacting.

To explain subjective experience, it seems we need something new and radical compared to our old buddy reductive materialism.

Any question anybody can ask can be reduced down to "explaining the behavior of people asking that question". So it's behavioral and there is no way to avoid it.

well, I'm not necessarily using the term "subjective experience". to mean something non-physical. at least for me, I believe it's fundamentally physical in some way. I probably shouldn't have used the term "first person" because if materialism is true then our thoughts won't be private given the right technology.

These threads are so god damn stupid. Rethink your lives.

Bhikkhus, for a virtuous person, one whose behavior is virtuous, no volition need be exerted: ‘Let non-regret arise in me.’ It is natural that non-regret arises in a virtuous person, one whose behavior is virtuous.

“For one without regret no volition need be exerted: ‘Let joy arise in me.’ It is natural that joy arises in one without regret.

“For one who is joyful no volition need be exerted: ‘Let rapture arise in me.’ It is natural that rapture arises in one who is joyful.

“For one with a rapturous mind no volition need be exerted: ‘Let my body be tranquil.’ It is natural that the body of one with a rapturous mind is tranquil.

“For one tranquil in body no volition need be exerted: ‘Let me feel pleasure.’ It is natural that one tranquil in body feels pleasure.

“For one feeling pleasure no volition need be exerted: ‘Let my mind be concentrated.’ It is natural that the mind of one feeling pleasure is concentrated.

“For one who is concentrated no volition need be exerted: ‘Let me know and see things as they really are.’ It is natural that one who is concentrated knows and sees things as they really are.

“For one who knows and sees things as they really are no volition need be exerted: ‘Let me be disenchanted and dispassionate.’ It is natural that one who knows and sees things as they really are is disenchanted and dispassionate.

“For one who is disenchanted and dispassionate no volition need be exerted: ‘Let me realize the knowledge and vision of liberation.’ It is natural that one who is disenchanted and dispassionate realizes the knowledge and vision of liberation.

Like what the fuck is this shit? This thread is just a bunch of NEET's throwing around big words and long-winded empty statements to appear smart.

You are cherry-picking and ignoring the logical arguments. This topic is important because neuroscientists will never be able to explain consciousness if they ignore qualia. I don't think they will ever "explain" it really, but they may be able to infer how it works. Perhaps electromagnetic fields are actually consciousness who knows. Maybe every field is consciousness, I don't know for certain.

so if you believe what science has to offer about the functions of different parts of the brain, you agree that there must be a causal chain leading from, for example, a c-fiber being stimulated and the qualia of pain? or do you think the correlation is complete coincidence? because if there's a causal chain from a physical event that somehow leads to a qualia, then either there's a point in the chain that a physical event triggers a non physical event, or the actual qualia is in some way physical. of course neither of those sound very appealing. possibly there are more modes of existence than physical and non-physical that just haven't entered our consideration, which would give us more options.

holy shit checked

are you sure that wasn't just you samefagging so you had some material to quote in order back up your incorrect point?

all good, up until
>"If the brain can change itself by itself from its own thoughts, then it seems like an external agent must be acting on it. I propose that is consciousness."
Parts of the brain (hard-drive equivalents) that are supposed to change do change to accomodate new memories etc. You then say it never changes to accomodate changes in conciousness.. and then instead of "we don't know what to measure yet" you jump (very far) to "it therefore can't be just matter". Maybe the "CPU equivalent" is hard-wired and doesn't change physicly? Maybe conciousness is closer to the effect of software running, which is not reflected in hard longterm physical changes like memory is? Just leaping directly to "it can't be just the brain because conciousness doesn't work like memory!" doesn't seem a legit move here.

Changes we can see that correlate with changes in conciousness:
-split brain patients getting two separate personalities
-physical changes in brains that practice meditation for a few years
-changes in brainwaves in coma-patients/sleep/anesthesia
-nothing even close to conciousness ever without a physical brain

People thought that temperature can't possibly be represented by just one number, because termometers were shitty. It's just too wonderous and elusive, and must be complex and maybe unexplainable! etc.

Our ego always seems to push for magical explanations when not enough facts are available. So far, that has never panned out. The solution was always more data and doubling down on exploring the naturalistic explanations.
But maybe this time, it will be "outside forces".

it seems to me that everybody is a retard and probably not actually conscious anyway

Ask yourself who or what benefits from you looking away from yourself.

yeah wtf dude !!!1
these threads are so much better my dude xD

The interaction problem (if the mental is separate from the physical, how can they interact?) is a valid criticism to all dualist ideas. Epiphenomenalism attempts to solve the interaction problem by saying phenomenal experience doesn't affect the physical, yet the thoughts and verbal reports created by the brain about the mysteries of the phenomenal seems to indicate that they do. If this phenomenal "stuff" is so different from the physical, then how is it that it manifests so profoundly in the behavioral output of me? How can a purely functional system directly speak to the existence of the phenomenal, if the very nature of the phenomenal escapes and goes up and beyond the functions of the system making the argument?

One way out is to say that the physical has no causal effect on the mental either. To demonstrate how this could work, you could imagine setting two clocks at the start of the universe - one digital and one mechanical. A billions years later, their time will correspond to each other, without them ever needing to interact with each other. Just like the mechanical clock didn't cause the digital clock to match its time, the cognitive function of pain didn't cause the phenomenal feeling of pain.

There are other theories such as neutral monism that says that fundamentally, the universe is made of neither physical nor mental stuff, but this sort of neutral stuff, that depending on how it is group together, exhibits properties of physical, or mental. There are problems of such ideas too, of course, such as how small units of phenomenal experience could lead to a unity of it in a physical brain.

>Physicality has a 100% win record
>So?
Then it's overwhelmingly likely to be completely explicable physically. It could be something else, but likely is not.
>we do not understand what a particle action IS. We don't understand the intrinsic nature of our observations.
Not knowing how it works doesn't imply it doesn't adhere to physicality. In fact, as I've iterated like 6 or 7 times now, it always has worked out to be explicable. It's as assumable as the axioms of addition. Even when when we found out physics as we knew it broke down at a quantum level, everyone didn't jump ship to this weird "it's clearly wholly or at least partially nonphysical" ship.

Meant for

I don't have much time to discuss now and typing on a phone truly is a excruciating job, but I want to give my opinion as a compsci faggot:

The von Neumann architecture seems to solve this problem of the brain rewiring itself. And apparently we have a physical OS, that usually does not let us rewrite kernel functions. In GNU/Linux for example, it's like we conscious beings do not have root access.

The reason I don't think the same old principles of reductive materialism can explain subjective experience is because it deals with purely quantitative aspects. You can correlate pain with a certain area in the brain and say, when these neurons fire in this and this way with this intensity, that's pain. You can have a very complex functional understanding of how pain is caused and how it affects behavior. But with all that, it still doesn't tell us anything about what it is like to experience pain; it completely ignores the qualitative aspect. Consciousness is the only thing in the universe where asking how something functions doesn't seem to be able to give us any conceivable answers to the question of why it feels like something phenomenally from the inside. I think that highlights a big gap between explaining how something functions, and explaining experience. From this gap, we can infer that the frameworks of science clearly misses something here in terms of the structure/format of the explanation.

...

This thread is intrinsically Veeky Forums, I came here just to say that mods are retarded and this board should be erased from earth, with its users.

>tfw we will never get a true standalone philosophy board

Here's your quick rundown on Dennett / consciousness, op. First we have this very popular view:

>Even if you explain every physical process that occurs between the eyes, optic nerve, and visual cortex, you still haven't explained where 'color' comes from.

Dennett (and others, though he gets associated with this maybe the most in modern times because he dedicated an entire book to the argument) came along and said:

>Let's just stick to what we have real, heterophenomenal (i.e. not solely dependent on what one person believes they've 'experienced') evidence for and see what that tells us.
>When we take this approach, we find all the physical facts of the brain and body, along with all the behavioral facts (e.g. what a person says or does in response to being in the presence of red light). What we don't find are qualia. We find *reports of so called qualia*, but crucially reporting behavior is totally explicable and grounded in physical, heterophenomenal reality as long as you really do take it as just reporting behavior and don't try to tack on anything more than that.

Now ask yourself: Is it possible we could be compelled to behave consistent with and/or believe in premises that aren't literally true? Answer: Yes! Constantly in fact, it's the great recurring theme of perceptual psychology experiments that what we believe is happening is frequently very different from what's actually happening. Our brain has no moral objections to taking shortcuts that get us behaving how it needs us to with much less work than perfect fidelity in feeding us details of the world around us would require.

What are qualia then? They're convenient abstractions used to make it easier to navigate and communicate about ourselves and the world around us. 'What it's like to be in pain' isn't a literal object like a tree but rather a neurological / behavioral story telling and response protocol where the fictional character of 'pain' stands in for the complexities of biology.

You are failing to understand the p-zombie argument. It requires as part of its prenise that you accept p-zombies and non-zombies behave outwardly in the exact same way. The whole point is to try to separate the outward behavioral stuff materialists like Dennett claim as the entirety of what's there from the non-outward qualia stuff dualists like Chalmers claim is there.

I tend to think dualists fail to understand the full extent of what their p-zombie premise requires precisely because they're aware on some level that you qualia as a real thing in itself is incoherent and the behavior is what really matters.

Words and numbers aren't real

Seems like a non sequitur, but abstractions like numbers and words are exactly the class of object people like Dennett categorize qualia as. They aren't literal, physical things but rather useful fictions we deal with as shortcuts to needing to constantly speak and act in terms of physical literals e.g. imagine if every time someone stubbed their toe they began describing the activity of their brain's pain receptors and how it's led to them engaging in the pain behavior of tensing their muscles, saying 'ow' and recalling memories of past toe stubbing events. Definitely a lot easier to just have people say 'ow' and talk about the abstract placeholder of 'pain' that stands in place of all those messy details.

Natural selection is not an optimization strategy.

>abstractions

'what it's like to x' is not an abstraction; it is precisely the experience of x prior to any move to categorization/propositional formation 'about x. The buzzing, blooming, etc.

Why do you feel qualia require a functionalist emanating explanation?

Heterophenomenal evidence tells us what we have are *reports of 'what it's like'*

You're taking an extra step and assuming this reporting behavior / belief behavior we're compelled to participate in must be indicative of a literal immediate 'experience' phenomenon beyond the stimuli and our response behaviors.

The reason you will never find a scientific answer for how this 'experience' phenomenon works is because it never existed to begin with. The stimuli and response behavior are what's really there, and the use of 'qualia / experience' language is not any more real than any other abstract fiction. We're compelled to speak in terms of these abstractions rather than in terms of what's literally going on. But you shouldn't lose track of the fact that what we have is a belief in immediate experience, not actual evidence of immediate experience. And that's all the brain needs, to stimulate belief and behavior, not to conjure literal phantasms. If you believe you're having an experience then mission accomplished.

How convenient.

That's not what psueudointellectual means. Unless you had an issue with their prose